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Pak Tribesmen Moving Against Militants

Well I won’t pretend to be an expert on tribal social structure but I can tell you that there are tribes, and then sub-tribes with in tribes. When a laskhar is called up, usually the entire tribe is expected to send people but sometimes like has happened in recent years; a sub-tribe might not contribute or might in fact side with those who the tribe is called up against. It’s a complicated situation, and Al-Qaeda and Taliban have helped make things worse in that they are the reason tribesmen have been breaking these ancient norms and have become harder to control.

But in general I would say that the tribe still is the strongest focal-point of loyalty and subordination. And Laskhars are still relatively widely recruited within the tribe and are never expected to operate in areas belonging to other tribes. Perhaps cleaning up intruders from one of their own sub-tribes, or more commonly driving foreign elements or criminals out from their own lands, but that’s it.
 
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Well I won’t pretend to be an expert on tribal social structure but I can tell you that there are tribes, and then sub-tribes with in tribes. When a laskhar is called up, usually the entire tribe is expected to send people but sometimes like has happened in recent years; a sub-tribe might not contribute or might in fact side with those who the tribe is called up against. It’s a complicated situation, and Al-Qaeda and Taliban have helped make things worse in that they are the reason tribesmen have been breaking these ancient norms and have become harder to control.

But in general I would say that the tribe still is the strongest focal-point of loyalty and subordination. And Laskhars are still relatively widely recruited within the tribe and are never expected to operate in areas belonging to other tribes. Perhaps cleaning up intruders from one of their own sub-tribes, or more commonly driving foreign elements or criminals out from their own lands, but that’s it.
Kasrkin; sir
yes i am agred to your , point of veiw just like to add a bit that, i guss pakarmy has adopted the policy of the US inthe early days of the invasion of afghanistan, i mean NORTHERN ALLAINCE vs TALIBANS(ALQEADA) , infact US used the enimity , which was burning because of the ss bombings in which AHMED SHAH MASSOD was bieng killed by ALQEADA.

I think NORTHERN ALLAINCE did put up good fight to talibans, even N-ALLAINCE was being supported by USAF from the air but , they made a very quick withdrawll of talibans from key locations , that stratagic policy has been tried by PAKARMY now in FATA, i hope it willbe good enough.:agree::tup::smitten::pakistan:
 
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i disagree with mr batmannow, janab.

The best parallel can be seen with the awakening councils in Iraq, where tribes who were formally supporting AQ, switched loyalties, and were given money, weapons, etc to drive out the extremists.

That strategy, plus a show of force by the US, reassuring the tribes that they are not going to be left in the lurch, worked for the Us, and an impossible situation has now become a manageable one. Gen Patreus has snatched victory from the jaws of defeat, so to speak.

We in the tribal areas are not that far down the road, and many tribals are not supporting the neo-talibs at all. So to harness their support at this juncture is an inspired move, and more to do probably with the tribals themselves than any proddign from our side.

We should instantly step in, provide these tribals with cash, arms and some military personnal to help train and guide them. And keep a quick reaction force ready, in case back up is needed by the lashkars.

These lashkars are a blessing in disguise, and could be the death blow to these neo-talibs.
 
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i disagree with mr batmannow, janab.

The best parallel can be seen with the awakening councils in Iraq, where tribes who were formally supporting AQ, switched loyalties, and were given money, weapons, etc to drive out the extremists.

That strategy, plus a show of force by the US, reassuring the tribes that they are not going to be left in the lurch, worked for the Us, and an impossible situation has now become a manageable one. Gen Patreus has snatched victory from the jaws of defeat, so to speak.

We in the tribal areas are not that far down the road, and many tribals are not supporting the neo-talibs at all. So to harness their support at this juncture is an inspired move, and more to do probably with the tribals themselves than any proddign from our side.

We should instantly step in, provide these tribals with cash, arms and some military personnal to help train and guide them. And keep a quick reaction force ready, in case back up is needed by the lashkars.

These lashkars are a blessing in disguise, and could be the death blow to these neo-talibs.
Excellent mate,u r bang on target....its the most viable way to wipe the terrorist out of our tribal belt....
And there is no option left with the tribals but to cooperate with our forces and US against the talibans otherwise they are in grave danger...They are very well aware of the policy of the new US govt(obama & maccain)...

So the situation is getting from bad into worse(start taking action against talibans or become history)....
And how to make them stronger,go through the above highlighted lines..
 
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My good sirs, if I may just add that as far as drawing parallels with Iraq's Awakening councils go, it’s all good in theory but when practically trying to apply the situation in FATA one runs into complications. The laskhars called up the tribes in FATA are not professional military bodies, none of their members have prior military experience like was the case in Iraq’s Sunni Tribes and they are certainly not lead by ex-Generals like in the case of Iraq either. Laskhars are called up for a specific job for a specific timeframe and have to be disbanded or dissolved once the situation is settled. Sure these guys are good shots and hardy warriors but joining the Lashkar is not a source of income for them, they do so out of voluntary service and by the end of couple of month MAX they have to return to their farms and villages that are more often than not in far off places.

So they are not ideally suited for policing roles, they cannot be expected to operate anywhere for extended periods of time without seriously depleting their manpower and morale. And frankly man-power is the main advantage they have at the moment against the Taliban, also problems of morale will affect these guys more so than professional soldiers.

This is how thing happen in the tribal areas; terrorist infiltrate a tribes territory, no one actually guards the roads or mans check points at this point. These militants start heating things up, getting involved in crime, assassinating tribal elders, picking fights with their body guards, etc. When these tribal elders see their own *** on the line, plus pressure from political agents, plus threat of military operations then a Laskhar are called up. It takes at least a week to organize, that Laskhar then burns houses, arrests any foreigners sheltering in them, moves on to monitor traffic on roads coming into our out of their village, then usually spurred by the government they take to hills or outposts occupied with the militants, there too with the help of government direction and firepower they push the Taliban just out their land. Then they come back and go home usually within less than a month and the whole affair is hailed as a success by the tribal elders and the government. But we all know that’s never the end of it…militants make a comeback and this affair starts over again.

I agree with batmannow, this is sort of using the North Alliance like the Americans did in 2001. Americans were just being lazy in giving important work to these guys, I think we should not do that despite the fact that these tribes are likely to do better than those NA folk from all the way across the country did because this is their territory and their homes on the line after all. Also it was a bad idea to rely solely on the NA to keep the peace, provide for the people or facilitate reconstruction.

(Damn I really must try and shorten my posts now and again)
 
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The situation with the Awakening Councils in Iraq now are what to do with them once they have completed their objectives?

They are asking to be incorporated into the New Iraqi Army but this is being resisted by the Iraqi government at the risk of alienating a well equiped militia that could return to its former hostile stance against the government.

The same cannot be said for these tribal Lashkars. I cannot see the tribals being incorporated into the Pakistani security apparatus except maybe with the frontier constabulary.

I once read on the BBC that former Insurgents from Kashmir were being given rehabilitation training to reintegrate into civilian life and that maybe an option.

The risks are outweighed by the benefits of combating the Taliban and I am in favour of this policy but long term consideration needs to be given.
 
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Modifying the FCR

Dawn Editorial
Wednesday, 15 Oct, 2008 | 09:02 AM PST |


'We cannot rein wild horses with silken braids,' wrote John William Kaye, secretary of the political and secret department of the India Office, justifying the special set of laws he helped draft to control the unruly tribesmen of Fata. Modernity may finally have caught up with the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) though. A report in this paper on Monday revealed that a federal cabinet committee has recommended 'drastic changes' in the FCR. While this is a step down from Prime Minister Gilani’s pledge to repeal the FCR, the proposed changes go some way in blunting the worst effects of these draconian laws.

For one, it has been recommended that the power of the political agent — whose decisions were constitutionally shielded from judicial review — be pared down. The recommendations have not gone so far as to suggest that the constitutional ouster of the jurisdiction of the high courts and the Supreme Court be amended. However, it has been suggested that a three-member tribunal, with high court-like powers and consisting of members familiar with tribal administration, be set up to review decisions of political agents or district coordination officers.

Moreover, it has been suggested that if the parties to a civil dispute agree, the matter should be settled by a council of elders, albeit one selected by the political agent.

These compromises should go some way in curbing the most persistent criticism of the FCR: that the political agent is a power unto himself.

The second set of important changes that have been recommended focus on extending the constitutional guarantee of fundamental rights to the people of Fata. In addition, the political agent’s right to arrest minors, women and the elderly under collective punishment rules will be curtailed.

Again, a compromise straddling the dialectic of custom and statutory law has been mooted: the political agent will retain the right to arrest immediate male relatives of persons suspected in subversive acts against the state.

It appears then that the government has not been able to decisively break from the traditions of the past. There is some merit to the argument that given the security situation in the tribal areas, now is not the time to be experimenting with administrative codes that are untested.

However, there is no doubt that a permanent solution to the crisis of militancy in Fata must include political and administrative reforms. One way of balancing the security needs of the moment with the genuine human rights demands of the tribesmen would be to issue a firm timeline for the process of fully incorporating the tribal areas into the political and administrative mainstream of the country.

If we expect the tribesmen to give up the ways of their ancestors, we must be ready to hand them the protections of modernity.

DAWN.COM | NWFP | Modifying the FCR
 
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My good sirs, if I may just add that as far as drawing parallels with Iraq's Awakening councils go, it’s all good in theory but when practically trying to apply the situation in FATA one runs into complications. The laskhars called up the tribes in FATA are not professional military bodies, none of their members have prior military experience like was the case in Iraq’s Sunni Tribes and they are certainly not lead by ex-Generals like in the case of Iraq either. Laskhars are called up for a specific job for a specific timeframe and have to be disbanded or dissolved once the situation is settled. Sure these guys are good shots and hardy warriors but joining the Lashkar is not a source of income for them, they do so out of voluntary service and by the end of couple of month MAX they have to return to their farms and villages that are more often than not in far off places.

So they are not ideally suited for policing roles, they cannot be expected to operate anywhere for extended periods of time without seriously depleting their manpower and morale. And frankly man-power is the main advantage they have at the moment against the Taliban, also problems of morale will affect these guys more so than professional soldiers.

This is how thing happen in the tribal areas; terrorist infiltrate a tribes territory, no one actually guards the roads or mans check points at this point. These militants start heating things up, getting involved in crime, assassinating tribal elders, picking fights with their body guards, etc. When these tribal elders see their own *** on the line, plus pressure from political agents, plus threat of military operations then a Laskhar are called up. It takes at least a week to organize, that Laskhar then burns houses, arrests any foreigners sheltering in them, moves on to monitor traffic on roads coming into our out of their village, then usually spurred by the government they take to hills or outposts occupied with the militants, there too with the help of government direction and firepower they push the Taliban just out their land. Then they come back and go home usually within less than a month and the whole affair is hailed as a success by the tribal elders and the government. But we all know that’s never the end of it…militants make a comeback and this affair starts over again.

I agree with batmannow, this is sort of using the North Alliance like the Americans did in 2001. Americans were just being lazy in giving important work to these guys, I think we should not do that despite the fact that these tribes are likely to do better than those NA folk from all the way across the country did because this is their territory and their homes on the line after all. Also it was a bad idea to rely solely on the NA to keep the peace, provide for the people or facilitate reconstruction.

(Damn I really must try and shorten my posts now and again)




Dear Kasrkin; sir
thanks for supporting my veiw, it is same thing which was planed and executed against iraqi army & to the loyalist of SADDAM HUSSAIN, in IRAQ, where iraqi kurds were supported to have go at IRAQI army , with the support of USAF.
the same theory, was in effect against TALIBANS (alqeada) , where NORTHERN ALLAINCE was given air cover by USAF, well on the ground the were supported by USAF commando's with the help of CIA experts.

In both cases, the malitia's were used against another maliatia or against former iraqi army, but once the mission was completed both were thrown away without dismentling these malitia's, which caused more breakway groups from these malatia's.
In IRAQ kurds were promised to have thier own seprate indepndent country, which was imposible practicly, but it was tried to make KLF (kurdish lebration army) staisfy for some period, but after TURKEYS strong & heavy militry intervention , dreams of KLF been put in the box , for now yes! iraqi insurgency has been on decline but it cant be seen as a victory of USA either ?
insurgents are regrouping , still alqeada is active in iraq, still ALLIED TROOPS are targets, once US troops out of iraq , i am sure there would be a lot of voilence still to come.
:tup:
 
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Iraqi Military Operation in Diyala Province Risks Renewal of Kurdish-Arab Conflict
By Ramzy Mardini

As tensions rise between Iraqi Kurds, Arab Sunnis, and Arab Shiites in ethnically mixed Diyala Province during a massive and ongoing military operation by the Iraqi Army, a bombing in the disputed city of Khanaqin threatens to launch the region into new convulsions of violence. On September 13 a powerful improvised explosive device killed nine members of the Kurdish peshmerga militia responsible for security in the city. The dead included Colonel Zulfiqar, the local commander of peshmerga forces (AFP, September 13; Awsat al-Iraq, September 14).

In recent remarks, the exiting commander of the Multinational Forces in Iraq, General David Petraeus, noted the security progress that has begun to stabilize Iraq was “not irreversible” (BBC, September 11). The U.S. general’s remarks came after last month’s unexpected confrontation between the Iraq Army and Kurdish peshmerga forces in Khanaqin. Though Iraq’s security and economy have radically improved since the implementation of the U.S. “surge” strategy, developments in Diyala highlight the danger of a sudden reversion to ethnic and religious bloodshed.

Recently, Diyala has been the focal point of unusual security moves by the government of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki. In mid-August, under the supposed direction of al-Maliki, special counterterrorism forces – known as Emergency Response Units (ERUs) – raided the office of Diyala Governor Raad Rashid al-Mullah, shot and killed his cousin, and commenced a gunfight with local police (Awsat al-Iraq, August 19). The raid’s aim was the arrest of popular Sunni political figure Dr. Hussein al-Zubaidi, who heads Diyala’s security committee. Al-Zubaidi was beaten before being carried away. A Diyala politician responded to his colleague’s detention, saying, “This has sent a bad message to the people of Diyala, that the government in Baghdad is not really going after the outlaws, it’s going after their elected officials” (Fox News, September 6).

But according to an Interior Ministry spokesman, al-Maliki had not authorized the raid, leading the U.S. military to assume it was a “rogue operation.” Sunni politicians in Baghdad question al-Maliki’s ostensible lack of participation. Salim Abdullah al-Juboori, a member of the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), believes “such a raid could not have taken place unless Mr. Maliki had at least prior knowledge of it.” With their leadership and attributes strictly classified, the ERUs operate under the control of the Prime Minister’s office. According to a Defense Ministry official, the ERUs normally operate in Baghdad, but shifted operations towards Diyala beginning in July (McClatchy Newspapers, August 22).

The Iraq Army began Operation Bashaer al-Kheir (Promise of Good) on July 29 in cooperation with American forces. The operation is a major offensive consisting of 50,000 soldiers and police aimed at rooting out al-Qaeda and Shiite militias in Diyala province (Awsat al-Iraq, September 5). Local Awakening Council (Sahwa) members complain that the operation is being waged against them – purposely undermining their prospects for a future political role. Government efforts to marginalize the province’s mostly Sunni Sahwa fighters have increased considerably since the operation commenced. Leaders have been arrested or evicted from their posts in an effort to hasten their disbandment.

But the central and potentially explosive issue resulting from the government’s military operation in Diyala was the confrontation at Khanaqin between Kurdish militias and Iraqi forces. An oil-rich city along the Iranian border of the Diyala governorate, Khanaqin is considered one of the “disputed territories” cited in Article 140 of the Iraq Constitution. Article 140 outlines a legal process intended to reverse the “Arabization” campaigns of the former Baathist regime and settle the territorial disputes between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Arbil and the federal government in Baghdad. Driven by force from Khanaqin, Iraqi Kurds have been returning to the city since 2003 and now form the majority of the population. The local council has proposed integrating the city with the Kurdistan region, but like the similar cases of Kirkuk and Mosul, a reluctant Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad has delayed finalizing Khanaqin’s status.

In 2005, overwhelming violence in Diyala province led Baghdad to invite Kurdish forces to enter Khanaqin to help stabilize the area and protect its Kurdish inhabitants (Awsat al-Iraq, September 5). Last month, however, under al-Maliki’s authority, the Iraqi Army ordered Kurdish forces to withdraw from Khanaqin within 24 hours (Alsumaria, September 6). Citing direct orders from the KRG, the peshmerga refused and Iraqi troops entered Khanaqin under the pretense of carrying out their province-wide military operation.

To defuse the escalating rhetoric of both sides, the KRG and the federal government came to a temporary agreement calling for a reversion to the status quo, the preference of local authorities. As part of the accord, Kurdish peshmerga forces withdrew from the Khanaqin affiliated districts of Qurat Taba and Jalawlaa (Awsat al-Iraq, September 5). Though ongoing negotiations have yet to settle Khanaqin’s status, Kurdish trust of the Shiite government has suffered considerable and risky damage – arguably reaching the lowest point since 2003.

Kurdish officials expressed suspicion of the government’s reasoning behind sending the army into Khanaqin, since they believe the town had already been pacified under peshmerga supervision. Salar Mahmud, an organizer of the Khanaqin demonstrations, professed: “We think the military crackdown in Diyala province is politically aimed against the will of the Kurdish area residents… These military forces should be deployed to control areas affected by terrorism, not to show their power in front of the Kurdish people” (Kurdish Globe, August 24). However, Iraqi Defense Minister Abdel Qadir al-Ubaidi downplayed the Khanaqin incident, claiming “it was not a crisis but lack of coordination” between Arbil and Baghdad (Awsat al-Iraq, September 10).

Kurdish skeptics point to Baghdad’s inconsistencies. For example, Khanaqin Mayor Muhammad Mullah Hassan claimed, “there is no Al Qaeda in our city” as the local backlash of demonstrations reinforced the public’s unfavorable view of the government’s actions (Kurdish Globe, August 28). Moreover, Kurdish peshmerga constitute an effective and capable armed force – leading many to challenge why Khanaqin was ever part of the wider Bashaer al-Kheir operation. As KRG President Massoud Barzani noted, “Khanaqin is a safe area and it’s a wonder that the Iraqi Army entered it under the pretext of combating terrorism” (Awsat al-Iraq, August 28).

One explanation for the army’s entry into Khanaqin was provided by acting KRG Peshmerga Minister Anwar Hajji Osman, who observed that the operation reflected the government’s aim of controlling Kurdish inhabited areas and disrupting the KRG’s political and military positions (Kurdish Globe, August 28). Such tactics may be directed at weakening the KRG’s influence in Diyala, hoping to marginalize its prospects in the disputed territories before the provincial elections scheduled later this year. This is suggested by the actions witnessed in the Qurat Taba area of Khanaqin, where the Iraq Army raided the headquarters belonging to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and the Kurdistan Communist Party, as well as taking down the KRG flag (Awsat al-Iraq, August 24). Another accusation was set forth by Sami al-Atroushi, a member of the Kurdistan Islamic Union, who accused the central government of engaging in “political blackmailing” to force the KRG to “give up article 140 of the Iraqi constitution” (Awsat al-Iraq, September 10).

According to a secret report produced by a Kurdish political party, “Al-Maliki has started to undermine the influence of those in the Iraqi military and security commanders who are classified as protégés of the Americans…The freezing of the powers of the Iraqi Army’s chief of staff, Babakir Zebari, is the first indication of this trend” (Gulf News, September 12). Massoud Barzani claimed that the Diyala operation was implemented “behind the back” of General Zebari, a Kurd, who “was not consulted” and whose presence “has become nominal” (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 1).

The level of rhetoric surrounding the issue has reached a new and dangerous high. Barzani claimed the new Iraqi Army had “acted exactly like the former army…including the crimes that were committed during Operation Al-Anfal [a reference to Saddam Hussein’s 1986-89 campaign against the Kurds]” (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 1). More critically, KRG representative Mullah Bakhtiyar announced: “Kurdish negotiators in Baghdad have opened 99 gates for dialogue and one gate for war,” claiming that if the Iraq government picked “the gate to war, they have been told that if war happens in Khanaqin it will happen in Kirkuk, Mosul, and the other disputed areas” (Kurdish Globe, September 11).

More fallout from the Khanaqin crisis appeared when Kurdish authorities questioned the government’s interest in purchasing 36 F-16 fighter jets from the United States. The motives behind the military buildup had created in Kurds “a justified fear,” linking past atrocities and recent developments in Diyala. When describing the Khanaqin crisis, the KRG’s parliamentary speaker Adnan al-Mufti observed: “If the situation plays out in this way and there is a government or head of the government in the future who thinks of a military solution to impose their will… and if they have F-16s, they may use them” (Reuters, September 10).

Unlike past political disputes, the Khanaqin crisis provides the first incident in which the new Iraq has adopted a formalized military response towards the Kurds. This provocation reinforces Kurdish fears of past attitudes, reactivating the anti-State narrative as Barzani points to a “chauvinist Baathist approach” practiced by some in Baghdad (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 1). The rapid deterioration in trust resulting from developments in Diyala increases the risk that the unfolding security dilemma could lead to open conflict and decrease the prospect of disputes being resolved at the political level. As provincial elections approach and pressures to implement Article 140 intensify, the concurrent shift of American forces to secondary responsibilities and the deteriorating situation in Khanaqin may leave Iraq in a vulnerable security position.

this is for those who think USA has got a victory in iraq, & for those who thinks that! Gen Patreus has snatched victory from the jaws of defeat, its just that ,Gen Patreus got success in geting the easy wayout for next year's US troops withdrawll.
thats it, notthing more, once US out of IRAQ, above mentioned crisis would be waiting, but its not uncle sams problum....right?
the 2 basic stratagical points, why CIA planned the INVASION of iraq in frist place, were
1.destroying the anti-ISRAELI govt of SADDAM HUSSAIN.
2. getting control of the center of oil producing arab countries.

The frist stratagic point was achived, but the second one is more important, and i dont think USA can control , center point of arabian penisula long time.
there are more criss in making, like the above mentioned one, posting this artical is a reason to show our for mates that, plz stop thinking that any way US is , or going tobe victorious in IRAQ!
 
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Afghanistan's Northern Alliance
By BBC News Online's Fiona Symon

Wednesday, 19 September, 2001, 19:03 GMT 20:03



The Afghan Northern Alliance is made up of an ethnically and religiously disparate group of rebel movements united only in their desire to topple the ruling Taleban.

Made up of mainly non-Pashtun ethnic groups, it relies on a core of some 15,000 Tajik and Uzbek troops defending the northeastern stronghold, Badakhshan, eastern Takhar province, the Panjshir Valley and part of the Shomali plain north of Kabul.

Until recently, the alliance's main backers were Iran, Russia and Tajikistan.



New leader: Can he keep the alliance together?


General Ahmed Shah Masood, leader of the alliance until his death earlier this month, made a series of alliances with former opponents, some of whom the Taleban had driven into exile.

This extended the area where the Taleban faced challenges into eastern, central, northern and northwestern parts of the country.

Main groupings

There are now three main elements in the alliance.


The ethnic Tajik Jamiat-I-Islami, led by Masood's successor General Mohammed Fahim Khan.

In the west central Ghor and Herat provinces, Ismael Khan, a member of Jamiat-I-Islami and former Herat governer is also key figure.

The second main grouping is the ethnic Uzbek Junbish-i-Milli-yi Islami, led by General Abdul Rashid Dostum, a former opponent of General Masood who joined the alliance earlier this year.

The third main element is the ethnic Hazara shia groupings of the Hizb-i Wahdat led by Karim Khalili and Mohaqiq.
In addition, some of the commanders formerly under the leadership of the Pashtun leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, are now fighting with the alliance.

Military setbacks

As a strategic thinker, General Massoud excelled in the complex task of military and political co-ordination between this disparate patchwork of guerrilla zones.

But his success in forging alliances did not translate into significant military success on the ground.



Traditional stronghold: The Panjshir valley

In recent months that paid off in a series of guerrilla operations in central and western Afghanistan that diverted Taleban forces that might otherwise have been deployed against the alliance's northeastern base.

But the alliance has until recently lacked the manpower, training and equipment to do much more than hold its own against the Taleban.

The alliance controls under 5% of Afghanistan - the Panjshir valley, stronghold and birthplace of Gen Masood, and a small enclave in the mountainous north-east.

Morale boost

General Masood's death might well have meant the end of the alliance if the bombing of the World Trade Centre and Pentagon had not inspired possible US moves to take military action against Osama Bin Laden and his Taleban backers.

This has boosted the morale of the alliance.

The alliance's political leaders are confident now that their enemy will be eliminated and have stated that they are willing to fight alongside the Americans against the Taleban.

However, a leading figure in Afghanistan's anti-Taleban opposition, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, has cast some doubts on that, alleging that the Americans are wrong to blame Osama Bin Laden for the attacks in New York and Washington.



Official figurehead

The official head of the Northern Alliance is the ousted President Burhanuddin Rabbani.

An ethnic Tajik and former lecturer at the Islamic law at Kabul University, he is the most senior figure in the movement and the one who could still play an effective mediating role between the different groups.



Rabbani is confident that the Taleban will be eliminated


Rabbani holds the country's United Nations seat and has embassies in 33 countries.

His seat of government in Faizabad is dependent on goods smuggled from Taleban-controlled areas.

The Northern Alliance follow a milder form of Islam than the Taleban.

In Faizabad, women can work and girls can gain higher education.

But during Rabbani's period in office, they were not noted for their respect for human rights.

Zahir Tanin believes that although people are tired of the Taleban, the Northern Alliance proved a disappointment and was unable to unite the country when it held power briefly after the expulsion of Soviet forces from the country.

US troops 'based in Northern Alliance village'

War on Terrorism: Front Line


By Justin Huggler in Dasht-e Qaleh, Afghanistan
Wednesday, 31 October 2001
Independent.co.uk

American soldiers are at a base inside Afghanistan co-ordinating attacks with the Northern Alliance. And while the United States unleashed its most savage bombardment yet of Taliban positions in the north, Northern Alliance leaders said an offensive to capture the strategic city of Mazar-i-Sharif would begin within days.


American soldiers are at a base inside Afghanistan co-ordinating attacks with the Northern Alliance. And while the United States unleashed its most savage bombardment yet of Taliban positions in the north, Northern Alliance leaders said an offensive to capture the strategic city of Mazar-i-Sharif would begin within days.
Donald Rumsfeld, the US Defence Secretary, said last night in the clearest acknowledgement so far of the presence of troops inside Afghanistan that a "modest number" of troops were there. Mohammed Ashraf Nadeem, a Northern Alliance spokesman, said 15 to 20 uniformed American soldiers had been co-ordinating attacks at a base in the Alliance- controlled village of Dar-e Suf, near Mazar-i-Sharif, since the air attacks began.

Northern Alliance fighters watched on horseback as planes swept over the front line yesterday, pounding the Taliban positions with bombs. They flew over the fortress of Ay Khanoum, built by Alexander the Great, while Northern Alliance fighters struggled to carry ammunition through the rapids of the Kokcha river.

The strikes were visible to the cheering Northern Alliance fighters, who watched the bombs fall on the hills and send up flames and towers of black smoke when they hit.

The Northern Alliance complained that the Americans were not bombing the Taliban enough to allow its fighters to attack on the ground. There were no complaints yesterday. Within 45 minutes, the planes made 13 strikes.

An Alliance commander said that under the flames and smoke were Taliban guard posts and garrisons full of men, tanks and artillery. Many must have died in the onslaught.

Attacks like this were launched across northern Afghanistan for the third consecutive day. The Northern Alliance said there were bombing raids near Mazar.

Suddenly, the focus of the US campaign has shifted sharply to the north, where the prize of Mazar would give the Americans an air base in the wild mountains of Afghanistan and a paved road in via Uzbekistan. To get their hands on Mazar, the Americans seem to be relying on the help of the Northern Alliance, which has loosely allied groups fighting across the north, including around Mazar.

Both America and the Alliance said yesterday that co-operation between them was improving. Dr Abdullah Abdullah, a Northern Alliance spokesman, said a major offensive to capture Mazar would begin in the next few days. That could include a three-pronged attack on the front lines here to link up with the forces further west attacking Mazar, who are surrounded by Taliban.

While the Americans fear that helping the Alliance to capture the capital, Kabul, could split the country ethnically, Mazar and the north are the Alliance's homelands. Speculation is also growing that American ground forces could be involved in an offensive on Mazar. About 1,000 troops from the American army's 10th mountain division are in Uzbekistan, and Mazar is not far from the Uzbek border.

The Northern Alliance is not a simple homogeneous unit, but a loose alliance of different groups whose allegiance is to their respective warlords, and America is clearly nervous over whom it chooses to make alliances with in Afghanistan, a country where wars are won and lost by the changing loyalties of local warlords.

The key to capturing Mazar is its local warlord, General Rashid Dostum, who has changed sides more than anyone else in Afghanistan.

Donald Rumsfeld, the US Defence Secretary, was the key stratagic planner in both, IRAQ & IN AFGHANISTAN.
 
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GEO Pakistan
Security forces to launch decisive action against militants

Updated at: 1314 PST, Wednesday, October 15, 2008

KHAR: Security forces on Wednesday imposed curfew in Tehsil Khar in a bid to launch a decisive operation against the militants in Bajaur Agency.

According to sources, security forces continued operation against the local militants in Bajaur Agency, while curfew was enforced in Khar.

The fresh troops have started to reach the troubled agency while all arrangements have been finalized to launch decisive onslaught against the militants.

Meanwhile, a large number of local people is moving to safe places due to poor security situation in the area. ;)
 
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Thursday October 16, 11:07 AM
International effort in Afghanistan falling short: Gates


WASHINGTON (AFP) - The international effort in Afghanistan is falling short, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned Wednesday, stressing the need for a better integrated approach to stabilizing the country.

"These efforts today, however well-intentioned and even heroic, add up to less than the sum of the parts," said Gates in a speech prepared for delivery to the US Institute for Peace.

His remarks came amid growing US fears that an upsurge of insurgent violence and corruption in Afghanistan is threatening the viability of an already weak central government.

"To be successful, the entirety of the NATO alliance, the European Union, NGOs, and other groups -- the full panoply of military and civilian elements -- must better integrate and coordinate with one another and also with the Afghan government," he said.

"Afghanistan is the test, on the grandest scale, of what we are trying to achieve when it comes to integrating the military and civilian, the public and private, the national and international."

But Gates complained that allied nations were unable to provide "the quantity and types of forces needed for this kind of fighting."



NATO forces, meanwhile, are hamstrung by caveats that nations have placed on the use of the military forces that they have provided, he said.

"An enduring requirement is the ability to rapidly train, equip, and advise Afghan security forces, as we are doing to improve the size and quality of Afghanistan's army and police," he said.

"Until recently, this capacity did not exist within most Western governments or militaries outside their Special Forces."

Gates called for a concerted development strategy that persuades and inspires the public to counter Taliban influence through intimidation.

"As one USAID contractor who worked in Afghanistan put it, we need to show the citizenry that we are 'fully committed to making a difference, rather than working disconnectedly on "one-off" projects'."

Gates' speech was the latest in a series advocating a more intelligent use of non-military instruments of power to deal with instability in poor and failing states.

"Enlightened counter-measures we take today will bolster the internal strength of vulnerable states so they will not harbor violent networks seeking to launch the next attack," he said.

Gates acknowledged that "at the end of the day," it will be necessary to deal with tribal leaders in Afghanistan to overcome the Taliban insurgency and to restore peace and security.

"I think the proper approach is not to abandon trying to create a strong central government, but also (to underline) the importance of dealing with provincial or tribal leaders and trying to bring them on board," he said.

"The key is ... how do you do that without creating new warlords, new tribal militias that are not part of provincial or national governments?"

"But I think, at the end of the day, the only solution in Afghanistan is to work with the tribes and provincial leaders, in terms of trying to create a backlash against the Taliban."

Unrest in Afghanistan has intensified despite the presence of 70,000 troops deployed under two multinational missions -- the NATO-led ISAF stabilization force and Operation Enduring Freedom, which is under US command.
 
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