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PAF’s ability to conduct limited counterinsurgency operations was inbuilt in its force structure but could at best be described as a ‘dumbed down’ version of an operational campaign against a traditional adversary. For as long as the service was not called upon to undertake a serious insurgency campaign, it was not a cause for concern.
However, as the threat of insurgency grew in the country’s Tribal Belts, PAF has been repeatedly tasked to conduct major COIN operations against an adversary exploiting the 4GW technique. Many serious shortcomings soon became apparent. It was realised that counterinsurgency operations require a different set of calculus than the ones needed against a conventional foe.
New strategies were needed, and new capabilities had to be developed for this new form of warfare. Tracing and accurately recording the history of PAF’s role in counterinsurgency operations is, therefore, essential not only for posterity but also to ensure that many valuable lessons learnt from some of the recent campaigns are not lost, past mistakes are not repeated, and the service is better prepared for future operations.
PAF’s Baptism of Fire in Counterinsurgency Operations
The insurgency in Waziristan by the legendary Faqir of Ipi (nee Mirza Ali Khan) against the British rule in India had erupted in 1937. Two Royal Air Force (RAF) squadrons operating from Risalpur and Kohat were employed in the counterinsurgency role to quell the rebellion. Air actions against the legendary Faqir proved ineffective, and as the insurgency lingered on, RAF squadrons were reinforced by Royal Indian Air Force (RIAF) units operating from Miranshah.
Neither side could gain a decisive victory while the stalemate lingered on. RAF and RIAF squadrons continued to operate in ‘watch and ward’ duties in Waziristan year after year until, in 1947, when it was handed over to the nascent Royal Pakistan Air Force (RPAF).
On August 15 1947, just a day after the new state of Pakistan had come into existence in the Indian subcontinent, RPAF undertook its first operational assignment in Waziristan. Two Tempest squadrons from Peshawar took over the ‘watch and ward’ role from the British by deploying small detachments in rotation at Miranshah.
From December 17 1947, RPAF became a part of GHQ’s ‘Operation Curzon’ aimed at extraditing the Pakistan Army troops from Razmak in Waziristan. While transport support for airlifting of troops and freight was provided by two Dakotas of No. 6 RPAF squadron and Tempest fighter bombers of 5 and 9 squadrons flew 47 sorties to ensure the marauding tribesmen did not interfere with the evacuation process.
The RPAF air operations continued till June 1949, and in total the service flew 139 sorties dropping 72 bombs, 108 rockets and 4600 rounds of 20 mm on the rebels. After 1949, the rebellion by the Faqir declined appreciably although he never surrendered or was captured. On November 4 1954, the surrender of a key rebel leader and a notorious outlaw Meher Dil in effect brought the Waziristan insurrection to an end.
While the Pakistan Army and the RPAF had successfully contained the Faqir of Ipi led insurgency, the watch and ward duties continued. Tempests were replaced by Furies operating from Kohat. In 1960 trouble erupted again, this time in Dir – Bajaur area and PAF (RPAF’s nomenclature had been changed to PAF in 1956) was again deployed operationally to quell the rebellion.
Flying in support of the Pakistan Army troops, PAF flew strafing, reconnaissance, bombing and extensive leaflet dropping missions. Furies and the newly acquired Sabre jets flew the bulk of the missions during the campaign that also saw meaningful participation by the RT-33 jets, Freighter transport planes and the H-43 helicopters.
Read more: Pakistan Air Force: Rising above the Oblivion
During the entire operations that continued until 1962, PAF did not suffer a single mishap, and the air-land cooperation between the Army and the Air Force was considered very satisfactory. The Dir-Bajaur rebellion was successfully put down by 1962, which witnessed the end of nearly two and a half decades of watch and ward duties by the service in Pakistan’s tribal belts.
Waziristan Revisited – Army Operation Al Mizan – 2004
When the USA decided to invade Afghanistan in October 2001, following the 9/11 attack on its soil, Pakistan was sucked into somebody else’s long-drawn war which it could ill afford. Before 9/11, Pakistan was one of the only three countries to recognise and have ties with the Taliban regime.
It had to take a complete summersault in its Afghan policy and permit the US and Coalition forces to use its territory to topple the Taliban rule in Afghanistan, in effect becoming a key coalition partner. The move did not go well with the public, and the wave of anti-American sentiments that was generated has still not subsided.
The defeated Taliban leadership and foot soldiers were not destroyed, and they melted away and took refuge among their Pakistani Pashtun clansmen across the Durand Line (the official border between Pakistan and Afghanistan). When the focus of USA shifted from Afghanistan to Iraq in 2003, the Taliban recuperated and regrouped in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) to start a campaign to regain power in Afghanistan.
ATLIS equipped F-16s flew over the area trained their ATLIS pods over the suspected sites and brought back video footages for analysis
The sanctuaries that the Taliban enjoyed in Pakistani held territories from where they could conduct their operations against the NATO and Afghan forces in Afghanistan became a severe bone of contention between USA and Pakistan. Under intense US pressure, Pakistan was forced to launch a military campaign in South Waziristan where the Taliban were firmly established.
South Waziristan is one of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas that was a part of Pakistan but had enjoyed a very high degree of autonomy – the tribes followed their practices and customs. They would not welcome any interference from the federal government. Even the British in their heydays had shied away from establishing their authority if the tribes did not harm their core interests.
Operation Al Mizan was launched in South Waziristan by the Pakistan Army in June 2004. During the planning phase at GHQ, Air Headquarters was not taken on board although air support from the PAF was envisaged and it was recognised that the campaign was likely to be conducted as a classical air-land battle where air support would form a key ingredient.
As the battle unfolded, PAF was requested to fly emergency surveillance and reconnaissance missions to identify enemy ambush sites, supply depots and compounds from where their leadership and foot soldiers operated and having pinpointed the targets follow up with interdiction missions to neutralise them.
Since the Army was working against insurgents employing 4GW technique, the targets to be identified were small, generally located amidst local population and in many instances fleeting in nature. PAF’s tactical reconnaissance capabilities had been developed for operations against conventional forces. The sophisticated cameras in its reconnaissance fleet were optimised to capture relatively large stationary targets and were not ideally suited to locate and identify small ones.
The service had to improvise in an emergency, and instead of employing the specialist Mirage reconnaissance fleet, it opted for the ATLIS pod equipped F-16s to accomplish the task. The ATLIS pods are airborne auto laser designators for the delivery of laser-guided bombs during surgical strikes. It has an inbuilt TV camera that video records the target for post-mission analysis. Given the peculiar nature of the task the auto laser designators although not initially designed for pinpoint reconnaissance were considered more appropriate.
The Army provided the PAF approximate coordinates of observed enemy fire, likely ambush sites and suspected enemy hideouts. ATLIS equipped F-16s flew over the area trained their ATLIS pods over the suspected sites and brought back video footages for analysis.
The results were subsequently conveyed to the GHQ, and with their input, interdiction targets were selected for subsequent airstrikes. Because no special communication setup had been established for the purpose, the entire process could take up to 24 hours. Where targets were fleeting, the time delay resulted in lost opportunities.
However, where these were of a fixed nature like specific houses/compounds which served as their supply dumps/command and control centres and where their commanders and foot soldiers resided, the intelligence gathered proved very useful. More than a dozen ATLIS equipped F-16 sorties were launched, and on occasions, Mirage reconnaissance platforms were also flown.
https://www.globalvillagespace.com/history-of-pafs-role-in-counterinsurgency-operations/
Rest of the article here
However, as the threat of insurgency grew in the country’s Tribal Belts, PAF has been repeatedly tasked to conduct major COIN operations against an adversary exploiting the 4GW technique. Many serious shortcomings soon became apparent. It was realised that counterinsurgency operations require a different set of calculus than the ones needed against a conventional foe.
New strategies were needed, and new capabilities had to be developed for this new form of warfare. Tracing and accurately recording the history of PAF’s role in counterinsurgency operations is, therefore, essential not only for posterity but also to ensure that many valuable lessons learnt from some of the recent campaigns are not lost, past mistakes are not repeated, and the service is better prepared for future operations.
PAF’s Baptism of Fire in Counterinsurgency Operations
The insurgency in Waziristan by the legendary Faqir of Ipi (nee Mirza Ali Khan) against the British rule in India had erupted in 1937. Two Royal Air Force (RAF) squadrons operating from Risalpur and Kohat were employed in the counterinsurgency role to quell the rebellion. Air actions against the legendary Faqir proved ineffective, and as the insurgency lingered on, RAF squadrons were reinforced by Royal Indian Air Force (RIAF) units operating from Miranshah.
Neither side could gain a decisive victory while the stalemate lingered on. RAF and RIAF squadrons continued to operate in ‘watch and ward’ duties in Waziristan year after year until, in 1947, when it was handed over to the nascent Royal Pakistan Air Force (RPAF).
On August 15 1947, just a day after the new state of Pakistan had come into existence in the Indian subcontinent, RPAF undertook its first operational assignment in Waziristan. Two Tempest squadrons from Peshawar took over the ‘watch and ward’ role from the British by deploying small detachments in rotation at Miranshah.
From December 17 1947, RPAF became a part of GHQ’s ‘Operation Curzon’ aimed at extraditing the Pakistan Army troops from Razmak in Waziristan. While transport support for airlifting of troops and freight was provided by two Dakotas of No. 6 RPAF squadron and Tempest fighter bombers of 5 and 9 squadrons flew 47 sorties to ensure the marauding tribesmen did not interfere with the evacuation process.
The RPAF air operations continued till June 1949, and in total the service flew 139 sorties dropping 72 bombs, 108 rockets and 4600 rounds of 20 mm on the rebels. After 1949, the rebellion by the Faqir declined appreciably although he never surrendered or was captured. On November 4 1954, the surrender of a key rebel leader and a notorious outlaw Meher Dil in effect brought the Waziristan insurrection to an end.
While the Pakistan Army and the RPAF had successfully contained the Faqir of Ipi led insurgency, the watch and ward duties continued. Tempests were replaced by Furies operating from Kohat. In 1960 trouble erupted again, this time in Dir – Bajaur area and PAF (RPAF’s nomenclature had been changed to PAF in 1956) was again deployed operationally to quell the rebellion.
Flying in support of the Pakistan Army troops, PAF flew strafing, reconnaissance, bombing and extensive leaflet dropping missions. Furies and the newly acquired Sabre jets flew the bulk of the missions during the campaign that also saw meaningful participation by the RT-33 jets, Freighter transport planes and the H-43 helicopters.
Read more: Pakistan Air Force: Rising above the Oblivion
During the entire operations that continued until 1962, PAF did not suffer a single mishap, and the air-land cooperation between the Army and the Air Force was considered very satisfactory. The Dir-Bajaur rebellion was successfully put down by 1962, which witnessed the end of nearly two and a half decades of watch and ward duties by the service in Pakistan’s tribal belts.
Waziristan Revisited – Army Operation Al Mizan – 2004
When the USA decided to invade Afghanistan in October 2001, following the 9/11 attack on its soil, Pakistan was sucked into somebody else’s long-drawn war which it could ill afford. Before 9/11, Pakistan was one of the only three countries to recognise and have ties with the Taliban regime.
It had to take a complete summersault in its Afghan policy and permit the US and Coalition forces to use its territory to topple the Taliban rule in Afghanistan, in effect becoming a key coalition partner. The move did not go well with the public, and the wave of anti-American sentiments that was generated has still not subsided.
The defeated Taliban leadership and foot soldiers were not destroyed, and they melted away and took refuge among their Pakistani Pashtun clansmen across the Durand Line (the official border between Pakistan and Afghanistan). When the focus of USA shifted from Afghanistan to Iraq in 2003, the Taliban recuperated and regrouped in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) to start a campaign to regain power in Afghanistan.
ATLIS equipped F-16s flew over the area trained their ATLIS pods over the suspected sites and brought back video footages for analysis
The sanctuaries that the Taliban enjoyed in Pakistani held territories from where they could conduct their operations against the NATO and Afghan forces in Afghanistan became a severe bone of contention between USA and Pakistan. Under intense US pressure, Pakistan was forced to launch a military campaign in South Waziristan where the Taliban were firmly established.
South Waziristan is one of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas that was a part of Pakistan but had enjoyed a very high degree of autonomy – the tribes followed their practices and customs. They would not welcome any interference from the federal government. Even the British in their heydays had shied away from establishing their authority if the tribes did not harm their core interests.
Operation Al Mizan was launched in South Waziristan by the Pakistan Army in June 2004. During the planning phase at GHQ, Air Headquarters was not taken on board although air support from the PAF was envisaged and it was recognised that the campaign was likely to be conducted as a classical air-land battle where air support would form a key ingredient.
As the battle unfolded, PAF was requested to fly emergency surveillance and reconnaissance missions to identify enemy ambush sites, supply depots and compounds from where their leadership and foot soldiers operated and having pinpointed the targets follow up with interdiction missions to neutralise them.
Since the Army was working against insurgents employing 4GW technique, the targets to be identified were small, generally located amidst local population and in many instances fleeting in nature. PAF’s tactical reconnaissance capabilities had been developed for operations against conventional forces. The sophisticated cameras in its reconnaissance fleet were optimised to capture relatively large stationary targets and were not ideally suited to locate and identify small ones.
The service had to improvise in an emergency, and instead of employing the specialist Mirage reconnaissance fleet, it opted for the ATLIS pod equipped F-16s to accomplish the task. The ATLIS pods are airborne auto laser designators for the delivery of laser-guided bombs during surgical strikes. It has an inbuilt TV camera that video records the target for post-mission analysis. Given the peculiar nature of the task the auto laser designators although not initially designed for pinpoint reconnaissance were considered more appropriate.
The Army provided the PAF approximate coordinates of observed enemy fire, likely ambush sites and suspected enemy hideouts. ATLIS equipped F-16s flew over the area trained their ATLIS pods over the suspected sites and brought back video footages for analysis.
The results were subsequently conveyed to the GHQ, and with their input, interdiction targets were selected for subsequent airstrikes. Because no special communication setup had been established for the purpose, the entire process could take up to 24 hours. Where targets were fleeting, the time delay resulted in lost opportunities.
However, where these were of a fixed nature like specific houses/compounds which served as their supply dumps/command and control centres and where their commanders and foot soldiers resided, the intelligence gathered proved very useful. More than a dozen ATLIS equipped F-16 sorties were launched, and on occasions, Mirage reconnaissance platforms were also flown.
https://www.globalvillagespace.com/history-of-pafs-role-in-counterinsurgency-operations/
Rest of the article here
