nightrider_saulat
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i want to see F-16s and JF-17s dropping bombs
PAF Exercise High Mark - 2010
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air marshal
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Azm-e-Musalsal!
May 13, 2010
BY Air Cdre Khalid Iqbal (R)
Pakistan Army concluded its Exercise Azm-e-Nau-III with the tempo transcending into a commitment for pursuing Azm-e-Musalsal (perennial resolve) to defend the motherland against all odds. It was a multi-stage joint services activity involving Pakistan Air Force as well. Prior to this exercise PAF had just finished its very elaborate five yearly exercise, High Mark 2010, having participatory role by our army and navy. Presently Pak Army and the PAF are conjointly conducting COIN operations in various parts of the country. In this context, service level and joint exercises by these two components of national security were indeed events of their own class and kind. Conduct of such manoeuvres in the eastern theatre indicates sound understanding by our armed forces in the context of the sourcre of existential threat.
Peculiar circumstances facing the country over the last about eight years or so warranted a fresh field level look at the threat matrix and viability of our response. The process that began in 2008 with Azm-e-Nau I have now been carried out to its logical operational conclusion. Pakistans armed forces as indeed the entire security apparatus has never been as overstretched as it is now. We are facing a two fronts plus quandary, which calls for corresponding state of readiness. Armed forces of Pakistan have pursued their operations against extremist elements with remarkable tenacity. A protracted commitment of troops on such operations always has telling effects on their capacity to fight a conventional interstate war for which we have had two close calls from over eastern neighbour since 9/11. It is indeed a difficult preposition to handle. But choices are limited.
To cater for such situations, Pakistan has no option but to maintain dual capability for handling both threats simultaneously. Azm-e-Nau III was a practical demonstration of this capability as well as a reassessment of the capacity. While a major chunk of our land forces is enduring combat environment on the western front, the remaining formations went through a revealing saga of a professional refresher. Conducting such an event with subdued strength and marginal resources is always taxing, yet revealing and thus useful.
It is interesting to contrast the determination of our armed forces with Indian approach. Recently, Indian army and air chiefs had expressed strong reservations with respect to employment of their forces against Naxalites. Controversy rose in the wake of unfortunate incident when Naxalites killed 272 security personnel of Indian civil armed forces. When pressured for action, the two Indian chiefs argued that their forces are overstretched and cannot take further counterinsurgency tasking. Likelihood of protracted fixation of a large chunk of forces in COIN role was cited as another reason. Keeping in view the huge size of Indian armed forces, both these argument were indeed evasive tactics.
Nevertheless, the backup professional reason was sound and needs attention. It was stated that fighting counterinsurgency battles needs a different type of organization, equipment and training of personnel, and that any component of the armed forces committed for COIN operations for a protracted time loses its potential to fight a typical conventional inter-state war. Fighting COIN needs reorganization of armed forces into small fighting sub-units having swift mobility. Such troops need to carry infantry biased weapons and associated gear. Weapons for COIN are to be of low yield and high precision to minimise collateral damage. Furthermore troops have to be indoctrinated for resisting provocation and for keep their tactical and operational level plans in sync with ongoing political process.
On the other hand fighting conventional interstate wars need bigger and complex military formations required to employ a different assortment of arm and munitions. During these wars, focus is on concentration of force at right time and place to cause crippling damage to the adversary. Certainly these two strategies are a paradigm apart.
It is interesting to observe that Israeli armed forces are used to countering insurgents as a matter of routine. Due to this extended exposure, the bias of Israeli forces inadvertently shifted towards COIN configuration. Hence, once they had to face Lebanon in a conventional war, a few years back, Israeli nation was quite embarrassed. Indian defence analysts are pursuing the suggestion that there is a need for raising a suitable civil armed force to handle internal law and order situations including Naxalite class of uprising. Keeping in view the limited capability and capacities of the civil armed forces of Pakistan and the present threat profile emanating from extremists, armed forces of Pakistan are in for a long haul in the context of ongoing broad spectrum COIN operations. Nevertheless there is a need to make concerted effort to retain our capability to handle COIN as well as conventional inter-state wars. Also, at national level, we need to workout a timeframe for offloading COIN responsibility to a properly raised and developed civil armed force.
Keeping aside detractors pint of view, there is no denying the fact that our existential threat originates from the east. Fighting of extremists is a transient phenomenon. Need of this fight would diminish as the contributory causes pushing the people toward extremism are prudently handled as a part of well thought out national strategy. Moreover, effort must be kept on to minimize the effects of regional and extra regional factors which are giving a sustaining boost to these contributory factors.
Hence, while exercise Azm-e-Nau III concludes, there is a need to carry forth the concept of handling dual faceted threat simultaneously. It would not be appropriate to bifurcate the formations role wise; it would however be feasible to train in dual role and retain role currency trough tenure rotations.
In the overall context, this elaborate exercise has radiated the message that armed forces of Pakistan are neither task evaders nor risk shy. Handling of COIN operations has certainly enhanced the image of our armed forces amongst the people of Pakistan as well as amongst the comity of nations. Nevertheless, caution is due; temptations and pressures leading towards mission keep must continue to be resisted.
Azm-e-Musalsal!
May 13, 2010
BY Air Cdre Khalid Iqbal (R)
Pakistan Army concluded its Exercise Azm-e-Nau-III with the tempo transcending into a commitment for pursuing Azm-e-Musalsal (perennial resolve) to defend the motherland against all odds. It was a multi-stage joint services activity involving Pakistan Air Force as well. Prior to this exercise PAF had just finished its very elaborate five yearly exercise, High Mark 2010, having participatory role by our army and navy. Presently Pak Army and the PAF are conjointly conducting COIN operations in various parts of the country. In this context, service level and joint exercises by these two components of national security were indeed events of their own class and kind. Conduct of such manoeuvres in the eastern theatre indicates sound understanding by our armed forces in the context of the sourcre of existential threat.
Peculiar circumstances facing the country over the last about eight years or so warranted a fresh field level look at the threat matrix and viability of our response. The process that began in 2008 with Azm-e-Nau I have now been carried out to its logical operational conclusion. Pakistans armed forces as indeed the entire security apparatus has never been as overstretched as it is now. We are facing a two fronts plus quandary, which calls for corresponding state of readiness. Armed forces of Pakistan have pursued their operations against extremist elements with remarkable tenacity. A protracted commitment of troops on such operations always has telling effects on their capacity to fight a conventional interstate war for which we have had two close calls from over eastern neighbour since 9/11. It is indeed a difficult preposition to handle. But choices are limited.
To cater for such situations, Pakistan has no option but to maintain dual capability for handling both threats simultaneously. Azm-e-Nau III was a practical demonstration of this capability as well as a reassessment of the capacity. While a major chunk of our land forces is enduring combat environment on the western front, the remaining formations went through a revealing saga of a professional refresher. Conducting such an event with subdued strength and marginal resources is always taxing, yet revealing and thus useful.
It is interesting to contrast the determination of our armed forces with Indian approach. Recently, Indian army and air chiefs had expressed strong reservations with respect to employment of their forces against Naxalites. Controversy rose in the wake of unfortunate incident when Naxalites killed 272 security personnel of Indian civil armed forces. When pressured for action, the two Indian chiefs argued that their forces are overstretched and cannot take further counterinsurgency tasking. Likelihood of protracted fixation of a large chunk of forces in COIN role was cited as another reason. Keeping in view the huge size of Indian armed forces, both these argument were indeed evasive tactics.
Nevertheless, the backup professional reason was sound and needs attention. It was stated that fighting counterinsurgency battles needs a different type of organization, equipment and training of personnel, and that any component of the armed forces committed for COIN operations for a protracted time loses its potential to fight a typical conventional inter-state war. Fighting COIN needs reorganization of armed forces into small fighting sub-units having swift mobility. Such troops need to carry infantry biased weapons and associated gear. Weapons for COIN are to be of low yield and high precision to minimise collateral damage. Furthermore troops have to be indoctrinated for resisting provocation and for keep their tactical and operational level plans in sync with ongoing political process.
On the other hand fighting conventional interstate wars need bigger and complex military formations required to employ a different assortment of arm and munitions. During these wars, focus is on concentration of force at right time and place to cause crippling damage to the adversary. Certainly these two strategies are a paradigm apart.
It is interesting to observe that Israeli armed forces are used to countering insurgents as a matter of routine. Due to this extended exposure, the bias of Israeli forces inadvertently shifted towards COIN configuration. Hence, once they had to face Lebanon in a conventional war, a few years back, Israeli nation was quite embarrassed. Indian defence analysts are pursuing the suggestion that there is a need for raising a suitable civil armed force to handle internal law and order situations including Naxalite class of uprising. Keeping in view the limited capability and capacities of the civil armed forces of Pakistan and the present threat profile emanating from extremists, armed forces of Pakistan are in for a long haul in the context of ongoing broad spectrum COIN operations. Nevertheless there is a need to make concerted effort to retain our capability to handle COIN as well as conventional inter-state wars. Also, at national level, we need to workout a timeframe for offloading COIN responsibility to a properly raised and developed civil armed force.
Keeping aside detractors pint of view, there is no denying the fact that our existential threat originates from the east. Fighting of extremists is a transient phenomenon. Need of this fight would diminish as the contributory causes pushing the people toward extremism are prudently handled as a part of well thought out national strategy. Moreover, effort must be kept on to minimize the effects of regional and extra regional factors which are giving a sustaining boost to these contributory factors.
Hence, while exercise Azm-e-Nau III concludes, there is a need to carry forth the concept of handling dual faceted threat simultaneously. It would not be appropriate to bifurcate the formations role wise; it would however be feasible to train in dual role and retain role currency trough tenure rotations.
In the overall context, this elaborate exercise has radiated the message that armed forces of Pakistan are neither task evaders nor risk shy. Handling of COIN operations has certainly enhanced the image of our armed forces amongst the people of Pakistan as well as amongst the comity of nations. Nevertheless, caution is due; temptations and pressures leading towards mission keep must continue to be resisted.
Azm-e-Musalsal!
razgriz19
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so far i think they haven't even tested guided munitions from thunder. and im not even sure if jf carry a targeting pod or not....
razgriz19
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And the rudder is also different..?
its prototype 03!
cant u guyz read!?
prototype 04 is the production one with DSI intakes and other things..
razgriz19
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lol cant they use some other music?
they used this one when thunder rolled out from kamra and many times before...
BTW the good part from this music is at the beginning!(its not in the vid)
Windjammer
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Syed TALHA SHAH
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Shahzad834
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old memories 
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