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COMMENT: Not an easy war —Abbas Rashid
The only way to ensure the security of the people as well as their trust would be for the military to maintain a presence in proximity to the settlements rather than at remote locations
The bombing of the PC hotel in Peshawar on Tuesday with a high number of casualties is yet another reminder that the success of the military operation in Malakand does not mean we are anywhere close to the end of this war. The terrorists can no longer exercise their writ in huge swathes of the area but they are bent on taking the war to the rest of the country. They may be desperate but their strikes are obviously no less effective for that.
Like their attack on the Rescue 15 building in Lahore, the bombing in Peshawar was preceded by firing to gain closer access to the building and inflict maximum damage. It is probable that such attacks are meant to undermine the popular consensus at this point in favour of decisively tackling this challenge of terrorism and insurgency and to continue Operation Rah-e-Rast beyond Malakand to that end.
This is obviously an uphill battle for our forces that are not trained for counter-insurgency warfare. They have demonstrated extraordinary courage in taking on the Taliban who have the obvious advantage of terrain if not training, and certainly do not seem to be lacking in firepower or funds — whatever the source. At the same time the innocent men, women and children caught up trying to flee the battle zones are paying a very high price for the war.
Even though no specific plans have been announced, there is now an expectation that the military will take the battle to the Taliban holed up in the tribal agencies. This will obviously increase the influx into the settled areas. And while some reports suggest that things have improved somewhat in the camps, there is still along way to go with just the heat being enough to drive people to despair. In any case the great majority of the IDPs are with host families, most of whom are at breaking point given that they had few resources to begin with other than their immense generosity.
It has apparently been decided that military presence will continue in the area to ensure against any attempt by the Taliban to re-establish their presence. Nevertheless, it is the civilian administration, including the police, which will have the primary task of ensuring the development and security requirements of those who return to pick up the pieces and begin all over again.
It is far from clear whether the political leadership has a clearly elaborated plan to this effect. At this point the financial resources available are insufficient even for the relief effort, as the UN has warned on more than one occasion. According to a recent update, the Humanitarian Response Plan has so far received only 22 percent funding. Had the host families in Mardan, Swabi and elsewhere not come forward in such large numbers, this would already be a crisis of a very different kind. But this valuable time that has thus been provided should be put to good use, otherwise the crisis will simply have been postponed rather than averted.
Meanwhile, local tribes or lashkars will have to be supported by the military once they decide to take on the Taliban. Previously such efforts were not backed up and cases such as that of Pir Samiullah a few months ago, whose body the Swat Taliban exhumed and hanged as a warning to all who dared offer resistance, led to widespread demoralisation.
That has changed. For instance, we now have the example of Upper Dir where the local people, infuriated at the bombing of a mosque by the terrorists and the killing of dozens of men offering prayers, formed a lashkar and with the military’s support went after the Taliban themselves.
The military obviously has a key role to play in this phase that entails pushing out the Taliban from the areas where they had taken control. But, it is important to ensure that the role of airpower, including drones, is sharply curtailed. For it exacts a high toll in terms of loss of life and property among non-combatants, fuelling alienation and resentment among the younger people in particular.
There have been some statements to the effect that the war will only be won when the entire terrorist leadership is eliminated. This may be a long-term enterprise and some may already have made their way into Afghanistan. In any case the priority in the phase after the operation has to be restoring the badly shaken confidence of the people of the area who, it must be remembered, have seen the Taliban retreat and reappear more than once.
The only way to ensure the security of the people as well as their trust would be for the military to maintain a presence in proximity to the settlements rather than at remote locations. Equally, in this second phase the role of the civil administration is critical. And given our track record on governance this is going to be a challenge no less formidable than that of getting the area freed from Taliban control.
In the process we also have to look to the role that the electronic media, particularly radio, can play in getting a different kind of message across to the people in the camps as well as the many others deeply affected by this war in various ways. A concept note titled ‘school khuley hain’ that I recently came across is an eminently sensible proposal for the use of FM and medium-wave transmitters for continuing by other means the education of children in camps and in areas where the Taliban have destroyed schools.
The programmes would have to be engaging and instructive and might even end up being an improvement over the education currently available in most of our schools. Programmes for other audiences also need to be developed. It is ironic that for years we have appeared unable to jam the radio frequencies being used by the likes of Fazlullah to indoctrinate and intimidate the local population while at the same time developing no strategy for using the electronic media for our purposes.
At another level altogether there has to be a clearer understanding among our ruling elite not only of what is at stake but also what it will take to navigate our way out of this storm — not limited to the NWFP and FATA. Even as the military operation moves ahead, the widening gulf between Pakistan’s two major political parties, for instance, suggests a lack of clarity on one or both counts.
Abbas Rashid lives in Lahore and can be contacted at abbasrh@gmail.com
The only way to ensure the security of the people as well as their trust would be for the military to maintain a presence in proximity to the settlements rather than at remote locations
The bombing of the PC hotel in Peshawar on Tuesday with a high number of casualties is yet another reminder that the success of the military operation in Malakand does not mean we are anywhere close to the end of this war. The terrorists can no longer exercise their writ in huge swathes of the area but they are bent on taking the war to the rest of the country. They may be desperate but their strikes are obviously no less effective for that.
Like their attack on the Rescue 15 building in Lahore, the bombing in Peshawar was preceded by firing to gain closer access to the building and inflict maximum damage. It is probable that such attacks are meant to undermine the popular consensus at this point in favour of decisively tackling this challenge of terrorism and insurgency and to continue Operation Rah-e-Rast beyond Malakand to that end.
This is obviously an uphill battle for our forces that are not trained for counter-insurgency warfare. They have demonstrated extraordinary courage in taking on the Taliban who have the obvious advantage of terrain if not training, and certainly do not seem to be lacking in firepower or funds — whatever the source. At the same time the innocent men, women and children caught up trying to flee the battle zones are paying a very high price for the war.
Even though no specific plans have been announced, there is now an expectation that the military will take the battle to the Taliban holed up in the tribal agencies. This will obviously increase the influx into the settled areas. And while some reports suggest that things have improved somewhat in the camps, there is still along way to go with just the heat being enough to drive people to despair. In any case the great majority of the IDPs are with host families, most of whom are at breaking point given that they had few resources to begin with other than their immense generosity.
It has apparently been decided that military presence will continue in the area to ensure against any attempt by the Taliban to re-establish their presence. Nevertheless, it is the civilian administration, including the police, which will have the primary task of ensuring the development and security requirements of those who return to pick up the pieces and begin all over again.
It is far from clear whether the political leadership has a clearly elaborated plan to this effect. At this point the financial resources available are insufficient even for the relief effort, as the UN has warned on more than one occasion. According to a recent update, the Humanitarian Response Plan has so far received only 22 percent funding. Had the host families in Mardan, Swabi and elsewhere not come forward in such large numbers, this would already be a crisis of a very different kind. But this valuable time that has thus been provided should be put to good use, otherwise the crisis will simply have been postponed rather than averted.
Meanwhile, local tribes or lashkars will have to be supported by the military once they decide to take on the Taliban. Previously such efforts were not backed up and cases such as that of Pir Samiullah a few months ago, whose body the Swat Taliban exhumed and hanged as a warning to all who dared offer resistance, led to widespread demoralisation.
That has changed. For instance, we now have the example of Upper Dir where the local people, infuriated at the bombing of a mosque by the terrorists and the killing of dozens of men offering prayers, formed a lashkar and with the military’s support went after the Taliban themselves.
The military obviously has a key role to play in this phase that entails pushing out the Taliban from the areas where they had taken control. But, it is important to ensure that the role of airpower, including drones, is sharply curtailed. For it exacts a high toll in terms of loss of life and property among non-combatants, fuelling alienation and resentment among the younger people in particular.
There have been some statements to the effect that the war will only be won when the entire terrorist leadership is eliminated. This may be a long-term enterprise and some may already have made their way into Afghanistan. In any case the priority in the phase after the operation has to be restoring the badly shaken confidence of the people of the area who, it must be remembered, have seen the Taliban retreat and reappear more than once.
The only way to ensure the security of the people as well as their trust would be for the military to maintain a presence in proximity to the settlements rather than at remote locations. Equally, in this second phase the role of the civil administration is critical. And given our track record on governance this is going to be a challenge no less formidable than that of getting the area freed from Taliban control.
In the process we also have to look to the role that the electronic media, particularly radio, can play in getting a different kind of message across to the people in the camps as well as the many others deeply affected by this war in various ways. A concept note titled ‘school khuley hain’ that I recently came across is an eminently sensible proposal for the use of FM and medium-wave transmitters for continuing by other means the education of children in camps and in areas where the Taliban have destroyed schools.
The programmes would have to be engaging and instructive and might even end up being an improvement over the education currently available in most of our schools. Programmes for other audiences also need to be developed. It is ironic that for years we have appeared unable to jam the radio frequencies being used by the likes of Fazlullah to indoctrinate and intimidate the local population while at the same time developing no strategy for using the electronic media for our purposes.
At another level altogether there has to be a clearer understanding among our ruling elite not only of what is at stake but also what it will take to navigate our way out of this storm — not limited to the NWFP and FATA. Even as the military operation moves ahead, the widening gulf between Pakistan’s two major political parties, for instance, suggests a lack of clarity on one or both counts.
Abbas Rashid lives in Lahore and can be contacted at abbasrh@gmail.com
