By Ismail Khan
Saturday, 09 May, 2009
PESHAWAR: Army Chief Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani burnt the proverbial midnight oil, spending the early morning hours on Thursday with his senior military aides at the General Headquarters in Rawalpindi, to give final touches to the operational plan of Rah-i-Haq-II in the militancy-plagued Swat.
Barely a few hours later, he told his commanders at the 118th Corps Commanders Conference that the present security situation requires that all elements of national power should work in close harmony to fight the menace of terrorism and extremism.
The plan to fight the menace of terrorism and extremism in Swat had begun in the right earnest. That day, when Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani went on the national television to announce a full-scale military operation against militants in Swat, the military had already swung into action to hit some of the targets selected earlier in the day.
Much water has flown under the bridge; the military wants us to believe. The action, this time, it says, will be decisive. But let there be no illusion, we are warned, this is going to be a long and hard battle.
The militants, said to be numbering 4,000, further reinforced by their comrades in arms from Bajaur led by Maulana Faqir Mohammed (a key lieutenant to the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan chief, Baitullah Mehsud) who had agreed to lay down arms and surrender to the government in a peace deal with tribal elders in March, have virtually taken over the entire Swat valley.
All major roads, including those leading into the regional headquarters of Mingora, have been heavily mined. Militants have descended from their mountain top positions and moved into urban areas, raising the spectre of an urban guerrilla warfare that may entail a virtual house-to-house combat and cause collateral damage.
There were few takers of the NWFP government peace agreement with Maulana Sufi Mohammad on February 16 because of scepticism about the ability of the hardline cleric to persuade militants to lay down arms and help restore the writ of the state.
Senior military officers and leaders of the ruling political party in the NWFP now say that they were never convinced about the ability of Sufi Mohammad to deliver, but the Nizam-i-Adl Regulation, 2009 was something that was necessary to address the aspiration of people in Malakand.
By all accounts, the militants seized the opportunity to take over the remaining few areas outside their control and make ingress into the neighbouring districts of Lower Dir and Buner. A further push would have brought them to the brink of Peshawar valley.
POLITICAL SUPPORT
Perhaps the only mileage, argue backers of the now dead peace agreement, is the political disarming of the Taliban in Swat by denying them the slogan of fighting for sharia. And this has, without any doubt, brought with it the much-needed and crucial political and public support to deliver the knock-out punch on the militants in the valley.
But this has come at a terrible cost of losing large swathes of territory to the militants, a further expansion of the war-theatre and exodus of hundreds of thousands of people.
QUESTIONS COMES TO MIND
Did the government err in its judgment by betting on the wrong horse in the shape of Maulana Sufi Muhammad? The answer is an unequivocal yes.
Why did the government have to wait as the Taliban reinforced their ranks and continued with their activities leaving little doubt as to their designs to expand in all directions, not just the neighbouring districts but also threatening to cut off the strategic Karakoram Highway? A little further push and they would have been sitting on top of Pakistans biggest hydel-power generating stations.
Furthermore, why did the government have to wait, instead of taking immediate action when intelligence reports poured in, bringing into question the role of the now-former commissioner of Malakand in the militants spillover into Buner?
In the larger context, why did the government not make an accurate assessment of the Talibans expansionist designs and the possible fallout of the peace agreement in Swat on other districts? After all, this was not the first agreement and not the last one to collapse.
Perhaps the biggest conspiracy against Pakistan, as one commentator put it, is not how the world powers want to dismember the country but the incompetence of those at the helm. We are reacting to the events and not responding to the threats, the commentator said.
Apparently, complacency gave way to urgency and seriousness when reports of a Taliban advance within 60 miles of the federal capital triggered alarm bells in the corridors of power.
But as the military machine lumbers into the militant- and mine-infested Swat with fresh force induction from Mingora and adjoining Shangla district, senior military officials say they now have better intelligence and better plans to root out militancy.
Aware of the public perception that the military had been playing ducks and drakes with opportunities to root out the Taliban, senior military officers say their mission is very clear; eliminate the militants and wrestle back control of the lost valley for the government.
On the face of it, the plan seemed pretty tight, including force deployment, choking off supplies lines, throwing a security ring to ensure there is no spillover. But the success of the military operation may hinge on factors beyond the military control.
First, the speed at which the military offensive is taken forward and the success it achieves. The longer the military operation continues, the higher will be the risk of fatigue in public and political support. Any setback in the initial stages may prove to be counter-productive both in terms of morale and public support.
Second, and more importantly, the ability or inability of the military to take out the core leadership would not only largely determine the shape and direction of the battle in Swat but also the credibility of the action and support of the people in Swat in this high-stake war.
Perhaps equally critical, says one analyst, to the success of the military operation will be the handling and rehabilitation of the internally displaced people from Malakand.
And last but not the least, the ability of the government to handle the possible fallout and reaction of the TTP leadership elsewhere, mainly of Baitullah Mehsud, in the form of suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks, and to hold, sustain and further consolidate public support, will play a critical role in shaping up events in Swat.
As the military enters its third round of action in Swat, the battle is crucial not for the military but also for the political leadership to establish not just the writ of the state but also their credibility in the eyes of an increasingly sceptical and cynical public to improve not just security but also governance.
