Operation Rah-e-Nijat

[fatman17]

The Taliban responded by setting up complex ambushes, including surface-to-air missile traps, a senior US military intelligence official told The Long War Journal. Several Pakistani Army helicopters were said to have been shot down during the fighting. The Pakistani military claimed that 120 Taliban and 45 soldiers were killed in the fighting, but independent reports put the number of soldiers killed much higher.

what total crap! - only 1 cobra has been lost because of technical fault! 1-puma and 1-bell 412 were lost due to accidents not related to s and n waziristan!

 

[fatman17]

^OTOH, PAF is flying minimum of 50-60 sorties daily using F-16s and Mirages targeting militant hideouts using MK-82/84 bombs.

 

[fatman17]

Endgame closing in on Baitullah

Baitullah Mehsud has had his opponent Qari Zainuddin murdered in Dera Ismail Khan for disclosing facts about him that he had denied. If this is a measure of how Baitullah will react to his diminishing hold over his objectors, then he is sure to kill another local rival Turkistan Bitani who had made public his criminal activities last week. Does this mean that Baitullah is gaining the upper hand in the region where the Pakistan Army is now challenging him with an operation? The fact to keep in mind is that Zainuddin and Bitani were encouraged to speak out because of the hope revived in them by the military operation. That Baitullah has had to kill Zainuddin instead of ignoring him as in the past points to his growing insecurity.

Pakistan has been opposed to the American drone attacks on its territory, but not without some evidence that the local population living under the heel of Baitullah Mehsud did not mind them. There was a time when the drones did not target Baitullah simply because he was not attacking American troops across the Durand Line. This was a tactic of keeping down the number of people operating in Afghanistan through the “incentive” of “non-strikes”. Now that pattern is changing and the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is feeling the heat of missiles coming from the drones. On Tuesday, these missiles killed at least 51 Taliban in South Waziristan, where the army is poised for an attack on Baitullah’s stronghold.

South Waziristan under attack is going to expose a whole lot of people hiding there and operating in neighbouring countries. The estimates about the strength of the people Baitullah has under arms keep changing; so do the estimates about the funds he has at his disposal. He is now said to have approximately 20,000 militants. There was a time when people thought he could mobilise 50,000. Only the “foreigners” he was protecting were supposed to be 5,000. To the number of Uzbeks, Arabs, Chechens and Uighurs have been added a number of Tajiks who are fighting against the Uzbek-dominated regime of Tajikistan. Uzbekistan has suffered a number of attacks guided from South Waziristan by Qari Tahir Yuldashev of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Baitullah has also allegedly used IMU men to kill the innocent people of Swat.

Before the decision to mount a military operation against him, Baitullah enjoyed the kind of grudging recognition that tyrants enjoy when they are unchallenged. The mere fact that the army has decided to go for him has changed that point of view. The greatest weakness suffered by him is the loss of support from the people of Pakistan who now consider him a threat to the state and to Islam itself. Not only have his opponents come out of their hiding to speak out against him, his suicide-bombers are being caught “before the fact” in all the vulnerable cities of Pakistan because of the slackening of the will to die for someone who is no longer a model for them.

Perhaps it was a wrong strategy to mop up his lieutenants on the margins and leave him alone at the centre to gradually suffer a waning of his power. Fazlullah in Swat and other commanders in Bajaur and Orakzai were engaged simply because they were more manageable as targets in territories considered easy terrain. That strategy has partly paid off because the commanders have tended to run away to South Waziristan after being defeated in their regions. But the decision to go for South Waziristan is without a doubt more effective in lowering the prestige and outreach of TTP in the whole of Pakistan. TTP minions who cut a man’s both hands in Hangu on Tuesday for theft will be sorted out after Baitullah has got his comeuppance from the army. *

Second Editorial: Between ‘capability’ and ‘intent’

President Asif Ali Zardari has once again stated to a European news agency that India is no longer a military threat to Pakistan, while “the Taliban threaten not only the world, but also our way of life”. Then he added something that lies at the crux of the debate going on in Pakistan on the reality of the Indian threat: “The question is that India has the capability. Capability is what matters.”

He was referring to a fact of military strategy in which the states cannot afford to make subjective judgements about the intent to attack. It is accepted by all military thinkers that to assess threat from a state it is safer to look at the level of military preparedness of the said state rather than searching for intent that may not be clearly expressed. This truth has been derived from the fact that if a state has the intent to attack, its lack of capability will hamper its action.

Of course not all states can live in the world like that. Each state must define what it means by threat and the way it can defuse it. For instance, such a threat perception is not viable between two friendly states with unequal capability for attack. Should Canada look at the United States as potential attacker simply because it has the capability to attack? On the other extreme, how should one assess a state that lacks capability but has substantiated its “intent” to attack?

Pakistan doesn’t have the capability to attack India but has stood up against that state time and again. Should the military strategist abandon the yardstick of “capability” and adhere to the reality of “intent”? Pakistan seems to have stood a military concept on its head, even if its policy has claimed to rise out of an anticipation of Indian attack assessed on the basis of the latter’s capability.

It is in this perspective that President Zardari has had to repudiate Pakistan’s “intent” to attack India. The sub-text is that if Pakistan has attacked in the past out of fear then that fear has disappeared. Some people may not like this assertion but the jurisprudence of war between India and Pakistan tells us that Pakistan, on the basis of its “grand narrative”, has experienced “fear” in the past. Its assertion that it no longer feels that way opens the door for a dialogue of peace between the two neighbouring states. *

http://thedailytimes.com.pk

 

[Imran Khan]

 

[Imran Khan]

 

[waraich66]

Endgame closing in on Baitullah

Baitullah Mehsud has had his opponent Qari Zainuddin murdered in Dera Ismail Khan for disclosing facts about him that he had denied. If this is a measure of how Baitullah will react to his diminishing hold over his objectors, then he is sure to kill another local rival Turkistan Bitani who had made public his criminal activities last week. Does this mean that Baitullah is gaining the upper hand in the region where the Pakistan Army is now challenging him with an operation? The fact to keep in mind is that Zainuddin and Bitani were encouraged to speak out because of the hope revived in them by the military operation. That Baitullah has had to kill Zainuddin instead of ignoring him as in the past points to his growing insecurity.

Pakistan has been opposed to the American drone attacks on its territory, but not without some evidence that the local population living under the heel of Baitullah Mehsud did not mind them. There was a time when the drones did not target Baitullah simply because he was not attacking American troops across the Durand Line. This was a tactic of keeping down the number of people operating in Afghanistan through the “incentive” of “non-strikes”. Now that pattern is changing and the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is feeling the heat of missiles coming from the drones. On Tuesday, these missiles killed at least 51 Taliban in South Waziristan, where the army is poised for an attack on Baitullah’s stronghold.

South Waziristan under attack is going to expose a whole lot of people hiding there and operating in neighbouring countries. The estimates about the strength of the people Baitullah has under arms keep changing; so do the estimates about the funds he has at his disposal. He is now said to have approximately 20,000 militants. There was a time when people thought he could mobilise 50,000. Only the “foreigners” he was protecting were supposed to be 5,000. To the number of Uzbeks, Arabs, Chechens and Uighurs have been added a number of Tajiks who are fighting against the Uzbek-dominated regime of Tajikistan. Uzbekistan has suffered a number of attacks guided from South Waziristan by Qari Tahir Yuldashev of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Baitullah has also allegedly used IMU men to kill the innocent people of Swat.

Before the decision to mount a military operation against him, Baitullah enjoyed the kind of grudging recognition that tyrants enjoy when they are unchallenged. The mere fact that the army has decided to go for him has changed that point of view. The greatest weakness suffered by him is the loss of support from the people of Pakistan who now consider him a threat to the state and to Islam itself. Not only have his opponents come out of their hiding to speak out against him, his suicide-bombers are being caught “before the fact” in all the vulnerable cities of Pakistan because of the slackening of the will to die for someone who is no longer a model for them.

Perhaps it was a wrong strategy to mop up his lieutenants on the margins and leave him alone at the centre to gradually suffer a waning of his power. Fazlullah in Swat and other commanders in Bajaur and Orakzai were engaged simply because they were more manageable as targets in territories considered easy terrain. That strategy has partly paid off because the commanders have tended to run away to South Waziristan after being defeated in their regions. But the decision to go for South Waziristan is without a doubt more effective in lowering the prestige and outreach of TTP in the whole of Pakistan. TTP minions who cut a man’s both hands in Hangu on Tuesday for theft will be sorted out after Baitullah has got his comeuppance from the army. *

Second Editorial: Between ‘capability’ and ‘intent’

President Asif Ali Zardari has once again stated to a European news agency that India is no longer a military threat to Pakistan, while “the Taliban threaten not only the world, but also our way of life”. Then he added something that lies at the crux of the debate going on in Pakistan on the reality of the Indian threat: “The question is that India has the capability. Capability is what matters.”

He was referring to a fact of military strategy in which the states cannot afford to make subjective judgements about the intent to attack. It is accepted by all military thinkers that to assess threat from a state it is safer to look at the level of military preparedness of the said state rather than searching for intent that may not be clearly expressed. This truth has been derived from the fact that if a state has the intent to attack, its lack of capability will hamper its action.

Of course not all states can live in the world like that. Each state must define what it means by threat and the way it can defuse it. For instance, such a threat perception is not viable between two friendly states with unequal capability for attack. Should Canada look at the United States as potential attacker simply because it has the capability to attack? On the other extreme, how should one assess a state that lacks capability but has substantiated its “intent” to attack?

Pakistan doesn’t have the capability to attack India but has stood up against that state time and again. Should the military strategist abandon the yardstick of “capability” and adhere to the reality of “intent”? Pakistan seems to have stood a military concept on its head, even if its policy has claimed to rise out of an anticipation of Indian attack assessed on the basis of the latter’s capability.

It is in this perspective that President Zardari has had to repudiate Pakistan’s “intent” to attack India. The sub-text is that if Pakistan has attacked in the past out of fear then that fear has disappeared. Some people may not like this assertion but the jurisprudence of war between India and Pakistan tells us that Pakistan, on the basis of its “grand narrative”, has experienced “fear” in the past. Its assertion that it no longer feels that way opens the door for a dialogue of peace between the two neighbouring states. *

http://thedailytimes.com.pk

PA should be vegilant on both eastern boarders and western boarders Indian army is now in front and back yard of Pakistan,it is very critical time for us , they used same tactics in 1971 first creat insurgency through makti bhani then encirle our army finally paratrooper landed before fall of Dhaka.

 

[courageneverdies]

Rawalpindi - June 25, 2009:

Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani today had a day long visit to South Waziristan Agency to spend time with field commanders and troops deployed in the area. On arrival in the area, he was received by the Corps Commander.

During the informal discussion with troops, COAS appreciated their performance and high morale. He also offered fateha for the shaheeds of recent operations. He was also briefed in detail by the respective General Officer Commanding.

COAS stated that Pakistan Army is executing a deliberate 'Campaign Plan' to achieve the desired end state of re-establishing the writ of the state while ensuring minimum loss to life and damage to property. He thanked the people of Pakistan for their whole hearted Support. He also paid rich tributes to the role of Pakistan Air Force in the ongoing operations. He appreciated the support of local tribes and urged them to use their full influence to rid the area of terrorists.

Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani meeting with troops during his visit to South Waziristan Agency on Thursday. (25-6-2009) – Photo ISPR

---

KIT Over n Out

 

[Imran Khan]

 

[fatman17]

insight: Casualties and pro-active operations —Ejaz Haider

Despite all these difficulties, the army must strive to procure equipment for the foot-soldier, make him an expert in the use of such equipment and the handling of general purpose weapons and develop SOPs and drills to minimise casualties,

In the ongoing operations in Swat, Lower Dir, Buner and the forays into Waziristan, the army has so far lost 144 officers and men; the toll for the injured stands at 450. Among those killed, the ratio of officers is about 10 percent, so nearly 14 have died so far.

Is this rate acceptable?

This is a difficult question; very difficult to answer. But before we get into this issue of what is acceptable and what not, let me flag one point. For those who remain sceptical about the genuineness of the operation(s), these figures should provide the occasion for review.

These figures should also provide an answer to those analysts, inside and outside, who never tire of questioning whether the army and the ISI are on the same page. Unless the DG-ISI is fighting a covert war against the COAS and getting his operatives to help those who are killing the officers and men under the overall command of the army chief, logic would dictate that both are on the same wavelength.

Also, since the DG-ISI serves at the pleasure of the army chief and the ISI’s upper echelon belongs to the three services, including the army, it would stretch one’s imagination to think that a subordinate organisation, even a spy agency, is plotting against the army and getting brother officers and men killed in the process.

But since other than logic seems to be at work in such sceptical assumptions, we shall move on to the issue of casualty rate of the army.

Ideally, every man who falls is a life lost, a family traumatised. But soldiering involves a clear understanding that some day one might be called upon to kill and get killed. A civilian is called a soft target because a civilian does not bind himself to managing or perpetrating violence through such an understanding.

The upshot is that soldiers, in a conflict, do get killed; many more sustain injuries, some are left disabled for life.

Even so, the entire thrust of training during peacetime revolves around developing skills, standard operating procedures and battle drills to keep casualties to a minimum. The entire exercise involves multiple training regimens because no matter how sound the plan — and leaving aside the truism that in any conflict the first casualty is the plan — it is effective execution that ultimately matters, and effective execution involves a range of coordinated activities among elements from fighting and supporting arms and services.

The irregular war the army is fighting, where the adversary begins with an asymmetric advantage over the soldier, requires constant innovation — the need to stay ahead of the opponent. Not an easy thing to do since irregular war essentially presupposes a combination of conventional and unconventional fighting and techniques.

Let’s consider some of the reasons for army casualties. Two stand out: IEDs (improvised explosive devices) and sniping. The third reasons is ambush, which can involve the use of IEDs, snipers and a body of men positioned to take on a convoy at a point of their own choosing (this is what happened two days ago in North Waziristan).

The fourth reason for casualties is ground assaults to capture entrenched positions, especially in built-up areas, orchards and on heights. Attacking troops always have a disadvantage, even when the attacker is using area weapons (and aerial platforms) to soften positions or destroy the enemy’s cover to make the use of general purpose weapons more effective.

The army has used direct fire from tanks to hit houses or visible enemy locations; fire from the tanks’ co-axel guns to clear orchards; indirect artillery fire and TOW (tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided) missiles from Cobra helicopter gunships and in some cases jet fighters. But all said, ground has to be captured and that involves, at the end of the day, boots on the ground. That is where the real danger lies.

Clearing heights is another problem area. The planner can decide to roll up or use helis to land troops on the heights to roll down. Both courses of action have their own downsides and it is difficult to avoid casualties.

To be sure, the army uses jammers with vehicles during convoy movement, especially when the movement is large. But the adversary can work around this by finding a vehicle that is outside the range of the jammers or use wires to activate the IED. Sometimes wires can get entangled with a vehicle’s tyres and activate the device.

Similarly, while large movements are covered from the air, it is difficult to provide that kind of cover to every movement. Also, even when cover is provided, it is virtually impossible for it to be all-pervasive. No area can be hermetically sealed or sanitised. All it takes are a couple of snipers to take out two or three soldiers.

That’s the nub of the matter. The adversary doesn’t have to win. He just has to ensure that the other side doesn’t. This is why, while it is important for the Taliban fighters — I use the term Taliban generically — to retain control of territory already under their control, they can afford to withdraw if and when the going gets tough. They don’t have to necessarily strike as part of a larger plan; they can also strike just simply to kill. That’s exactly what happened to the police and FC contingent in Buner in which Captain Mairaj of 12 Cavalry was killed.

The Taliban could not hope to exploit that operation as part of a larger plan. But they could kill and show that things haven’t returned to normal. And they did that.

Despite all these difficulties, the army must strive to procure equipment for the foot-soldier, make him an expert in the use of such equipment and the handling of general purpose weapons and develop SOPs and drills to minimise casualties. It has to stay ahead of the adversary in terms of innovations and initiative.

Yet, all said and done, pro-active operations will always beget casualties, especially given any number of hostile factors, not least the horrendous terrain and a porous border. The only way to avoid them is to garrison oneself and let the countryside go to the dogs. That is not really an option.

Ejaz Haider is Consulting Editor of The Friday Times and Op-Ed Editor of Daily Times. He can be reached at sapper@dailytimes.com.pk

 

[muse]

Security forces stretched thin for Baitullah Mehsud battle

ISLAMABAD: Consolidating military gains in Swat and worries about Taliban spillover from south Afghanistan are clouding Pakistani security forces’ offensive against Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan chief Baitullah Mehsud, analysts say.

In mid-June, the military said it had received orders and was preparing to launch an offensive against Mehsud and his network in South Waziristan.

Troops have sealed off much of the eastern border between South Waziristan and areas under government control, and carried out air raids to soften up for a full-scale ground operation.

The security forces say they have eliminated the Taliban in Buner, Dir and Swat. But deadly skirmishes continue.

“The army has to consolidate Swat and help maintain security so that the IDPs could return without any fear that the Taliban would come back,” former interior minister Hamid Nawaz told AFP.

“My assessment is that the army will remain in Swat until the civilian set-up is also consolidated and an intelligence network is in place,” the retired lieutenant general said. US envoy to the region Richard Holbrooke said he thought a Waziristan offensive had been delayed because of operations in Swat.

Defence analyst Talat Masood said, “This could be the consideration,” but argued the army would continue targeted airstrikes against Mehsud’s network, concentrated on perfect guerrilla terrain.

“They have always been hesitant to launch a full-scale operation in South Waziristan, because the conditions there are very different than Swat,” Masood said. “They would continue with limited targeted action.”

Military spokesman Major General Athar Abbas denied that Waziristan was on the back burner. “Military operations are of different forms... The areas around South Waziristan are sealed and aerial targeting is being done,” Abbas said. “We will decide upon the ground offensive at an appropriate time. We do not start operations because someone or media reports say so,” he said. afp

 

[waraich66]

Mahsud days are numbered, PA is finalizing the final attack plans, but casualties will be high on both sides.

 

[TaimiKhan]

To give a better idea about the waziristan situation and what PA is trying to do.

 

[Xeric]

insight: Casualties and pro-active operations —Ejaz Haider

Despite all these difficulties, the army must strive to procure equipment for the foot-soldier, make him an expert in the use of such equipment and the handling of general purpose weapons and develop SOPs and drills to minimise casualties,

In the ongoing operations in Swat, Lower Dir, Buner and the forays into Waziristan, the army has so far lost 144 officers and men; the toll for the injured stands at 450. Among those killed, the ratio of officers is about 10 percent, so nearly 14 have died so far.

Is this rate acceptable?

This is a difficult question; very difficult to answer. But before we get into this issue of what is acceptable and what not, let me flag one point. For those who remain sceptical about the genuineness of the operation(s), these figures should provide the occasion for review.

These figures should also provide an answer to those analysts, inside and outside, who never tire of questioning whether the army and the ISI are on the same page. Unless the DG-ISI is fighting a covert war against the COAS and getting his operatives to help those who are killing the officers and men under the overall command of the army chief, logic would dictate that both are on the same wavelength.

Also, since the DG-ISI serves at the pleasure of the army chief and the ISI’s upper echelon belongs to the three services, including the army, it would stretch one’s imagination to think that a subordinate organisation, even a spy agency, is plotting against the army and getting brother officers and men killed in the process.

But since other than logic seems to be at work in such sceptical assumptions, we shall move on to the issue of casualty rate of the army.

Ideally, every man who falls is a life lost, a family traumatised. But soldiering involves a clear understanding that some day one might be called upon to kill and get killed. A civilian is called a soft target because a civilian does not bind himself to managing or perpetrating violence through such an understanding.

The upshot is that soldiers, in a conflict, do get killed; many more sustain injuries, some are left disabled for life.

Even so, the entire thrust of training during peacetime revolves around developing skills, standard operating procedures and battle drills to keep casualties to a minimum. The entire exercise involves multiple training regimens because no matter how sound the plan — and leaving aside the truism that in any conflict the first casualty is the plan — it is effective execution that ultimately matters, and effective execution involves a range of coordinated activities among elements from fighting and supporting arms and services.

The irregular war the army is fighting, where the adversary begins with an asymmetric advantage over the soldier, requires constant innovation — the need to stay ahead of the opponent. Not an easy thing to do since irregular war essentially presupposes a combination of conventional and unconventional fighting and techniques.

Let’s consider some of the reasons for army casualties. Two stand out: IEDs (improvised explosive devices) and sniping. The third reasons is ambush, which can involve the use of IEDs, snipers and a body of men positioned to take on a convoy at a point of their own choosing (this is what happened two days ago in North Waziristan).

The fourth reason for casualties is ground assaults to capture entrenched positions, especially in built-up areas, orchards and on heights. Attacking troops always have a disadvantage, even when the attacker is using area weapons (and aerial platforms) to soften positions or destroy the enemy’s cover to make the use of general purpose weapons more effective.

The army has used direct fire from tanks to hit houses or visible enemy locations; fire from the tanks’ co-axel guns to clear orchards; indirect artillery fire and TOW (tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided) missiles from Cobra helicopter gunships and in some cases jet fighters. But all said, ground has to be captured and that involves, at the end of the day, boots on the ground. That is where the real danger lies.

Clearing heights is another problem area. The planner can decide to roll up or use helis to land troops on the heights to roll down. Both courses of action have their own downsides and it is difficult to avoid casualties.

To be sure, the army uses jammers with vehicles during convoy movement, especially when the movement is large. But the adversary can work around this by finding a vehicle that is outside the range of the jammers or use wires to activate the IED. Sometimes wires can get entangled with a vehicle’s tyres and activate the device.

Similarly, while large movements are covered from the air, it is difficult to provide that kind of cover to every movement. Also, even when cover is provided, it is virtually impossible for it to be all-pervasive. No area can be hermetically sealed or sanitised. All it takes are a couple of snipers to take out two or three soldiers.

That’s the nub of the matter. The adversary doesn’t have to win. He just has to ensure that the other side doesn’t. This is why, while it is important for the Taliban fighters — I use the term Taliban generically — to retain control of territory already under their control, they can afford to withdraw if and when the going gets tough. They don’t have to necessarily strike as part of a larger plan; they can also strike just simply to kill. That’s exactly what happened to the police and FC contingent in Buner in which Captain Mairaj of 12 Cavalry was killed.

The Taliban could not hope to exploit that operation as part of a larger plan. But they could kill and show that things haven’t returned to normal. And they did that.

Despite all these difficulties, the army must strive to procure equipment for the foot-soldier, make him an expert in the use of such equipment and the handling of general purpose weapons and develop SOPs and drills to minimise casualties. It has to stay ahead of the adversary in terms of innovations and initiative.

Yet, all said and done, pro-active operations will always beget casualties, especially given any number of hostile factors, not least the horrendous terrain and a porous border. The only way to avoid them is to garrison oneself and let the countryside go to the dogs. That is not really an option.

Ejaz Haider is Consulting Editor of The Friday Times and Op-Ed Editor of Daily Times. He can be reached at sapper@dailytimes.com.pk

i would not dwell upon the casualty rate (Officers) mentioned in the article. It may be high or lower than the actual, but this should serve as an eye opener for certain blind folds who had doubts over, both the dedication of the military to fight out these buggers and also for those who think Officers' casualty rates are lower than their men.

The Army has been maintaining a fine casualty rate since the '65 war. It includes the '71 and Kargil episode. The military higher-ups have been satisfied with it and this time too during the current casualty rate of Officers is acceptable, though the one mentioned in the above article may not be accurate.

Each and every cadre of the Army has come up to the expectations of the Nation. This includes both the Officers and their Men. They have fought well and we all are proud of them. Together the Men and Leaders of our Army are no doubt are an invincible force to reckon with!!

Salute to all those have fallen and prays for those who still stand to be honored another day!!

 

[TaimiKhan]

PESHAWAR: A missile believed to have been fired by a US drone aircraft struck the house of Pakistani Taliban chief Baitullah Mehsud’s father-in-law on Wednesday, killing at least one woman, a relative said.

US missile attacks on Mehsud territory in the South Waziristan tribal region have become more frequent in the past month and Pakistan has also bombarded the militant stronghold with air raids and medium range artillery.

Mehsud’s whereabouts were not known at the time. The relative who spoke to Reuters did not want to be identified. —Reuters

 

[fatman17]

FACTBOX - U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan

Sat Jul 11, 2009

ISLAMABAD (Reuters) - A pilotless U.S. drone fired two missiles into a Taliban communication center in an ethnic Pashtun tribal region on the Afghan border, killing five militants, intelligence officials said Saturday.

The attack on the center run by Baitullah Mehsud, Pakistani Taliban chief and an al Qaeda ally, took place late Friday in the South Waziristan region.

Here are some facts about the U.S. missile attacks, the controversy they have caused, and a list of some of the more prominent militants killed, according to Pakistani officials.

WHY DOES THE UNITED STATES ATTACK?

Many al Qaeda members and Taliban fled to northwestern Pakistan's ungoverned ethnic Pashtun belt after U.S.-led soldiers ousted Afghanistan's Taliban government in 2001. From their sanctuaries there the militants have orchestrated insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The United States and Afghanistan have pressed Pakistan to eliminate the sanctuaries. Apparently frustrated by Pakistan's inability to do so, the United States is hitting the militants itself.

HOW MANY ATTACKS?

The United States has carried out about 48 drone air strikes since the beginning of last year, most since September, killing about 465 people, including many foreign militants, according to a tally of reports from Pakistani intelligence agents, district government officials and residents.

SOME OF THE PEOPLE REPORTED KILLED

January 28, 2008 - A senior al Qaeda member, Abu Laith al-Libi, was killed in a strike in North Waziristan.

July 28 - An al Qaeda chemical and biological weapons expert, Abu Khabab al-Masri, was killed in South Waziristan.

November 22 - Rashid Rauf, a Briton with al Qaeda links and the suspected ringleader of a 2006 plot to blow up airliners over the Atlantic, was killed in an attack in North Waziristan. An Egyptian named as Abu Zubair al-Masri was said to be among the dead in the same attack.

January 1, 2009 - A U.S. drone killed three foreign fighters in South Waziristan, Pakistani agents said. A week later, a U.S. counter-terrorism official said al Qaeda's operational chief Usama al-Kini and an aide had been killed in South Waziristan. The U.S. official declined to say how or when they died.

WHERE ARE THE DRONES LAUNCHED FROM?

A senior U.S. lawmaker, Senator Dianne Feinstein, told a U.S. Senate hearing in February that drones were being operated and flown from an air base inside Pakistan. Pakistan denied that, saying there was no permission for the strikes, nor had there ever been.

U.S. POSITION

The United States has shrugged off Pakistani protests. It says the missile strikes are carried out under an agreement with Islamabad which allows Pakistani leaders to decry the attacks in public.

U.S. officials also say the United States has been giving Pakistan data on militants in the Afghan border area gathered by surveillance drones in Pakistani airspace under an agreement with Pakistan.

PAKISTAN'S POSITION

Although the army is preparing an offensive against Mehsud, Pakistan officially objects to the drone strikes, saying they violate its sovereignty and undermine efforts to deal with militancy because they inflame public anger and bolster support for the fighters.

Pakistan denies that the drone attacks are carried out under a secret agreement. It also denies any agreement under which it gets data from U.S. surveillance drones. Pakistan has pressed the United States to provide it with drones to allow it to conduct its own anti-militant operations.

(Compiled by Islamabad Newsroom; Editing by Robert Birsel and Sugita Katyal)


© Thomson Reuters 2009