The hunt for Hakimullah
Tuesday, January 19, 2010
Rahimullah Yusufzai
Imagine a most-wanted man listening to the radio carrying reports of his death and hearing not very well-informed analysts talking about its consequences. All this sounds bizarre, but this is what seems to have happened on Jan 14 when the CIA fired its drones to kill Pakistani Taliban commander Hakimullah Mahsud in the remote Shaktoi area in South Waziristan.
Hakimullah survived, claiming that he wasn't even there at the time of the attack and contradicting his spokesman, Azam Tariq, who had earlier said that the "ameer," or head, was in Shaktoi but had left before the pilotless US spy planes struck the mountainous village.
In an audiotape released later to the media, Hakimullah made fun of reporters and analysts who reported and analysed his death. He didn't realise that the media, hungry for news but lacking access to the military-controlled theatre of war, was merely reporting the claim of unnamed Pakistani security officials who were confidently saying that Hakimullah had been killed. It was strange that the US authorities weren't ready to make any such claim, but Pakistani officials, apparently not even taken into confidence about the attack, were excitedly announcing Hakimullah's death.
This wasn't the first time that wrong claims were made about the death of some most-wanted militants, such as Baitullah Mahsud, Qari Hussain, Maulana Fazlullah, Shah Dauran and Faqir Mohammad. Such claims are still being made and the media duly reports whatever it is told, without bothering, or being able, to check and crosscheck facts. The handicapped media sometimes also reports the wild claims made by the militants. Journalism has been in most cases reduced to reporting from a safe distance the claims and counter-claims of parties to the conflict.
In Hakimullah's case, Interior Minister Rahman Malik repeatedly claimed last year that he had been killed in a shootout with supporters of another Taliban commander, Waliur Rahman, following a dispute over the succession of Baitullah. Even when it became obvious that Hakimullah was alive and that no clash had even taken place between his men and Waliur Rahman's after Baitullah's death in a US drone strike on Aug 5, the minister kept insisting that Hakimullah's brother, having a close resemblance with him, had taken his place and was giving interviews to the media.
As far as Hakimullah is concerned, he escaped the attack in question, and he may have survived strikes in the past. So he remains a major target, both for the US and Pakistani armies. He was already public enemy number one of the Pakistani government after claims of responsibility by his Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) for most of the suicide attacks and bombings against security forces and law-enforcement agencies in the country.
The military operation in South Waziristan last October was specifically launched against his group to wrest control of the Mahsud tribal territory and deny sanctuaries to local and foreign militants and terrorists aligned to it.
Hakimullah is also on the hit-list of the US, but he earned further American wrath when he was seen recently in a videotape with Jordanian suicide bomber Dr Humam Khalil al-Balawi, who killed seven CIA agents and caused injuries to another six in a suicide attack in late December in a secret base in Afghanistan's Khost province. The dramatic increase in US missile strikes in the aftermath of the suicide bombing at the CIA station, first in North and then South Waziristan, is evidence enough that revenge is the major motive for these attacks.
The CIA, which primarily operates the missile-fitted spy planes, will continue to hunt Hakimullah, using every resource at its disposal, because it must avenge the loss of its seven agents to raise the morale of its employees. Both the CIA and the US army are convinced that the Khost suicide bombing was planned in Waziristan with assistance from Taliban militants.
Hakimullah may not have played any significant role in planning the suicide bombing, but he provided evidence of his involvement by agreeing to appear in the video with Dr al-Balawi. The Jordanian in his farewell statement also made it clear that he was undertaking the suicide mission to avenge the death of the late TTP head Baitullah and the suicide attack was thus seen as a joint operation.
Twice in three days recently, US drones attacked suspected hideouts of militants in Shaktoi in the hope of eliminating Hakimullah. More than 30 people were killed in these attacks, apparently mostly Pakistani tribal militants, but the prime target managed to get away. Taliban sources conceded that improved intelligence about the whereabouts of their ranking figures was due to infiltration of their ranks by US and Pakistani government spies.
In a situation when Taliban fighters start suspecting their own colleagues, one could expect reprisals and beheadings of those accused of spying. Such a situation could sap the militants' morale, which already was low after their having lost strongholds in South Waziristan, the birthplace of the Pakistani Taliban, and in Bajaur, Mohmand, Swat and the rest of Malakand Division.
The TTP has also suffered setbacks in Orakzai Agency, which is critical for its operations in Peshawar, Kohat, Hangu and other place due to its central location. In fact, the decrease in the number of acts of terrorism in Peshawar and its surroundings is attributed to the military's advance into the Ferozkhel Mela area in Orakzai Agency and control of the approach roads to Peshawar and Kohat. The improved security, as a result of police sacrifices and vigilance in and around Peshawar, has also made it difficult for vehicle-borne suicide bombers to enter the city to attack targets.
Shaktoi's emergence as a new TTP sanctuary will force the security forces to try and seize its control. The military is claiming control of 80 per cent territory in the Mahsud-populated territory in South Waziristan, but its operations would be incomplete if it is unable to capture the remaining, and far tougher, mountainous and forested area where the militants have converged.
Shaktoi is near the boundary with North Waziristan, where the presence of Pakistani and foreign militants has become a bone of contention between the US and Pakistan as Washington is pushing Islamabad to start military action against the Haqqani network of the Afghan Taliban and their tribal allies. Until then, the US will continue drone attacks against all those tribal territories that are beyond the control of the Pakistani security forces.
The mild, and at times hollow, protests by Pakistan leaders and government functionaries including the president and the prime minister, won't change the US determination to go after the Pakistan-based militants who kill American and Nato soldiers and threaten to inflict defeat on the world's only superpower in Afghanistan.
Rather, the US policy to uses drones in Pakistan will continue as long as the Obama administration considers it an effective and essential part of its strategy to stabilise Afghanistan. It would be another matter that if the drone attacks kill far more other people than the few who are targeted, thereby further radicalising the population and contributing to the anti-US sentiment in Pakistan and the Muslim world.
Pakistan's stated policy opposing the US drone strikes is also hard to believe, considering the fact that these missile attacks have facilitated its own task by eliminating some of its most dangerous enemies, such as Baitullah and Haji Omar. Since the government itself was unable to get these militants, Islamabad would be pleased if Hakimullah and the other militants too were taken out by the American drones. This is one reason why many Pakistanis are convinced that the authorities are secretly cooperating with the US in carrying out the drone strikes, even though they publicly complain about it in a bid to calm down resentment among people.
It also explains the government and military's reluctance to follow the parliament's unanimous resolution against the US drone attacks and its recommendation for a peaceful resolution of the conflict in the NWFP and its tribal areas. That resolution wasn't meant to be implemented and the government's meaningless protests on this count shouldn't be taken seriously. And thus, for the foreseeable future, the US drone attacks and Pakistan's military operations in the tribal areas will continue, in the hope that the militants, after having lost all public support, will be eventually defeated.
The writer is resident editor of The News in Peshawar. Email: rahim
yusufzai@yahoo.com
