Operation Barbarossa: The Biggest Military Adventure in History

[Levina]

Signalian is what students of an army signals college call themselves who incidentally think that signal processing is the highest art form known to mankind. Though Sarge here is a gentleman through and through but there is an another turd on PDF who calls himself 'mourning sage' because he studies at a signals college. LOL

I know what it means.
My father was in the Signals regiment too.

 

[Deidara]

I know what it means.
My father was in the Signals regiment too.

Here they are not in army. They are the college alumni.

 

[farrukhnawaz]

Here they are not in army. They are the college alumni.

 

[mingle]

One of the most discussed analysis in Staff College, Quetta.

What they said about it regarding outcome of that operation .

 

[Signalian]

What they said about it regarding outcome of that operation .

Delay in starting.logistics failure due to long distances and weather. changing of initial planning. under estimating enemy determination and weapons.

 

[Desert Fox]

Its a bit of a hypothetical to be honest. While I agree focusing on grabbing the oil fields was probably the better strategy (in hindsight)...Hitler (plus a number of his generals who he unfortunately formed an echo chamber of) had a strong and valid reason for going after Stalingrad past just the name it bore (which has been overhyped by many historians I feel).

This was to guard the rear (and logistics chain) of the caucasus assault...a break (both bank control) of the volga river was needed at some point to accomplish this (given the supply route of the river +Caspian Sea for the Soviet forces to assault any weakness in the Caucasus supply chains both before and hypothetically afterwards too).

The mistake was in choosing an urban environment for this break (the name of Stalin in the city did tip this for Hitler)....but again its easy to see it in hindsight. At the time of the initial assault on Stalingrad, no one had any idea what sustained urban warfare would be like (it wasnt even really planned for by the Germans, they expected to conduct swift encirclement). Even Leningrad (closest parallel at the time) was effectively a partial siege. But the idea to take no chances in protecting the rear of the caucasus assault comes from sound strategy too (given the Germans had faced such problems in various theatres of barbarossa earlier). It was implemented badly (and with bias - a commanders worst enemy). In hindsight, a breach of the volga river could have been done at several other areas without a city to slow it down and act as an eventual quagmire and turning point.

By the time it had turned to a morass and logjam, Hitler valued saving face over sound strategic doctrine...and the rest they say is history.

@AUSTERLITZ @Levina @The Sandman @Desert Fox @Psychic @Vergennes@vostok

Your inputs if you have any regarding this?

Thanks for the tag. For some reason i did not get the notification on the mobile app. I agree with your analysis. I believe Hitler himself gave priority to Army group south's offensive in the Ukraine when he diverted Guderian's panzers to assist in the offensives there during the autumn of 1941 with the intention of eventually grabbing the oil fields in the Caucasus. He understood very well that a capture of Moscow would only serve as a symbolic victory. Soviet Union was too large and capturing Moscow would not have done anything to cripple Stalin's war machine when the oil supply fueling his air force and tank armies was left undisturbed (some 86% of Soviet oil came from Caucasus). The only way to cripple (or at least slow down) the Soviet war machine was to capture its main source of oil. Such a vctory would have dealt a major blow to Soviet offensive capabilities. I believe the Wehrmacht had a much better chance of defeating the Soviet Union if they had gone straight for the Caucasus region from the outset of Barbarossa when the Red Army was completely decimated and could not respond effectively instead of focusing their main thrust towards a capture of Moscow which turned out to be futile. After the failed attempt at Moscow the writing was on the wall for all to see that the next German attempt would be at the Caucasus but only this time the Red Army was rebuilt and well prepared to respond.

Stalingrad itself served as a major ready-made-fortress sitting on the strategic river Volga, perfect for guarding the rear of the axis armies fighting in the Caucasus. The OKW's biggest mistake was to underestimate the Soviet strength and allow the battle to drag on for as long as it did but this was due to faulty intelligence reports. Now, once the Soviet encirclement was complete there was possibility of a break out being successful initially while the soviet attack was still fresh. However Hitler was against this due to the fact that a retreat now would leave Axis troops in the Caucasus sealed off and endanger the costly initiative to take the caucasus not to mention irreplaceable heavy equipment would have to be abandoned as well. It was a damned if you do, damned if you don't kind of situation. However there was a belief that the better option would be if the 6th Army remained in Stalingrad the Luftwaffe would be able to continuously resupply them and keep the Red Army's divisions bogged down until a breakthrough force could relieve the 6th army but the effort fell short of delivering the necessary amount of supplies to keep the 6th army afloat.

Also most historians tend to neglect the effects of aristocratic traitors within the German high command who deliberately ignored Hitler's orders and at times outright sabotaged them like when General Halder disobeyed Hitler and deployed the 22nd Panzer division to fight in the city instead of reinforcing its weak Italian flank (where Hitler ordered it to be deployed and where the Red army focused its main attack). After all Hitler to them was a lowly Austrian corporal who was threatening their exclusive social class with his socialistic policies back home. Of course after the war it was convenient for these same Generals to lump the entire blame of all of their failures during the war on a dead Hitler. A dead man makes an easy scapegoat.



@Psychic @The Sandman

 

[Psychic]

Thanks for the tag. For some reason i did not get the notification on the mobile app. I agree with your analysis. I believe Hitler himself gave priority to Army group south's offensive in the Ukraine when he diverted Guderian's panzers to assist in the offensives there during the autumn of 1941 with the intention of eventually grabbing the oil fields in the Caucasus. He understood very well that a capture of Moscow would only serve as a symbolic victory. Soviet Union was too large and capturing Moscow would not have done anything to cripple Stalin's war machine when the oil supply fueling his air force and tank armies was left undisturbed (some 86% of Soviet oil came from Caucasus). The only way to cripple (or at least slow down) the Soviet war machine was to capture its main source of oil. Such a vctory would have dealt a major blow to Soviet offensive capabilities. I believe the Wehrmacht had a much better chance of defeating the Soviet Union if they had gone straight for the Caucasus region from the outset of Barbarossa when the Red Army was completely decimated and could not respond effectively instead of focusing their main thrust towards a capture of Moscow which turned out to be futile. After the failed attempt at Moscow the writing was on the wall for all to see that the next German attempt would be at the Caucasus but only this time the Red Army was rebuilt and well prepared to respond.

Stalingrad itself served as a major ready-made-fortress sitting on the strategic river Volga, perfect for guarding the rear of the axis armies fighting in the Caucasus. The OKW's biggest mistake was to underestimate the Soviet strength and allow the battle to drag on for as long as it did but this was due to faulty intelligence reports. Now, once the Soviet encirclement was complete there was possibility of a break out being successful initially while the soviet attack was still fresh. However Hitler was against this due to the fact that a retreat now would leave Axis troops in the Caucasus sealed off and endanger the costly initiative to take the caucasus not to mention irreplaceable heavy equipment would have to be abandoned as well. It was a damned if you do, damned if you don't kind of situation. However there was a belief that the better option would be if the 6th Army remained in Stalingrad the Luftwaffe would be able to continuously resupply them and keep the Red Army's divisions bogged down until a breakthrough force could relieve the 6th army but the effort fell short of delivering the necessary amount of supplies to keep the 6th army afloat.

Also most historians tend to neglect the effects of aristocratic traitors within the German high command who deliberately ignored Hitler's orders and at times outright sabotaged them like when General Halder disobeyed Hitler and deployed the 22nd Panzer division to fight in the city instead of reinforcing its weak flanks guarded by the Italians and Romanians (where Hitler ordered it to be deployed and where the Red army focused its main attack). After all Hitler to them was a lowly Austrian corporal who was threatening their exclusive social class with his socialistic policies back home. Of course after the war it was convenient for these same Generals to lump the entire blame of all of their failures during the war on a dead Hitler. A dead man makes an easy scapegoat.



@Psychic @The Sandman

But perhaps dividing the German forces was a mistake. The troops fighting in the Caucuses still had to make a hasty retreat after the Stalingrad debacle as the Russian divisions raced towards the Donets to seal off their escape route. It could have led to a catastrophe of an even greater magnitude. The continual treason at the OKW made the job of STAVKA a lot easier. The entire German plans were transmitted to the Russians, sometimes within hours of their formulation at the OKW.

Also most historians tend to neglect the effects of aristocratic traitors within the German high command who deliberately ignored Hitler's orders and at times outright sabotaged them like when General Halder disobeyed Hitler and deployed the 22nd Panzer division to fight in the city instead of reinforcing its weak flanks guarded by the Italians and Romanians (where Hitler ordered it to be deployed and where the Red army focused its main attack). After all Hitler to them was a lowly Austrian corporal who was threatening their exclusive social class with his socialistic policies back home. Of course after the war it was convenient for these same Generals to lump the entire blame of all of their failures during the war on a dead Hitler. A dead man makes an easy scapegoat.

"Victory has a thousand fathers, but defeat is an orphan."
People tend to neglect that Hitler forced certain plans upon his generals which ended in decisive victories like the blitzkreig in Poland, and the Manstein plan which led to the fall of France. Hitler also made many mistakes but people do not give him any credit for his bold plans which turned out to be successful.
It was Hitler who supported geniuses like Manstein, Guderian and Doenitz instead of old fashioned Generals. If those Prussian aristocrats, had the power, they would have never allowed revolutionary ideas like the formation of panzer divisions or the conduct of naval war by the means of submarines to be implemented.

 

[Desert Fox]

But perhaps dividing the German forces was a mistake. The troops fighting in the Caucuses still had to make a hasty retreat after the Stalingrad debacle as the Russian divisions raced towards the Donets to seal off their escape route. It could have led to a catastrophe of an even greater magnitude. The continual treason at the OKW made the job of STAVKA a lot easier. The entire German plans were transmitted to the Russians, sometimes within hours of their formulation at the OKW.

In hindsight this is true. I believe the perception within the OKW was that if the 6th Army could just hold out until a breakthrough force could be sent that would save the Wehrmacht from having to give up precious territory gained after much blood letting and sacrifices. Though eventually they ended up retreating regardless after the 6th Army capitulated. We know now that this could have been avoided had Hitler allowed a retreat for the 6th Army, but again hindsight is twenty-twenty, as they say.

Regarding the Soviets having prior knowledge of German plans this is certainly true. The Soviet spy network was the most sophisticated and soviet spies had infiltrated top positions of Western governments and military intelligence. But in Germany's case it was aristocratic officers who did most of the sabotaging and fed classified information to the British who in turn passed on the info to the Soviets. Wilhelm Canaris, the head of the Abwehr (German military intelligence) turned out to be a traitor. He was instrumental in convincing Franco to refuse Hitler's offer in joining the Axis which for Hitler was very crucial as that would deny British access to the Mediterranean through capturing the strategic Gibraltar Straights, thus making a quick German victory in North Africa a possibility. Had Franco joined the Axis this would have convinced Stalin to join as well seeing that an Axis victory against the British was solidified. What Canaris did caused great harm to German foreign policy strategy. Also, the British had broken the enigma code and were intercepting and reading classified German transmissions as early as 1940. So for the rest of the duration of the war highly classified German transmissions from military planning to concentration camp death toll was being read by the British.

Stalin was well aware of the German plans for Operation Barbarossa. Churchill himself wrote countless letters to Stalin warning him of an "impending German attack". But Stalin refused to believe these warnings because according to his iron logic the Germans would be too stupid to attack without preparing for a long drawn out war dragging into the winter. Though Barbarossa would change that mentality of Stalin's causing him to give greater considerations to all warnings thereafter.

"Victory has a thousand fathers, but defeat is an orphan."
People tend to neglect that Hitler forced certain plans upon his generals which ended in decisive victories like the blitzkreig in Poland, and the Manstein plan which led to the fall of France. Hitler also made many mistakes but people do not give him any credit for his bold plans which turned out to be successful.
It was Hitler who supported geniuses like Manstein, Guderian and Doenitz instead of old fashioned Generals. If those Prussian aristocrats, had the power, they would have never allowed revolutionary ideas like the formation of panzer divisions or the conduct of naval war by the means of submarines to be implemented.

True. Both sides share the blame equally. Hitler refusing to allow those of his Generals like Manstein, who were loyal, to exercise their own command where necessary while in other instances other aristocratic Generals deliberately went out of their way to impede Hitler's orders where it would have benefited the German strategy (the above example of Canaris).

@Nilgiri @The Sandman

 

[mingle]

When Barbarossa was on table German high command told Hitlor what happened to great army of Nepoleon on Russian invasion but they been snubbed by Hitlor who was high on that time quick victories in Europe .its was not Gen were not aware about risks involve in this operation but they failed to stand againest Hitlor .

 

[AUSTERLITZ]

On the breakout decision ,manstein later said if the breakout had to be attempted it had to be done immediately ,before the soviets had consolidated the encirclement.After that he said it became necessary to sacrifice the 6th army at stalingrad because it could no longer breakout as a cohesive body and without the huge formation keeping dozens of soviet divisions occupied,the forces in caucasus would be permanently trapped and army group south overrun.

However treason is being given too much priority here.Intelligence didn't play a vital role until 1943 when the enigma codes were decrypted.STAVKA was actually caught by surprise thrice.In 1941 itself,despite warning to soviets from their top spy in japan.Then in 2nd battle of kharkov in summer 1942.And finally in fall blau when soviets focused their defences around moscow,but attack came in the south.

 

[Psychic]

In hindsight this is true. I believe the perception within the OKW was that if the 6th Army could just hold out until a breakthrough force could be sent that would save the Wehrmacht from having to give up precious territory gained after much blood letting and sacrifices. Though eventually they ended up retreating regardless after the 6th Army capitulated. We know now that this could have been avoided had Hitler allowed a retreat for the 6th Army, but again hindsight is twenty-twenty, as they say.

True that

Regarding the Soviets having prior knowledge of German plans this is certainly true. The Soviet spy network was the most sophisticated and soviet spies had infiltrated top positions of Western governments and military intelligence. But in Germany's case it was aristocratic officers who did most of the sabotaging and fed classified information to the British who in turn passed on the info to the Soviets. Wilhelm Canaris, the head of the Abwehr (German military intelligence) turned out to be a traitor. He was instrumental in convincing Franco to refuse Hitler's offer in joining the Axis which for Hitler was very crucial as that would deny British access to the Mediterranean through capturing the strategic Gibraltar Straights, thus making a quick German victory in North Africa a possibility. Had Franco joined the Axis this would have convinced Stalin to join as well seeing that an Axis victory against the British was solidified. What Canaris did caused great harm to German foreign policy strategy. Also, the British had broken the enigma code and were intercepting and reading classified German transmissions as early as 1940. So for the rest of the duration of the war highly classified German transmissions from military planning to concentration camp death toll was being read by the British.

Hitler should have taken Gibraltar regardless...

True. Both sides share the blame equally. Hitler refusing to allow those of his Generals like Manstein, who were loyal, to exercise their own command where necessary while in other instances other aristocratic Generals deliberately went out of their way to impede Hitler's orders where it would have benefited the German strategy (the above example of Canaris).

Very right.
BTW Have you read otto skorzeney's memoirs?

However treason is being given too much priority here.Intelligence didn't play a vital role until 1943 when the enigma codes were decrypted.STAVKA was actually caught by surprise thrice.In 1941 itself,despite warning to soviets from their top spy in japan.Then in 2nd battle of kharkov in summer 1942.And finally in fall blau when soviets focused their defences around moscow,but attack came in the south.

*EDIT*

IMO, intelligence and treason played a decisive role.
For example, in one of his books, historian Liddel Hart admitted that the British secret service had "to a great extent" been informed about Operation Barbarossa "long before," and that it "informed the Russians accordingly."
Probably the Russians did not believe that the Germans would be capable to launch an attack on Russia as early as 1941, but at times the Russians were helped to a great extent by the German military and civilian traitors like when Stalin was assured by his spy in Japan, Dr Sorge that the Japanese had no intention to attack Russia, which subsequently enabled Stalin to move about half a million well equipped and well trained troops to Moscow.
When the master spy or the master traitor "Coro", who was a Luftwaffe Leutnant, was arrested in 1941, his ring conisisted of 81 people who were active in the Ministry of Economics, the Ministry of Labor, the Air Ministry, the Foreign Ministry and the Abwehr. His intelligence was transmitted to the Russians via radio transmitter operated by his men in Berlin. After the apprehension of this ring, "Werther" replaced "Coro". Werther's information was more reliable, more timely and at times it came directly from the Fuhrer's HQ. Alexander Radolfi alias Rado or Dora, the Soviet spy based in Switzerland transmitted that intelligence to "Director", who was General Fyodor Kuznetsov. The code used by Dora was difficult to crack as compared to the one used by Coro. Werther supplied information regarding casualties, new recruits, armaments industry, war production, new weapons, future plans, decisions taken at the Fuhrer's HQ, and even the disagreements at the Fuhrer's HQ. Whether Werther was a single person or a group of informants is not clear to this day.
The Russians believed in the accuracy of the intelligence supplied by Werther and reacted accordingly. They only failed to react when Hitler changed his mind all of a sudden e.g when he ordered Guderian and Kliest to veer South towards Kiev. Or when some general disobeyed like when Paul Hauser retreated from Kharkov against Hitler's express orders before counter attacking.

The Abwehr was also led by traitors like Admiral Canaris and his associates like General Hans Oster.
Generaloberst Jodl declared Abwehr under Canaris as a "nest of traitors". Canaris not only supplied false intelligence to the OKW but also ruined the efforts of thousands of Abwehr's agents who collected vital intelligence for example Elyesa Banza alias "Cicero" who was the valet of the British ambassador in Ankara gave the intelligence that the allies would land at Normandy but with Canaris as the head of the Abwehr, this intelligence was not given any closer thought.
Because of Canaris and Werther, the Germans did not have a clue regarding the Soviet reserves and the number of planes and tanks in the Soviet arsenal whereas on the contrary, the Soviets knew about the German strength and their intentions.

Many hundreds of radio messages of the various spy nets were eventually deciphered. Reproduced here are four signals from the Red Orchestra, which are mentioned by Hauptmann V.F Flicke (who during the war was a conscientious officer of the Abwehr) in his book Spionage- gruppe Row Kapelle (1949:
"July 2, 1941 - To Director No. 34 - RDO.
Most urgent.
The valid operations plan is Plan No. I with the objective of the
Urals via Moscow and diversionary maneuvers on the wings. - Main
attack in the center. Rado."

"July 3, 1941 - To Director No. 37 - RDO.
Present Stuka production is 9 to 10 daily. Average Luftwaffe losses
on the Eastern Front 40 units. Source: German Air Ministry. - Rado "

"July 5, 1941 - To Director No. 44 - RDO.
The Luftwaffe currently has a total strength of 21,500 first-and
second-line aircraft and 6,350 Ju 52 transport aircraft.
-Rado."

'July 27, 1941 -To Director No. 92 - RDO.
In the event that Plan I should run into difficulties, it will be
immediately replaced by Plan II. It foresees an attack on Arkhangelsk
and Murmansk, In the event of a change of plan I will receive details
within 48 hours. - Rado."


On July 27, 1941 alone, the STAVKA had received 92 messages from Rado alone and knew about the German attack plan and its variants. The red orchestra continued to play the following year as well. What is most critical is the fact that the information from Werther was at times, highly classified, sometimes known by only a dozen men at the Fuhrer's HQ. The quantity and quality of the intelligence supplied by Werther is staggering. It is astonishing to look at the demands made by the "Director" from Werther and the boldness of those demands.
The STAVKA knew the exact objectives and the detailed plans of the summer offensives of 1942 and 1943. For example, when General Paulus' Sixth Army did not appear where the Russians were expecting it, STAVKA first reacted with alarm, then with panic. They feared that Hitler had once again over turned his plans without Werther learning of it, where was Paulus then? It was characteristic of the general staff of the Red Army that it did not turn to its air force or patrols to find the answer to this question: Director asked Rado. From Rado and Werther the Russians learned that the Sixth Army was immobilized: due to a shortage of gasoline! This fuel crisis lasted eighteen days... the STAVKA was also completely aware of the exact spots where the Germans were supposed to attack in the Kursk offensive, they also knew the exact time of the start of the Kursk offensive and timed their artillery barrages on the German frontlines and bomber raids against the German airstrips at Kharkov accordingly. The forces were deployed exactly where the Germans were supposed to attack.

All of this had everything to do with the treason being committed at the Fuhrer's HQ.

With that sort of intelligence being fed, it is right to say that " An enemy whose intentions are known is already half beaten".



@Desert Fox @Nilgiri

 

[Desert Fox]

True that

Hitler should have taken Gibraltar regardless...

True.

Very right.
BTW Have you read otto skorzeney's memoirs?

No i haven't. But will definitely give it a read one of these days.

*EDIT*

IMO, intelligence and treason played a decisive role.
For example, in one of his books, historian Liddel Hart admitted that the British secret service had "to a great extent" been informed about Operation Barbarossa "long before," and that it "informed the Russians accordingly."
Probably the Russians did not believe that the Germans would be capable to launch an attack on Russia as early as 1941, but at times the Russians were helped to a great extent by the German military and civilian traitors like when Stalin was assured by his spy in Japan, Dr Sorge that the Japanese had no intention to attack Russia, which subsequently enabled Stalin to move about half a million well equipped and well trained troops to Moscow.
When the master spy or the master traitor "Coro", who was a Luftwaffe Leutnant, was arrested in 1941, his ring conisisted of 81 people who were active in the Ministry of Economics, the Ministry of Labor, the Air Ministry, the Foreign Ministry and the Abwehr. His intelligence was transmitted to the Russians via radio transmitter operated by his men in Berlin. After the apprehension of this ring, "Werther" replaced "Coro". Werther's information was more reliable, more timely and at times it came directly from the Fuhrer's HQ. Alexander Radolfi alias Rado or Dora, the Soviet spy based in Switzerland transmitted that intelligence to "Director", who was General Fyodor Kuznetsov. The code used by Dora was difficult to crack as compared to the one used by Coro. Werther supplied information regarding casualties, new recruits, armaments industry, war production, new weapons, future plans, decisions taken at the Fuhrer's HQ, and even the disagreements at the Fuhrer's HQ. Whether Werther was a single person or a group of informants is not clear to this day.
The Russians believed in the accuracy of the intelligence supplied by Werther and reacted accordingly. They only failed to react when Hitler changed his mind all of a sudden e.g when he ordered Guderian and Kliest to veer South towards Kiev. Or when some general disobeyed like when Paul Hauser retreated from Kharkov against Hitler's express orders before counter attacking.

The Abwehr was also led by traitors like Admiral Canaris and his associates like General Hans Oster.
Generaloberst Jodl declared Abwehr under Canaris as a "nest of traitors". Canaris not only supplied false intelligence to the OKW but also ruined the efforts of thousands of Abwehr's agents who collected vital intelligence for example Elyesa Banza alias "Cicero" who was the valet of the British ambassador in Ankara gave the intelligence that the allies would land at Normandy but with Canaris as the head of the Abwehr, this intelligence was not given any closer thought.
Because of Canaris and Werther, the Germans did not have a clue regarding the Soviet reserves and the number of planes and tanks in the Soviet arsenal whereas on the contrary, the Soviets knew about the German strength and their intentions.

Many hundreds of radio messages of the various spy nets were eventually deciphered. Reproduced here are four signals from the Red Orchestra, which are mentioned by Hauptmann V.F Flicke (who during the war was a conscientious officer of the Abwehr) in his book Spionage- gruppe Row Kapelle (1949:
"July 2, 1941 - To Director No. 34 - RDO.
Most urgent.
The valid operations plan is Plan No. I with the objective of the
Urals via Moscow and diversionary maneuvers on the wings. - Main
attack in the center. Rado."

"July 3, 1941 - To Director No. 37 - RDO.
Present Stuka production is 9 to 10 daily. Average Luftwaffe losses
on the Eastern Front 40 units. Source: German Air Ministry. - Rado "

"July 5, 1941 - To Director No. 44 - RDO.
The Luftwaffe currently has a total strength of 21,500 first-and
second-line aircraft and 6,350 Ju 52 transport aircraft.
-Rado."

'July 27, 1941 -To Director No. 92 - RDO.
In the event that Plan I should run into difficulties, it will be
immediately replaced by Plan II. It foresees an attack on Arkhangelsk
and Murmansk, In the event of a change of plan I will receive details
within 48 hours. - Rado."


On July 27, 1941 alone, the STAVKA had received 92 messages from Rado alone and knew about the German attack plan and its variants. The red orchestra continued to play the following year as well. What is most critical is the fact that the information from Werther was at times, highly classified, sometimes known by only a dozen men at the Fuhrer's HQ. The quantity and quality of the intelligence supplied by Werther is staggering. It is astonishing to look at the demands made by the "Director" from Werther and the boldness of those demands.
The STAVKA knew the exact objectives and the detailed plans of the summer offensives of 1942 and 1943. For example, when General Paulus' Sixth Army did not appear where the Russians were expecting it, STAVKA first reacted with alarm, then with panic. They feared that Hitler had once again over turned his plans without Werther learning of it, where was Paulus then? It was characteristic of the general staff of the Red Army that it did not turn to its air force or patrols to find the answer to this question: Director asked Rado. From Rado and Werther the Russians learned that the Sixth Army was immobilized: due to a shortage of gasoline! This fuel crisis lasted eighteen days... the STAVKA was also completely aware of the exact spots where the Germans were supposed to attack in the Kursk offensive, they also knew the exact time of the start of the Kursk offensive and timed their artillery barrages on the German frontlines and bomber raids against the German airstrips at Kharkov accordingly. The forces were deployed exactly where the Germans were supposed to attack.

All of this had everything to do with the treason being committed at the Fuhrer's HQ.

With that sort of intelligence being fed, it is right to say that " An enemy whose intentions are known is already half beaten".



@Desert Fox @Nilgiri

Very insightful. Can you list all of the books you got this information from?

 

[Psychic]

Very insightful. Can you list all of the books you got this information from?

Scorched earth 43-45
My commando operations-Otto skorzeney

 

[Desert Fox]

Scorched earth 43-45
My commando operations-Otto skorzeney

Thanks. Will give these a read.

 

[third eye]

A quick look at the invasion of the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany in 33 facts:

1. The invasion of the Soviet Union was the most ambitious campaign of the Second World War, and yet Hitler believed that it could be won within three months with a fast, powerful blitzkrieg strike.

2. The campaign was launched with Fuhrer Directive 21. Signed on 18th of December 1940, it set out the intention to “crush Soviet Russia in one rapid campaign”.


3. In February 1941, British and American intelligence learned of the planned invasion of the USSR. Hoping to encourage Stalin to act against Hitler, they informed him of the plan. Stalin did not believe them, as he believed that Hitler would stick to the non-aggression pact the two countries had signed before the war.

4. The German navy was to play a part in the operation, blocking Soviet ships from breaking out of the Baltic Sea.

5. Ready for the invasion, the Germans mustered over 3 million soldiers in 152 divisions. This included 17 Panzer and 13 motorized divisions.


A burning village in Russia. Photo Credit
6. Transport was provided by 625,000 horses and 600,000 motor vehicles.

7. The initial invasion force included 3,350 tanks, 7,146 artillery pieces, and 1,950 aircraft.

8. The Finnish army also took part in the invasion. They supplied 17 divisions and 2 brigades. Following the Soviet invasion of Finland earlier in the war, they were eager for revenge.

9. Romania also contributed to the army, with 14 divisions, 7 brigades and one reinforced panzer regiment.

10. The German ambassador in Moscow delivered a declaration of war at 0530 on 22 June 1941, citing Soviet violations of their pact as the excuse for invasion.

11. The frontier across which the Germans invaded ran from the Baltic to the Black Sea, a distance of 1,900 miles.

12. They were divided into three army groups – Army Group South under Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, Army Group North under Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb, and Army Group Centre under Field Marshal Fedor von Bock.

13. The invasion was named Operation Barbarossa after the founder of the 12th century First German Reich.

German soldiers in the Soviet Union, June 1941.
14. Only 20% of the invading forces could conduct the sort of rapid mobile warfare Operation Barbarossa relied on – the rest were too slow-moving to keep up with the rapid pace of blitzkrieg.

15. Stalin was so shocked by the invasion that it was said he did not speak for eleven days.

16. The Soviets had two to three times as many tanks and planes as the Germans, but many of the planes were obsolete.



T-34 Tanks heading towards the front.
17. Among the Russian tanks was the T-34, arguably the best tank of any fielded in the Second World War.

18. At the time of the invasion, the Soviets had 150 divisions in their western territory, able to immediately turn and face the Germans.

19. After two weeks, successful battles on the frontiers led the Nazi command to believe that the campaign was already won, the Soviet forces crumbling.


20. The speedy initial advance allowed the Germans to take in the summer harvest from most of Ukraine, bolstering their food supply and badly depriving the Soviets.

21. The Germans surrounded several Soviet armies, forcing them to surrender. Those cut off at Minsk and Smolensk alone led to nearly 600,000 soldiers becoming prisoners of war. A further 665,000 prisoners were taken at Kiev.

22. By the end of July, just over a month into the invasion, they had seized a chunk of the Soviet Union more than twice the size of France.


German soldiers marching through a village in Russia.
23. By mid-August, 200 more Soviet divisions had joined the fray, massively outnumbering the Germans.

24. The Soviets struggled with military leadership, as Stalin had purged the Red Army in the 1930s, getting rid of supposedly anti-Communist officers, and killing many of the best generals in the process.


25. In the Baltic states and parts of Belorussia and Ukraine, the Germans were welcomed as liberators throwing out the Russian Communist oppressors.

26. In Kiev, the Jews welcomed the Nazis. The Germans had treated Kiev’s Jews well during the First World War, and the horrors of the death camps had not yet been revealed. But a terrible shock followed within days, as 100,000 Jews were led out of the city and massacred at the Babi Yar ravine.

27. To keep the war effort going, Stalin had entire factories moved eastwards so that they could keep on manufacturing aircraft, tanks, and other equipment.


British Mk III ‘Valentine’ destroyed in Soviet Union, January 1944.
28. Eager to keep Hitler occupied in the east, Britain and America both quickly began providing the Soviets with materials. They helped to build up the military machine that they, in turn, would face off against a decade later – a recurring theme in 20th-century wars.

29. From the 10th of July to the 16th of August, the Finnish army re-took the land they had lost to the Soviets. The German-Soviet Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact had enabled these Soviet conquests, but it was the Germans whose invasion allowed the Finns to retake their lost territory. They stopped at the old border, refusing to join the Germans in their invasion of Russia, but their presence helped to cut off Leningrad from the north.

30. The Siege of Leningrad, one of the most important engagements of the invasion, lasted 900 days. During that time, 200,000 civilians were killed by German bombardment. At least another 630,000 died from the disease and starvation that are constant threats for the targets of any siege.


Antiaircraft guns guarding the sky of Leningrad, in front of St. Isaac’s Cathedral.
31. With the fall of Vyazma and Bryansk in October, the Russians were left with only 824 tanks and no air support on the front.

32. When foreign diplomats were evacuated from Moscow in preparation for a siege, the embalmed body of former Soviet leader Lenin went with them. His loss was considered too terrible a propaganda blow for the Soviets to risk leaving him there.

33. The winter that halted the German advance was the coldest for 140 years. Oil froze in the engines of tanks. The grease used to pack artillery froze. Almost everyone in the German army suffered from frostbite. The same problems that had stopped the Soviets in Finland now saved them.


@The SC