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Operation Barbarossa: The Biggest Military Adventure in History

The SC

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Operation Barbarossa, Nazi Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union -- the biggest military adventure in history, which led directly to the downfall of Adolf Hitler’s murderous regime. Together with the Holocaust that followed it, Operation Barbarossa was the ultimate expression of Hitler’s twisted vision, reflecting both the vaulting ambition and depthless cruelty of Nazi ideology.

After Germany’s humiliating defeat in the First World War, the Austrian-born Hitler — consumed by weird conspiracy theories and even weirder notions of racial purity — made it his life mission to reunite the German people, topple the Soviet Union, destroy Communism and win lebensraum (“living space”) for the superior Aryan race. In Mein Kampf, dictated in 1924, the aspiring dictator linked the push for more territory with his planned crusade against Germany’s “eternal enemies,” “Bolshevism” and “world Jewry,” which were in fact the same thing: “If we talk about new soil and territory in Europe today, we can think primarily only of Russia and its vassal border states. The colossal empire in the east is ripe for dissolution, and the end of the Jewish domination in Russia will also be the end of Russia as a state.”

Hitler never offered many specifics about his grand vision -- perhaps because even he realized they were too shocking to be committed to paper. After years rattling around his hate-filled brain, in 1940 Hitler give the task of actually planning the colonization of Eastern Europe to his loyal henchman Heinrich Himmler -- the commander of the elite Schutzstaffel (SS) security force, and a man who rivaled his Führer in sheer crazed murderous ambition.

In the broad outlines of Himmler’s Generalplan Ost (Eastern Master Plan), German victory in the east would inaugurate ethnic cleansing on an unprecedented scale. After the destruction of the Soviet Union, approximately 31 million “Slavic sub-humans” would be murdered, starved to death, or forcibly deported to Siberia to make room for 8-10 million German settlers. The groups to be “resettled” (which soon became a euphemism for murder) included all of Eastern Europe’s Jews and most of the Slavic populations of Poland, Ukraine, and Belorussia. Fourteen million Slavs would be sterilized and retained as slave labor.

The Great Gamble
Although many members of his general staff were skeptical about the wisdom of invading Russia, Hitler’s fantastic vision seemed a little more plausible following an unbroken string of triumphs from 1936-1940. Remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936 was followed by the annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1938. Britain and France finally declared war on Germany following Hitler’s invasion of Poland in September 1939 -- but the German Wehrmacht (armed forces) appeared unstoppable with the lightning conquests of Denmark, Norway, the Low Countries, and France from March-June 1940. And all this was merely a preamble.

Operation-Barbarossa-1.jpg


On December 18, 1940, Hitler issued a secret order to Germany’s top generals instructing them to begin preparing a massive surprise attack on the Soviet Union, codenamed “Barbarossa” after a 12th-century Holy Roman Emperor who won land for the Germans from the Slavs. The element of surprise was crucial, Hitler emphasized, because of the need to prevent the Red Army from withdrawing into Russia’s vast interior; German troops would drive deep into Soviet territory and capture millions of enemy troops in huge encirclements before their commanders had time to react. To accomplish this, Hitler’s generals planned a “blitzkrieg,” or “lightning war,” similar to the ones that destroyed Poland and France in 1939-1940 -- but on a much, much larger scale.

As originally planned, the attack would begin in the spring, “no later than May 15,” to give German armies the most time for fighting before the grim seasonal deadline imposed by the Russian winter; the Red Army would have to be beaten no later than December 1941, or millions of German soldiers risked death by freezing.

Underlying this breathtakingly ambitious strategy was the German general staff’s conviction that the Red Army had been fatally weakened by Stalin’s purges in the late 1930s, when the paranoid Soviet dictator executed 40,000 (or 50%) of his own top officers. Hitler had also lulled Stalin into something like a false sense of security with a non-aggression pact signed when the two dictators divided up Poland in 1939; in reality this treaty (like all Hitler’s diplomatic agreements) was nothing more than a “scrap of paper” to be treacherously discarded after serving its purpose.

“Unprecedented, Unmerciful, and Unrelenting Harshness”
Viewing the coming invasion of Russia as a battle to the death between Germany and “Judeo-Bolshevism,” Hitler ordered his generals to crush resistance with utmost brutality. In a secret speech on March 30, 1941, recorded by Army Chief of the General Staff Franz Halder in his diary, Hitler warned these proud Prussian officers to abandon “obsolete” notions of decency and honor:

“The war against Russia will be such that it cannot be conducted in a knightly fashion. This struggle is one of ideologies and racial differences and will have to be conducted with unprecedented, unmerciful, and unrelenting harshness. All officers will have to rid themselves of obsolete ideologies. I know that the necessity for such means of waging war is beyond the comprehension of you generals but . . . I insist absolutely that my orders be executed without contradiction.”

This included killing every Communist official — the infamous “Commissar Order.” Hitler justified mass murder by arguing that Bolshevik officials, left alive, would lead a guerrilla war threatening the German military’s lines of communication and supply. Indeed the same method -- summary executions -- would be used against anyone even suspected of supporting the partisan resistance. If guilty parties couldn’t be found, the Germans would simply execute everyone in the nearest village to make their point. In short, millions of people (mostly peasants) would be murdered for trivial or imagined offenses.

And there was a still-darker secret Hitler hid even from his generals, aside for a few vague allusions: the planned murder of all of Europe’s Jews, beginning with roughly three million Polish Jews, 900,000 Ukrainian Jews, and 600,000 Belorussian Jews. In his fevered imagination Hitler lumped together poor Jewish peasants, Communist party officials, and anti-German partisans in a single, malignant conspiracy that had to be “exterminated.”

Some of the officers objected to the “Commissar Order” and atrocities against civilians on grounds of honor; Field Marshal Erich von Manstein “told the commander of the Army Group under which I served at that time… that I could not carry out such an order, which was against the honor of a soldier.” But Hitler, anticipating the qualms of his professional soldiers, gave them an easy out: much of the dirty work of hunting partisans and murdering Jews would be left to about 3,000 retired policemen and petty thugs, operating as four roving SS death squads euphemistically termed Einsatzgruppen (“Special Action Groups”).

In the final months before Barbarossa, personnel and materials moved around Europe on an unprecedented scale, as roughly 3.8 million men massed in four giant armies along a 820-mile front stretching from Finland to Romania. 3.2 million German troops would be supported by 600,000 troops drawn from the Third Reich’s vassal states and allies, including 300,000 Finns, 250,000 Romanians and 50,000 Slovaks.

Speaking with his top generals on February 3, 1941, the Führer contemplated his vast gamble with typical nihilism: “When the attack on Russia commences, the world will hold its breath and make no comment.” But the world would have to wait to hold its breath.

Crucial Delays
Hitler originally intended to launch Operation Barbarossa around May 15, 1941. But then (in typical fashion) a small Balkan intervention turned into a sweeping hemispheric gambit for control of the Middle East.

In November 1940, Hitler sent German troops to support his embattled ally Mussolini, who’d launched an ill-advised invasion of Greece. Meanwhile, the hapless Italian ally also suffered a humiliating setback in North Africa after invading British-occupied Egypt; in February 1941, Hitler dispatched Rommel’s Afrika Korps to tidy up the situation. Then in May 1941, Hitler invaded Yugoslavia to crush the government established two months before by nationalist air force officers, costing him three more crucial weeks.

Of course timing was of the essence: like clockwork, torrential rain would turn Russian roads into an ocean of mud by late August and temperatures would fall below freezing as early as October, with snow soon to follow. However, even though it was now a month behind schedule, Hitler decided Germany couldn’t afford to push back Operation Barbarossa to the next spring, arguing that the German Wehrmacht would never be as strong vis-à-vis the Red Army as it was now. And Hitler himself wasn’t fully in control, to hear him tell it: in February 1940 he divulged that “I follow the path assigned to me by Providence with the instinctive sureness of a sleepwalker.” A fatalist first and last, the Führer couldn’t wait to roll the dice.

The Die Is Cast
The attack came before dawn on June 22, 1941, commencing at 3:15 a.m. with the largest artillery bombardment in history, as 20,000 artillery pieces rained thousands of tons of shells on Red Army positions. Simultaneously 3,277 Luftwaffe combat aircraft launched a record-breaking aerial onslaught targeting the Soviet air force on the ground. Columns of tanks punched holes in Red Army defenses, followed by motorized and regular infantry, all supported by a continuing air assault, now targeting Soviet ground forces.

The invasion had three main objectives. Army Group Center, consisting of 1.3 million troops, 2,600 tanks and 7,800 artillery pieces, mounted a massive drive on Moscow. Meanwhile, Army Group North, consisting of 700,000 troops, 770 tanks and 4,000 artillery pieces, drove north from East Prussia through the Baltic States towards Leningrad, with an assist from Finnish and German troops coming from Finland. Finally Army Group South, consisting of one million troops, 1,000 tanks and 5,700 artillery pieces, invaded the Ukraine with an assist from Romanian troops targeting the Black Sea port of Odessa.

At first it looked like Hitler’s boldest gamble would be rewarded with his most spectacular success, as German and allied troops scored victory after victory. By December 1941, the combined German armies had killed 360,000 Soviet soldiers, wounded one million, and captured two million more, for total Red Army losses of around 3.4 million by the end of the year. In six months, German troops and their allies advanced up to 600 miles and occupied over 500,000 square miles of Soviet territory, home to 75 million people.

The Invasion Stalls
Operation-Barbarossa-2.jpg


But final victory eluded the Germans. For one thing, Hitler continually meddled with the schedule and strategy for Barbarossa, resulting in further critical delays: in September 1941, he diverted part of Army Group Center north to help the attack on Leningrad, and another part south to help capture Kiev. The encirclement of Kiev was one of the greatest military victories in history, with over 450,000 Soviet troops taken prisoner in one giant roundup. But Army Group Center’s push on Moscow -- the main goal of Barbarossa -- was pushed back by another month.

And as impressive as their gains were, the Germans paid a high price for them, suffering 550,000 total casualties by September 1941, rising to 750,000 by the end of the year, including 300,000 listed as killed or missing in action. Lengthening supply lines were increasingly disrupted by partisans and bad weather; Army Group Center alone required 13,000 tons of supplies per day, and even during the dry months deliveries by trucks and horses could only meet about 65% of this demand. At its longest in 1942, the front stretched over 1,800 miles from the Arctic to the Black Sea. And still the steppes stretched out, seemingly endless, inducing a kind of horizontal vertigo. Halder’s diary entry from November 7, 1941 was tinged with unease: “Beyond the Russian expanses, no plan at present.”

A New Red Army (From Scratch)
The terrifying truth, now dawning on some officers, was that Hitler’s planners had drastically underestimated the strength of the Soviet military due to faulty intelligence and their desire to please the Führer. During the planning phase, they judged an invasion force of 3.8 million men in 193 divisions sufficient to defeat a Soviet military believed to number 4.2 million men in 240 divisions, including reserves. In reality, in June 1941 the Soviet military could muster five million men in 303 divisions, and this was just the tip of the iceberg in terms of Soviet manpower: from June-December 1941, the Red Army was able to field 290 more divisions, essentially creating an entire new army from scratch.

Operation-Barbarossa-3.jpg


Thus Stalin was able to collect over 1.25 million men to defend Moscow against the final German onslaught of the year, “Operation Typhoon,” from October 1941-January 1942, and then launch a bloody counter-offensive to push Army Group Center back from Moscow. The Soviets continued to suffer huge losses during these operations, but they were better-prepared than the Germans for winter fighting. And as luck would have it, the winter of 1941-1942 was the coldest in decades. The temperature plunged to a record -42 degrees Fahrenheit in late December, and by March 1942, 113,000 German soldiers had been killed or incapacitated by frostbite. Most German tanks were damaged and needed to be serviced, and gasoline was scarce. On December 2, 1941, German scouts spotted the spires of the Kremlin through binoculars, but this was as close as they ever came to the enemy capital.

soviet-poster.jpg
In short, Operation Barbarossa had failed. Although German armies would take the offensive again in spring 1942, this time the Red Army would be expecting it. And while Germany could draw additional manpower from allies like Romania, Finland, Hungary, and Italy, it also faced an ever-growing circle of enemies (principally the United States, after Hitler declared war on the U.S. in support of the Third Reich’s Japanese ally on December 11, 1941).

German officers were apprehensive, and rightly so -- not just about the likelihood of defeat, but also the prospect of violent retribution for the terrible things happening behind the front. For one thing, almost no provision had been made for feeding or housing prisoners of war. As a result, captured Soviet soldiers were simply left to perish from starvation and exposure in cattle cars or open-air camps. Of the 3.4 million Soviet soldiers taken prisoner between June 1941 and February 1942, two million had already died by the latter date.

Meanwhile, the four SS Einsatzgruppen embarked on the systematic mass murder of Eastern European Jews, shooting about 800,000 by the end of 1941 and a total of 1.4 million by the end of the war. In many places, the Nazis found willing accomplices among the local populations, where anti-Semitism ran deep. On September 29-30, 1941, Ukrainian collaborators helped Einsatzgruppe C murder 33,771 Jews in a ravine at Babi Yar, just outside Kiev, and Lithuanian mobs and militias murdered thousands of Jews before German troops even arrived.

Cold-blooded as they were, these local killers probably never suspected the murder of the Jews was intended as a preamble to the colonization of Eastern Europe. But the changing fortunes of war forced Hitler and Himmler to put the rest of the insane scheme -- the deportation or murder of tens of millions of “Slavic sub-humans” -- on hold. Still, their murderous impulses would find expression elsewhere.

Hitler's Dark Prophecy
Frustrated by the failure of Barbarossa, Hitler vented his anger against the Jews of Western and Southern Europe, reasoning that they all somehow shared responsibility for German setbacks in the East. Indeed, in January 1939 Hitler had issued this dark “prophecy”:

“If International Finance Jewry within and outside of Europe succeeds in plunging the nations once again into a world war, the result will not be the Bolshevization of the world and the victory of Jewry, but rather the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe!”

Now over a million Western and Southern European Jews would pay with their lives for the failure of Hitler’s nightmare utopia in the East. After a verbal command from the Führer, Hitler’s stooges briskly hashed out the procedural details for genocide at the secret Wannsee Conference on January 20, 1942, leaving a helpful paper trail as they did so.

The murder of 5.7 million Jews from all over Europe was just the crowning atrocity. Although some of the following figures are open to debate, from 1941-1945 the Eastern Front claimed the lives of about 25 million Soviet citizens (10 million soldiers and 15 million civilians) along with four million German soldiers, 300,000 Romanians, 300,000 Hungarians, 95,000 Finns, and 80,000 Italians. Poland -- which became one of the main battlegrounds of the Eastern Front towards the end of the war -- lost over 5.5 million civilians and soldiers from 1939-1945, including about three million Polish Jews.

http://mentalfloss.com/article/28033/operation-barbarossa-biggest-military-adventure-history
 
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I notice you are starting a bunch of threads on the third reich + wehrmacht @The SC .

Lets see how much interest they get.
 
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I notice you are starting a bunch of threads on the third reich + wehrmacht @The SC .

Lets see how much interest they get.
This is the military history and tactics section, and WW2 is the most recent war fought with modern weapons.. My intention is to contribute some knowledge, if it generates interests it is fine, if it helps educate and enlighten, it is still better yet..
 
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One of the most discussed analysis in Staff College, Quetta.

It was ( is ? ) a subject studied in Military History in India too.

Seen from a Military standpoint alone, I think it was among the boldest plans made - ever. A masterpiece in planning & execution ( in the initial stages). From the Mechanized forces POV , never again will the world ever see such moves , I still marvel at the equipment that withstood such large moves across the terrain they traversed , the logistics involved in execution of such a plan.

On the Soviet side, what Zukov achieved is a study in itself. This subject has been discussed here too .

https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/operation-barbarossa.324703/
 
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If it wasn't for the ego fight between Hitler and Stalin, the German high command had better plans than Hitler's, they wanted to go south first to insure the Oil supply for the German armies from the Russian oil fields and to Attack Moscow first, but Hitler insisted on Attacking Stalingrad first.. one can call it faith or whatever, but there is where he lost the war, with 4 million soldiers dead and another 4 million captured he had no more soldiers to fight the war and not even enough to defend Germany where young kids and the elderly had to fight for their lives.. all of it to satisfy some sick ego of Hitler to take Stalingrad that bares the name of his arch-enemy Stalin..
Both sides had brilliant generals, the Russians took advantage of the ego-blinded plans of Hitler, and the Germans fought valiantly in trust of their leader, but they themselves weren't convinced and that played heavily on their moral, since they knew very well that their own plans were winners and they couldn't execute theme or be executed themselves..
 
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If it wasn't for the ego fight between Hitler and Stalin, the German high command had better plans than Hitler's, they wanted to go south first to insure the Oil supply for the German armies from the Russian oil fields and to Attack Moscow first, but Hitler insisted on Attacking Stalingrad first.. one can call it faith or whatever, but there is where he lost the war, with 4 million soldiers dead and another 4 million captured he had no more soldiers to fight the war and not even enough to defend Germany where young kids and the elderly had to fight for their lives.. all of it to satisfy some sick ego of Hitler to take Stalingrad that bares the name of his arch-enemy Stalin..

Its a bit of a hypothetical to be honest. While I agree focusing on grabbing the oil fields was probably the better strategy (in hindsight)...Hitler (plus a number of his generals who he unfortunately formed an echo chamber of) had a strong and valid reason for going after Stalingrad past just the name it bore (which has been overhyped by many historians I feel).

This was to guard the rear (and logistics chain) of the caucasus assault...a break (both bank control) of the volga river was needed at some point to accomplish this (given the supply route of the river +Caspian Sea for the Soviet forces to assault any weakness in the Caucasus supply chains both before and hypothetically afterwards too).

The mistake was in choosing an urban environment for this break (the name of Stalin in the city did tip this for Hitler)....but again its easy to see it in hindsight. At the time of the initial assault on Stalingrad, no one had any idea what sustained urban warfare would be like (it wasnt even really planned for by the Germans, they expected to conduct swift encirclement). Even Leningrad (closest parallel at the time) was effectively a partial siege. But the idea to take no chances in protecting the rear of the caucasus assault comes from sound strategy too (given the Germans had faced such problems in various theatres of barbarossa earlier). It was implemented badly (and with bias - a commanders worst enemy). In hindsight, a breach of the volga river could have been done at several other areas without a city to slow it down and act as an eventual quagmire and turning point.

By the time it had turned to a morass and logjam, Hitler valued saving face over sound strategic doctrine...and the rest they say is history.

@AUSTERLITZ @Levina @The Sandman @Desert Fox @Psychic @Vergennes@vostok

Your inputs if you have any regarding this?
 
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In autumn 1940, high-ranking German officials drafted a memorandum on the dangers of an invasion of the Soviet Union. They said Ukraine, Belorussia and the Baltic States would end up as only a further economic burden for Germany. It was argued that the Soviets in their current bureaucratic form were harmless and that the occupation would not benefit Germany. Hitler disagreed with economists about the risks and told his right-hand man Hermann Göring, the chief of the Luftwaffe, that he would no longer listen to misgivings about the economic dangers of a war with Russia. It is speculated that this was passed on to General Georg Thomas, who had produced reports that predicted a net economic drain for Germany in the event of an invasion of the Soviet Union unless its economy was captured intact and the Caucasus oilfields seized in the first blow, and he consequently revised his future report to fit Hitler's wishes

German military planners also researched Napoleon's failed invasion of Russia. In their calculations, they concluded that there was little danger of a large-scale retreat of the Red Army into the Russian interior, as it could not afford to give up the Baltic states, Ukraine, or the Moscow and Leningrad regions, all of which were vital to the Red Army for supply reasons and would thus have to be defended. Hitler and his generals disagreed on where Germany should focus its energy. Hitler, in many discussions with his generals, repeated his order of "Leningrad first, the Donbass second, Moscow third"; but he consistently emphasized the destruction of the Red Army over the achievement of specific terrain objectives. Hitler believed Moscow to be of "no great importance" in the defeat of the Soviet Union and instead believed victory would come with the destruction of the Red Army west of the capital, especially west of the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers, and this pervaded the plan for Barbarossa. This belief later led to disputes between Hitler and several German senior officers, including Heinz Guderian, Gerhard Engel, Fedor von Bock and Franz Halder, who believed the decisive victory could only be delivered at Moscow. Hitler had grown overconfident in his own military judgment as a result of the rapid successes in Western Europe.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barbarossa
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barbarossa


In June 1941 Hitler ordered a surprise invasion of the Soviet Union, and for most of the next year the German army routed the Soviet troops, capturing thousands of square kilometers of their country in the process. In August 1942 the German VI Army had pushed all the way to the banks of the Volga River, near the industrial heartland of the USSR. Once captured, the Nazis could sever the Volga, and potentially destroy Moscow’s ability to continue fighting. All they had to do was take one more city. Stalingrad.

The prewar population of Stalingrad was four hundred thousand. It was home to a key river port as well as numerous important war and civilian industries. Because the city bore the name of the leader of the USSR, Joseph Stalin, Hitler took particular interest in capturing the city as a personal hit on the Soviet leader. Stalin likewise placed great importance on holding the city to prevent Hitler from capturing the city carrying his name.

Though Stalingrad carried significant military importance, the psychological importance both leaders placed on the city elevated it to a level of importance above perhaps even the capital city of Moscow. The price both armies were willing to pay to possess it transcended military utility and entered fully into the category of obsession.

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/th...s-the-bloodiest-battle-all-world-war-ii-18535
 
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Its a bit of a hypothetical to be honest. While I agree focusing on grabbing the oil fields was probably the better strategy (in hindsight)...Hitler (plus a number of his generals who he unfortunately formed an echo chamber of) had a strong and valid reason for going after Stalingrad past just the name it bore (which has been overhyped by many historians I feel).

This was to guard the rear (and logistics chain) of the caucasus assault...a break (both bank control) of the volga river was needed at some point to accomplish this (given the supply route of the river +Caspian Sea for the Soviet forces to assault any weakness in the Caucasus supply chains both before and hypothetically afterwards too).

The mistake was in choosing an urban environment for this break (the name of Stalin in the city did tip this for Hitler)....but again its easy to see it in hindsight. At the time of the initial assault on Stalingrad, no one had any idea what sustained urban warfare would be like (it wasnt even really planned for by the Germans, they expected to conduct swift encirclement). Even Leningrad (closest parallel at the time) was effectively a partial siege. But the idea to take no chances in protecting the rear of the caucasus assault comes from sound strategy too (given the Germans had faced such problems in various theatres of barbarossa earlier). It was implemented badly (and with bias - a commanders worst enemy). In hindsight, a breach of the volga river could have been done at several other areas without a city to slow it down and act as an eventual quagmire and turning point.

By the time it had turned to a morass and logjam, Hitler valued saving face over sound strategic doctrine...and the rest they say is history.

@AUSTERLITZ @Levina @The Sandman @Desert Fox @Psychic @Vergennes@vostok

Your inputs if you have any regarding this?

Stalingrad was not in the initial plan,it was to be a flank guard operation with a defense line along the volga.OKW with orders from hitler made a series of mistakes -they diverted forces from main thrust towards the caucasus for stalingrad.Thus the main force ,especially after being stripped of hoth's panzers and luftwaffe support was too weak to go all the way and seize baku.Germans violated 2 principles - selection and maintainence of aim and their own much emphasized concentration of effort.Worst was that stalingrad was an urban environment with no scope for an envelopment due to the river.As more and more troops were funnelled into the city ,the actual flank guarding operation was compromised,leaving mostly allied foreign troops(often without anti tank weapons to counter t-34s) instead of german soldiers to hold the ground.OKW and paulus were unable to adapt to the needs of urban warfare properly.German intelligence actually showed mass buildup of soviet forces from new production,but hitler tore the intelligence papers to pieces as halder speaks of in his diary .He couldn't believe after such a massive blow struck against russians in 1941 they still had industrial capacity left to produce more tanks than germany did and called it the 'biggest bluff since genghis khan'.So the attack came,overran the flanks and trapped the army.Goering assured hitler he could resupply the trapped force and hitler made his final mistake -to not try a breakout.
Eventually they lost the best army in the wehrmacht,huge amount of material,large no.of luftwaffe bombers and transports,massive shock to morale,axis allies diminished as a fighting force.Soviets outlasted the germans within the city and eventually outfought them with the double envelopment outside.To understand the brutality and scale of the fighting,i recommend you guys read 'the last letters from stalingrad' - a very short booklet of 39 letters home from german soldiers fighting in stalingrad.Its probably available free on the net.Ofcourse for a more detailed approach to the human aspect of the fighting there is A.beevor's stalingrad.
 
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'the last letters from stalingrad' - a very short booklet of 39 letters home from german soldiers fighting in stalingrad.

Yeah I would agree. Remember reading these quite a while back. A quote from it was also in the intro of the first serious book I read about the Wehrmacht.
 
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Stalingrad was not in the initial plan,it was to be a flank guard operation with a defense line along the volga.OKW with orders from hitler made a series of mistakes -they diverted forces from main thrust towards the caucasus for stalingrad.Thus the main force ,especially after being stripped of hoth's panzers and luftwaffe support was too weak to go all the way and seize baku.Germans violated 2 principles - selection and maintainence of aim and their own much emphasized concentration of effort.Worst was that stalingrad was an urban environment with no scope for an envelopment due to the river.As more and more troops were funnelled into the city ,the actual flank guarding operation was compromised,leaving mostly allied foreign troops(often without anti tank weapons to counter t-34s) instead of german soldiers to hold the ground.OKW and paulus were unable to adapt to the needs of urban warfare properly.German intelligence actually showed mass buildup of soviet forces from new production,but hitler tore the intelligence papers to pieces as halder speaks of in his diary .He couldn't believe after such a massive blow struck against russians in 1941 they still had industrial capacity left to produce more tanks than germany did and called it the 'biggest bluff since genghis khan'.So the attack came,overran the flanks and trapped the army.Goering assured hitler he could resupply the trapped force and hitler made his final mistake -to not try a breakout.
Eventually they lost the best army in the wehrmacht,huge amount of material,large no.of luftwaffe bombers and transports,massive shock to morale,axis allies diminished as a fighting force.Soviets outlasted the germans within the city and eventually outfought them with the double envelopment outside.To understand the brutality and scale of the fighting,i recommend you guys read 'the last letters from stalingrad' - a very short booklet of 39 letters home from german soldiers fighting in stalingrad.Its probably available free on the net.Ofcourse for a more detailed approach to the human aspect of the fighting there is A.beevor's stalingrad.

Why The Germans Lost Stalingrad?

In Stalingrad, now called Volgagrad, a battle began that historians call the largest battle in history. Why Stalingrad? Some say Hitler was trying to poke a finger in Stalin’s eye by decimating his namesake city. And obviously because of it’s strategic location on a bend in the Volga River. The Germans sought to control this waterway where oil supplies and manufactured goods were brought into the northern Soviet territories, and where factories created everything from tractors to sewing machines to tanks. The total estimated dead including civilians and combatants is over two million. This alone which would make Stalingrad a holocaust of its own. One would think that Hitler would want to capture the capital city first, Moscow, but Operation Typhoon, the battle for Moscow was delayed at the last second by Hitler. He even ordered Heinz Guderian to take his half of Army Group Center and link up with General Von Paulus to support the offensive. The battle began roughly in July 1942, and roughly ended in February 1943. Some historians say it went from November 1942 to January 1943. The entire history of the German invasion into Russia is rife with these discrepancies. Sometimes what we call an invasion and what we call a military action are differentiated by semantics. Suffice it to say that results were the same for the Wehrmacht.


In a recent one-hour program on the History channel, many important things were discovered and history itself was once again revised. Here are some interesting point discovered, or repeated depending on what you’ve already read and seen.

The massive bombing campaign against Stalingrad did not bring the whole city down.

In fact, most of the buildings in Stalingrad were made of steel reinforced concrete. So the idea that cinder block construction of the previous Russian cities would be ground into powder turned out to be bad prediction by German war planners. A blast expert named David Hadden traveled to Volgagrad and discovered that the reinforced concrete buildings for the most part withstood much of the bombing, and large windows on all floors gave blast energy a place to escape. So much of the city was still standing, if not severely damaged.

The bombing campaign created a battleground that defeated armor and favored the defenders.


The Panzer Kampfwaggen Mark III with it’s 5 man crew and 37mm gun was the MBT of the Stalingrad theatre. The gun itself wasn’t really big enough to blow down buildings. Once the city was devastated, tanks simply could not pass through the rubble. Not unlike the use of the phalanx, armor corps needed open ground and open fields of fire to operate. But there was little open ground in the ruins of Stalingrad. Also the main gun had limitations on elevation, so once it was a block or two away from a building, snipers in the upper floors were for the most part protected.

Also, there is a famous “drink” the Russians invented called the Molotov cocktail, which could be dropped from a building onto the back of a tank where the engine and petrol were stored. Left burning long enough it would set off the fuel and the tank rounds stored in the back of the turret. Soldiers scrambling out of the tank were easily picked off by snipers. A Molotov cocktail could be made from many petroleum products: turpentine, gasoline, cooking oil, a cloth dipped in paraffin, and a thickening agent like egg whites or woodsoap.


There were places when German infantry could see a hundred blown out windows in buildings left standing in the city. Each darkened hole could have easily held and hidden a sniper. One sniper going from room to room 100 yards away could pin down an entire company for hours. Pinned down German infantry tended to freeze in the Artic Soviet winter.

German snipers and infantry were easily outmatched by Russians.


Russia had an entire generation of people who as a rite of passage, joined rifle clubs and learned marksmanship. Little did the Germans know that basically the average Russian citizen, man or woman, knew how to shoot and shoot accurately. The scope on the bolt-action Mosin-Nagant was easier to adjust than the German scope on the Mauser 98K. That might seem like a small thing, but when snipers are the combatants of choice it isn’t a small issue at all. Women, typically non combatants, were available in large numbers and many were deadly accurate.


Also, the Germans were not used to the Russian winter. The Russians lived it every year of their lives. German gun oil froze, and the Russians mixed their gun oil with gasoline that gave it another ten to twenty degrees of cold to operate in. Germans had to sleep with their weapons, hoping their body heat would keep the weapons from freezing.

Germans did not prepare for disease and starvation, while the Russians were ready.


Germans died of starvation and had to wait until autoposies could be conducted to discovered that when you have no body fat, you die. Well, duh!. Also the Russians developed typhus and tularemia vaccines. The Germans did not.

Russian outwear was warmer that the outer wear of German soldier.


The German soldier wore an undershirt, a cotton shirt, a woolen coat, and a scarf, and a steel helmet. The steel helmet froze and failed to protect the Germans from cold on the part of their body that most needed warmth – their heads. The Russians wore aheavy cotton undergarments, a woolen tunic, a padded body length tunic over that which was adapted from the nomadic warriors in the frozen north, and a fake fur hat.

There was one more ingredient to this: The Russians were defending their country. The Germans were a thousand miles from home.


The air campaign set the battlefield, the armor could not penetrate the city and the panzergrenadiers then had to do the dirty work. The rest is history.


Source: History Channel
https://civilianmilitaryintelligencegroup.com/2296/why-the-germans-lost-stalingrad

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Its a bit of a hypothetical to be honest. While I agree focusing on grabbing the oil fields was probably the better strategy (in hindsight)...Hitler (plus a number of his generals who he unfortunately formed an echo chamber of) had a strong and valid reason for going after Stalingrad past just the name it bore (which has been overhyped by many historians I feel).

This was to guard the rear (and logistics chain) of the caucasus assault...a break (both bank control) of the volga river was needed at some point to accomplish this (given the supply route of the river +Caspian Sea for the Soviet forces to assault any weakness in the Caucasus supply chains both before and hypothetically afterwards too).

The mistake was in choosing an urban environment for this break (the name of Stalin in the city did tip this for Hitler)....but again its easy to see it in hindsight. At the time of the initial assault on Stalingrad, no one had any idea what sustained urban warfare would be like (it wasnt even really planned for by the Germans, they expected to conduct swift encirclement). Even Leningrad (closest parallel at the time) was effectively a partial siege. But the idea to take no chances in protecting the rear of the caucasus assault comes from sound strategy too (given the Germans had faced such problems in various theatres of barbarossa earlier). It was implemented badly (and with bias - a commanders worst enemy). In hindsight, a breach of the volga river could have been done at several other areas without a city to slow it down and act as an eventual quagmire and turning point.

By the time it had turned to a morass and logjam, Hitler valued saving face over sound strategic doctrine...and the rest they say is history.

@AUSTERLITZ @Levina @The Sandman @Desert Fox @Psychic @Vergennes@vostok

Your inputs if you have any regarding this?
Stalingrad was an enormous industrial and shipping center, it had to be neutralized regardless of what many historians think.
One of the least discussed aspect of Eastern front is that the STAVKA was continually supplied with accurate and timely intelligence, intelligence which proved to be fateful for the third Reich.
 
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THE TRUTH ABOUT OPERATION BARBAROSSA; THE GERMAN INVASION OF THE SOVIET UNION ON JUNE 22, 1941.
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75 Years ago today at approximately 4am on the 22nd of June, 1941, Germany commenced a massive counter-stroke and preemptive strike against the Soviet Union code named Operation Barbarossa.

Contrary to what has been taught in the West, the former Soviet Union and the public at large, German intelligence in 1940-1941, from it’s Abwehr unit had uncovered a massive invasion that Stalin was planning to unleash against not only Germany, but the entire continent of Europe as early as July 10, 1941.

A goal that international Communism had etched in their mindset as early as 1920 when the Bolsheviks drove west in an attempt to link up with German Communists in their world wide revolution. This attack alone is rarely mentioned, nor is the defender, Polish Marshal Pilsudski ever given credit for halting the Red Army outside the gates of Warsaw. This event took place while Adolf Hitler was only party member number 7 of an obscure and unknown minor party in Munich, Germany and four years before Mein Kampf was even written.

For many, the truth about the actual historical events is hard to understand or fathom. In essence they suffer from what has been termed; Cognitive Dissonance. The reason being has been the intentional distortion and omittance of the true historical facts from the public mindset.


In psychology, cognitive dissonance is the mental stress or discomfort experienced by an individual who holds two or more contradictory beliefs, ideas, or values at the same time, performs an action that is contradictory to one or more beliefs, ideas, or values, or is confronted by new information that conflicts with existing beliefs, ideas, or values.


That being said, eventually truth has a way of seeping through the facade of propaganda, lies, manipulations, distortions and state repression of documents. However, windows of opportunity open up for those who diligently seek the actual historical facts. For us, two of those individuals emerged out of the Soviet Union itself.


The first individual who uncovered strong and irrefutable circumstantial evidence was Viktor Suvorov, a former intelligence officer of GRU, a deep inner agency of the KGB. He published his findings after defecting to the West in his book: Icebreaker. It was a sensation when it hit the book shelves in Great Britain in 1990. However, it exposed the fact that the West had intentionally hidden the real facts concerning the War in the East. The book after it was published fell under pressure from behind the scenes to be squashed, repressed and no second printing was allowed. Like most books that uncover truth they are quickly given no reviews and further publications are halted. Hence their value begins to soar with those digging for the truth, as book dealers command higher prices for those seeking the truth.


Finally, in 1989 the Soviet Union collapsed and a lone Russian historian named Igor Bunich began to freely peruse the Soviet Archives. It was in these once top secret archives that he uncovered the grand designs of Joseph Stalin to commence the invasion of Germany and the West with the start date of July 10, 1941. It’s main aim was to drive into the Rumanian oil fields and deprive Germany of the oil needed to continue any means of fueling it’s defense combined with a secondary drive into Germany.


Germany had only, at most, a 45 day supply of oil. Igor Bunich published his findings in three volumes titled: Operation Groza (Thunderstorm). As of this date, none of his very important books has been translated into any other language and the few remaining volumes in Russian are disappearing and commanding ever increasing prices for those seeking the truth or at least hoping to preserve the truth from evidence uncovered in the Kremlin Archives. Additionally, as of this later date, even Putin is seeking to repress these facts in preserving the “official ” Soviet style version of what they term “The Great Patriotic War.”


Finally, by the mid nineties, Viktor Suvorov’s “pre emptive strike” motif of the German attack known as Operation Barbarossa gained the attention of the Neo-Con’s in the Republican administration. It was then that he was invited to speak before cadets at the United States Naval Academy. In addition, between the publication of Icebreaker and the publication of his newly named book Chief Culprit he was given additional information from other Russians who had uncovered more and vital documentation. This was added to what Viktor Suvorov already knew. These findings were published by none other than the United States Naval Academy Press.


Unfortunately, neither the works of Suvorov nor Bunich has been widely promoted outside the circles of military or government policy makers.


Nonetheless, the facts speak for themselves and Germany on June 22nd of 1941 had no other choice but to attack or fall to the same fate of what already had befallen to the nations of Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and partially to Rumania.


And contrary to what we have been taught, the German military was grossly unprepared nor did she even have the advanced weapons in huge numbers of light, medium and heavy artillery, tanks(especially the T-34 and KV), paratroop formations on the scale the Soviet Union had where factories had been churning out weapons 24/7 for several years with new prototypes being proposed that would quickly alter any hope for any viable defense of the West. Nor did Germany have the manpower for a sustained war by stripping her industry of men to fight at the front for a period of time she ended up fighting; whereas the Soviet Union had a large pool of workers and soldiers, which finally almost became exhausted by 1945 by the supreme efforts of German war organization of women, free labor and transcripted labor.


Unfortunately for Germany, the West itself had been manipulated and infiltrated by Communists and Communist sympathizers who guided the innermost workings of the policies of Great Britain and the United States. That is another story in itself uncovered from the Soviet Archives in the Vernona Papers.


–Richard M. Connelly June 22, 2016
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Watch “Why Hitler Struck Against the Soviet Union in 1941” on YouTube


Important evidence has come to light in recent decades that shatters the official, endlessly repeated view that Hitler, bent on world conquest, launched a treacherous surprise attack against a peaceful Soviet Union. Long-suppressed documents and other detailed evidence shows that by June 1941 Soviet dictator Stalin had built the world’s largest military machine, and had deployed an enormous strike force on the western Soviet frontier, in readiness for a massive attack against Germany that would roll on to overwhelm central and western Europe. Hitler’s ‘Barbarossa” attack, say a growing number of historians in Russia, Germany and other countries, was actually a preventive war to forestall an imminent Soviet strike.

Watch “Who Started World War II? by Viktor Suvorovon YouTube
This is Viktor Suvorov’s book presentation at the United States Naval Academy on October 7, 2009


A former Soviet army intelligence officer (true name Vladimir Rezun), the author explains that Stalin’s strategy leading up to World War II grew from Vladimir Lenin’s belief that if World War I did not ignite the worldwide Communist revolution, then a second world war would be needed to achieve it. Stalin saw Nazi Germany as the power that would fight and weaken capitalist countries so that Soviet armies could then sweep across Europe. Suvorov reveals how Stalin conspired with German leaders to bypass the Versailles Treaty, which forbade German rearmament, and secretly trained German engineers and officers and provided bases and factories for war. He also calls attention to the 1939 nonaggression pact between the Soviet Union and Germany that allowed Hitler to proceed with his plans to invade Poland, fomenting war in Europe.


Suvorov debunks the theory that Stalin was duped by Hitler and that the Soviet Union was a victim of Nazi aggression. Instead, he makes the case that Stalin neither feared Hitler nor mistakenly trusted him. Suvorov maintains that after Germany occupied Poland, defeated France, and started to prepare for an invasion of Great Britain, Hitler’s intelligence services detected the Soviet Union’s preparations for a major war against Germany. This detection, he argues, led to Germany’s preemptive war plan and the launch of an invasion of the USSR. Stalin emerges from the pages of this book as a genius consumed by the vision of a worldwide Communist revolution at any cost–a leader who wooed Hitler and Germany in his own effort to conquer the world. In contradicting traditional theories about Soviet planning, the book is certain to provoke debate among historians throughout the world.
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Watch “Who Started World War II ? by Viktor Suvorov (full version)” on YouTube

This is Viktor Suvorov’s book presentation at the United States Naval Academy on October 7, 2009. In his recent book “The Chief Culprit” the bestselling author Viktor Suvorov probes newly released Soviet documents and reevaluates existing material to analyze Stalin’s strategic design to conquer Europe and the reasons behind his controversial support for Nazi Germany.

He argues that Stalin was caught just days before launching his own assault into Central Europe. Thus the Red Army’s offensive posture rendered it uniquely vulnerable to German attack.

A former Soviet army intelligence officer (true name Vladimir Rezun), the author explains that Stalin’s strategy leading up to World War II grew from Vladimir Lenin’s belief that if World War I did not ignite the worldwide Communist revolution, then a second world war would be needed to achieve it. Stalin saw Nazi Germany as the power that would fight and weaken capitalist countries so that Soviet armies could then sweep across Europe. Suvorov reveals how Stalin conspired with German leaders to bypass the Versailles Treaty, which forbade German rearmament, and secretly trained German engineers and officers and provided bases and factories for war. He also calls attention to the 1939 nonaggression pact between the Soviet Union and Germany that allowed Hitler to proceed with his plans to invade Poland, fomenting war in Europe.

Suvorov debunks the theory that Stalin was duped by Hitler and that the Soviet Union was a victim of Nazi aggression. Instead, he makes the case that Stalin neither feared Hitler nor mistakenly trusted him. Suvorov maintains that after Germany occupied Poland, defeated France, and started to prepare for an invasion of Great Britain, Hitler’s intelligence services detected the Soviet Union’s preparations for a major war against Germany. This detection, he argues, led to Germany’s preemptive war plan and the launch of an invasion of the USSR. Stalin emerges from the pages of this book as a genius consumed by the vision of a worldwide Communist revolution at any cost–a leader who wooed Hitler and Germany in his own effort to conquer the world. In contradicting traditional theories about Soviet planning, the book is certain to provoke debate among historians throughout the world.

About the Author

VIKTOR SUVOROV is the author of eighteen books that have been translated into more than twenty languages, including “Inside the Aquarium: The Making of a Top Soviet Spy” and “Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War?” A Soviet army officer who served in military intelligence, he defected in 1978 to the United Kingdom, where he worked as an intelligence analyst and lecturer. He lives in England.

https://uncensoredspeechworldwide.c...invasion-of-the-soviet-union-on-june-22-1941/



 
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Are you in the signal regiment?
Signalian is what students of an army signals college call themselves who incidentally think that signal processing is the highest art form known to mankind. Though Sarge here is a gentleman through and through but there is an another turd on PDF who calls himself 'mourning sage' because he studies at a signals college. LOL
 
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