Of Pakistan, Terrorism, and Confusion
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TalibanSwatter
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Talat Masood
Anti-Americanism continues to rise unabated in Pakistan. It is not confined to fringe elements alone but is spreading in the mainstream. A few recently retired military officers and politicians have gone as far as accusing US for abetting and supporting acts of terror that have engulfed the country. This is despite the fact that President Obama and the administration has made serious efforts clearing up misunderstandings and reducing the inherent tensions not only with Pakistan but with the Muslim world in general.
Washington has tried to redress the past policy mistakes of abandoning Pakistan by developing a long-term strategic relationship. It has expanded, in scope and depth, Pakistan’s economic assistance threefold and doubled military assistance, totaling $2.2 billion annually. The Enhanced Partnership Act, notwithstanding its intrusive clauses and abrasive wording, is a clear manifestation of breaking from the past. The United States has also been highly supportive of Pakistan at the World Bank, IMF and other multilateral forums to ease its financial crisis.
Furthermore, on a larger canvas, President Obama has tried to reach out to the Muslims and expressed as a matter of policy his desire to develop a relationship on the basis of mutual respect. He has repeatedly emphasised his close personal links with Muslims and frequently reflects warmly on his experiences in Muslim countries during the early part of his life. His speech at the University of Cairo and prior to that in Turkey was a clear indication of this shift. The immediate withdrawal of some of the draconian measures like water boarding and his plans to close Guantanamo Bay, although as yet to be implemented, are all signs that were meant to reduce the cleavage with the Muslim world and an assurance that the US is not at war with Islam but is only fighting those radical Muslim elements that have taken arms against them. The Nobel Peace Prize award to Obama was an acknowledgement of the transformational changes that he was aspiring to bring in American policy.
But nothing seems to work. Even when the US administration or the military leadership makes a statement that the resolution of the Kashmir dispute would contribute towards regional stability, it is viewed with great scepticism. Similarly, when top US military and government officials publicly acknowledge that Pakistan’s nuclear assets are safe it fails to resonate.
In short, cynicism and dislike for America has reached a point of no return among a certain class in Pakistan, and from their point of view nothing that US does can possibly be good for the country. And they cling to the mantra, despite repeated assurances, that Washington’s interest only lies in taking out our nuclear assets.
What then are the reasons for this distrust and how far are these allegations of the US wanting to destabilise Pakistan, with the help of India, credible?
Any major power, when it adopts a security or foreign policy, always weighs the flip side of everything. If Washington were to destabilise Pakistan as a deliberate policy, then the ensuing chaos will create a vacuum that would surely be filled by the Taliban and jihadi forces, posing a far greater danger to the US, India and the rest of the world. It would be absurd for the US to simultaneously fight the militants, be it the Taliban or Al Qaeda, and support them.
The fact, however, is that the internal and external policies Pakistan has pursued in the last three decades to advance its perceived national interests were flawed and have come to roost. Regrettably, we are in a state of denial and not prepared to accept that militancy is not home grown, and has taken root with the people. There is no doubt that American policies along with Indian designs have accentuated Pakistan’s regional problems. But the answer to our insurgency and the expanding frontiers of terrorism lies primarily with us. It is the responsibility of our leaders to give clarity in defining the nature of threat and mobilising the nation’s resources, both human and material, to combat it successfully. Failure to do so has resulted in the spread of endless rumours generally to the advantage of the militants. We are also failing to optimise the exceptional support that the international community is willing to extend in these difficult times.
This is also true that the legacy of betrayal is so strong and deep-seated that the US will have to work very hard to overcome the prevailing suspicions. The US administration will have to make a categorical assertion that Blackwater or its associates are not operating in Pakistan if confidence in the public of its sincerity is to be restored. The policy of employing drones needs also to be reviewed so that Pakistan military’s involvement at the intelligence and operational levels is fully integrated.
Otherwise every drone attack fuels anti-Americanism and exposes the contradiction in our relations, neutralising the tactical advantage that its employment accrues.
It is equally important to realise that, while we are passing through the worst of times, not everything is lost. There are many positive elements that are emerging as we wade through the present crisis. Despite all odds, a democratic system however fragile has been put in place. Institutions have started functioning, the judiciary is asserting itself, and media is robust debating every facet of our political, economic and social life and acting as a watchdog on our leaders. Parliament has yet to energise but is under public pressure to assume its responsibilities of legislating and assisting in the formulation of national policies. The civil society is emerging, albeit somewhat gradually.
Tragically, the nation is paying a heavy price in blood and sweat in combating militancy. It is forcing us to reform or face the consequences of an existential threat. The cumulative impact of these developments whether it is pressure of media, civil society or the violent acts of militants is bringing about fundamental changes in the society. Feudalism and tribal hierarchy is on its way out and politicians canot fool the people, and the military is in no position to capture power. Militancy is now compelling the government to act and reach out to the tribal people whom they neglected for 62 years. Similarly, the insurgency in Baluchistan is forcing the government to take political and economic measures that it denied to them. The military is acting against the proxies that at one time it patronised. The society is in flux and anarchic but there are several positive happenings as well.
Talat Masood
Anti-Americanism continues to rise unabated in Pakistan. It is not confined to fringe elements alone but is spreading in the mainstream. A few recently retired military officers and politicians have gone as far as accusing US for abetting and supporting acts of terror that have engulfed the country. This is despite the fact that President Obama and the administration has made serious efforts clearing up misunderstandings and reducing the inherent tensions not only with Pakistan but with the Muslim world in general.
Washington has tried to redress the past policy mistakes of abandoning Pakistan by developing a long-term strategic relationship. It has expanded, in scope and depth, Pakistan’s economic assistance threefold and doubled military assistance, totaling $2.2 billion annually. The Enhanced Partnership Act, notwithstanding its intrusive clauses and abrasive wording, is a clear manifestation of breaking from the past. The United States has also been highly supportive of Pakistan at the World Bank, IMF and other multilateral forums to ease its financial crisis.
Furthermore, on a larger canvas, President Obama has tried to reach out to the Muslims and expressed as a matter of policy his desire to develop a relationship on the basis of mutual respect. He has repeatedly emphasised his close personal links with Muslims and frequently reflects warmly on his experiences in Muslim countries during the early part of his life. His speech at the University of Cairo and prior to that in Turkey was a clear indication of this shift. The immediate withdrawal of some of the draconian measures like water boarding and his plans to close Guantanamo Bay, although as yet to be implemented, are all signs that were meant to reduce the cleavage with the Muslim world and an assurance that the US is not at war with Islam but is only fighting those radical Muslim elements that have taken arms against them. The Nobel Peace Prize award to Obama was an acknowledgement of the transformational changes that he was aspiring to bring in American policy.
But nothing seems to work. Even when the US administration or the military leadership makes a statement that the resolution of the Kashmir dispute would contribute towards regional stability, it is viewed with great scepticism. Similarly, when top US military and government officials publicly acknowledge that Pakistan’s nuclear assets are safe it fails to resonate.
In short, cynicism and dislike for America has reached a point of no return among a certain class in Pakistan, and from their point of view nothing that US does can possibly be good for the country. And they cling to the mantra, despite repeated assurances, that Washington’s interest only lies in taking out our nuclear assets.
What then are the reasons for this distrust and how far are these allegations of the US wanting to destabilise Pakistan, with the help of India, credible?
Any major power, when it adopts a security or foreign policy, always weighs the flip side of everything. If Washington were to destabilise Pakistan as a deliberate policy, then the ensuing chaos will create a vacuum that would surely be filled by the Taliban and jihadi forces, posing a far greater danger to the US, India and the rest of the world. It would be absurd for the US to simultaneously fight the militants, be it the Taliban or Al Qaeda, and support them.
The fact, however, is that the internal and external policies Pakistan has pursued in the last three decades to advance its perceived national interests were flawed and have come to roost. Regrettably, we are in a state of denial and not prepared to accept that militancy is not home grown, and has taken root with the people. There is no doubt that American policies along with Indian designs have accentuated Pakistan’s regional problems. But the answer to our insurgency and the expanding frontiers of terrorism lies primarily with us. It is the responsibility of our leaders to give clarity in defining the nature of threat and mobilising the nation’s resources, both human and material, to combat it successfully. Failure to do so has resulted in the spread of endless rumours generally to the advantage of the militants. We are also failing to optimise the exceptional support that the international community is willing to extend in these difficult times.
This is also true that the legacy of betrayal is so strong and deep-seated that the US will have to work very hard to overcome the prevailing suspicions. The US administration will have to make a categorical assertion that Blackwater or its associates are not operating in Pakistan if confidence in the public of its sincerity is to be restored. The policy of employing drones needs also to be reviewed so that Pakistan military’s involvement at the intelligence and operational levels is fully integrated.
Otherwise every drone attack fuels anti-Americanism and exposes the contradiction in our relations, neutralising the tactical advantage that its employment accrues.
It is equally important to realise that, while we are passing through the worst of times, not everything is lost. There are many positive elements that are emerging as we wade through the present crisis. Despite all odds, a democratic system however fragile has been put in place. Institutions have started functioning, the judiciary is asserting itself, and media is robust debating every facet of our political, economic and social life and acting as a watchdog on our leaders. Parliament has yet to energise but is under public pressure to assume its responsibilities of legislating and assisting in the formulation of national policies. The civil society is emerging, albeit somewhat gradually.
Tragically, the nation is paying a heavy price in blood and sweat in combating militancy. It is forcing us to reform or face the consequences of an existential threat. The cumulative impact of these developments whether it is pressure of media, civil society or the violent acts of militants is bringing about fundamental changes in the society. Feudalism and tribal hierarchy is on its way out and politicians canot fool the people, and the military is in no position to capture power. Militancy is now compelling the government to act and reach out to the tribal people whom they neglected for 62 years. Similarly, the insurgency in Baluchistan is forcing the government to take political and economic measures that it denied to them. The military is acting against the proxies that at one time it patronised. The society is in flux and anarchic but there are several positive happenings as well.
TalibanSwatter
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Dawn News
Roots of Terrorism
Shahid Javed Burki
Although there are still a couple of weeks to go before the new year, 2009 will go down in Pakistan’s exceptionally turbulent history as the country’s bloodiest year — bloodier than the time of ‘Operation Cleanup’ in the early 1990s in Karachi.
The security forces then dealt with a situation that was confined to one city, albeit the largest in the country and that was the result of warring groups seeking to establish their political and economic writ. It was not aimed at destroying the Pakistani state or establishing a new political, economic and social order. It was about control of the city. This time the state is the target. Pakistan is dealing with an insurgency that poses an existential threat.
Complicating the situation is the fact that the germs of this insurgency were planted by operators both within and outside Pakistan. According to popular belief the main reason for the development of extremism in the country was the involvement of the US in Afghanistan in the 1980s and the decision by Washington to pull out of the area that, in policy terms, it now refers to as AfPak.
The US left once the Soviet Union withdrew its forces from Afghanistan. But that is only a quarter of the explanation. There were several others. Among these was the social and political engineering of Gen Ziaul Haq who decided on his own and without the aid of public support that Pakistan needed to adopt Islam as the basis of its economic, political and social systems.
Under him, the country went through a wrenching change which was aided and abetted by the several Arab states with which his government had become closely associated. Saudi Arabia was particularly important in pushing Pakistan in that direction. It had helped finance Mujahideen efforts in Afghanistan and also financed the founding and development of a number of madressahs in large cities.
These madressahs taught a version of Islam that was mostly foreign to Pakistan. This is how Wahabi/Salafi Islam struck roots in Pakistani soil. It flourished in particular in those areas whose people had been exposed to it because of their sojourn in Saudi Arabia.
One relatively less understood reason for the rapid growth of this more orthodox interpretation of Islam is the channel it found through the temporary migration to the Gulf states from Pakistan’s northern areas. This lasted for a decade and a half, from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s, and involved several million people from northern Punjab and the NWFP.
These workers were hired on fixed contracts, stayed in camps near the construction sites, and spent a good deal of their spare time in the mosques. They thus came under the influence of the local imams steeped in the Wahabi tradition. They brought this interpretation with them when they returned to Pakistan.
Also contributing to the problem is the fact that Pakistan’s political development was arrested because of the repeated involvement of the military in politics. The state’s priorities kept on changing as the leadership provided by the military in politics changed. But there was one thing common in the way all four military dictators governed. They had little confidence in the political will of the people they governed; all knowing, they ruled the country according to their particular whims.
Ayub Khan believed in limited democracy. He called it basic democracy. Ziaul Haq believed in what he thought was the Islamic way — the people should be governed by a pious leader who should not be constrained by the expressed wishes of the people. His only obligation was to consult a group of wise people chosen by the pious leader and assembled in a forum he called the shura.
Pervez Musharraf went back to the Ayubian formula by limiting democracy to a system of local government and a king’s party controlling a largely inconsequential national legislature. Being military men, these leaders believed in strong command and control systems in politics and economics. Since they were distant from the people they could not build popular support for their policies.
By far the most important contributor to the rise of extremism was the way a series of administrations managed the Pakistani economy. For many decades Pakistan experienced one of the sharpest increases in the rate of population growth. The country’s population at the time of independence was only 32 million of which 10 per cent lived in urban areas. It has increased almost five and a half times to 170 million on the eve of 2010.
This implies an average rate of growth of over three per cent sustained over a period of 60 years. Although the country has not held a population census for many years, I believe that nearly a half of this large and growing population is now urban. The urban population has increased at the rate of 4.5 per cent a year, again one of the highest in the world.
Unfortunately these demographic developments were not factored into the making of economic policy. Islamabad should have focused not only in getting the economy to grow rapidly — which it did on occasions and during the periods when the military was in charge — but also on ensuring that the rewards of rapid growth were widely distributed. The result is that the country now has millions of alienated youth with little faith in their future. They have been successfully recruited to jihadist causes. The latest of these is the destruction of the Pakistani state.
In developing an approach towards growing extremism and terrorism it is breeding, policymakers as well as the citizenry must first understand its complex causes. By focusing on just one aspect — the American pressure to go after the perpetrators of terrorist activities — the country will not be able to evolve a cogent response.
Roots of Terrorism
Shahid Javed Burki
Although there are still a couple of weeks to go before the new year, 2009 will go down in Pakistan’s exceptionally turbulent history as the country’s bloodiest year — bloodier than the time of ‘Operation Cleanup’ in the early 1990s in Karachi.
The security forces then dealt with a situation that was confined to one city, albeit the largest in the country and that was the result of warring groups seeking to establish their political and economic writ. It was not aimed at destroying the Pakistani state or establishing a new political, economic and social order. It was about control of the city. This time the state is the target. Pakistan is dealing with an insurgency that poses an existential threat.
Complicating the situation is the fact that the germs of this insurgency were planted by operators both within and outside Pakistan. According to popular belief the main reason for the development of extremism in the country was the involvement of the US in Afghanistan in the 1980s and the decision by Washington to pull out of the area that, in policy terms, it now refers to as AfPak.
The US left once the Soviet Union withdrew its forces from Afghanistan. But that is only a quarter of the explanation. There were several others. Among these was the social and political engineering of Gen Ziaul Haq who decided on his own and without the aid of public support that Pakistan needed to adopt Islam as the basis of its economic, political and social systems.
Under him, the country went through a wrenching change which was aided and abetted by the several Arab states with which his government had become closely associated. Saudi Arabia was particularly important in pushing Pakistan in that direction. It had helped finance Mujahideen efforts in Afghanistan and also financed the founding and development of a number of madressahs in large cities.
These madressahs taught a version of Islam that was mostly foreign to Pakistan. This is how Wahabi/Salafi Islam struck roots in Pakistani soil. It flourished in particular in those areas whose people had been exposed to it because of their sojourn in Saudi Arabia.
One relatively less understood reason for the rapid growth of this more orthodox interpretation of Islam is the channel it found through the temporary migration to the Gulf states from Pakistan’s northern areas. This lasted for a decade and a half, from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s, and involved several million people from northern Punjab and the NWFP.
These workers were hired on fixed contracts, stayed in camps near the construction sites, and spent a good deal of their spare time in the mosques. They thus came under the influence of the local imams steeped in the Wahabi tradition. They brought this interpretation with them when they returned to Pakistan.
Also contributing to the problem is the fact that Pakistan’s political development was arrested because of the repeated involvement of the military in politics. The state’s priorities kept on changing as the leadership provided by the military in politics changed. But there was one thing common in the way all four military dictators governed. They had little confidence in the political will of the people they governed; all knowing, they ruled the country according to their particular whims.
Ayub Khan believed in limited democracy. He called it basic democracy. Ziaul Haq believed in what he thought was the Islamic way — the people should be governed by a pious leader who should not be constrained by the expressed wishes of the people. His only obligation was to consult a group of wise people chosen by the pious leader and assembled in a forum he called the shura.
Pervez Musharraf went back to the Ayubian formula by limiting democracy to a system of local government and a king’s party controlling a largely inconsequential national legislature. Being military men, these leaders believed in strong command and control systems in politics and economics. Since they were distant from the people they could not build popular support for their policies.
By far the most important contributor to the rise of extremism was the way a series of administrations managed the Pakistani economy. For many decades Pakistan experienced one of the sharpest increases in the rate of population growth. The country’s population at the time of independence was only 32 million of which 10 per cent lived in urban areas. It has increased almost five and a half times to 170 million on the eve of 2010.
This implies an average rate of growth of over three per cent sustained over a period of 60 years. Although the country has not held a population census for many years, I believe that nearly a half of this large and growing population is now urban. The urban population has increased at the rate of 4.5 per cent a year, again one of the highest in the world.
Unfortunately these demographic developments were not factored into the making of economic policy. Islamabad should have focused not only in getting the economy to grow rapidly — which it did on occasions and during the periods when the military was in charge — but also on ensuring that the rewards of rapid growth were widely distributed. The result is that the country now has millions of alienated youth with little faith in their future. They have been successfully recruited to jihadist causes. The latest of these is the destruction of the Pakistani state.
In developing an approach towards growing extremism and terrorism it is breeding, policymakers as well as the citizenry must first understand its complex causes. By focusing on just one aspect — the American pressure to go after the perpetrators of terrorist activities — the country will not be able to evolve a cogent response.
TalibanSwatter
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DAWN
Nadeem Piracha
Across Pakistan’s history a number of politicians, lawyers, journalists, student leaders and party workers have bravely wrestled with the establishment’s civil, military and economic arms.
These arms have played every dirty trick in the book of destructive Machiavellian politics set into motion against democrats so the ‘establishment’ can retain a stagnant and largely reactionary political and economic status-quo; a status-quo that fears the pluralistic and levelling qualities of democracy.
Many from the higher echelons of society have prospered from this status-quo. They are always ready to ward off democracy through a synthetic brand of ‘patriotism’ concocted from overt displays of nationalistic chauvinism and politicised Islam.
Though they are quick to blame the masses for falling so easily for democratic parties’ ‘empty’ promises, the truth is, the same masses have been more susceptible to whatever hate-spewing gibberish and mythical brew these magicians have been feeding the people for decades in the name of history, Islam and patriotism.
This brew, present in the history books our children are taught, has been gradually turning the average Pakistani into a paranoid and pessimistic android who, as if instinctively, lets out his frustrations by pounding the democrats with cynical blows, also swinging wildly at Pakistan’s many enemies he is told are lurking within and outside its borders.
In this mangled discourse, the documented horrors of the long military dictatorships that this republic has suffered are conveniently forgotten; sometimes even by those in the political and journalistic circles who had struggled hard for a democratic setup; they suddenly seem to lose all their painfully cultivated tolerance and patience, once that democratic setup is revived.
No wonder, in this day and age, we are still debating whether democracy is right for Pakistan, and/or is it compatible with Islam. It is not surprising that such debates crop up in a nation constantly injected with a heavy dose of dubious history which begins not five thousand years ago with the Indus Valley Civilisation, but many centuries later with Muhammad Bin Qasim’s conquest of Sindh. In fact, some textbooks have had no qualms of completely bypassing logic by claiming that Qasim was actually the first Pakistani!
This history then cleverly ignores the many terrible intrigues and murders that were committed by a series of Muslim rulers against their own comrades and kin, sometimes in a fit of jealously and sometimes owing to pure power play. This historical narrative goes to work right away when we are quick to present ourselves as noble people who are incapable of murder, genocide and intrigue, and assert that it is actually other races and religions who have been targeting us.
We forget West Pakistan’s controversial role and the bloodbath that followed in the former East Pakistan. We forget how the founder of Pakistan was treated while on his death bed, as he lay lamenting how some of his closest colleagues couldn’t wait to see him die. We forget how a wily general calling himself a pious Muslim sent a popularly elected prime minister to the gallows on the feeblest of evidences.
We forget how an Islamic party being led by a renowned Islamic scholar was behind two of the most shameful acts of mass rioting against the Ahmadiya community. We forget how, long before Hindu fanatics tore down the Barbri Masjid in India, varied Islamic sects and sub-sects were busy going to war against one another in the streets of Lucknow (Muharram processions are banned in that city for over a decade now owing to Sunni-Shia and not Hindu-Muslim rivalry).
We forget the terrible sounds of the army’s tanks rolling into Balochistan (1962, 1973); and then in Sindh (1983), slaughtering a number of young Baloch and Sindhis, accusing them of treason, when all they wanted were their democratic rights. We forget the terrible decade-long armed action by the state against ‘Muhajirs’ in Karachi, in which whole families were wiped out.
We forget how our intelligence agencies schemed the downfall of one democratic government after another in the 1990s, all the while fattening scores of holy monsters many of whom are now blowing up our markets and mosques. There are many more of these horrid episodes in which Pakistanis killed Pakistanis and Muslims slaughtered Muslims.
Why is it so difficult then for us to understand that the mayhem rained on us today is by monsters like the home-grown Taliban? ‘It can’t be us. It can’t be Muslims,’ we say.
Back in 1971, very few Pakistanis were willing to advise Yahya Khan to get into a dialogue with rebelling Bengalis. But today, after years of unprecedented violence perpetrated by the Taliban, we have many politicians, TV hosts, and journalists suggesting a dialogue with men who one can’t even be described as human. These people’s minds and those of their followers have been influenced by all the concocted and mythical moments of glory, and of justified hatred in the name of religion and patriotism present in our historical discourse and the false memories that it has created in us.
Unfortunately such demagogic claptrap still manages to pass as being Pakistan and Muslim history in the textbooks and on popular TV.
Nadeem Piracha
Across Pakistan’s history a number of politicians, lawyers, journalists, student leaders and party workers have bravely wrestled with the establishment’s civil, military and economic arms.
These arms have played every dirty trick in the book of destructive Machiavellian politics set into motion against democrats so the ‘establishment’ can retain a stagnant and largely reactionary political and economic status-quo; a status-quo that fears the pluralistic and levelling qualities of democracy.
Many from the higher echelons of society have prospered from this status-quo. They are always ready to ward off democracy through a synthetic brand of ‘patriotism’ concocted from overt displays of nationalistic chauvinism and politicised Islam.
Though they are quick to blame the masses for falling so easily for democratic parties’ ‘empty’ promises, the truth is, the same masses have been more susceptible to whatever hate-spewing gibberish and mythical brew these magicians have been feeding the people for decades in the name of history, Islam and patriotism.
This brew, present in the history books our children are taught, has been gradually turning the average Pakistani into a paranoid and pessimistic android who, as if instinctively, lets out his frustrations by pounding the democrats with cynical blows, also swinging wildly at Pakistan’s many enemies he is told are lurking within and outside its borders.
In this mangled discourse, the documented horrors of the long military dictatorships that this republic has suffered are conveniently forgotten; sometimes even by those in the political and journalistic circles who had struggled hard for a democratic setup; they suddenly seem to lose all their painfully cultivated tolerance and patience, once that democratic setup is revived.
No wonder, in this day and age, we are still debating whether democracy is right for Pakistan, and/or is it compatible with Islam. It is not surprising that such debates crop up in a nation constantly injected with a heavy dose of dubious history which begins not five thousand years ago with the Indus Valley Civilisation, but many centuries later with Muhammad Bin Qasim’s conquest of Sindh. In fact, some textbooks have had no qualms of completely bypassing logic by claiming that Qasim was actually the first Pakistani!
This history then cleverly ignores the many terrible intrigues and murders that were committed by a series of Muslim rulers against their own comrades and kin, sometimes in a fit of jealously and sometimes owing to pure power play. This historical narrative goes to work right away when we are quick to present ourselves as noble people who are incapable of murder, genocide and intrigue, and assert that it is actually other races and religions who have been targeting us.
We forget West Pakistan’s controversial role and the bloodbath that followed in the former East Pakistan. We forget how the founder of Pakistan was treated while on his death bed, as he lay lamenting how some of his closest colleagues couldn’t wait to see him die. We forget how a wily general calling himself a pious Muslim sent a popularly elected prime minister to the gallows on the feeblest of evidences.
We forget how an Islamic party being led by a renowned Islamic scholar was behind two of the most shameful acts of mass rioting against the Ahmadiya community. We forget how, long before Hindu fanatics tore down the Barbri Masjid in India, varied Islamic sects and sub-sects were busy going to war against one another in the streets of Lucknow (Muharram processions are banned in that city for over a decade now owing to Sunni-Shia and not Hindu-Muslim rivalry).
We forget the terrible sounds of the army’s tanks rolling into Balochistan (1962, 1973); and then in Sindh (1983), slaughtering a number of young Baloch and Sindhis, accusing them of treason, when all they wanted were their democratic rights. We forget the terrible decade-long armed action by the state against ‘Muhajirs’ in Karachi, in which whole families were wiped out.
We forget how our intelligence agencies schemed the downfall of one democratic government after another in the 1990s, all the while fattening scores of holy monsters many of whom are now blowing up our markets and mosques. There are many more of these horrid episodes in which Pakistanis killed Pakistanis and Muslims slaughtered Muslims.
Why is it so difficult then for us to understand that the mayhem rained on us today is by monsters like the home-grown Taliban? ‘It can’t be us. It can’t be Muslims,’ we say.
Back in 1971, very few Pakistanis were willing to advise Yahya Khan to get into a dialogue with rebelling Bengalis. But today, after years of unprecedented violence perpetrated by the Taliban, we have many politicians, TV hosts, and journalists suggesting a dialogue with men who one can’t even be described as human. These people’s minds and those of their followers have been influenced by all the concocted and mythical moments of glory, and of justified hatred in the name of religion and patriotism present in our historical discourse and the false memories that it has created in us.
Unfortunately such demagogic claptrap still manages to pass as being Pakistan and Muslim history in the textbooks and on popular TV.
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