Saturday, April 14, 2007
Nuclear terrorism chance in Pakistan low: expert
By Khalid Hasan
WASHINGTON: Although an act of nuclear terrorism is of very remote probability in Pakistan, controls around various nuclear installations and radiation facilities are enough to deter and delay a terrorist attack. Any modified diversion would be detected early, while a terrorist group will not favour the fabrication of a radiological dispersion, according to a Pakistani expert.
Abdul Mannan, director of Transport and Waste Safety, Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority, who spent a period of attachment at the Stimson Centre from November 2006 to February 2007, writes in a report released by the Centre that given the access terrorists now have to science and technology, the threat of nuclear terrorism is no longer fiction but real. Terrorists have the intention to inflict catastrophic damage on human beings, property and the environment.
While Pakistan is not considering reprocessing of nuclear materials and hence there may be no need for transportation, the study, based on several low probabilities of sabotage events of spent fuel and high activity sources, shows that an explosion and subsequent fire would cause hundred of deaths and severe damage to surrounding buildings. Whereas in an explosion alone only a few casualties could be expected due to radiation sickness in the area of 200 metres, extensive environmental contamination is to be expected accompanied by potential exposure of thousands of individuals in the downwind zone. The number of people expected to get exposure to unsafe levels of radiation causing late effects leading to cancerous deaths would not only depend on the strength of the radioactive materials but also on the timing and location of the attack.
Mannan writes that a personnel reliability programme has to be made an integral part of any nuclear security infrastructure. He records that in Pakistan, a background check is conducted to verify identity, credit history, criminal history, reputation and character of the personnel employed in nuclear facilities. Additionally, a detailed interview to verify background information and elucidate other potential concerns is conducted at the time of employment or when a sensitive task is being assigned. Not listed by the Pakistani expert is the individualâs inclination towards religious extremism of fundamentalism.
Mannan maintains that any evacuation/sheltering of communities based on a 360° potential-hazard zone may be adopted instead of a cone shaped zone predicted by the code to eliminate the many associated uncertainties and changing wind directions in real situations. Difficulties are likely to arise in informing members of the public in an urban area where it may not be practicable to evacuate such large numbers, or in a rural situation where individuals may be unaware of the incident and who, scattered about the countryside, may be difficult to locate and advise in time.
To dilute the consequences of any successful sabotage event, preplanning is very important through well developed and coordinated efforts of various agencies.
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\04\14\story_14-4-2007_pg7_7
Nuclear terrorism chance in Pakistan low: expert
By Khalid Hasan
WASHINGTON: Although an act of nuclear terrorism is of very remote probability in Pakistan, controls around various nuclear installations and radiation facilities are enough to deter and delay a terrorist attack. Any modified diversion would be detected early, while a terrorist group will not favour the fabrication of a radiological dispersion, according to a Pakistani expert.
Abdul Mannan, director of Transport and Waste Safety, Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority, who spent a period of attachment at the Stimson Centre from November 2006 to February 2007, writes in a report released by the Centre that given the access terrorists now have to science and technology, the threat of nuclear terrorism is no longer fiction but real. Terrorists have the intention to inflict catastrophic damage on human beings, property and the environment.
While Pakistan is not considering reprocessing of nuclear materials and hence there may be no need for transportation, the study, based on several low probabilities of sabotage events of spent fuel and high activity sources, shows that an explosion and subsequent fire would cause hundred of deaths and severe damage to surrounding buildings. Whereas in an explosion alone only a few casualties could be expected due to radiation sickness in the area of 200 metres, extensive environmental contamination is to be expected accompanied by potential exposure of thousands of individuals in the downwind zone. The number of people expected to get exposure to unsafe levels of radiation causing late effects leading to cancerous deaths would not only depend on the strength of the radioactive materials but also on the timing and location of the attack.
Mannan writes that a personnel reliability programme has to be made an integral part of any nuclear security infrastructure. He records that in Pakistan, a background check is conducted to verify identity, credit history, criminal history, reputation and character of the personnel employed in nuclear facilities. Additionally, a detailed interview to verify background information and elucidate other potential concerns is conducted at the time of employment or when a sensitive task is being assigned. Not listed by the Pakistani expert is the individualâs inclination towards religious extremism of fundamentalism.
Mannan maintains that any evacuation/sheltering of communities based on a 360° potential-hazard zone may be adopted instead of a cone shaped zone predicted by the code to eliminate the many associated uncertainties and changing wind directions in real situations. Difficulties are likely to arise in informing members of the public in an urban area where it may not be practicable to evacuate such large numbers, or in a rural situation where individuals may be unaware of the incident and who, scattered about the countryside, may be difficult to locate and advise in time.
To dilute the consequences of any successful sabotage event, preplanning is very important through well developed and coordinated efforts of various agencies.
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\04\14\story_14-4-2007_pg7_7
