MultaniGuy
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And who cares about North Korea.
North Korea is a pariah state.
North Korea is a pariah state.
North Korea Defence Forum
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EndangeredSpecies
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Bigger question, where will you folks bring North Koreans from, to participate in this forum?
BHarwana
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Trump cares he takes the name of North Korea more than any other country.
UkroTurk
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North Korea missiles: Projectile flies over Japan
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41078187
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41078187
yavar
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Galactic Penguin SST
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The Hwasong-14 nosecone fairing is 3.2 m in length and 1.3 m in diameter.
One single thermonuclear warhead is estimated to be 1.4 m in length, 65 cm in diameter and 700 kg in weight, without the trigger mechanism.
The total mass of the thermonuclear warhead is estimated to be 850 kg.
The Hwasong-14 nosecone fairing is 3.2 m in length and 1.3 m in diameter.
One single thermonuclear warhead is estimated to be 1.4 m in length, 65 cm in diameter and 700 kg in weight, without the trigger mechanism.
The total mass of the thermonuclear warhead is estimated to be 850 kg.
The Hwasong-14 nosecone fairing is 3.2 m in length and 1.3 m in diameter.
One single thermonuclear warhead is estimated to be 1.4 m in length, 65 cm in diameter and 700 kg in weight, without the trigger mechanism.
The total mass of the thermonuclear warhead is estimated to be 850 kg.
As you can see in the picture above, the thermonuclear warhead primary system is a spherical nuclear bomb that looks like a basketball.
The inner surface of the primary system, which connects the primary and secondary system, is made of a reflector that prevents radiation from being scattered in all directions, made of polystyrene, a kind of colorless transparent synthetic resin.
In the secondary system, the thermonuclear charge is filled with a dual structure, made of lithium deuteride on the inside, and highly enriched uranium, called sparkplug, on the outside, which triggers a fusion reaction. Depending on the amount of lithium deuteride, the explosive power of the fusion charge can be controlled.
Three scientists are seen assembling a nuclear warhead. It seems clear that the text printed on the nuclear warhead is "hydrogen".
As you can see in the picture above, the thermonuclear warhead primary system is a spherical nuclear bomb that looks like a basketball.
The inner surface of the primary system, which connects the primary and secondary system, is made of a reflector that prevents radiation from being scattered in all directions, made of polystyrene, a kind of colorless transparent synthetic resin.
In the secondary system, the thermonuclear charge is filled with a dual structure, made of lithium deuteride on the inside, and highly enriched uranium, called sparkplug, on the outside, which triggers a fusion reaction. Depending on the amount of lithium deuteride, the explosive power of the fusion charge can be controlled.
https://media.giphy.com/media/yvXyKcOWq2vny/giphy.gif
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WLAIG1-B0pM
T=9s to T=14s
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WLAIG1-B0pM
T=9s to T=14s
https://media.giphy.com/media/v9aqaqtNJxbwI/giphy.gif
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WLAIG1-B0pM
T=24s to T=26s
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WLAIG1-B0pM
T=24s to T=26s
http://
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WLAIG1-B0pM
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WLAIG1-B0pM
The upper photo shows the artificial earthquake wave of the nuclear warhead explosion test of the DPRK shown in the earthquake measuring device of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Organization.
They announced that the earthquake size was 6.1. The lower photo shows the artificial earthquake wave of the thermonuclear warhead explosion test of the DPRK in the earthquake measuring device of the Geological Physics Division of the Russian Academy of Sciences. They announced that the earthquake size was 6.4.
According to the Kelly Kiloton Index (KKI), formulated in 2006 by H. A. Kelly of UCLA, which is an earthquake magnitude converted to explosive power, the earthquake magnitude of 6.0 means a 1 Mt explosive power. The power is 1.4 Mt. Therefore, when the artificial earthquake that occurred in the nuclear warhead explosion test of the DPRK is 6.0-6.1, the explosive power is 1-1.4Mt.
The United States and Russia have nuclear ballistic missiles equipped with multi-warheads of about 200 kt.
In the case of the single-warhead Russian Topol-M the yield is 800 kt.
And the RS-24 YARS intercontinental ballistic missile thermonuclear multi-warheads are each of 150-500 kt.
The Trident of the United States is 100 kt and the B61-12 is 500 kt.
September 12, 2017
At the time of the sixth nuclear test, the preliminary seismic magnitude estimates varied from 5.8, as published by both the CTBTO and NORSAR, to 6.3 by the United States Geological Survey (USGS). More recently, both the CTBTO and NORSAR have officially revised their estimates upward to 6.1. This revision is significant because, rather than providing an equivalent yield of about 120 kilotons derived from the lower magnitude estimates, the application of standard formula with appropriate constants shows that the yield can now be estimated to have been roughly 250 kilotons (one quarter megaton). This large explosive yield is also quite close to what 38 North had previously determined to be the maximum estimated containable yield for the Punggye-ri test site.
http://www.38north.org/2017/09/punggye091217/
▲ Cosmic energy unleashed by The Dumbbell
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Safriz
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So ths is uranium based design with Lithium 6. Not plutonium based
▲ September 4, 2017 SBS 8:00 news reports that China and the United States measured a 6.3 seismic magnitude meaning the explosive yield can be estimated to have been roughly 250 kilotons.
The United States and Russia have nuclear ballistic missiles equipped with multi-warheads of about 200 kt.
In the case of the single-warhead Russian Topol-M the yield is 800 kt.
And the RS-24 YARS intercontinental ballistic missile thermonuclear multi-warheads are each of 150-500 kt.
The Trident of the United States is 100 kt and the B61-12 is 500 kt.
September 12, 2017
At the time of the sixth nuclear test, the preliminary seismic magnitude estimates varied from 5.8, as published by both the CTBTO and NORSAR, to 6.3 by the United States Geological Survey (USGS). More recently, both the CTBTO and NORSAR have officially revised their estimates upward to 6.1. This revision is significant because, rather than providing an equivalent yield of about 120 kilotons derived from the lower magnitude estimates, the application of standard formula with appropriate constants shows that the yield can now be estimated to have been roughly 250 kilotons (one quarter megaton). This large explosive yield is also quite close to what 38 North had previously determined to be the maximum estimated containable yield for the Punggye-ri test site.
http://www.38north.org/2017/09/punggye091217/
▲ Published on Sep 11, 2017. North Korea shows scientists preparing H-Bomb test during concert, and footage of the explosion!http://
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WLAIG1-B0pM
▲ North Korean scientists have harnessed the cosmic power of thermonuclear fusion with The Dumbbell
▲ Cosmic energy unleashed by The Dumbbell
▲ Oli Heinonen, Secretary General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has commented about the nuclear weapons of North Korea: "EMP is a very dangerous weapon that destroys all electronic equipment on the ground ". Because EMP blasts explode at very high altitudes, intercepting is difficult and affects a vast area, so even if you only hold for a few minutes, you will have tremendous destructive power.
Galactic Penguin SST
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So much for Iranian missile being a copy cat of North Korea.
North Korea’s Missile Success Is Linked to Ukrainian Plant, Investigators Say
A photo released by North Korea’s state news agency in July purported to show a test of a Hwasong-14, thought to be capable of reaching the mainland United States.
KOREAN CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY, VIA REUTERS
By WILLIAM J. BROAD and DAVID E. SANGER
AUGUST 14, 2017
North Korea’s success in testing an intercontinental ballistic missile that appears able to reach the United States was made possible by black-market purchases of powerful rocket engines probably from a Ukrainian factory with historical ties to Russia’s missile program, according to an expert analysis being published Monday and classified assessments by American intelligence agencies.
The studies may solve the mystery of how North Korea began succeeding so suddenly after a string of fiery missile failures, some of which may have been caused by American sabotage of its supply chains and cyberattacks on its launches. After those failures, the North changed designs and suppliers in the past two years, according to a new study by Michael Elleman, a missile expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Such a degree of aid to North Korea from afar would be notable because President Trump has singled out only China as the North’s main source of economic and technological support. He has never blamed Ukraine or Russia, though his secretary of state, Rex W. Tillerson, made an oblique reference to both China and Russia as the nation’s “principal economic enablers” after the North’s most recent ICBM launch last month.
Analysts who studied photographs of the North’s leader, Kim Jong-un, inspecting the new rocket motors concluded that they derive from designs that once powered the Soviet Union’s missile fleet. The engines were so powerful that a single missile could hurl 10 thermonuclear warheads between continents.
Those engines were linked to only a few former Soviet sites. Government investigators and experts have focused their inquiries on a missile factory in Dnipro, Ukraine, on the edge of the territory where Russia is fighting a low-level war to break off part of Ukraine. During the Cold War, the factory made the deadliest missiles in the Soviet arsenal, including the giant SS-18. It remained one of Russia’s primary producers of missiles even after Ukraine gained independence.
But since Ukraine’s pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych, was removed from power in 2014, the state-owned factory, known as Yuzhmash, has fallen on hard times. The Russians canceled upgrades of their nuclear fleet. The factory is underused, awash in unpaid bills and low morale. Experts believe it is the most likely source of the engines that in July powered the two ICBM tests, which were the first to suggest that North Korea has the range, if not necessarily the accuracy or warhead technology, to threaten American cities.
“It’s likely that these engines came from Ukraine — probably illicitly,” Mr. Elleman said in an interview. “The big question is how many they have and whether the Ukrainians are helping them now. I’m very worried.”
Bolstering his conclusion, he added, was a finding by United Nations investigators that North Korea tried six years ago to steal missile secrets from the Ukrainian complex. Two North Koreans were caught, and a U.N. report said the information they tried to steal was focused on advanced “missile systems, liquid-propellant engines, spacecraft and missile fuel supply systems.”
Investigators now believe that, amid the chaos of post-revolutionary Ukraine, Pyongyang tried again.
Mr. Elleman’s detailed analysis is public confirmation of what intelligence officials have been saying privately for some time: The new missiles are based on a technology so complex that it would have been impossible for the North Koreans to have switched gears so quickly themselves. They apparently fired up the new engine for the first time in September — meaning that it took only 10 months to go from that basic milestone to firing an ICBM, a short time unless they were able to buy designs, hardware and expertise on the black market.
The White House had no comment when asked about the intelligence assessments.
Last month, Yuzhmash denied reports that the factory complex was struggling for survival and selling its technologies abroad, in particular to China. Its website says the company does not, has not and will not participate in “the transfer of potentially dangerous technologies outside Ukraine.”
American investigators do not believe that denial, though they say there is no evidence that the government of President Petro O. Poroshenko, who recently visited the White House, had any knowledge or control over what was happening inside the complex.
On Monday, after this story was published, Oleksandr Turchynov, a top national security official in the government of Mr. Poroshenko, denied any Ukrainian involvement.
“This information is not based on any grounds, provocative by its content, and most likely provoked by Russian secret services to cover their own crimes,” Mr. Turchynov said. He said the Ukrainian government views North Korea as “totalitarian, dangerous and unpredictable, and supports all sanctions against this country.”
How the Russian-designed engines, called the RD-250, got to North Korea is still a mystery.
Mr. Elleman was unable to rule out the possibility that a large Russian missile enterprise, Energomash, which has strong ties to the Ukrainian complex, had a role in the transfer of the RD-250 engine technology to North Korea. He said leftover RD-250 engines might also be stored in Russian warehouses.
But the fact that the powerful engines did get to North Korea, despite a raft of United Nations sanctions, suggests a broad intelligence failure involving the many nations that monitor Pyongyang.
Since President Barack Obama ordered a step-up in sabotage against the North’s missile systems in 2014, American officials have closely monitored their success. They appeared to have won a major victory last fall, when Mr. Kim ordered an end to flight tests of the Musudan, an intermediate-range missile that was a focus of the American sabotage effort.
But no sooner had Mr. Kim ordered a stand-down of that system than the North rolled out engines of a different design. And those tests were more successful.
American officials will not say when they caught on to the North’s change of direction. But there is considerable evidence they came to it late.
North Korean soldiers massed in Kim Il-sung Square in Pyongyang in July after the test launch of their country’s first intercontinental ballistic missile.
JON CHOL JIN / ASSOCIATED PRESS
Leon Panetta, the former C.I.A. director, said on CBS’ “Face the Nation” on Sunday that the North Korean drive to get workable ICBMs that could be integrated with nuclear weapons moved more quickly than the intelligence community had expected.
“The rapid nature of how they’ve been able to come to that capability is something, frankly, that has surprised both the United States and the world,” he said.
It is unclear who is responsible for selling the rockets and the design knowledge, and intelligence officials have differing theories about the details. But Mr. Elleman makes a strong circumstantial case that would implicate the deteriorating factory complex and its underemployed engineers.
“I feel for those guys,” said Mr. Elleman, who visited the factory repeatedly a decade ago while working on federal projects to curb weapon threats. “They don’t want to do bad things.”
Dnipro has been called the world’s fastest-shrinking city. The sprawling factory, southeast of Kiev and once a dynamo of the Cold War, is having a hard time finding customers.
American intelligence officials note that North Korea has exploited the black market in missile technology for decades, and built an infrastructure of universities, design centers and factories of its own.
It has also recruited help: In 1992, officials at a Moscow airport stopped a team of missile experts from traveling to Pyongyang.
That was only a temporary setback for North Korea. It obtained the design for the R-27, a compact missile made for Soviet submarines, created by the Makeyev Design Bureau, an industrial complex in the Ural Mountains that employed the rogue experts apprehended at the Moscow airport.
But the R-27 was complicated, and the design was difficult for the North to copy and fly successfully.
President Petro O. Poroshenko of Ukraine visiting the Yuzhmash plant in Dnipro in 2014.
POOL PHOTO BY MYKHAILO MARKIV
Eventually, the North turned to an alternative font of engine secrets — the Yuzhmash plant in Ukraine, as well as its design bureau, Yuzhnoye. The team’s engines were potentially easier to copy because they were designed not for cramped submarines but roomier land-based missiles. That simplified the engineering.
Economically, the plant and design bureau faced new headwinds after Russia in early 2014 invaded and annexed Crimea, a part of Ukraine. Relations between the two nations turned icy, and Moscow withdrew plans to have Yuzhmash make new versions of the SS-18 missile.
In July 2014, a report for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace warned that such economic upset could put Ukrainian missile and atomic experts “out of work and could expose their crucial know-how to rogue regimes and proliferators.”
The first clues that a Ukrainian engine had fallen into North Korean hands came in September when Mr. Kim supervised a ground test of a new rocket engine that analysts called the biggest and most powerful to date.
Norbert Brügge, a German analyst, reported that photos of the engine firing revealed strong similarities between it and the RD-250, a Yuzhmash model.
Alarms rang louder after a second ground firing of the North’s new engine, in March, and its powering of the flight in May of a new intermediate-range missile, the Hwasong-12. It broke the North’s record for missile distance. Its high trajectory, if leveled out, translated into about 2,800 miles, or far enough to fly beyond the American military base at Guam.
On June 1, Mr. Elleman struck an apprehensive note. He argued that the potent engine clearly hailed from “a different manufacturer than all the other engines that we’ve seen.”
Mr. Elleman said the North’s diversification into a new line of missile engines was important because it undermined the West’s assumptions about the nation’s missile prowess: “We could be in for surprises.”
That is exactly what happened. The first of the North’s two tests in July of a new missile, the Hwasong-14, went a distance sufficient to threaten Alaska, surprising the intelligence community. The second went far enough to reach the West Coast, and perhaps Denver or Chicago.
Last week, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists featured a detailed analysis of the new engine, also concluding that it was derived from the RD-250. The finding, the analysts said, “raises new and potentially ominous questions.”
The emerging clues suggest not only new threats from North Korea, analysts say, but new dangers of global missile proliferation because the Ukrainian factory remains financially beleaguered. It now makes trolley buses and tractors, while seeking new rocket contracts to help regain some of its past glory.
Fake news! Stop spreading this gross fabricated disinformation!
Here Anatoly Zak's bylined commentary:
The RD-250 engine at the center of an international storm
September 10, 2017
In 2017, North Korea stunned the world with a series of test launches of long-range ballistic missiles. One popular explanation for the East Asian state's remarkable progress in rocketry essentially blamed Ukraine for providing North Korea with know-how on the powerful RD-250 engine which bore some superficial resemblance to a North-Korean engine. But was it really possible, given the scale of effort required to reproduce and drastically redesign a complex rocket engine?
However, the most serious charge in the IISS publication claims that a one-chamber version of the RD-250 had been produced in Russia or Ukraine:
However, as described above, the Ukrainian space agency spent more than a decade trying to obtain the original RD-250 engine, badly needed for the nation’s rocket program. After spending a decade and almost $400 million, the Ukrainians were still unable to simply reproduce the Russian RD-250 with two combustion chambers, let alone develop and build a brand-new new, heavily modified one-chamber version, which now appears on the North Korean ICBM.
The failure to reproduce the RD-250 was one of the major reasons that Ukrainian engineers conceived a drastically new Tsyklon-4M rocket around 2016, which would avoid the use of Russian engines.
Although Ukrainians admit a superficial resemblance of some components on the North Korean propulsion system to those on RD-250, they see a much simpler explanation. “North Koreans could simply be inspired by the same photos of RD-250 (found in the IISS report),” one expert said.
As of possible scenarios for the origin of the North Korean engine, Ukrainian experts suggest an indigenous effort, but point at China as the most likely source of assistance in propulsion know-how, with Russia being a distant second possibility. Unlike Ukraine, the former two countries have at least some clear political motivation to help North Korea advance its missile program as a tool against the United States.
http://russianspaceweb.com/rd250.html
Thrust estimation of the Paektusan-1(B) rocket engine
"백두산계렬 80tf급 액체로케트(발동기): Paektusan Series 80 tf liquid rocket (engine)" is written in red. Note, the world "engine" is out of the camera's field!
The title of the explanatory note indicates that the high-power liquid rocket engine developed and completed at this time is 80 ton-force liquid rocket engine. © Ju Shobo and Han Ho Seok
2017/09/04
According to a March 20, 2017 report, Korean military experts analyzing the thrust of the new liquid rocket engine shown in the DPRK photographs, evaluated the liquid rocket engine as a 100-ton-force rocket engine.
The 100-ton-force is 980 kilo Newtons. The 80-ton-force liquid rocket engine appeared on the static ground test on September 19, 2016, and the 100-ton-force liquid rocket engine appeared on the static ground test conducted on March 18, 2017. As a result, it can be seen that, as of September 2017, the Paektusan liquid rocket engine series was developed as an 80 ton-force type in 2016 and a 100 ton-force type in 2017, respectively.
http://jajusibo.com/sub_read.html?uid=35475§ion=sc38§ion2=
According to a March 20, 2017 report, Korean military experts analyzing the thrust of the new liquid rocket engine shown in the DPRK photographs, evaluated the liquid rocket engine as a 100-ton-force rocket engine.
The 100-ton-force is 980 kilo Newtons. The 80-ton-force liquid rocket engine appeared on the static ground test on September 19, 2016, and the 100-ton-force liquid rocket engine appeared on the static ground test conducted on March 18, 2017. As a result, it can be seen that, as of September 2017, the Paektusan liquid rocket engine series was developed as an 80 ton-force type in 2016 and a 100 ton-force type in 2017, respectively.
http://jajusibo.com/sub_read.html?uid=35475§ion=sc38§ion2=
The Hwasong-12 ICBM seems to be a missile of the same class as the Hwasong-13 ICBM but with more advanced design, therefore the same thrust of about 100 tons, but with only one main engine and four verniers instead of two main engines and four verniers.
Code:
╔═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗
║ Comparative estimated North Korean ICBMs first stage main engine thrusts ║
╠═══════════════╤════════════════════════╤════════════════════════════╤═════════════════════════════╤═════════════════╣
║ Launchers │ Thrust of main engines │ Thrust of verniers engines │ Total thrust of first stage │ Estimated range ║
╟───────────────┼────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────┼─────────────────╢
║ Moksong-2 │ 4 x 32 tons │ 4 x 5 tons │ 150 tons │ >11,000 km ║
╟───────────────┼────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────┼─────────────────╢
║ Hwasong-13 │ 2 x 35 tons │ 4 x 8 tons │ 102 tons │ >12,000 km ║
╟───────────────┼────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────┼─────────────────╢
║ Hwasong-12/14 │ 1 x 80 tons │ 4 x 5 tons │ 100 tons │ 6,5 Mm / ~14 Mm ║
╚═══════════════╧════════════════════════╧════════════════════════════╧═════════════════════════════╧═════════════════╝Attachments
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yavar
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Ivan the Immigrant
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There are still lot of confusions about North Korean missiles and their classifications but now we at least know this for sure:
Hwasong-12
Sucesfully tested: 14 May 2017, 29 August 2017 and 15 September 2017
Hwasong-14
Sucessfully tested: 4 July 2017 and 28 July 2017
Hwasong-12 is somewhat smaller missile than Hwasong-14. I found some speculations that Hwasong-12 is actually a first stage of Hwasong-14. However this seems not to be correct since Hwasong-12 has smaller diameter thus making it lower class missile than Hwasong-14. But what is confusing is that both Hwasong-12 and Hwasong-14 probably use the same rocket engine what again puts them in same class. Big question is why North Korea complicate thing with building two different missiles of different proportions in the same class, testing both missiles separately, etc.. It would be much more easier and less complicated to build only one missile in this class?
Hwasong-12
Sucesfully tested: 14 May 2017, 29 August 2017 and 15 September 2017
Hwasong-14
Sucessfully tested: 4 July 2017 and 28 July 2017
Hwasong-12 is somewhat smaller missile than Hwasong-14. I found some speculations that Hwasong-12 is actually a first stage of Hwasong-14. However this seems not to be correct since Hwasong-12 has smaller diameter thus making it lower class missile than Hwasong-14. But what is confusing is that both Hwasong-12 and Hwasong-14 probably use the same rocket engine what again puts them in same class. Big question is why North Korea complicate thing with building two different missiles of different proportions in the same class, testing both missiles separately, etc.. It would be much more easier and less complicated to build only one missile in this class?
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anas_nurhafidz
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interesting thread 
Galactic Penguin SST
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A screen shot from north Korean military parade.
The missile has too much resemblance with Russian Iskander M system
Below is the image of Iskander M
"
New North Korean Missile Resembles South Korea's Hyunmu
February 21, 2018 13:13
▲ The new missile that made its debut during a military parade in Pyongyang on Feb. 8, 2018
▲ Hyunmu-2
The South Korean National Assembly's Defense Committee on Tuesday raised suspicions that North Korea has stolen the blueprint of the South's Hyunmu-2 missile by hacking the computer system of a government agency.
The committee claimed that a new missile that made its debut during a military parade in Pyongyang on Feb. 8 looks suspiciously similar to the Hyunmu-2.
Song said that the North Korean missile in question is a new missile using cold-launch technology and a solid-fuel engine and that while the North Korean missile does indeed looks like the Hyunmu, it seems to have a different guidance system.
He added that it is hard to make a precise assessment of North Korea's firepower because it has not unveiled its most formidable submarine-launched ballistic missile yet. Others have suggested that the North instead copied Russia's Iskander SS26 missile, which was in turn the archetype of the Hyunmu.
The Hyunmu-2 is the key part of the "kill chain" preemptive strike system of the South Korean military. In June last year, President Moon Jae-in visited the ADD, where he watched a test-launch.
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2018/02/21/2018022101540.html
February 21, 2018 13:13
▲ The new missile that made its debut during a military parade in Pyongyang on Feb. 8, 2018
The South Korean National Assembly's Defense Committee on Tuesday raised suspicions that North Korea has stolen the blueprint of the South's Hyunmu-2 missile by hacking the computer system of a government agency.
The committee claimed that a new missile that made its debut during a military parade in Pyongyang on Feb. 8 looks suspiciously similar to the Hyunmu-2.
Song said that the North Korean missile in question is a new missile using cold-launch technology and a solid-fuel engine and that while the North Korean missile does indeed looks like the Hyunmu, it seems to have a different guidance system.
He added that it is hard to make a precise assessment of North Korea's firepower because it has not unveiled its most formidable submarine-launched ballistic missile yet. Others have suggested that the North instead copied Russia's Iskander SS26 missile, which was in turn the archetype of the Hyunmu.
The Hyunmu-2 is the key part of the "kill chain" preemptive strike system of the South Korean military. In June last year, President Moon Jae-in visited the ADD, where he watched a test-launch.
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2018/02/21/2018022101540.html
,,
What is the intelligence quotient (IQ)?
The definition states that the intelligence quotient is a measure of intellectual ability.
It is the "ability" of performing. In other words, the ability for comprehension, combinations and learning.
The one who can achieve the same education with less effort is classified as more intelligent.
According to the above definition, one can easily, see that the education expenditure per capita of the U.S. is 1,949 $ with a national average IQ of only 98, ranking at the 27th place.
In comparison, North Korea with a national average IQ of 102, ranks 7th, with the lowest education expenditure per capita. This says a lot about its population's genetical and environmental factors indeed!
No wonder, as per the displayed IQ that was averaged out of the results of 9 international studies and compared to the average income and government expenditures on education over 20 years (1990 to 2010), we see that North Korea ranks 7th in the world, thus easily outsmarting the U.S. at the 27th place!
https://defence.pk/pdf/attachments/...2/?temp_hash=4719295d7a19dbc49a8fea2fb4564203
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DV4oHzzUQAAuzZL.jpg:large
https://twitter.com/PDChina/status/963251530664050689
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DV4oHzzUQAAuzZL.jpg:large
https://twitter.com/PDChina/status/963251530664050689
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