North Korea could take initiative in joining international community

[TaiShang]

North Korea could take initiative in joining international community

By Ding Gang Source:Global Times Published: 2018/5/25


The situation on the Korean Peninsula seems to be at a dead end.

What US President Donald Trump wants is North Korea's sincere abandonment of its nuclear weapons, not only as a promise, but also as an actual, irreversible action, and to have the denuclearization process closely monitored. What North Korea wants is its security, and its worry is whatever it does will not satisfy the US' demands. North Korea worries that the US' ultimate goal is a regime change.

Trump's asking price is very high, and it is not clear what he will give to North Korea; at least, he hasn't stated anything substantial. In fact, when North Korea's security and the denuclearization are both to the standards of what the US wants, or at least controlled by the White House, the scales are not balanced in North Korea's favor.

However, if you take a step back, you may see a brighter future. If North Korea unwaveringly abandons its nuclear program, can the international community provide North Korea with security? If so, Trump's meeting with Kim is less critical.

The next question that will inevitably arise will be the issue of South Korea and the US, that is, how, or when, will US military troops withdraw, so as to allow the Korean Peninsula to begin a comprehensive peace arrangement.

We do not believe the US will dare to launch a war against or subvert North Korea once North Korea reaches a specific agreement with the international community and begins the process of denuclearization. At the same time, once the denuclearization starts, the United States will have no reason to impose sanctions.

Peace on the peninsula is only possible if the denuclearization and the withdrawal of US troops happen at the same time.

Therefore, North Korea's nuclear issue must be solved through four goals: first, denuclearization; second, the withdrawal of the US military; third, the unification of the two Koreas; and fourth, the permanent neutrality of Korea after the Korean reunification. The four goals should be reached simultaneously in a package arrangement.

Such an arrangement will certainly not exclude the United States, but might gradually weaken the dominance of the United States. The facts have shown that the security of the peninsula is dominated by the US, and as a result may never be able to "reach a beneficial solution."

Only with the participation of the international community and using common agendas can North Korea achieve a new balance.

Of course, it requires that the North Korean leader sees the overall situation and takes the initiative. On the surface, North Korea seems to be compromising, and this will lead to a positive result and help North Korea get out of its current difficulties to win the international communities' support and let a more solid foundation for its future development.

***

Might that be the advise China has given to the DPRK leader? I am still not sure it is a good advice -- unless China promised absolute security guarantee to the country in case of US aggression.

If I were Kim, I would have difficulty in heeding the advice above. It is too optimistic. China needs to put some real deal on top of such advice.

@Chinese-Dragon

 

[atan651]

NK should just become a fully-autonomous province of China for now. This will bring NK prosperity and at the same time tick off the Americans. Wild idea but...

 

[MReynolds]

...can the international community provide North Korea with security?

The IC can't even do anything about that disaster in Yemen much less NK.

NK should just become a fully-autonomous province of China for now. This will bring NK prosperity and at the same time tick off the Americans. Wild idea but...

The South Koreans would just be upset as the Americans, if not more; not sure what Japan would do.

 

[rott]

 

[TaiShang]

Opinion: Why Trump-Kim summit not happening is not a big deal

Wen Yang
2018-05-26

Editor’s note: As it stands, the summit between US President Donald Trump and the DPRK leader Kim Jong Un is off, but it could be back on. Hopes for the highly-anticipated meeting were dashed after Trump called off the planned June 12 talks, blaming Pyongyang's "tremendous anger and open hostility". However, they were revived again when the US president labelled as "warm and productive" the DPRK's response, which said it supports the meeting pushing through. On Friday night, Trump tweeted that "very productive talks" are underway with the DPRK about reinstating the summit.

Trump blew it. But it wasn’t important who blew it, his June 12 Singapore summit with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) leader Kim Jong Un was collapsing anyway. What the US president did, which is a face-saving move to say the least, was just the last straw that broke the camel’s back.

Many foreign policy pundits were quick to establish a correlation between the DPRK’s demolition of its nuclear test site at Punggye-ri and Trump’s decision to cancel the summit, drawing hasty conclusions that this was nothing more than another revelation of the US president’s merchant instinct to exploit a situation for a quick profit. Such a simplistic view fails to grasp the complex nature of the DPRK nuclear issue.

There is an unspoken precondition for the DPRK to consider denuclearization: Its nuclear and missile programs must have reached a certain developmental stage that could allow for a temporary suspension. International observers must bear this in mind when they analyze the flurry of diplomatic activities surrounding the DPRK since the PyeongChang Winter Olympics.

The premises for the DPRK’s denuclearization was quite well-established when Kim Jong Un and South Korea’s Moon Jae-in’s historical handshake took place on April 27 at Panmunjom.

The DPRK leader Kim Jong Un (L) and South Korea's President Moon Jae-in walk together past the Military Demarcation Line that divides their countries at Panmunjom, April 27, 2018. /VCG Photo.

And exactly because such premises exclude initiatives from the US and other stakeholders, the DPRK’s sweet plan would inevitably turn sour. Despite the different roles played by China, the US, and South Korea in the DPRK’s denuclearization process, it is the DPRK's own initiative that has actively made the process a success.

Therefore, it is also easy to understand that the real motivation for all parties involved, except the DPRK, has been exerting influence on the denuclearization framework rather than safeguarding the Singapore summit.

In the Panmunjom Declaration, the DPRK made its position abundantly clear. First, Seoul and Pyongyang affirmed the principle of determining the destiny of the Korean nation on their own accord. Secondly, both Koreas confirmed the common goal of realizing, through complete denuclearization, a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.

Note the intended omission of "verifiable" and "irreversible" – the language used in UNSC resolutions to describe the dismantlement of DPRK’s nuclear program as far back as 2006 – in the Panmunjom Declaration. It is not hard to decipher the document’s subtext: self-determination of Korean people is dependent on and assured by their lasting possession of nuclear capabilities.

Such subtext would help one realize that the DPRK’s denuclearization framework is likely to be scrutinized and revised again and again.

South Korean President Moon Jae-in (R) talks with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo during their meeting in Washington, May 22, 2018. /VCG Photo.

The US came to this realization almost immediately. The day after the two Koreas issued a joint declaration, US National Security hawk John Bolton suggested the talks with the DPRK should follow the "Libya Model." And on May 2, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in his inaugural speech that the DPRK’s denuclearization should follow a revised set of principles known as PVID – P for "Permanent."

Since then, the US’ critical attitude has seriously undermined the foundation of the DPRK’s denuclearization plan.

Kim Jong Un understood very well what was implied by the US statements. He had no better alternative but to travel to China for the second time in two months to seek support from President Xi Jinping on May 7.

Kim made such an unexpected move not as an attempt to salvage the Singapore summit, but to probe the possibility of receiving China’s support in regards to his goal – that is, national self-determination safeguarded by nuclear capabilities – under US pressure.

The US’ takeaway from the Xi-Kim summit in Dalian was primarily negative. It saw itself in a highly disadvantaged position.

In a move to prevent itself from being sidelined, South Korea actively attempted to become the sole broker of the Singapore summit between the US and the DPRK, while passively accommodating the US position and participating in a routine joint military drill.

US stocks bounced between gains and losses as plummeting oil prices rocked energy shares and investors weighed what US President Donald Trump called DPRK's 'warm and productive' response to his decision to cancel a summit with the nation's leader Kim Jong Un, May 25, 2018. /VCG Photo.‍

The series of events further undermined the DPRK’s premises of denuclearization, resulting in its decision to cancel a prescheduled high-level inter-Korean meeting.

From the Panmunjom Declaration on April 27, to Kim Jong Un’s pullback from the second inter-Korea talks on May 16, no player approached the denuclearization summit with a constructive mindset. Everyone has been looking after their own interest. No wonder the summit was bound to fail.

Couldn’t everyone involved just approach this sophisticated issue with a little more seriousness and maturity?

There’s no straightforward answer.

The world is not ready to embrace the DPRK as the first nuclear-capable middle power. The DPRK is seeking to achieve a de facto ownership of nuclear weapons so as to ensure unhampered self-determination for all Koreans on the Peninsula. The profound historical significance and geopolitical ramifications of such a scenario are too much for a few symbolic summits in the span of a few months to bear.

Unless all relevant parties are on the same page regarding the complexity of the DPRK nuclear issue, there will be no commonly accepted architecture.

Canceling the summit will not spell doom since the US side’s sincerity was very much in doubt to begin with. Though tremendous efforts were wasted, going back to square one helps everyone see things more clearly.

(Wen Yang is a senior fellow at the China Institute in Fudan University of China. The article reflects the author's opinion, and not necessarily the views of CGTN.)