Both the governments of India and Bangladesh are involved in revisionist history. War Crimes trials was the last thing India wanted in the aftermath of the 1971 war . Declassified documents 50 years later show how Indira Gandhi and her advisers P.N. Haksar, D.P.Dhar and Indian COAS Sam Manekshaw threw Bangladesh under the bus.
India views at least a rapprochement with Pakistan far more important to its security and regional big power status ambitions, than relations with any other country.
Gary Bass of Princeton University wrote a paper "
Bargaining away Justice " with now declassified information. His paper is fascinating because on one hand he laments the miscarriage of justice and on the other hand he gives a blow by blow account of how both India and Pakistan actively colluded to avoid dragging out the aftermath of the civil war in pursuit of their own security priorities.
All Bangladeshis, Pakistanis and Indians should read this.
( Link )
The following extracts from the paper written by Princeton University Scholar Gary J Bass, "
Bargaining away Justice" are extremely interesting.
" The basic reason was not legal, but military: although Indian troops and Bengali guerrillas had won a decisive victory in East Pakistan, the war had been inconclusive on the other front in West Pakistan. "
"As Hans Morgenthau put it, “[T]he principle of the defense of hu- man rights cannot be consistently applied in foreign policy because it can and it must come in conflict with other interests that may be more important than the defense of human rights in a particular instance.”31 In many ways, Bangladesh would seem a propitious case for prosecuting war criminals: there was a military victory by a liberal democracy; that democracy was appalled by the recent atrocities; it held many war crimes suspects in custody; and the per- petrator regime had collapsed. Even so, India, although victorious in the 1971 war, was not dominant enough to force Pakistan to accept humiliating trials of its troops. Instead, India sought its security through seizing a rare opportunity for making peace with Pakistan, embodied in the generous Simla agreement of 1972. With that strategic prize at stake, India proved ready to bargain away the trial of Pakistani war criminals. This was the kind of bargain that Huntington, Snyder, and Vinjamuri would expect.
In Bangladesh, too, international security concerns trumped the drive for retribution against the killers. Newly separate from Pakistan, Bangladesh desperately needed global acceptance as an independent state. With China and the United States hostile to the newborn country, Bangladesh feared lingering in a nether space of nonrecognition, which could tempt revanchism from Pakistan. Pakistan, however, insisted that the price of its recognition—a precedent-setting act of legitimation that would allow other states to follow—was impunity for war criminals. Bangladesh had little real choice but to acquiesce.
"At root, the problem was that India’s military dominance was not comparable to that of the Allies after winning the unconditional surrenders of Germany and Japan in World War II. It was not even as resounding as some less conclusive victories, such as the Allied victory over Germany and the Ottoman Empire in World War I or NATO’s 1995 victory in Bosnia.32 India could not impose its will on a helpless foe; it did not occupy West Pakistan, and could not have. Pakistan, even stripped of Bangladesh, remained capable of defying and provoking India. Under these strategic circumstances of a relatively incon- clusive victory, with the defeated foe’s cooperation needed for future security, some kind of amnesty was likely."
Summing up Gary Bass's paper:
The results of Pakistan's Civil War were not definite, unlike normal Civil Wars where the winning faction gets control of the entire nation. Pakistan retained control of its vital, strategic and far more defensible Western territory along with its rich mineral
and water resources and natural beauty. Pakistan also retained control of the core of its armed forces allowing it to rebuild and threaten India's territories .
Thus Pakistan's defeat was not like Germany or Japan in World War 2.
Pakistan deftly used its international clout to get back its prisoners and territories from India. But most important was India's desire to give preference to building relations with Pakistan over Bangladesh. I never knew this until a few days back when I read the excellent study on this subject that has been done by Princton University Scholar
Gary J Bass in his paper "
Bargaining away Justice" . Reading this paper with declassified information now available is an eye opener for Pakistanis, Indians and Bangladeshis, As a Pakistani I felt quite relieved to read this document, and it made me look very differently on India 50 years after our Civil War. I am hopeful that if sense prevails now as it did then we can still avoid nuking ourselves. Then as of now Bangladesh was peripheral to the interests of both Pakistan and India.
Following is clear after reading this paper :
1. Bangladesh is never going to get any sort of "apology " from Pakistan. There will be no war crimes trials. Not even symbolic ones.
2. Semantics aside India is not going to pressurize or intercede with Pakistan on Bangladesh's behalf for war reparations, apologies, trials of "war criminals " nor will any other nation. Bangladesh is alone in dealing with Pakistan.
3. India is primarily concerned with avoiding a showdown with Pakistan, and will look to only display as much military posturing as to prevent a full blown war. There was a brief moment of madness in February 2019 but for now matters are likely to be quiet.
4. Optics aside, Pakistan has no real interest in negotiations or improved relations with Bangladesh, and the last thing Pakistan will discuss is the Civil War. If it had not been for the prisoners of war held by India, Pakistan may never have recognized Bangladesh and nor would the majority of Muslim nations as well as China.
5. Military incompetence has consequences. In the third week of December 1971, Bangladesh and India were at the peak of their friendship and power backed by the Soviet Union. Yet they were not strong enough to crush Pakistan in the West. The fighting in the West was by India alone, but India's failure to break Pakistan ultimately resulted in Bangladesh making a humiliating compromise on prisoners of war trials. So Bangladesh's dependence on India resulted in severe lack of maneuvering room.
Reading these 40 pages made me feel much better as a Pakistani. Deft diplomacy and raw military power worked for my nation. The USA, China and our Arab allies stood by us in those dark days. We have much to be grateful for.
I also ended up viewing India as it was then quite differently, and I regret that an opportunity to settle issues between my nation and India ( as has often happened) has been lost. Regardless, we were able to bring every one of our fighting boys home in dignity and honor, and even as an enemy we must give credit to India for sticking to International Law. Even if I have to say it... I salute India for this act of chivalry.
, they too say the same thing...they even say that the civil war would've never happened if bhutto had behaved and conceded the election as he should have and the united states hadn't jumped into the mix by pressurizing yahya khan because mujeeb was pro soviet and the u.s. did not want a pro soviet government in Pakistan's both wings. naturally, mujeeb went for independence, not like he had much of a choice and with the majority of the population being in East Pakistan with the bengalis in the military ranks over there naturally rebelling, it was a sealed fate...india is just like that neighborhood widow grandma that tries to take credit for something she never could and never will achieve.
...........especially the one where 40,000 lightly armed Pakistani troops kill 3 million bangladeshis and raped millions of bangladeshi women at the same time in just under 5 weeks in 1971..........
