And it is incorrect that the ANP was calling for the Army to help via military operations - Gen. Athar Abbas and other Army officials clearly stated in various interviews that the Army was under specific orders to not initiate military operations unless attacked first. That is why you heard of stories such as a attacks in a field close to an Army base or checkpoint and the Army doing nothing, because the Army soldiers were not being attacked and therefore the RoE were not met.
Dawn News
April 2009
WHEN faced with a frightening civil war and reeling from repeated blows from a ruthless and determined foe, how does our government react? It puts the country’s clocks forward by an hour. I suppose this is one of the few things it can do to show it exists at all.
The rest of us can be excused for doubting the presence of an administration, given the slide and drift we have been seeing over the last year. As the Taliban have made rapid inroads, and now strut about with greater impunity — to say nothing of immunity — than ever before, it has been painful to watch how ineffective the PPP-led coalition has been.
When her widower, Asif Zardari, signed that infamous instrument of surrender known as the Nizam-i-Adl, Benazir Bhutto must have turned in her grave. Whatever else she might have been accused of in her lifetime, even her worst enemies concede she was a courageous fighter. And although the original demand for Sharia law in Malakand surfaced during her tenure in 1994, I doubt very much that she would have surrendered the state’s writ as easily as this government has done.
Another major politician who would have thoroughly disapproved of the turn of events in Swat and elsewhere is Khan Abdul Wali Khan. The late father of ANP chief Asfandyar Wali Khan, a member of the ruling coalition, was an avowed secularist. His National Awami Party was committed to Bacha Khan’s democratic ideals and struggled to keep religion separate from politics. The sight of his son cravenly handing over Swat (with the NWFP to follow) to the Taliban would have broken the tough old Pashtun leader’s heart.
To their credit, a handful of politicians did not roll over as the Nizam-i-Adl was propelled smoothly through the National Assembly. My old friend Ayaz Amir made sure this law did not pass without some serious doubts being expressed. And the MQM lived up to its secular credentials, although I would have been happier if they had resisted rather than boycotted the proceedings. By contrast, the PPP succumbed and feebly maintained the party line of surrender.
But the deed is done, and we are left to face the consequences of the government’s gutless display.
However, we must also accept the fact that we are where we are because the army refused to fight the Taliban in Swat. It can be argued that due to this lack of military resolve, the provincial and federal governments had few options. But surely, given political will, the administration had enough resources at its disposal to confront around 5,000 militants.
This resounding defeat is the cumulative result of years of pandering to extremists. Partly, this happened because the army thought it expedient to use them to further its agenda in Afghanistan and Kashmir. But mainly, it is due to the massive confusion about the true nature of the threat. After my column (‘The high cost of defeat’
appeared in this space last week, I must have received at least a score of emails accusing me of, among other things, not wanting a dialogue with the Taliban. Several readers asked why I did not wish to treat the militants as errant brothers, and reason with them.
I wrote back saying that if any brother of mine went around blowing people up, and chopping off the heads of innocent people, I would want him locked up and tried for murder. No society anywhere advocates negotiations with known killers, whatever their stated motives.
