New Russian Stealth Tank to Have Remotely Controlled Gun Turret

[Oldman1]

This tank ran out of ammo and then all crew left it.

So the tank is expendable. Run out of ammo and abandon it?

 

[Oldman1]

This tank ran out of ammo and then all crew left it.

So the tank is expendable. Run out of ammo and abandon it?

 

[Birbal]

Double post self-delete.

 

[Birbal]

Lol...you pulled this from some forum?
A gaming forum too at that? Jane's Rewiev about Russian tank armour - Battlefront Forum

Let me link you a proper tank debate forum thread about your wunder Russian armour. The article is considered fake there.
EFFECTIVENESS OF SOVIET HEAVY ERA - Tanknet

My mistake. Copy-pasted the wrong version of the article. Here's the actual article:

Jane's International Defence Review 7/1997, pg. 15:

"IMPENETRABLE RUSSIAN TANK ARMOUR STANDS UP TO EXAMINATION

"Claims that the armour of Russian tanks is effectively impenetrable, made on the basis of test carried out in Germany (see IDR 7/1996, p.15), have been supported by comments made following tests in the US.

"Speaking at a conference on Future Armoured Warfare in London in May, IDR's Pentagon correspondent Leland Ness explained that US tests involved firing trials of Russian-built T-72 tanks fitted with Kontakt-5 explosive reactive armour (ERA). In contrast to the original, or 'light', type of ERA which is effective only against shaped charge jets, the 'heavy' Kontakt-5 ERA is also effective against the long-rod penetrators of APFSDS tank gun projectiles.

"When fitted to T-72 tanks, the 'heavy' ERA made them immune to the DU penetrators of M829 APFSDS, fired by the 120 mm guns of the US M1 Abrams tanks, which are among the most formidable of current tank gun projectiles.

"Richard M. Ogorkiewicz"

And here's some more information on Kontakt-5. In short, it increases protection level by 61%. http://www.russianarmor.info/Tanks/EQP/era.html:

ht ERA

The first impetus to develop 'energetic' armours began in the 1960s after the expensive glass and ceramic armours proved defficient. The goal of such research was essentially to use the controlled release of energy to somehow destroy a forming HEAT jet. Logically, most of these ideas utilized the compact chemical energy stored in explosives to push some sort of metal plate into the incoming jet. One early idea incorporated the idea of using explosive 'pills' which were a metal plate backed by a thick layer of explosive. This explosive was confined or tamped by metal sidewalls, thus forming a metal pillbox over the explosive. This setup was then stuck on the surface of a tank and was detonated when the HEAT jet penetrated the cover plate, driving the plate into the jet. This idea was later abandoned by Rafael because the design proved unfeasible due to the large amount of explosive necessary to effect any damage against the jet.

Around 1969, a Norwegian working for Rafael by the name of Dr. Manfred Held discovered the drive-plate explosive sandwich design which later became explosive reactive armour. In this design two rectangular metal plates, referred to as the reactive or dynamic elements, sandwich an interlayer of high explosive. This 'box' is set at high obliquity to the anticipated angle of attack by the HEAT jet, usually 60°. When the jet penetrates the outer plate, the explosive is detonated by the pressures involved and the plates are rapidly forced apart; the acceleration is completed in around 6 us. The orientation of the plates to the explosive detonation front accelerates the front plate upwards in the x-y plane and slightly forwards and conversely forces the rear plate downward and slightly backward. The front plate is moving upward through the path of the jet and it exerts a destabilizing force on it, i.e. there are elastic longitudual waves travelling down the length of the jet. The destabilized jet, i.e. undergoing wave motion, then reaches the rear plate, which is moving in the opposite direction to the original plate. The force exerted by the rear plate is essentially a torque when taken with that of the front plate, and this causes the already destabilized jet to break up into many smaller pieces. These smaller pieces exhibit self-destructive behavoir - namely yaw (the equivalent of the high velocity impact belly-flop) and transverse velocity, which causes them to strike seperate areas of the target's armour.

So what are all the destructive effects visited on HEAT jets by ERA? The largest and most obvious result is the break-up of the jet and rotation of its pieces. There are, however, also some secondary effects that should be kept in mind. The first secondary effect on the jet is mass loss. Essentially, the jet must penetrate (or, in reality, perforate) the ERA plates. While in 'light' ERA these plates are relatively thin, the transverse motion of the plates means that the jet must actually generate a 'slot' rather than a 'hole' in the plates. So if the jet must travel through a 3 mm plate set at 60° with an apparent height of 15 mm, the total amount of armour that must be penetrated is twice that (two plates) or 80 mm. However, since in reality the jet is perforating the plates rather than undergoing radial displacement penetration, this is really more equivalent to 60 mm. Still, it is an important factor. Another important factor is the damaging of the tip of the HEAT jet. The tip of a HEAT jet can be moving in excess of 8 000 m/s, while the outer edges may be closer to 3 000 m/s. The tip of a HEAT jet also acheives initial penetration of the target material, and initiates adiabatic phase penetration (target metal flow). Essentially, the tip of a HEAT jet is the most efficient part of the jet, and it allows the rest of the jet to efficiently pile into the hole it generated and force the armour material out of its path. Removing jet head will reduce the penetration of the jet by 30% or more, even though it is a relatively small part of the jet's mass.

These two secondary effects are actually pretty substantial, contributing as much as 50% to the effect of ERA. Part of the reason for this is that jet breakup - the primary defeat mechanism - is a pretty common phenomena. A HEAT jet is a piece of metal undergoing extremely rapid severe plastic destortion, so any tiny defect in the construction of the cone will be magnified by the enormous forces involved, resulting in critical failure of the material during the formation of the HEAT jet, and hence, some (limited) break-up. It wasn't actually until the late 1970s that we were able to design well constructed cones which would produce a continious jet.

This first generation light ERA generates about 350 - 400 mm RHA worth of protection against large calibre warheads for the vehicle equipped with it. This implies an efficiency multiplier of about 20, which is incredibly high. However, ERA is not some magical shield. It will not completely stop the HEAT jet from a RPG - a backing layer of armour is still necessary to absorb the remains of the HEAT jet.

2. Light ERAs Deployment History

Around 1978 concurrent with the deployment of the M111 'Hetz' APFSDS round, an ERA package called 'Blazer' was produced for the Israeli Defence Force's Mag'lach (M60A1 & M48A3) and Sho't (Centurion) tanks. Later, versions were also produced for Ti-67S (retrofitted T-55) tanks. The package for the Mag'lach massed about 1 000 kg and the package for Sho't massed about 850 kg.

The Israeli application of ERA was rather crude, using large blocks which left large null zones in the armour after detonation. However, it still proved to be quite a marvelous applique during Israel's invasion of Lebannon in 1982.

After the demonstration of ERA in Lebannon, Russian planners deployed their own Kontakt EDZ armour starting with the T-80BV in 1983. Kontakt EDZ was not a copy of Israeli Blazer ERA. Kontakt was developed by the Soviets cocurrently with Rafael's developments, but was not initially fielded because of concerns over safety. This was in 1978. The abbreviation EDZ stands for "Elementy Dinamicheskoi Zashity", this translates into something like "dynamic protection elements". Two types of Kontakt blocks exist, the standard 'brick' as well as the 'wedge' which has only a single fixed reactive element. The wedge is used to cover null zones and it partly relies on the overlap of its neigbouring bricks for its effectiveness. By about 1985 all Soviet model tanks in Grouping Soviet Forces Germany had EDZ packages.

The T-80BV usually carried a 210 - 222 block array of Kontakt EDZ which was layered over the turret front and side, as well as the top. The hull was covered over the glacis and two thirds of the way down the sides. The T-64BV, the other tank in service with GsfG at the time, only carried a 115 block array of charges which provided mainly frontal protection. After front-line forces had been equiped with EDZ, T-72A and T-72B tanks, and later T-62M and T-55AM1 tanks began to receive ERA packages. Unlike the T-64B and T-80B tanks, which usually have the suffix 'V' (vzryvnoi - explosive) added to indicate EDZ such as T-64BV, the T-72 when fitted with EDZ is usually not distinguished in this fashion.

Kontakt EDZ was more advanced than Blazer ERA in a couple respects. Firstly, the blocks are on the order of 40% the size of Blazer blocks, which is considerably more demanding in terms of technology of the explosive interlayer. This also means that the amount of underlying armour exposed after a detonation is less. Secondly, Kontakt is a little more clever in its configuration. The brick is assymetric in its explosive interlayer, meaning that one end is thicker than the other. This induces rotation in the plates as well as separation, and as a result the armour is effective against HEAT jets at a wider variety of angles.

3. Kontakt-5 Heavy ERA

The development of Kontakt EDZ logically led to the development of a later version, called Kontakt-5, which was optimized to be effective not only against HEAT jets, but also APFSDS long rods. It was first deployed around 1985 on the first T-80Us. It is claimed that Kontakt-5 provides about 300 mm RHA equivalent of additional protection against APFSDS rounds, which corresponds to an increase of about 160% over the base armour of the T-80U (~720 mm total).

We've done a lot of work to analyze how effective Kontakt-5 is and by what methods it defeats the incoming APFSDS rounds. The results of the analysis are quite impressive in their own rough and limited way. We assumed that the Kontakt-5 brick was 10.5 cm wide by 23.0 cm long by 7.0 cm thick, with a mass of 10.35 kg. We arrived at a total mass of 2.8 t for the array. We later found out from Steven Zagola's literature that the array is supposed to be around three tonnes, so we were pretty happy. Assuming the use of Semtex for the interlayer, I found that the configuration was most likely a 15 mm plate up front, backed by 35 mm of explosive, and then a 20 mm plate. This assymetrical configuration had improved effectiveness because the APFSDS rod could still 'catch' the retreating rear plate while the front plate would retain a charateristic high velocity. This is completely opposite to the model that the US Army used in the late 1980s to discribe 'heavy' ERA. In their model, the front plate was on the order of 60 mm thick and the rear a standard 5 mm plate. They thought that the thick plate simply moved up into the path of the incoming long rod and forced it to make a 'slot' (thickness x height) rather than a hole (thickness). This is bogus; the front plate would tamp the explosive and would be barely set in motion.

Anyway, back to the point. Without getting into the actual math, after a couple of analyses, we arrived at our conclusion as to what defeat mechanisms were being imployed. These conclusions have not yet been conclusively proved and we hope to do that soon. We assumed that the massive areal density of the long rod perforated the thin plates with relative ease. Actual ablatic penetrator mass loss was set at about 2%. What we found was that we had these two plates, each individually with about 60% the momentum of the long rod penetrator, were moving oppositely up/down to each other, and that the path of the penetrator was such that it was moving between them. The forces exerted on the penetrator are apparently very large, so large in fact that they were in the region of plastic failure for most (read: all) metals. Essentially, when the penetrator touches the rear plate, the front plate guillotines off the first 5 - 6 cm of the rod. For a round such as the 120 mm M829A1 this represents a loss of about 8% of the total mass. More importantly, the nose is blunted. You would not believe how important that sharp point on the penetrator is. The difference in penetration between an equivalent hyper-sonic spike tipped penetrator and a blunt nose one is at least 20% (to a maximum of around 30%). This is mainly because a blunt nose is very inefficient in the initial phase of penetration before the ablatic shear phase can begin. The penetrator has to actually sharpen itself to the optimum Von Karam plastic wave theory shape for penetration of the target material before it can begin radially displacing the target material. This resolves itself in the form of a lot of wasted work and thus penetrator mass. The blunted penetrator also suffers structural damage and more mass loss as a shock wave travels down its length and blows spall off the tail. The main secondary effect of Kontakt-5 EDZ against APFSDS rounds is yaw induced by the front plate before contact with the rear plate is established. The total is about two to three degrees of yaw, which suddenly becomes a lot more in a denser material such as steel. Reduction in penetration due to a 2° yaw is about 6% and it grows exponentially worse from there, and on the 67° slope of the front glacis of the T-64/72/80/90, this is increased to about 15%.

Total loss in penetration amounts to about 2% + 8% + 22% + 6% = 38%, or in other words the penetrator is now only capable of penetrating 62% its original potential. Conversely we could say that the base armour is increased by the factor of the reciprocal of 62%, which is - surprise! - 161%.

So was I surprised by the results? Not really. I had expected penetrator yaw to be the primary defeat mechanism, but otherwise we had verified the effectiveness of Kontakt-5 before it became general public knowledge, which is great bragging rights.

Of course, now the goal is to do a rigorous mathematical proof.

Working good, right? And this is no monkey model, it's a Russian tank from Chechnya. Second pic shows T-72 with Kontakt 5.

I'm not going to bother looking up how the Georgian tank was destroyed, but it probably wasn't by another T-72. As for the Russian tank, obviously advanced RPG hits to the back or side of the tank will destroy it. Just as RPGs and IEDs have destroyed many M1 tanks in Iraq:

You actually say that 70 tons equals 40 tons in protection terms. Right?.....

Lol what? Weight has nothing to do with protection level.

Here are some armor figures for you to digest. They are widely regarded as the most accurate representation of values available to the non-military world.
Tank Protection Levels, they have been posted on this forum already.

Enjoy.

I'm well aware of that table, along with the dangers of using a single value to characterize the protection level of a part of a tank. But let's compare the KE armor for two tanks created at approximately the same time, the M1A1 with heavy armor, and the T-72B with Kontakt-5 ERA:

T-72B Model 1988 / early T-90 (4)
Turret: 420-750-920
Glacis: 670-710
Lower front hull: 240

M1A1HA (2)
Turret: 660-680
Glacis:560--590
Lower front hull:580-630

As you can see, they're pretty well matched.

 

[500]

The T-72B was certainly a match for the M1A1.

Errr. No.

1) Primitive FCS.
2) Primitive night vision.
3) Unprotected ammo and fuel tanks.
4) Other things, like low gun depresion and elevation angles, 3 member crew, primitive transmission, very long time to change engine etc..

 

[LeGenD]

Lol what? Weight has nothing to do with protection level.

It actually does. Armor always contributes to the weight of the Tank.

 

[Birbal]

Errr. No.

1) Primitive FCS.
2) Primitive night vision.
3) Unprotected ammo and fuel tanks.
4) Other things, like low gun depresion and elevation angles, 3 member crew, primitive transmission, very long time to change engine etc..

1) Nothing primitive about a laser rangefinder with ballistic computer.
2) The 1K13-49 sight provided respectable night vision.
3) Ammunition storage is a problem (when the tank does get penetrated, it blows up rather than getting damaged, which is fine in a large scale war, but not when you're trying to minimize crew casualties in a small war). External fuel tanks can be emptied prior to combat and aren't a problem.
4) Depression and elevation angles (-7.13 to +15.47) where inferior to the M1 (-10 to +20), but the 3 member crew is not a problem when you have an autoloader saving weight. You'll have to point me to links about the transmission. Changing the engine isn't a big deal when your tank is cheaper allowing you to build twice as many. The Soviet support system was very different from the American support system. They recognized that in a large scale war with NATO, maintenance would be unfeasible. Instead, they relied on large scale reserves.

It actually does. Armor always contributes to the weight of the Tank.

The Logical Fallacies: Affirming the Consequent

 

[Oldman1]

As you can see, they're pretty well matched.

Its a combination of tech and training. The Gulf War 1 has shown the mismatch between the Abrams and the T72s.

 

[500]

1) Nothing primitive about a laser rangefinder with ballistic computer.

Its not automatic FCS its something similar to M60.

2) The 1K13-49 sight provided respectable night vision.

Its primitive 1st generation IR with searchlight and not stabilised too.

3) Ammunition storage is a problem (when the tank does get penetrated, it blows up rather than getting damaged, which is fine in a large scale war, but not when you're trying to minimize crew casualties in a small war).

Its very big problem. Especially in large scale war, when lack of trained crews is biggest issue. If tank is penetrated Abram's crew will continue fighting in another tank. T-72 crew is dead.

External fuel tanks can be emptied prior to combat and aren't a problem.

I was talking about unprotected fuel tanks in battle compartment.

but the 3 member crew is not a problem when you have an autoloader saving weight.

Its a problem because maintenanse of tank is heavy thing.

You'll have to point me to links about the transmission.

T-72 lacks automatic transmission and turning wheel. As result driver gets tired much faster during long marches. Also maneuvering during the battle is harder.

Changing the engine isn't a big deal when your tank is cheaper allowing you to build twice as many.

Its a big deal because M1 engine u can change in 1 hour and T-72 engine takes a whole day. As for price, U should compare wages.

 

[AUSTERLITZ]

T-72 is no match for m1a1.
But the t-90 ms vladimir can stand upto any modern tank including m1a3.With relikt new gen ERA.New DU sabot rounds.Active protection system.missile firing capability and whole lot of sensor upgrades its a very formidable beast.

 

[LeGenD]

The Logical Fallacies: Affirming the Consequent

Either prove your assertion or lay off.

Heavy armor (or several layers of armor) does increases the weight of the Tank.

Here is hint for you:

The tank is an 86 year old weapon system, having been in existence since 1915. A tank is
traditionally considered to have three major design elements, weapons, armor and mobility. Tank
design has always been a compromise between these three traditional elements, and the smaller the tank, the more compromises that must be made. In the last 86 years, virtually every combination and trade-off between gun, armor and mobility has been tried. Tanks have ranged in size from a couple of tons to over 70 tons in an attempt to find an ideal combination of components. Lighter tanks have an extensive lineage, having been used side-by-side with heavier tanks by most of the armies in World War II. Light tanks, in various forms, continued to be used by the US in the Korean and Vietnam War. There is no lack of valid historical comparisons and lessons to draw on when looking at the impact of tank design and design trade-off on combat effectiveness of lighter versus heavier armor.

 

[Birbal]

Its not automatic FCS its something similar to M60.

Bullshit. The original M60 had a stereoscopic rangefinder. The M60A3 (in 1979) was the first to get a ballistic computer.

Its primitive 1st generation IR with searchlight and not stabilised too.

It has passive as well as active capability and is vertically stabilized.

Its very big problem. Especially in large scale war, when lack of trained crews is biggest issue. If tank is penetrated Abram's crew will continue fighting in another tank. T-72 crew is dead.

Maybe for a tiny country like Israel. But for a decent sized country, given the historical decline in tank numbers, it's not a problem.

I was talking about unprotected fuel tanks in battle compartment.

In that case it's the same as the unprotected ammunition. If they explode, then the tank is probably disabled anyway.

Its a problem because maintenanse of tank is heavy thing.

Not sure what you mean.

T-72 lacks automatic transmission and turning wheel. As result driver gets tired much faster during long marches. Also maneuvering during the battle is harder.

Fair enough.

Its a big deal because M1 engine u can change in 1 hour and T-72 engine takes a whole day. As for price, U should compare wages.

Wages in most countries are insignificant compared to the cost of producing the tank. No need to change the engine during a war when you have a backup tank ready to roll.

Now, what about the T-72B's clear cut advantages over the M1A1 in glacis and turret armor as well as its smaller sillhouete?

Either prove your assertion or lay off.

Heavy armor (or several layers of armor) does increases the weight of the Tank.

Here is hint for you:

The tank is an 86 year old weapon system, having been in existence since 1915. A tank is
traditionally considered to have three major design elements, weapons, armor and mobility. Tank
design has always been a compromise between these three traditional elements, and the smaller the tank, the more compromises that must be made. In the last 86 years, virtually every combination and trade-off between gun, armor and mobility has been tried. Tanks have ranged in size from a couple of tons to over 70 tons in an attempt to find an ideal combination of components. Lighter tanks have an extensive lineage, having been used side-by-side with heavier tanks by most of the armies in World War II. Light tanks, in various forms, continued to be used by the US in the Korean and Vietnam War. There is no lack of valid historical comparisons and lessons to draw on when looking at the impact of tank design and design trade-off on combat effectiveness of lighter versus heavier armor.

You are showing that adding armor increases weight. You then seem to imply that increase weight means better armor. That's a logical fallacy. In this case, the armor difference is simply due to the weight saved by the smaller size of the T-72.

 

[LeGenD]

You are showing that adding armor increases weight. You then seem to imply that increase weight means better armor. That's a logical fallacy. In this case, the armor difference is simply due to the weight saved by the smaller size of the T-72.

You are not getting my point.

My point is that armor contributes to weight. Heavy Tanks are likely to be most heavily armored as well. This is evident from history.

And T-72 cannot have similar level of protection as M1A1D or M1A2 SEP Abrams, as evident from its relatively poor protection level at lower front hull and some other parts. In simple terms, it is not as heavily armored as the Abrams in all aspects of the body design. Do the math.

 

[500]

Bullshit. The original M60 had a stereoscopic rangefinder. The M60A3 (in 1979) was the first to get a ballistic computer.

All M60 had ballistic computer. Ballistic computer and automatic FCS are different things.

It has passive as well as active capability and is vertically stabilized.

Its passive range is barely 500 m and its not sabilized at all. M1A1 can see from 2000 m+. In case of smoke and fog T-72B wont see anything at all. Also thermal sights are very useful even during the day for detection of camouflaged targets.

Maybe for a tiny country like Israel. But for a decent sized country, given the historical decline in tank numbers, it's not a problem.

Its important for every country. I am talking about TRAINED crews, It takes some 8 month to get a trained crew.

In that case it's the same as the unprotected ammunition. If they explode, then the tank is probably disabled anyway.

But crew is not lost.

Not sure what you mean.

Tank requiers lots os maintenanse. Daily. When u have 4 member crew thats less work per crew member. Especially if it is a officer's tank.

Wages in most countries are insignificant compared to the cost of producing the tank.

Its significant. T-90 is two times cheaper than Abrams, but GDP per capita in USA is 3.7 times more than in Russia. That means per capita America can afford more Abramses than Russia can afford T-90.

No need to change the engine during a war when you have a backup tank ready to roll.

So u are basically saying that u neeed two T-72B to contfront one M1A1?

Now, what about the T-72B's clear cut advantages over the M1A1 in glacis

Clacis of T-72B may be slightly better, but lower hull is MUCH worse.

and turret armor as well

Turret is not better.

as its smaller sillhouete?

219 cm vs 235 cm - thats nothing for modern FCS.

You are showing that adding armor increases weight. You then seem to imply that increase weight means better armor. That's a logical fallacy. In this case, the armor difference is simply due to the weight saved by the smaller size of the T-72.[/QUOTE]