Jinnah pursued Pakistan for power
Jaswant disappoints; ignores British designs
The Tribune, Chandigarh, India - Opinions
by Narendra Singh Sarila
I am disappointed with Jaswant Singhs 660-page book on Jinnah and Partition, released earlier this week. At the end he says: I still fail to understand why India was partitioned in 1947? Or the manner in which it was done. If even after his massive research and hard work, he did not get to the bottom of his subject, there is a reason for it. It is because he has ignored the most important element that was responsible for Partition, namely British strategic interests that required the creation of Pakistan. The British top secret documents on Partition have now been unsealed and there was no excuse for ignoring them. I myself showed these to him some years back. The whole story is there in those documents.
The Labour government that came to power in Britain in mid-1945 was willing to grant independence to India but was worried about losing its 60-year-old military base here from which the British controlled the whole Indian Ocean area, including the eastern Middle-East that contained oil wells The Wells of Power of increasing importance in war and peace and which Stalin, with his rising ambition after his victory over Germany, the British feared, might seize. In the last two great wars it was from their Indian base that the British deployed Indian and British forces in Iran and Iraq and the British Chiefs of Staff were adamant on keeping a foothold in India. But Atlee, the British Prime Minister, knew that the government of a free India under the Congress partys rule would neither give them a military base nor join their team against the Soviet Union in the fresh Great Game. What were they to do?
Towards the end of 1945, Field Marshal Wavell, the Viceroy of India, came up with a possible wayout of their quandary. After the Congress party had refused to cooperate in the war effort in 1939, unless Britain announced that it would give freedom to India after the war, Wavells predecessor, Lord Linlithgow, had encouraged Jinnah to formulate the Pakistan scheme, informing London that Jinnah was in his pocket. He represents a minority and a minority can only hold its own with our assistance, the Viceroy told London.
Wavell now suggested that they use Jinnahs demand to create a separate state in the north-west not give him all he wanted in the west but territories along Iran, Afghanistan and Sinkiang with the port of Karachi and Pakistan would cooperate with them on defence matters. On being asked by London to give them a clear picture of the areas that could go to Pakistan, Wavell in a historic dispatch on February 6, 1946, sent a map delineating the boundaries of Pakistan he had in mind, which were exactly the boundaries that Radcliff drew 18 months later.
So, what Pakistan was going to be was already decided in early 1946 and the time between then and August 15 was used by Atlee, Cripps and Wavell and later Mountbatten to make Jinnah accept the smaller Pakistan and the Congress party to accept Partition, while Atlee kept proclaiming from housetops that they were working to preserve Indias unity. All the British manoeuvring can be discerned by studying the British top secret files. It is a myth that Jinnah founded Pakistan. President Roosevelt had posted his representative in Delhi after1942 and his dispatches in the US archives also tell us much.
Some of the assessments in the book are also mistaken. To believe that the Cabinet Mission Plan would have resulted in a united India is moonshine. After 10 years Punjab, Sindh and the NWFP had the option to break away on one side and Bengal and Assam on the other side. That would give the League a much larger Pakistan after 10 years and certainly, in the meanwhile, it would fan the flames of communalism to prepare the ground for the above. And what about the princely states? They had the option to break away too . So, possibly Hyderabad would join Pakistan and would help reach Tripura and Manipur, which would be swallowed up. The Plan would have balkanised India and Nehru, despite the many mistakes he made, was correct in striking it down.
The Congress made many mistakes in the struggle, but Gandhiji united a heterogeneous and largely uneducated people, without which Independence was not possible.
I agree with Jaswant Singh that Jinnah at heart was a nationalist and a secularist. And he remained so for the first 60 years of his life a long time. Jinnah opposed satyagrah, calling it an extreme programme that would lead to disaster. He was shunned by Gandhiji. And Motilal Nehru feared that this brilliant man would eclipse his son, Jawaharlal. In 1928 Jinnah proposed to convince the Muslims to give up separate electorates that were preventing Hindu-Muslim political interdependence and unity suggesting in return that Muslim representation in the Central Assembly be raised from 27 per cent to 33 per cent a very minor concession compared to the possibility of ending the pernicious separate electorates. But he was pooh-poohed, and virtually driven out from the Congress party.
After the Congress refused to cooperate in the war effort in 1939, the Viceroy sought out Jinnah. The doctors had earlier the same year told him that he had terminal TB. Jinnah had always wanted to be the first in every thing. There are many instances in history of people abandoning their principles to achieve power and glory. So, for him it was now or never. His Pakistan scheme, launching Direct Action the precursor of todays terrorism and mobilising Muslims against the Hindus, were all in the persuit of power and glory. He did not believe in what he was doing. After Pakistan had been achieved, he spoke in Karachi advocating secularism. But he quickly retreated when opposed by his followers.
Chagla, who worked with him in his law firm in Bombay, once told me that he was a man of great integrity. But it was tragic that at the end he lost it. And no man can be great without integrity. I also feel sympathy for Jinnah, for his humiliation and suffering. But at the end of his life he did many bad things, and inflicted incalculable harm. To believe that he was great just because he fought the mighty Congress party is nonsence. Do we call Hitler great because he fought the mighty Allies?n
The writer is a former Ambassador of India to France and Switzerland. Earlier, he was ADC to Lord Mountbatten. He has authored The Shadow of the Great Game: The Untold Story of Indias Partition.
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Jaswant Singhs book on Mohammed Ali Jinnah, which has become a talking point across India, has revived the old debate about Partition. Time for a reality check before we decide on heroes and villains
Rajinder Puri
Jaswant Singh, former cabinet minister, has written a book on Mohammed Ali Jinnah which has become a talking point across India . I have not read the book. I have heard Jaswant Singh on TV expounding his views on Jinnah. The main thrust of his work seems to be:
1) Jinnah has been unnecessarily demonised. He was a great man and not wholly responsible for the Partition of the subcontinent.
2) Pandit Nehru was primarily responsible for the Partition because he believed in a centralized India which left no space for the Muslims to protect themselves against Hindu domination.
3) Mahatma Gandhi, and other Congress leaders were opposed to the Partition and would not have allowed it if it were not for Nehru.
The view about Nehrus role in the Partition is not new. This scribe wrote about it in a book of just 107 text pages, not over 600 pages, which were published 20 ago. Others, such as former ADC to Lord Mountbatten and later India s ambassador abroad, Narendra Singh Sarila, wrote on the subject of the Partition at greater length.
Let us consider the three main postulates of Jaswant Singhs views outlined above.
1) Jinnah was not a great man. He was articulate, highly intelligent and focused. He missed greatness by a wide margin because he willingly colluded with the British to create a Pakistan about which he had not even determined boundaries or shape. He mainly fulfilled British goals while satisfying his own vanity.
Independence came first; the boundaries of the divided nations came later. The British had decided on Partition to serve their own strategic ends. On 29 March 1945, after Viceroy Lord Wavell met Prime Minister Churchill in London he recorded: He (Churchill) seems to favour partition of India into Pakistan, Hindustan and Princestan.
Sir Martin Gilbert, the British biographer of Winston Churchill revealed that Churchill had asked Jinnah to dispatch secret letters to him by addressing them to a lady, Elizabeth Giliat, who had been Churchills secretary. This secret interaction continued for years. Jinnahs key decisions between 1940 and 1946, including the demand for Pakistan in 1940, were taken after getting the nod from Churchill or Lord Linlithgow and Wavell, both Churchill's admirers.
Jinnah admitted during the Simla Conference in 1945 that he was receiving advice from London . In other words, Jinnah was as much a British puppet on a string as were the top Indian leaders.
2) Yes, Pandit Nehru was primarily responsible for the Partition. This was not because he was emotionally committed to a centralised India but because he too was thoroughly programmed by the British since his school days. His proximity to Lord Mountbatten has been recorded by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and historian Shashi Joshi among others. Even before Mountbattens arrival in India Lord Wavell had complained that Nehru was often informed by Whitehall before he was!
3) Mahatma Gandhi and other Congress leaders may have been unhappy about the Partition. They did not oppose it. When the resolution to accept Partition was taken by the Congress on June 3, 1947 Gandhi observed his day of silence. He assured Mountbatten on June 2 that he would not oppose Partition.
It can be nobodys case that Nehru was so powerful that he could override Gandhi and the rest. The truth was that Gandhi lacked the gumption to oppose Partition when it came to the crunch because he knew that his adversary was not Nehru but Britain . At Mountbattens bidding he could undertake a fast unto death to compel the Indian government to pay adequate compensation to Pakistan . He made no such protest when his lifes work of creating a united independent India was being destroyed.
Gandhis belated attempt to undo his mistake by wanting to settle in Pakistan and by demanding the dissolution of the Congress in his last will and testament was aborted by his death.
These judgments may appear cruel. Truth is seldom kind. Any assessment about the causes that led to the Partition of India would be flawed unless the central role of the British in creating it, and the compliant role of the Indian and Pakistani leaders in accepting it, are recognized.
The most clinching evidence of this is provided by the recorded views of Christopher Beaumont who was private secretary to Sir Cyril Radcliffe, chairman of the Indo-Pakistan Boundary Commission. His private papers were recently released by his son, Robert Beaumont. The elder Beaumont wrote in 1947:
The viceroy, Mountbatten, must take the blame - though not the sole blame - for the massacres in the Punjab in which between 500,000 to a million men, women and children perished
The handover of power was done too quickly."
Christopher Beaumont was most scathing about how partition affected the Punjab . He wrote:
"The Punjab partition was a disaster
Geography, canals, railways and roads all argued against dismemberment
The trouble was that Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs were an integrated population so that it was impossible to make a frontier without widespread dislocation
Thousands of people died or were uprooted from their homes in what was in effect a civil war
By the end of 1947 there were virtually no Hindus or Sikhs living in west Punjab - now part of Pakistan - and no Muslims in the Indian east
The British government and Mountbatten must bear a large part of the blame for this tragedy."
A few Britons are beginning to confront the truth. Will Indians ever start doing the same?