shehbazi2001
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Apr 18, 2008
- Messages
- 580
- Reaction score
- 0
All true, however I believe the PAF have still been neglectful in aquisition of SAM's. As of now neither high altitude SAM's which can potentially double up as ABM's or capable mobile SAM's been aquired in meaningful numbers. For a "defensive" forcesuch as the PAF where air denial is the main objective SAM's could be your best friend. Static sites of strategic importance need SAM's period. Also a defensive force creates "SAM Corridors" whereby you force your opposition into SAM traps which they might not have prior knowledge of.
Imagine an Indian strike package consisting of say mirages with SU-30 cover. They should be picked up by PAF ground radar and AWACS, but the question is how to engage? especially in lieu of the Sukhoi's impressive ability to punch from distance given it's powerful BAR's and associated BVR's. Incoming PAF aircraft will be detected by the Indians however, approach must be done in order to force IAF aircraft into these SAM zones. This way Indian's will either engage directly - which no Strike Package wants to do -be forced into SAM zone - which ultimately causes abortion of mission - wastage of fuel/countermeasures and leaves fleeing aircraft vulnerable - or abortion of mission which effectively is victory for the PAF.
It's not as if SAM's arn't part of the PAF's agenda - we've been hearing from Musharraf's time Pakistan being keen on acquiring high altitude SAM's. Though finance and "politics has become a hurdle"
The difficulty is that its hard to hide the radars of SAM batteries. ELINT aircraft and drones are on the constant watch to locate these radars through their radio and radar emissions. One way to get around this problem is to integrate these SAM sites with AWACS or AEW. AEW shall replace the surveillance radar of the SAM battery and order it to switch on its fire-control radar at a suitable moment. Also each SAM battery shall need a call-sign so that AEW can individually communicate with each battery.
But it should be kept in mind that first waves of air attack involve SEAD (suppression of enemy air defence) aircraft and SAM battery showing itself to SEAD aircraft means destruction by AGM-88 HARMs and other standoff missiles and guided bombs. This can be avoided to some extent by using laser radar or an intelligent coordination with AWACS/AEW with SAM battery switching its radar on only when aggressor aircraft are within the range of its missiles and aggressor aircraft have already overflown the SAM site. SAM battery can then engage the enemy from behind and be safe itself from their attack.
Alternatively the fire-control radar can be separated from the missile launchers for example the Crotale SAM launcher has its missiles loaded around the fire-control/engagement radar which is not safe. Anti-radar missiles home on these radars and missiles themselves should be separated from them so that a quick change of antenna can bring back the battery to action.
Despite all these measures, it would remain difficult to decide about the placement and positioning of SAM batteries when faced with standoff missiles like APACHE and Storm Shadow, long-range guided bombs, anti-radiation missiles and hovering attack drones like FireShadow.