NASR : SHORT RANGE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPON!

[Capt.Popeye]

They never "Junked" it. They ended it via treaties. Otherwise till the late 90s almost every NATO member was developing new Tactical weapons. Such as the french hades system.
As I said before Cap'n, dont let nationalism get in the way of those cogs whirring away.

Aw, c'mon..... don't let semantics get the better of you.

If all that those Guys did was so SMART then they'd never have ended it at all, whether through Treaties or whatever.... The adversaries were hardly "Paragons of Altruism and Virtue" to give up things just like that.
They did "wisen-up" along the way, and then discarded the stuff that was just plain useless.

I'll tell you now: I did'nt think that you were given to (now to quote one of your own literary gems of purple prose) "self-fellatio".

 

[shaheenmissile]

Pakistan is a narrow country and we need short range/battle field range nuclear missiles. Large ballistic missiles have a minimum range,within which target cannot be hit.
For example India's agni 5 with Apogee of 850 Km has minimum range of 2000 km and cannot hit targets nearer than that,and is no threat to Pakistan.
Same are restrictions on our ballistic missiles,cannot hit if enemy is too close,which can happen in a country as narrow as Pakistan.
So for that reason NASR makes perfect sense.

 

[The SC]

As opposed to India's thermonuclear approach, Dr. N.M. Butt, senior scientist, stated that "PAEC built a sufficient number of neutron bombs— a battlefield weapon that is essentially a low yield device"
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chagai-I
Chagai-I - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


Neutron bombs could be used as strategic anti-ballistic missile weapons or as tactical weapons intended for use against armored forces. The neutron bomb was originally conceived by the U.S. military as a weapon that could stop massed Soviet armored divisions from overrunning allied nations without destroying the infrastructure of the allied nation.

However the most effective use of a neutron bomb with respect to area denial would be to encase it in a thick shell of material that could be neutron activated, and use a surface burst. In this manner the neutron bomb would be turned into a "salted bomb", a case of Zinc-64, produced as a byproduct of depleted zinc oxide enrichment, would for example probably be the most attractive from a military point of view, as when activated the Zinc-65 that is created is a gamma emitter, with a half life of 244 days.

Neutron bomb - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

[SQ8]

Aw, c'mon..... don't let semantics get the better of you.

If all that those Guys did was so SMART then they'd never have ended it at all, whether through Treaties or whatever.... The adversaries were hardly "Paragons of Altruism and Virtue" to give up things just like that.
They did "wisen-up" along the way, and then discarded the stuff that was just plain useless.

I'll tell you now: I did'nt think that you were given to (now to quote one of your own literary gems of purple prose) "self-fellatio".

Adding smileys doesn't give your post any greater credence; rather it only seems to enforce the impression that you clearly haven't thought this line of opinion through.. to extrapolate my literary gem..in this case your own lack of evidence is giving fellatio to mine.

The ending of those weapons was due to local political pressure, in case you have difficulties buyig that I'd refer to a much more solid source such the US Army War College( unless off course you decide that even those are worth smileys, I would then suggest not quoting me as I am no mood for brainfarted discussions on the matter)

@SvenSvensonov @jhungary Would love to have your comments on the following and the matter itself.
From
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1103.pdf
The Strategic Studies Institute is the U.S. Army's institute for geostrategic and national security research and analysis. The Strategic Studies Institute conducts strategic research and analysis to support the U.S. Army War College curricula, provides direct analysis for Army and Department of Defense leadership, and serves as a bridge to the wider strategic community.

from
Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO
US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
pages 57-61

Mikhail Gorbachev’s arrival as General Secretary unfroze the U.S.-Soviet arms control talks, leading to the signing of the INF agreement in December 1987. This treaty banned all U.S. and Soviet ground-based ballistic and cruise missiles globally with ranges of 500-5,500 km. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) also gave up its 72 Pershing 1 missiles. The agreement was denounced by retired SACEUR Bernard Rogers 58 as removing NATO’s qualitative deterrent edge and so helping the USSR “to intimidate, coerce, blackmail, and neutralize Western Europe without calling troops out of barracks.” He therefore called—and in this was representative of wider opinion—for the rapid implementation of the second half of the 1983 Montebello Accords, i.e., the modernization of short-range nuclear forces (SRNF). Those plans envisaged that some older systems like artillery munitions and Lance would be withdrawn, but a number of possible new TNW systems under development would be introduced, including better nuclear artillery shells with increased range, the Follow On To Lance (FOTL), an improved surface-to-surface missile which could be fired from existing NATO Multiple-launch rocket systems, and a supersonic Tomahawk anti-ship air-to-surface missile (TASM) to improve the penetrability of tactical aircraft (some 389 had been planned to be placed in vaults in European airfields).109 Political opposition made this proposed modernization impossible. Anti-nuclear campaigners discovered NATO plans more rapidly than at previous TNW decision points and were able to mount effective opposition in the news media, denouncing the proposed package as “like trading in 2 pistols for an assault rifle and calling it arms reductions.” The plans needed to be resisted particularly strongly at that historical moment, according to the antinuclear campaigners, because “by keeping alive the traditional NATO doctrine of flexible response, the TASM could slow the process of change in Europe.”110 The Cold War was not yet conclusively over, and after visiting Europe, the new U.S. Secretary of State, James Baker, had concluded that “modernization [of SNF] would indeed show the Alliance’s resolve, yet it would simultane- 59 ously create a public and, above all, nuclear symbol that the Kremlin could use with Western European people against their governments.”111 German political resistance was also predictably adamant, and the modernization never occurred. Negotiations in Vienna, Austria, began to move toward signing of the CFE Treaty, aimed at introducing transparency and confidence-building measures, and eliminating many of the most threatening offensive combat assets. The CFE (signed in November 1990) greatly reduced future dangers of surprise conventional attack. In the summer of 1990, the political necessities of securing German reunification involved promises to Mikhail Gorbachev to conduct a comprehensive strategy review, and as the NATO summit approached, a package of measures which would signal reduced nuclear reliance within the Alliance (while still resisting No First Use), and also signal a general move away from early nuclear use. NATO nuclear weapons would “truly become weapons of last resort.” This wording was initially challenged by French President Francois Mitterrand and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, but, after intense debate at the NATO heads of government meeting in London on July 5, 1990, the wording was preserved. U.S. proposals to eliminate all nuclear artillery shells from Europe were accepted, and it was agreed that there would be reviews to consider new strategic principles replacing forward defense and flexible response. The London Communiqué, according to Michael Wheeler, represented the end of Cold War nuclear strategy.112 60 VI.


1991- 2012. THE RUSSIAN PREPONDERANCE IN TNWS: POLITICAL STASIS In 1991 and 1992, Presidents George H. W. Bush and Boris Yeltsin both announced unilateral though unverified TNW reductions. These parallel reductions, which came to be known as the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, were seen as preludes to negotiations aimed at elimination of TNWs after the Cold War ended. Those negotiations never occurred, and would have posed enormous verification problems even if they had. Soon after Soviet forces withdrew to Russia with all their nuclear weapons, NATO removed most of its remaining TNWs, leaving only “several hundred” B-61 gravity bombs. The United States proceeded to eliminate nuclear artillery and short-range surface-to-surface nuclear missiles from its global stockpile. (It has removed all TNWs from the ROK). The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review explicitly sought to reduce the salience of U.S. nuclear weapons, and President Barack Obama is a vigorous supporter of Global Zero. For various reasons the Russian Federation has not found it expedient to make comparable TNW reductions.113 The resultant TNW asymmetry in Moscow’s favor is now long established and probably impossible to eliminate in the near term, particularly because, in view of its shrunken military capabilities, the Russian Federation has abandoned the Soviet Union’s NOFUN posture. Its military doctrine seems to rely significantly upon the deterrent provided, especially at sea, by its remaining TNWs, which may number in the low thousands. In its 1991 Strategic Concept, NATO gave up forward defense as a defining principle and flexible response as a nuclear strategy. Alliance lead- 61 ers have repeatedly reemphasized that NATO regards all nuclear weapons as truly weapons of last resort, though always adding that NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist. NATO has sought to treat Russia as a partner rather than a potential antagonist, but the Russian government has found NATO membership enlargement into former Warsaw Pact countries and the former Soviet republics threatening, and insists on the continuing necessity for deterrence as a basis of the relationship. In such ambiguous political circumstances, the role of NATO TNWs cannot be expected to clarify

Another publication from the Same looks specifically at India and Pakistan.
file:///C:/Users/Faraz/Downloads/pub963.pdf
Pakistan's Nuclear Future: Reining in the Risk

Specific to the question posed at page 49

With the armies likely enmeshed and intermixed on the battlefield, dropping a weapon would require care to avoid also killing Pakistani soldiers. This could argue for using a weapon well behind Indian lines, but that could produce only marginal effect on the actual fighting. Pakistan might instead target a military base close to the front.

@Didact

One of biggest issues that are faced with BM based TNW is outlined quite well here.. and also takes away that idea of any significant movement being undertaken by an armoured column.

The probability of misperceptions with the adversary increases, especially in South Asia. In the midst of war, any launch by such a strategic weapon (ballistic or cruise missile) will reach the target within 3 to 5 minutes. Depending on what warning and damage it does, any weapons fired from a strategic delivery vehicle will evoke unpredictable responses and the dimension of the battle will change.