Q&A: Pakistan after Musharraf
Page last updated at 13:39 GMT, Tuesday, 19 August 2008 14:39 UK
BBC.UK.COM
The resignation of President Musharraf in Pakistan has raised key questions over who will replace him and the future political stability of a country which up until now has played a key role in President Bush's "war against terror".
Mr Musharraf stepped down on Monday after nine years in power to avoid a move by the government to impeach him.
So what happens now that he has gone?
The impeachment of Pervez Musharraf was one of two main bones of contention between the two largest constituents of Pakistan's four-party ruling alliance.
One of those problems has now been removed with the president's exit.
But the other - the restoration of the senior judges Mr Musharraf sacked under the emergency last November - remains unresolved.
In theory their reappointment should now be a formality - the two parties decided on 7 August that this should happen - but in Pakistani politics nothing is certain.
Meanwhile the next constitutional step is to elect a new president to replace caretaker President Muhammad Sumroo.
Under the constitution, the parliament must elect a new president within 30 days of the departure of the old one.
How much powers will the next president have?
The present constitution confers vast powers on the president, including the power to appoint services chiefs, the head of the election commission and the head of the public service commission.
Mr Musharraf lost much credibility when he sacked senior judges
But the most controversial prerogative is the power to dismiss all or any of the central or provincial governments and parliaments.
These powers were included in the constitution by Mr Musharraf and the ruling alliance has indicated it will do away with them.
The next president will continue to have these powers until the parliament votes them out by a two-thirds majority.
So will the sacked judges be reinstated?
One of the two main alliance partners, Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), used the restoration of judges sacked by Mr Musharraf as its main slogan during the February elections.
The largest party in the alliance, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), although committed to their reappointment, believes some of them including deposed Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, should not be restored to their former positions.
One reason for that may be because Mr Chaudhry last year challenged an amnesty that enabled Asif Zardari, the PPP chief, to end his exile and return to Pakistan.
The army remains one of Pakistan's few properly functioning institutions
Some analysts point out that the Americans may also be averse to Justice Chaudhry's reinstatement because he is likely to reopen the cases of missing persons.
These include people alleged to have supported al-Qaeda who were handed over to the US by the Pakistani security agencies.
A third argument is that Justice Chaudhry has "disqualified" himself for the job by indulging in street politics since his dismissal.
With Mr Musharraf out of the way, the alliance is now under pressure to arrive at a consensus on how, when, and how many judges to restore.
What happens to Pervez Musharraf?
Since the departure of Mr Musharraf, there is a rising chorus for his prosecution, but few in Pakistan expect that.
Reports in Pakistan say his resignation came about as a result of some hectic mediation by American, British and Saudi diplomats as well as some Pakistani generals.
It was believed that his impeachment or a court trial would open a Pandora's box, with implications for everybody concerned - Mr Musharraf, the army, the politicians as well as the Western powers involved in the "war on terror".
Mr Musharraf has expressed a desire to stay in Pakistan and the government has expressed a readiness to offer him the same security he enjoyed as president.
But he is on the hit list of many militant groups, and could well leave the country for some time before returning to settle in Pakistan permanently.
Will Pakistan be ruled by the army or governed by civilians?
The army has dominated Pakistani politics directly or indirectly since the mid-1950s and has come to exert influence even in such non-professional sectors as the civilian administration, the police and the national economy.
Militants became much more active during Mr Musharraf's tenure
Partly because of this, and partly because of the defeats it suffered in Kargil in 1999 against Indian troops and later against militants in the north-western tribal region, it has grown extremely unpopular.
The unpopularity of Mr Musharraf's regime further dented its standing with the people.
With Mr Musharraf's resignation, the army appears to have completely withdrawn from the political field.
It is currently under pressure from Western powers because of its failure to contain militancy.
It is also faced with the prospect of co-existing with a set of rulers whose main reason to stay united is that they have each suffered military coups in the past.
In addition, it is under pressure from a vibrant Pakistani electronic media which is not shy of exposing and criticising its "political misadventures".
In spite of all this, the army still remains the most organised institution in the country and may well want to get involved in politics again if the politicians fail to steer Pakistan through its myriad problems.
What about the militant threat?
Over the last two years, militants sanctuaries in the tribal areas have gradually spread across government territory in the north-west where they have established their own system of justice and revenue collection.
In recent weeks, many of them have also been flocking to Indian-administered Kashmir where they have helped conduct a bloody insurgency against Indian rule.
In the past, analysts around the world have linked this phenomenon to a strategy of the Pakistani security establishment to allow the militants secure bases in Pakistan from which to destabilise India and Afghanistan - which it has traditionally considered to be a threat.
Pakistan denies this.
In the post-Musharraf period, an escalation or dilution of this threat is likely to hinge on the policies of the new civilian leadership - and whether it can impose its authority.
Leaders who won the election in the North West Frontier Province were initially optimistic that they would be able to isolate hardcore militants through political means,
This included tactics such as weaning away their fringe members, enabling local people to evict them from their areas and using selective force where those options failed.
With Mr Musharraf out of the way, it remains to be seen how successful this policy will be.
