which fact do you need about A Q Khan? that you think i should bring that will satisfy you???? you need words of Musharaf himself before he started to sing a different tune due to the color of zionist/american dollars????
here is a thread i posted which gives comprehensive story of pakistan nuclear program from start to testing in 1998...all by american author;
http://www.pakistaniforces.com/forums/showthread.php?t=2314
it gives A Q Khan contribution in the right perspective.
Musharaf and shoe shinning....i bet he'll need american dictation to acomplish even that.
For some reason you only tend to post from sources that have a motivated agenda to make Pakistani program look bad. And then on top of that, you quote people who's sole information is based on 2nd hand intel. Your beloved Carey Sublette has more than enough references in her second-hand research paper that uses many references from PakDef member RMS Azem's research on the Pakistani nuclear program, but she is an outsider with no first hand info about the Pakistani nuclear program.
If you really want to know what Pakistani nuclear program is and the hows and who's of it, then read the following:
“PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR HISTORY:
SEPARATING MYTH FROM REALITY”
extensive research on our nuclear initiative puts the record straight.
[MA CHAUDHRI]
BUILDING THE PLUTONIUM BOMB
Highly Enriched Uranium is one route to nuclear weapons. The other route and more popular route is that of “plutonium”, which is used by all other nations to make nuclear weapons, such as India, Israel, China, Russia, United States, France and the United Kingdom, because plutonium bombs are smaller in size, but greater in explosive power or yield as compared to uranium bombs. Moreover they are more easily delivered and can be easily adapted as tactical nuclear weapons or for battlefield use, and being smaller in size and greater in yield, they can be easily fitted on to aircraft, missiles, or artillery shells.
Together with Dr. Abdus Salam, Munir Ahmad Khan had the privilege of preparing a proposal for the establishment of nuclear fuel reprocessing plant in Pakistan in late 1960's. Ayub Khan deferred the matter on economic grounds. Thus Pakistan lost a golden opportunity for acquiring this important technology when it was readily available to Pakistan without safeguards and at a nominal cost more than thirty years ago.[xliv]
There is a popular myth and allegation leveled against PAEC and Munir Khan that they failed at the plutonium route. Yet, contrary to popular perception, Pakistan did not forego the plutonium route to the bomb, and pursued it along with the uranium route, which is a testimony to Munir Khan's vision, as this route was the "next step" towards a thermonuclear capability.
The centerpiece of the PAEC weapon’s programme in the early 1970s was the effort to acquire a reprocessing plant to separate plutonium from the fuel of KANUPP and future nuclear power plants envisioned by the PAEC. The technology for KANUPP was the same natural uranium/heavy water technology used in the Indian Cirus and later Dhruva reactors used by India for producing weapons plutonium, therefore pursuing the plutonium route was the "logical" option given Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure at that time. KANUPP was a Heavy Water natural uranium reactor which could be refueled continuously, without any need to shut down the reactor, which would make it more difficult for outside observers to know how much fuel was used, thus enabling spent fuel to be diverted to military applications for reprocessing, if the need arose. KANUPP was under the IAEA safeguards, but Munir Ahmad Khan was not unduly concerned, as he himself had spent 14 years at the IAEA.
For the first few years of its operation KANUPP used Canadian fuel, which had come under IAEA safeguards before it left Canada. The IAEA therefore knew at that time precisely how much uranium was being shipped from Canada to be loaded into KANUPP. However, after Canada broke off supply of nuclear fuel in 1976, PAEC was able to provide its own fuel and, unless additional safeguards measures were applied, the IAEA would not be able independently to verify — to know with a reasonable degree of assurance — how much fuel was being loaded into and irradiated in KANUPP. Pakistan objected, however, to the additional safeguards measures proposed by the IAEA on the grounds that they were not foreseen in the safeguards agreement covering the KANUPP reactor. In his statement to the Board concerning Pakistan’s unwillingness to accept additional safeguards, the Director General of IAEA stressed that he was not reporting a breach of a safeguards agreement. Nonetheless, his report caused a stir and brought pressure on Islamabad, and on India where a similar problem had arisen. In due course both governments reached agreements with the IAEA Secretariat on additional safeguards and in June 1982, nine months after the Director General had first raised the matter in the Board, he was able to inform the Board that: “In these two cases there has been significant progress since the end of 1982 and the technical safeguards measures implemented at the plants in question now enable the Agency once more to perform effective verification.” [xlv] But by 1981, the PAEC had been successful in completing the "pilot" reprocessing plant at New Labs in PINSTECH and shortly after 1982 when the additional safeguards were put in place, the PAEC began work on the Khushab Heavy water plutonium and tritium production reactor in 1985.
The basic idea behind the reprocessing contract with France was to acquire technology from where ever it was available, and then to replicate and build indigenous power plants and nuclear facilities, as was done by PAEC in the case of "New Labs" and "Khushab".
"New Labs and Khushab- From Nuclear to Thermonuclear"
It is pertinent to mention here that in the late 1960s, Pakistan had contracted with both British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL) and Belgonucléaire to prepare studies and designs for pilot plutonium separation facilities. The BNFL design was supposed to be capable of separating up 360 g of fuel a year. The plans for this plant were completed by 1971. The first step after Multan was to build a pilot reprocessing facility called the "New Labs" at PINSTECH. This facility was a larger and more ambitious project than the original BNFL plan. [xlvi]
It was to be built in the early 70s by Belgonucléaire and the French corporation SGN, but following the French cancellation of the reprocessing contract, the PAEC went on to complete the pilot reprocessing plant by 1981 on its own, known as the "New Labs" in PINSTECH.
The pilot reprocessing plant contract was followed by a contract signed with SGN of France in March 1973 to prepare the basic design for a large scale reprocessing plant, one with a capacity of 100 tons of fuel per year, considerably more than KANUPP would generate. The Chashma plant, as it was known, would have the capability to reprocess 100 tons of used reactor fuel and produce about 800 kg of weapons grade plutonium a year, if sufficient fuel were available to feed it. It would have provided Pakistan with the ability to “break safeguards” and quickly process accumulated fuel from KANUPP and other future nuclear power plants, when it decided to openly declare itself a nuclear-armed state. The final detailed design and construction contract was signed on 18 October 1974, which followed the initial design contract. The original contract for this project did not include significant safeguards to discourage diversion of the separated plutonium, or controls on the technology.[xlvii]
In March 1973 a team of three PAEC nuclear scientists and engineers comprising of Khalil Qureshi, Zafarullah and Abdul Majid were sent to the headquarters of Belgonucleaire at Mol to participate in the designing of a pilot nuclear fuel reprocessing facility as well as gain training in reprocessing spent fuel. Chairman of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) Munir Ahmed Khan favored the Belgian pilot reprocessing plant over the British facility on grounds that it would be difficult for Pakistan to upgrade the downgraded reprocessing plant on offer from the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Agency (UKAEA).[xlviii]
The French government, under American influence began to show increased concern about the Chashma plant during 1976. A safeguards agreement for France brought the plant before the IAEA in February 1976, which was approved on 18 March and signed by Pakistan. This at least ensured that the plant would have monitoring so that diversion to military purposes could not be made. Despite Bhutto’s overthrow in 1977 by General Zia, the latter continued the project unabated, and continued to press the French to fulfill the Chashma contract. But France had begun gradually turning against the reprocessing plant. Despite the French backstabbing of the reprocessing contract, PAEC went on to develop its own plutonium reactor at Khushab in the mid-1980s, and it was a totally indigenous project. Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood designed the Khushab Reactor, and in technical terms, the PAEC plutonium programme is more significant than the enrichment project for Pakistan in the long run, as this project gave Pakistan the capability to produce indigenous plutonium and tritium which is used in developing advanced fission devices and is the basis of a thermonuclear capability. The Khushab reactor also produces tritium, which the PAEC had attempted to produce by irradiating lithium. By 1987, the PAEC was able to acquire from West Germany parts for a tritium purification facility. Later, Pakistan attempted to procure from Germany 30 tons of aluminum tubing, used to "clad lithium for irradiation in a reactor."[xlix]
This was also part of the PAEC effort to acquire complete mastery over the ‘nuclear fuel cycle’. The PAEC also went on to complete its indigenous 'pilot' reprocessing plant by 1981, called the "New Labs" at PINSTECH, which gave Pakistan the capability to reprocess enough plutonium for at least one nuclear weapon a year. "New Labs" is an experimental, pilot-scale plutonium reprocessing plant that has the capability to reprocess 10-20 kg of plutonium each year, work on which had begun in 1976. "Cold" tests were conducted at New Labs as early as 1982, and in 1987 West German sources claimed that the facility previously conducted "hot" tests.[l]
A very important point needs to be kept in mind regarding the timing of the initiation of the Kahuta Enrichment Project, A.Q. Khan’s arrival in Pakistan, and the cancellation of the French Plutonium Reprocessing Contract. The fact is that the Kahuta Enrichment Project was started in 1974. The Reprocessing contract was signed as two separate agreements, one in March 1973, for a “basic design”, the other for “detailed design” and actual construction in October 1974. It was begun along with the KRL project by PAEC, and was cancelled only in August 1978, where as A. Q. Khan arrived in Pakistan to work under Bashiruddin Mahmud at KRL/ERL in 1976, which is two years before the French cancelled the reprocessing contract. This clearly exposes the inaccuracy of the impression that his arrival in Pakistan was because the PAEC had failed in the plutonium route to the bomb, in the wake of the French cancellation of the reprocessing plant contract with PAEC. The PAEC had obtained almost all the detailed designs and drawings for the Chashma Reprocessing plant from the French firm SGN, before the contract was cancelled, and it went on to develop its own plant indigenously, at Khushab.[li] Khushab was finally commissioned in 1998.
A critical element in the manufacture of boosted fission devices and thermonuclear or Hydrogen bombs is tritium. In 1985, Germany licensed for export to PAEC a tritium plant by the firm NTG Nukleartechnik GmbH (NTG), preferring to call it a ’heavy water purifier’ instead of -- as the U.S. preferred -- a ’tritium recovery facility’ in the interests of complying with German regulations on sensitive nuclear exports. While heavy water purification technology was not subject to export controls in Germany at that time, technology for the recovery of tritium was controlled. The PAEC was also able to procure from NTG in 1987, a tritium gas storage and purification plant.
In order to obtain significant amounts of weapons grade tritium gas, the PAEC needed to irradiate lithium-6 targets, perhaps in an unsafeguarded research reactor. The plant provided by NTG was capable of purifying this tritium gas to 98%. In amounts of about 4 to 5 grams, tritium, the heaviest hydrogen isotope, is used as a booster in a fission nuclear weapon.
The plant , however, can purify the gas product obtained from irradiated lithium-6 targets, since separation of hydrogen isotopes would not be required. Bombarding lithium-6 with neutrons produces an end product of tritium, large amounts of helium-3 and helium-4. By 1986-87 the PAEC had also procured ’tritiated targets' which could be used at the Pinstech plant in Rawalpindi' to extract pure tritium.
Production of tritium via lithium requires bombarding the lithium-6 isotope with neutrons in a reactor. It was not likely that PAEC would use the Kanupp heavy water reactor, which is under IAEA safeguards, for this purpose.
An official at the IAEA at that time said that while heavy water at Kanupp was safeguarded along with reactor fuel, the control rods were not explicitly checked. ’From a safeguards point of view irradiation of lithium at Kanupp would be a theroretical possibility,'
Circumstantial evidence at that point in time indicated instead to the possibility that Pakistan could irradiate lithium-6 at an unsafeguarded, unknown research reactor. Because of the low melting point of the aluminum used in target cladding, irradiation in a Candu reactor core--where temperatures above 500 degrees F obtain--would also be undesirable.
The PAEC had in fact begun work by 1985 on building a 50-MWt research reactor at Khushab which is the source for tritium and which could produce plutonium with a few high-enriched uranium ’driver' rods in the core, but which could also be used to irradiate lithium targets. The U.S. magazine "Nuclear Fuel" reported that the PAEC was ’very proud' of its present capabilities in enrichment, reactor technology, and fuel fabrication, and that the PAEC believed that it had the means to build the Khushab plant itself.[lii] NTG also exported to PAEC a high-temperature vacuum oven in 1987. However, the artificially produced superheavy hydrogen or tritium decomposes quickly into helium. Therefore, it must be constantly renewed.That is precisely what the NTG plant can do: Every day, five grams of tritium can be recovered, which is incredibly large. A few grams of this gas are sufficient to increase the power of an explosive ’substantially,' nuclear weapons scientist Gerhard Locke, 56, of the Euskirchen Fraunhofer Institute in former West Germany was quoted as saying in Der Speigel, in 1989. Therefore, ’the second bomb generation of the lighter type' cannot do ’without tritium,' he said.
PINSTECH and Centre for Nuclear Studies - The backbone of the programme
The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission’s Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH) is the premier nuclear research and development establishment which dates back to the days of Dr. I.H.Usmani and proved to be the backbone of most of the PAEC’s projects and the entire nuclear programme.
PINSTECH played an unassuming and a subtle role in the success of the nuclear programme of Pakistan. All the leaders of civil and classified nuclear programmes were provided by PINSTECH from time to time during the execution of the projects. PINSTECH is a store house of R & D capabilities and has been a source of great academic strength of Pakistan in a similar manner as that provided by good universities in Europe.[liii]
Most people who have been writing on Pakistan's nuclear programme have failed to understand and ignored the primordial role of the research reactor at PINSTECH campus in Nilore, under PAEC chairman Munir Ahmed Khan, which directly helped KRL. This reactor proved to be world-class university and was extensively used for research in nuclear physics, materials science and metallurgy. This is where first generation of Pakistani scientists studied corrosion of metals, radio active fuel, and design / safety of reactors, the very same people who built KRL. This is where the scientists designed and conducted elaborate experiments to learn how different materials react in harsh environment of a power reactor. And this is where PAEC learned and grasped many of the finer points of reactor, material engineering (knowledge utilized later in centrifuge design) and nuclear physics long before A.Q. Khan took charge of KRL.
The same ignorant nuclear writers who have been writing extensively on the nuclear programme have also failed to comprehend the fact that Pakistan with its research and power reactor at PINSTECH became capable of developing nuclear weapons in two different ways without the help of AQ Khan. Before 1974, if Pakistan wanted, uranium used for reactor fuel could be set aside for further enrichment to weapon grade using variety of methods that had been completely and practically understood and mastered at PINSTECH as early as 1974. They are unable to realize that PAEC was capable to produce unstable plutonium (PU-239) from nuclear reactor and don't want to acknowledge that PAEC had crossed the threshold in several underlying technologies in early seventies, when Munir Ahmed Khan was PAEC chairman.
India used a reactor supplied by Canada to produce plutonium (from stolen fuel rods) for its nuclear weapons tested in 1974 and 1998. Israel did the same from its Dimona plant. Lately North Korea has attempted to produce a plutonium device from the unseparated Plutonium in fuel rods stolen at its nuclear facility at Yongbyon and Iran with active Russian help would probably do the same.
By 1979 PAEC and PINSTECH (under Munir ) had expanded and technically advanced to the point where these organizations were capable of doing what A.Q. Khan claims to have done all on his own.
The extensive programme of the nuclear fuel cycle is the back bone of the nuclear technology in Pakistan and the basic R & D, leading to pilot plants and later adopted on factory scale, was done at the two research centres, the Atomic Energy Mineral Centre in Lahore and the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH) in Islamabad which has also acted as a supplier of high quality human resource to almost all the main civil and nuclear defense projects in Pakistan.
Some of the most important departments of PINSTECH proved critical to all areas of nuclear programme. Nuclear Materials Division (NMD) of PINSTECH, was established in 1973, by Munir Ahmed Khan. At present, this Division is one of the most prestigious technical Divisions of PINSTECH which has contributed significantly to the development of PAEC's indiginization programme. It has the distinction of accomplishing several projects of strategic importance and has played a key role in the efficient running of these projects by solving scientific and engineering problems. [liv]
PINSTECH has contributed significantly to the development of PAEC’s indigenization programme by providing technical and finance for the development, production and characterization of materials related to nuclear industry and the nuclear programme. Several metallurgical and chemical processing projects have been undertaken in this field. R & D activities have been pursued on projects of strategic importance, including development of reactor fuel and structural materials, alloys, advanced ceramics, heat treatment, mechanical and corrosion testing, materials characterization, etc.[lv]
PINSTECH has played a pioneering role in the development of technical know-how for the production and processing of nuclear materials and fuel for Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP).
The Nuclear Engineering Division (NED) is one of the most prestigious Division of Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH). The Division was established with the objective to develop technical expertise mainly in the area of Nuclear Reactor Technology. NED has been constantly providing highly trained manpower for several projects of strategic importance. [lvi]
PINSTECH houses two small reactors, the Pakistan Atomic Research Reactor (PARR-1), being a 10 MW high-flux, pool-type research reactor supplied by the U.S in 1965, which was upgraded from 5 MW in 1989 and uses 20 % enriched uranium as fuel and PARR-2 is a 27 KWt pool-type light-water research reactor that was supplied by China in 1989. Both these research reactors like KANUPP are under the IAEA safeguards.
The Pakistan Institute of Engineering and Applied Sciences, (PIEAS) is one of the country’s leading research and educational institutions. The seeds of this institution were sown in 1967, when a small training facility, called "Reactor School", was established at PINSTECH by Dr. I.H.Usmani to conduct some courses related to nuclear technology for the newly inducted engineers and scientists of the PAEC. Later, the Reactor School was upgraded and the Centre for Nuclear Studies (CNS) was established by Munir Ahmad Khan in 1976, which catered to the technical manpower needs of all areas of the nuclear programme at a time when the world had closed its doors to Pakistani students. The CNS has so far produced over 5000 nuclear scientists, engineers and technicians who were the backbone and the human resource for the nuclear programme.[lvii]
The Departments of Nuclear Engineering, Chemical and Materials Engineering, Process Engineering, Systems Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Mechanical Engineering and Nuclear Medicine and Physics and Applied Mathematics and Information Technology, in the Centre for Nuclear Studies, now known as PIEAS or Pakistan Institute of Engineering and Applied Sciences, has been conducting one of the most advanced masters and post-graduate training programmes along with Ph.D programmes in these disciplines for over 34 years now.
Munir Ahmed Khan also established the Radiation & Isotope Applications Division (RIAD) in 1972 along with the Nuclear Materials Division in 1973 at PINSTECH. These, along with the Nuclear Chemistry and Nuclear Engineering Divisions of PINSTECH, which were established under I.H.Usmani, played a critical role in the nuclear programme all along. A full-fledged Computer Division was also established at PINSTECH by 1980.
The PAEC/PINSTECH facilities, expertise and training played the pivotal role in uranium enrichment and nuclear fuel cycle development and provided the much needed R&D and manpower for all strategic areas of the nuclear programme. [lviii]
The Pakistan Institute of Science & Technology (PINSTECH) is also responsible for fuel cycle R&D activities, including analytical chemistry, nuclear materials, metallurgy, fuel development, digital electronics, control instrumentation, and computational physics; basic research facilities are open to scientists/engineers from universities as well as research organizations.
The Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology uranium laboratories were focused in the mid-1970s on chemical processes and quality control procedures to fabricate uranium oxide pellets to be used to fuel the KANUPP reactor. Yellow cake has to be purified to reactor grade quality to remove trace impurities. A full scale refining plant was built for this purpose. And the refined uranium was fabricated into pure uranium oxide and pressed into small pellets which were sealed in zircaloy cladding tubes. PINSTECH developed techniques for producing high purity uranium from yellow cake, and converting it into oxide and pellets. PINSTECH facilities produced the uranium oxide, and developed the special welding techniques and other procedures required for large scale production operations.
HOW PAKISTAN MADE NUCLEAR FUEL
In 1965 Canada and Pakistan signed a contract for Canada to build the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP). At this time, Canada also offered to sell Pakistan a nuclear fuel fabrication plant, but Pakistan was not interested and refused. Canada began helping Pakistan operate KANUPP in 1972. The plant was kept in operation for the first four years with technical support from Canada. During this time, Pakistan began to re-start negotiations with Canada for the fuel fabrication plant. The chairman of the PAEC Munir Ahmad Khan went to Canada in early 1973, attempting to persuade the Canadian government to agree to supply Pakistan with the plant. Canada had two objections: first, Canada would lose the revenue earned previously by exporting fuel. Second, supplying Pakistan with its own fuel fabrication plant would, in turn, make Pakistan more independent in nuclear technology, which could indirectly contribute to nuclear proliferation. [lix]
In 1973, the President of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) decided to support the supply of a fuel fabrication plant to Pakistan, since Canada had also supplied such a fabrication plant to India. Pakistan's KANUPP was also already under IAEA safeguards, and those could be extended to the new plant. A formal contract was signed with Canada's Westinghouse Company, which expected completion of the fabrication plant by 1975. Fuel was to be co-manufactured in Pakistan under Canadian supervision for an initial period of approximately two years, after which Pakistan would be on its own. [lx]
With the explosion of a nuclear device by India in May 1974, Canada's view on nuclear exports changed dramatically. Canada changed its attitude toward nuclear exports, adopting a new and strict nonproliferation policy. This policy "demanded [that] any country receiving nuclear technology or facilities from Canada either sign the NPT or accept full-scope safeguards on all its facilities" as well as not to use Canadian supplies for nuclear explosions. This new policy effectively punished Pakistan for India's misuse of Canadian nuclear exports.
Pakistan refused to subscribe to the new condition. During this time, Pakistan continued construction of the fuel fabrication plant, expecting that all equipment needed for the fuel plant would be shipped from Canada by late 1974. However, just before the shipment was to leave for Pakistan, Canada placed an embargo on the equipment. Canada decided to place an embargo on the equipment for two reasons. Pakistan had signed an agreement with France in the meantime to build a nuclear reprocessing plant under safeguards, which Canada did not like. With such a plant, Pakistan would be capable of reprocessing fuel from KANUPP and producing plutonium, which was contrary to Canada's new nuclear non-proliferation policy. Pakistan also continued its unwillingness to sign the NPT. Therefore, on 23 December 1976, Canada unilaterally cut off all nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. Support abruptly ceased when Canada halted all supplies of nuclear fuel, heavy water, spare parts, safety and other technical information, and sent all Canadian experts stationed at KANUPP home. Pakistan was "left with no choice, but to find a way to make nuclear fuel on its own." [lxi]
Uranium is an essential raw material for nuclear fuel. Pakistan uses natural uranium rather than enriched uranium as fuel for KANUPP because it is a heavy water reactor, which is a better medium for facilitating a nuclear chain reaction than light water. Finding mine able quantities of uranium was a challenge for Pakistan. Reasonable quantities were found in the Siwalik Hills, west of Dera Ghazi Khan. Pakistan, however, had no experience in mining uranium. Beginning in 1972 the PAEC began geological surveys to find mine able deposits of uranium. Uranium deposits were found in several locations in Pakistan. The Atomic Energy Minerals Centre (AEMC) in Lahore was responsible for the exploration and mining operations.[lxii] A team of young engineers from the AEMC carried out the necessary exploration and mining operations. Even skilled labor was scarce, and the drillers and miners trained were "among an illiterate labor force" available in the region. The uranium ore indigenously mined by Pakistan was of relatively low grade and consisted of only a few kilograms of uranium per ton in contrast to uranium ore from Canada, which has a higher concentration of uranium per ton. Therefore, Pakistan's uranium extraction plant had to be designed more carefully, in order to reduce impurities and extract more uranium. Pakistan's uranium extraction was done entirely by chemical, mechanical, and electrical engineers from AEMC, with the assistance of Pakistani industries. As a result, Pakistan was able to complete its uranium yellow cake plant within a year. A full scale refining plant was built to turn concentrated uranium yellow cake into a pure uranium oxide usable in a nuclear reactor. [lxiii]
The uranium oxide was next pressed into small pellets of very high density to be burnt after being sealed in zircaloy cladding tubes. Basic research and development (R&D) facilities were created in the mid 1970's at the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH). These R&D facilities helped in developing the know-how for making high purity uranium from yellow cake and converting it into uranium oxide and pellets. PINSTECH made valuable contributions, such as setting up uranium laboratories, through which precise chemical processes and quality control procedures were established. PINSTECH also helped train highly skilled manpower and developed special welding techniques and other procedures required for large-scale operations. [lxiv]
When Canada stopped its nuclear exports to Pakistan, other problems in addition to making nuclear fuel arose. Pakistani scientists knew the overall measurements of the fuel but did not have the exact specifications of some of the key materials or the type of machinery needed, nor did they know certain manufacturing procedures or a source of supply for materials and machinery. Some special attachments had to be designed by Pakistan. Suppliers had to be located that were "willing to cooperate in spite of the negative atmosphere generated by the Indian explosion followed by the Canadian embargoes." Since none could be found, Pakistan relied heavily on local industries to make up for the lack of a foreign supplier.
In addition to uranium, technology, and machinery, Pakistan had to also plan for indigenous production of special alloys and materials, such as zircaloy cladding tubes use to encase the small pellets of uranium oxide. Pakistan could not rely on imported cladding tubes for very long, so it began to manufacture its own. Pakistan found large deposits of zirconium-bearing heavy sands along the seacoast and in the riverbanks of Balochistan. PINSTECH worked together with experts from AEMC to set up a pilot plant, which gave Pakistan the necessary experience over several years in the removal of hafnium, an element of earth found in natural zirconium.
Not a single fuel pellet has failed since Pakistan began manufacturing fuel elements for KANUPP in the late 1970's. KANUPP was designed, however, so that even if a few bundles of pellets happen to leak, "the system can easily take care of it." Canada did not supply Pakistan with a test reactor, and although Pakistan approached certain west European countries about testing and certifying its fuel, none agreed. Therefore, Pakistan set up test facilities outside the reactor to check fuel bundles for mechanical, pressure, temperature, and flow conditions. Other tests were also conducted to assure the fuel's strength to withstand the extreme conditions inside KANUPP. Pakistan then showed the results of the tests to "certain international experts and they were satisfied." [lxv]
By indigenously making fuel, Pakistan gained many new technologies. Pakistan produced the first ton of purified uranium oxide and metal before it produced the first ton of copper or any other mineral using local ore and indigenously developed technologies. Further, it taught Pakistani scientists and engineers about precision engineering, quality control, inspection, and design of complicated tools and machinery. Nuclear technology is interdisciplinary, which requires teamwork, and credit has to be given to and shared by all those who contribute and thereby took the country forward. Pakistan's accomplishments in the nuclear field "are an excellent example of collaborative work by people who accepted a challenge and decided to respond to it collectively. The participants, engineers, scientists, chemists, miners, and experts alike developed a system and an institution which is even more important than the product." [lxvi]
Moreover, the KANUPP plant has faced numerous challenges during its over two decades of operation. Following the withdrawal of vendor technical assistance and imposition of embargoes by major nuclear countries in 1976, the plant some times has been shutdown for longer durations to carry out maintenance, modifications or repair. A committed self-reliance programme by PAEC and KANUPP, however, kept the plant operational throughout the difficult period.
In 1980, PAEC successfully produced nuclear fuel for KANUPP and the first Pakistani nuclear fuel bundle was loaded successfully in the reactor core, while PAEC made all-out efforts to create the technical infrastructures, industrial resources and personnel expertise necessary to support station operation. The Design & Development Division (Mechanical), Computer Development Division, In-service Inspection Laboratory, Control & Instrumentation Application Laboratory, Quality Assurance Division and in 1973 the Karachi Nuclear Power Training Centre were established within the plant. At about the same time, the Technical and Health Physics Divisions were strengthened to provide necessary backup for technical and radiation control support. In 1990. the complete loading of the Kanupp reactor core with all Pakistani fuel bundles took place. [lxvii]
Such technical support does not form part of nuclear power plant operation in developed countries but in the case of KANUPP there was no other choice. Incidentally, KANUPP is the only nuclear power plant in the world which has been operating without technical support from the vendor which is vividly indicative of PAEC's commitment to self-reliance.
To acquire self-sufficiency in the production of heavy water, which was required for use in the heavy water plutonium production reactor at Khushab, the PAEC by 1980 completed a heavy water production plant at Multan, with an annual capacity of 13 metric tons.[lxviii]
The PAEC also went on to develop a nuclear fuel fabrication plant at Kundian, with the capacity to process 24 MT of natural uranium per year. This facility manufactures fuel for KANUPP.[lxix] Also known as the Kundian Fuel Fabrication Plant /Kundian Nuclear Complex I , Kundian is a reactor uranium fuel fabrication facility situated where SGN was to build a 50-100 tU/a spent fuel reprocessing plant (project started in 1974, halted in 1977), located near the Chashma reactor. With an annual production capacity of 24 tons, the facility has been manufacturing fuel for the KANUPP reactor since 1978. The Nuclear Fuel Plant is now known as KNC I - Kundian Nuclear Complex I. [lxx]. Kundian fuel fabrication facility is an important part of the nuclear fuel cycle facilities of the PAEC.
The chairman of the PAEC, Munir Ahmed Khan, in a press conference on August 31st, 1980 announced that Pakistan had achieved self-reliance in the manufacture of nuclear fuel from uranium and a nuclear fuel manufacturing plant had been built at Chashma by Pakistani scientists. According to him, fuel from the plant had been used in KANUPP during the past month to produce electricity for Karachi and the setting-up of the indigenous nuclear fuel production plant would save about $40 million in foreign exchange every year since Pakistan earlier had to depend on foreign suppliers for nuclear fuel.[lxxi]
The PAEC in 1981 continued uranium exploration activities and conducted geological mapping, radiometric measurements, drilling and subsurface excavations in the Potowar region. The exploration revealed the existence of uranium ores at Isa Khel and Thatti Nasratti.[lxxii]
In 1989, the PAEC broke an international embargo on Pakistan and was able to ensure Chinese support for a 300 MW Chashma-1 Nuclear Power Plant. This plant has been commissioned and another Nuclear Power Plant at the same site is under construction (CHASNUPP-II). The PAEC in from the 1960s onwards has also come up with over a dozen nuclear medical and agricultural centres throughout Pakistan and PINSTECH has been producing radioisotopes for various applications in industry.
BUILDING THE BOMB--NUCLEAR WEAPONS DESIGN, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING
The last major link in the long chain of building nuclear weapons is to acquire the means to develop the bomb from highly enriched uranium, or plutonium. This in itself is as great a challenge as producing enriched uranium for nuclear weapons, and without the know how to build an actual nuclear device, the fissile material or fuel in the form of HEU or PU would be useless.
The next critical step for the PAEC after the setting up the Kahuta Enrichment Project was to set up the Uranium Metals laboratory (UML), so that ultimately when the PAEC got enriched uranium hexafluoride back from the plant at Kahuta, it could be converted into metal and given its right shape to be used in a bomb and machined into a nuclear explosive device.[lxxiii]
Pakistani work on weapon design began even before the start of work on uranium enrichment and plutonium production and reprocessing, under the auspices of the PAEC. In October 1972 two Pakistani nuclear scientists, Dr. Riazuddin and Dr. Masud temporarily working at the International Center for Theoretical Physics (ICTP), Italy, returned to Pakistan to begin theoretical work on a fission explosive device. They were posted at the Pakistan Institute for Nuclear Science & Technology (PINSTECH). In December 1973, PAEC scientists elected to develop an 'implosion' over the 'gun' type of nuclear fission device citing economy in the use of fissile material. Subsequently Dr. Zaman Shaikh, an explosives expert at the Defense Science Laboratories, was tasked by PAEC chairman Munir Ahmed Khan with developing explosive lenses for the proposed device. [lxxiv]
In March 1974, chairman PAEC, Munir Ahmed Khan called a meeting to initiate work on an atomic bomb. Among those attending the meeting were Dr. Hafeez Qureshi, head of the Radiation and Isotope Applications Division (RIAD) at PINSTECH (later to become Member Technical, PAEC), Dr. Abdus Salam, then Adviser for Science and Technology to the Government of Pakistan and Dr. Riaz-ud-Din, Member (Technical), PAEC. The PAEC chairman informed Qureshi that he was to work on a project of national importance with another expert, Dr. Zaman Sheikh, then working with the Defence Science and Technology Organization (DESTO). The word “bomb” was never used in the meeting but Qureshi exactly understood the objective. Their task would be to develop the design of a weapon implosion system. The project would be located at Wah, appropriately next to the Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF). [lxxv]
The work at Wah began under the undescriptive codename ‘Research’ and Qureshi, Zaman and their team of engineers and scientists came to be known as “The Wah Group”. Initial work was limited to research and development of the explosive lenses to be used in the nuclear device. This expanded however to include chemical, mechanical and precision engineering of the system and the triggering mechanisms. The Wah Group procured equipment where it could and developed its own technology where restrictions prevented the purchase of equipment. They had come up with a nuclear weapon design by 1978 that was subsequently tested in the first cold test in 1983.
The critical thrust towards the actual nuclear device was to set up a theoretical physics group that could work on the design of the bomb. It had to be a purely Pakistani effort and PAEC scientists on the theoretical side had the capability to design their own bomb. They studied the literature that was available and they worked extremely hard, developed computer codes, acquired powerful computers to design this system and came up with the design that was to be manufactured. Another facility that was set up in those days was a manufacturing facility for the bomb. Therefore at the PAEC, the finest experimental physicists, engineers, electronics people and chemical engineers formed a team to manufacture these weapons. [lxxvi]
In 1973 Dr. Riazuddin travelled to the International Center for Theoretical Physics (ICTP), Italy, after which he proceeded to the United States to obtain open-source information on the 'Manhattan Project' from the Library of Congress and the National Information Center, Maryland. After his return from the United States, Riazuddin was inducted into the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) as Member (Technical). Dr. Riazuddin later worked as part of the team that worked on designs for Pakistan's nuclear explosive device. As he explained, "we were the designers of the bomb, like the tailor who tells you how much of the material is required to stitch a suit. We had to identify the fissile material, whether to use plutonium or...enriched uranium, which method of detonation, which explosive, which type of tampers and lenses to use, how material will be compressed, how shock waves will be created, what would be the yield." Since Pakistan found it difficult to manufacture beryllium reflectors, the first nuclear explosive device designed by the 'Theoretical Group' used Uranium-238 as a reflector.[lxxvii]
Moreover the PAEC had to develop its own explosive plants. The explosive used in a nuclear bomb is a very special type of explosive (HMX Explosive).
On 25 March 1974 Pakistani nuclear scientists including PAEC chairman Munir Ahmed Khan, Dr. Riazuddin, and Dr. Hafeez Qureshi convened a meeting with the head of the Pakistan Ordnance Factory at Wah cantonment, Lt. General Qamar Ali Mirza, to set up a plant to manufacture His Majesty's Explosive (HMX) for use in the explosive lenses of the proposed implosion-design fission device.[lxxviii] The project was codenamed "Research." It could not be purchased from anywhere in the world, and nobody would sell it to any other country. So the PAEC had to put up its own plant for this and the PAEC had to have chemical engineers who would operate this plant and make the explosives. Then the explosives had to be given the right shape according to the design that was delivered by the PAEC’s design team. The explosive had to be machined. The machining of the explosive was an awesome task. Explosives were very difficult materials to handle and their machining was a very dangerous process. PAEC had a dedicated team of people, mechanical engineers who were not afraid of this and who did this job, which of course was done by remote control. These pioneers risked their lives to machine the explosives.
When a nuclear bomb is manufactured, it has to be detonated and the detonation is not from one point. It is from several points on the surface of the bomb and the trick lies in this that one should be able to detonate the bomb from several points at the same time. This is called simultaneity and the simultaneity has to be of the order of 50 ns (nanosecond). A ns is one-billionth of a second. Therefore, it can be imagined that in 50 ns, the bomb has to be detonated at several points so that the implosion takes place in a simultaneous fashion and sets off a nuclear chain reaction. [lxxix]
This was a challenge for the PAEC electronics team because they had to develop the trigger mechanism. Then after the bomb had been manufactured, and the engineers had put the electronics in it, and it had got the explosives in it, in addition to the metallic uranium which was produced by Dr. Khalil Qureshi who converted the enriched uranium hexalflouride gas from Kahuta into metal and did all the coating and machining. That was one part. Then there had to be a holding system that would hold everything, the bits and pieces in such a way that a very rugged device was obtained. The device had to be rugged so that if deliverable weapons were required, there would be no problems. A missile or aircraft could therefore easily deliver the bomb.[lxxx]
All these things had to be started at the same time in parallel.
COLD TESTING THE BOMB
The last major link in making a bomb was to test the accuracy, and effectiveness of the weapon design parameters and accuracy of the triggering mechanism of the bomb itself. This required an elaborate system of facilities and technologies for nuclear testing. There are two types of tests, one is the “cold” test, and the other is the “hot” test. A cold test is one in which natural uranium is used instead of the enriched uranium, and the chain reaction does not take place.
In March 1983, the PAEC crossed a historic milestone. The first nuclear bomb had been manufactured. On 11th March 1983, the PAEC went for a cold test. A cold test is the actual detonation of a complete nuclear bomb except instead of enriched uranium, in the middle of the bomb, natural uranium is used. So it will not go into fission. It will not acquire full power, but it is a complete bomb in all respects. It produces a high flux of neutrons when the detonation takes place and one has to have the capability of measuring these neutrons. The diagnostics department of the PAEC had this capability and they measured neutrons from these cold tests very successfully. If there is a cold test and neutrons are detected and measured, the scientists can be more than 100 % sure that if enriched uranium is used in the same bomb, it is bound to give a fission reaction and a nuclear explosion. [lxxxi]
Pakistan’s first cold test of its nuclear device was carried out on 11 March 1983 in the Kirana Hills near Sargodha, home of the Pakistan Air Force’s main air base and the Central Ammunition Depot (CAD). The test was overseen by Dr. Ishfaq Ahmed. The tunnels at Kirana Hills, Sargodha are reported to have been bored after those at Chaghi, i.e. sometime between 1979 and 1983. As in Chaghi, the tunnels at Kirana Hills had been bored and then sealed. Prior to the cold tests, an advance team was sent to de-seal, open and clean the tunnels and to make sure the tunnels were clear of the wild boars that were found in abundance in the Sargodha region. After clearing of the tunnels, a PAEC diagnostic team headed by Dr. Samar Mubarakmand arrived on the scene with trailers fitted with computers and diagnostic equipment. This was followed by the arrival of the Wah Group with the actual nuclear device, in sub-assembly form. The device was assembled and then placed inside the tunnel. A monitoring system was set up with around 20 cables linking various parts of the device with oscillators in diagnostic vans parked near the Kirana Hills. The Wah Group had indigenously developed the explosive HMX (His Majesty’s Explosive) which was used to trigger the device.
The device was tested using the "push-button" technique as opposed to the "radio-link" technique used at Chaghi fourteen years later. The first test was to see whether the triggering mechanism created the necessary neutrons which would start a fission chain reaction in the real bomb. However, when the button was pushed, most of the wires connecting the device to the oscillators were severed due to errors committed in the preparation of the cables. At first, it was thought that the device had malfunctioned but closer scrutiny of two of the oscillators confirmed that the neutrons had indeed come out and a chain reaction had taken place. Pakistan’s first cold test of a nuclear device had been successful and 11 March became a red letter day in the calendar of the Pakistan nuclear programme.
A second cold test was undertaken soon afterwards which was witnessed by, among others, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Finance Minister, Lt. Gen. K.M. Arif, Vice Chief of Army Staff and Munir Ahmed Khan, chairman, PAEC. The need to improve and perfect the design of Pakistan’s first nuclear device required constant testing. As a result, between 1983 and 1990, the Wah Group conducted more than 24 cold tests of nuclear devices at Kirana Hills with the help of mobile diagnostic equipment. These tests were carried out in 24 horizontal-shaft tunnels measuring 100-150 feet in length which were bored inside the Kirana Hills. Later due to excessive US intelligence and satellite focus on the Kirana Hills site, it was abandoned and the Cold Test facility was shifted to the Kala-Chitta Range. Also, during the 1983-1990 period, the Wah Group went on to design and develop an atomic bomb small enough to be carried on the wing of a small fighter such as the F-16. It worked alongside the PAF to evolve and perfect delivery techniques of the nuclear bomb including ‘conventional free-fall’, ‘loft bombing’, ‘toss bombing’ and ‘low-level lay-down’ attack techniques using combat aircraft. Today, the PAF has perfected all four techniques of nuclear weapons delivery using F-16 and Mirage-V combat aircraft indigenously configured to carry nuclear weapons.[lxxxii]
The PAEC decided to keep on working on better and improved bomb designs and since 1983, the PAEC theoretical physicists, led by Dr. Masud Ahmad, did a remarkable job in that they designed one sample of the bomb after the other. After every 18 months or 2 years or so, the PAEC would have a new design and would perform a cold test on that. The success rate in every cold test was 100 percent. One design after the other kept coming out; they manufactured the bombs, tested them and were successful. After many years of bomb designing and development, the PAEC came through a series of 4 or 5 designs and then came up with a model that was the state-of-the-art. [lxxxiii]
The PAEC had a team of 300-400 people from the Diagnostics Directorate who were responsible for developing the detonation procedure. There are 5-6 different disciplines that have to be dealt with in this process. Each discipline in itself contained electrical engineers, electronics people, physicists, chemical engineers, metallurgists and so on.
This entire infrastructure for nuclear testing came into being by 1980. KRL had tried to come up with its own weapon design, based on an early Chinese bomb design, but it failed cold tests and was not adopted by Pakistan. The same design was in all probability passed on to Iran and Libya by A.Q. Khan.
PREPARING THE NUCLEAR TEST SITES
By 1976, the PAEC selected the sites in Chaghi and Kharan and their geologists went to work on these sites. In Kharan there is a desert and they went for a vertical shaft. It is like a vertical well that is 300-400 feet deep and at the bottom of the well there is a horizontal tunnel having an L-shaped configuration.
In Chaghi, where there was a mountain range, the Ras-Koh range, the PAEC went for an underground horizontal tunnel. The overburden available was about 400 feet. That was the height of the mountain available for containment of the explosion.
The designing of the tunnels was also a very intricate thing. It was not just blasting a hole into a mountain. If there was a straight tunnel and a bomb was put at the end of the tunnel, and the tunnel was plugged with concrete if one were to explode the bomb, the concrete would certainly blow out and all the radioactivity would leak out through the mouth of the tunnel. This had to be taken care of. The tunnel was designed in the form a double-S shape and when the bomb was detonated inside, the pressures would be very great. These pressured had the power to move the mountain outward and the force of the bomb was used to seal the tunnel. In this process when the rock would expand under the explosion, the rock would move in the direction so that it sealed the tunnel and so the tunnel would collapse inward by the force of the explosion, which would seal the tunnel in the process. Dr. Mansoor Beg of PAEC was an expert in this. Therefore, in 1976, the PAEC selected the sites for the atomic tests. In 1980-81, both the sites were complete and the shafts were all made. [lxxxiv]
The first preparations for eventual nuclear tests also started early - in 1976. Dr. Ishfaq Ahmad, Member (Technical) and Dr. Samar Mubarakmand of the PAEC were dispatched to Balochistan to conduct helicopter reconnaissance of potential test sites with the assistance of the Army Corps located at Quetta. The PAEC requirement was for a mountain with a completely dry interior capable of withstanding an internal 20 KT nuclear explosion. After a one-year survey of the site, completed in 1977, plans were finalized for driving a horizontal tunnel in the Ras Koh range for a future test. The tunnels for the tests were ready by 1980.[lxxxv]
PAKISTAN'S "FINEST" HOUR
In the wake of the Indian nuclear tests on May 11th and 13th, 1998, respectively, a meeting of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) was convened on the morning of 15 May 1998 at the Prime Minister’s Secretariat, Islamabad, to discuss the geo-political situation and strategic crisis arising out of the Indian nuclear tests. The meeting was chaired by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif who himself was holding the portfolio of defence and attended by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gohar Ayub Khan, the Minister of Finance & Economic Affairs, Sartaj Aziz, the Foreign Secretary, Shamshad Ahmed Khan and the three Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Air Force and Navy, namely General Jehangir Karamat, Air Chief Marshal Pervaiz Mehdi Qureshi and Admiral Fasih Bokhari respectively.
Since Dr. Ishfaq Ahmed, chairman of the PAEC, was, at the time, on a visit to the United States and Canada, the responsibility of giving a technical assessment of the Indian nuclear tests and Pakistan’s preparedness to give a matching response to India fell on the shoulders of Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, Member (Technical), PAEC. Dr. Mubarakmand was in charge of the PAEC’s Directorate of Technical Development (DTD), one of the most secretive organizations in the labyrinth of Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure. It may be said that the DTD established by Munir Ahmed Khan in 1974 is the forerunner of the National Development Complex (NDC), the designers and manufacturers of, among other things, Pakistan’s solid-fuelled Shaheen class of medium and intermediate range ballistic nuclear missile systems. Dr. Mubarakmand had supervised several cold tests since 1983 and was responsible for overseeing all of PAEC’s classified projects.
Dr. Mubarakmand added that if it is decided that Pakistan should go ahead with nuclear tests of its own, then the PAEC is fully prepared and capable of carrying out the nuclear tests within 10 days. The chairman of the PAEC, Dr. Ishfaq Ahmad, cut short his foreign trip and returned to Pakistan on 16 May 1998. The next day, on the morning of 17 May 1998, he received a call from the Pakistan Army GHQ, Rawalpindi informing him to remain on stand-by for a meeting with the Prime Minister. He was thereafter summoned by the Prime Minister House, Islamabad where he went accompanied by Dr. Mubarakmand. The Prime Minister asked the PAEC chairman for his opinion on the two points which were discussed in the DCC meeting of 15 May 1998 wherein it was discussed whether Pakistan should test in response to India's challenge and if the PAEC was ready to conduct the tests. Dr. Ishfaq Ahmad told the Prime Minister that the decision to test or not to test was that of the Government of Pakistan. As far as the PAEC preparedness and capability was concerned, they were ready to do their duty as and when required to do so. The Prime Minister said that eyes of the world were focused on Pakistan and failure to conduct the tests would put the credibility of the Pakistan nuclear programme in doubt and would encourage India into embarking on a misadventure against Pakistan – a concern expressed by many quarters. The PAEC chairman's reply was, “Mr. Prime Minister, take a decision and, Insha’Allah, I give you the guarantee of success.” He was told to prepare for the tests but remain on stand-by for the final decision.
Once the DCC had decided that Pakistan would give a matching response to the Indian challenge, a meeting was convened in the PAEC to decide the modus operandi, quantity and size of the nuclear tests to be conducted. This meeting was chaired by Dr. Ishfaq Ahmed and attended by Dr. Samar Mubarakmand and other high-ranking executives, scientists and engineers of the PAEC. It was decided that since the Indian nuclear tests had presented Pakistan with an opportunity to conduct nuclear tests for the first time after 14 years of having conducted only cold tests, the maximum benefit should be derived from this opportunity. It was, therefore, decided, that multiple tests would be carried out of varying yields as well as the live testing of the triggering mechanisms. Since the five horizontal shaft tunnels at Ras Koh Hills and the single vertical shaft tunnel at Kharan had the capability to collectively host a total of six tests, therefore, it was resolved that six different nuclear devices of different designs, sizes and yields would be selected, all of which had been previously cold tested.
Immediately afterwards, began the process of fitness and quality checks of the various components of the nuclear devices and the testing equipment. A large but smooth logistics operation also got under way with the help of the Pakistan Army and Air Force. This operation involved moving men and equipment as well as the nuclear devices to the Chagai test sites from various parts of the country.
On 19 May 1998, two teams comprising of 140 PAEC scientists, engineers and technicians left for Chaghi, Balochistan on two separate PIA Boeing 737 flights. Also on board were teams from the Wah Group, the Theoretical Group, the Directorate of Technical Development (DTD) and the Diagnostics Group. Some of the men and equipment were transported via road using NLC trucks escorted by the members of the Special Service Group (SSG), the elite commando force of the Pakistan Army and Pakistan Army Aviation AH-1 Cobra gunship helicopters.
Various support facilities were established at both the test sites, including instrumentation bunkers and observation posts. All the installations including the tunnel portals and the instrumentation and fire control cables leading into the tunnel shafts were camouflaged using canvass and net. The facilities were made to look like a small hamlet using adobe huts so as to deceive satellite surveillance. The tunnel portal itself was located inside an adobe hut. Barbed wire was placed around all the facilities so as to minimise the number of tracks and to keep pedestrian and vehicular movement on designated tracks. Vehicle tracks caused by incoming and outgoing trucks and jeeps were continuously erased by a team of soldiers assigned to the task. Support camps were established a few hundred yards away from Ground Zero at both the sites. These included lodging, food and water, restroom, shelter and communications facilities. These too were camouflaged. At Ras Koh, these support facilities were located directly south of the mountain in which the shafts had been bored.
The nuclear devices were themselves flown in semi-knocked down (SKD) sub-assembly form on two flights of PAF C-130 Hercules tactical transport aircraft from PAF Chaklala in northern Punjab to Dalbandin Airfield, situated in the Chagai District south-east of the Chagai Hills in Balochistan, escorted even within Pakistani airspace by four PAF F-16s armed with air-to-air missiles. At the same time, PAF F-7P air defence fighters, also armed with air-to-air missiles, were on CAP guarding the aerial frontiers of Pakistan against intruders. Both the nuclear devices (the bomb mechanism, the HMX explosive shields and casing) and the fissile material (the highly enriched uranium components) were divided into two consignments and flown separately on two independent flights of the Hercules. The PAEC did not want to put all its nuclear eggs in one basket in case something adverse was to happen to the aircraft. The security of the devices and the fissile material was so strict that that PAF F-16 escort pilots had been secretly given standing orders that in the unlikely event of the C-130 being hijacked or flown outside of Pakistani airspace, they were to shoot down the aircraft before it left Pakistan’s airspace. The F-16s were ordered to escort the C-130s to the Dalbandin airfield in Balochistan with their radio communications equipment turned off so that no orders, in the interim, could be conveyed to them to act otherwise. They were also ordered to ignore any orders to the contrary that got through to them during the duration of the flight even if such orders seemingly originated from Air Headquarters.
Once at the Dalbandin airfield south-east of the Chagai Hills, the sub-assembled parts of the nuclear devices were carefully offloaded from the aircraft and were separately taken in sub-assembled form to the test sites at Ras Koh Hills and Kharan presumably on Pakistan Army Aviation Mil Mi-17 helicopters. At Ras Koh Hills in Chagai, they were taken into the five ‘Zero Rooms’ located at the end of the kilometre long horizontal tunnels. Dr. Samar Mubarakmand personally supervised the complete assembly of all five nuclear devices. Diagnostic cables were thereafter laid from the tunnel to the telemetry. The cables connected all five nuclear devices with a command observation post 10 kilometres away. Afterwards, a complete simulated test was carried out by tele-command. This process of preparing the nuclear devices and laying of the cables and the establishment of the fully functional command and observation post took five days to complete.
On 25 May 1998, soldiers of the Pakistan Army’s 12 Corps arrived to seal the tunnel. They were supervised by engineers and technicians from the Pakistan Army Engineering Corps, the Frontier Works Organisation (FWO) and the Special Development Works (SDW). Dr. Samar Mubarakmand himself walked a total of 5 kilometres back and forth in the hot tunnels checking and re-checking the devices and the cables, which would be buried forever under the concrete. Finally, the cables were plugged into the nuclear devices. The process of the sealing the tunnels thereafter began with the mixing of the cement and the sand and their pouring into the tunnels. It took a total of 6,000 cement bags to seal the tunnel and twice the amount of sand.
The tunnels were sealed and plugged by the afternoon of 26 May 1998 and by the afternoon of 27 May 1998, the cement had completely dried out due to the excessive heat of the summer desert. After the engineers certified that the concrete had hardened and the site was fit for the tests it was communicated to the Prime Minister via the GHQ that the site was ready.
The date and time for Pakistan’s rendezvous with destiny was set for 3:00 p.m. on 28 May 1998.
Thursday, 28 May 1998 dawned with an air alert over all military and strategic installations of Pakistan. The PAF had earlier been put on red alert to respond to the remote, but real possibility of a joint Indo-Israeli pre-emptive strike against its nuclear installations. Pakistan thought it fit to be safe rather than sorry. PAF F-16A and F-7P air defence fighters were scrambled from air bases around the country to remain vigilant and prepared for any eventuality.
Before twilight, the automatic data transmission link from all Pakistani seismic stations to the outside world was switched off.
At Chaghi, it was a clear day. Bright, warm and sunny without a cloud in sight. There was a slight breeze. All personnel, civil and military, were evacuated from ‘Ground Zero’ except for members of the Diagnostics Group and the firing team. They had been involved in digging out and removing some equipment lying there since 1978.
Ten members of the team reached the Observation Post (OP) located 10-kilometres away from Ground Zero. The firing equipment was checked for one last time at 1:30 p.m. and prayers were offered. An hour later, at 2:30 p.m., a khaki-brown battle-camouflaged Pakistan Army Aviation Mil Mi-17 helicopter carrying the team of observers including PAEC chairman, Dr. Ishfaq Ahmed, KRL Director, Dr. A.Q. Khan, and four other scientists from KRL, including Dr. Fakhr Hashmi, Dr. Javed Ashraf Mirza (who later became Director, KRL on Dr. A.Q. Khan’s retirement from the post in March 2001), Dr. M. Nasim Khan and S. Mansoor Ahmed arrived at the site. Also accompanying them was a Pakistan Army team headed by Lt. Gen. Zulfikar Ali Khan, Chief of the Combat Division.
At 3:00 p.m., a truck carrying the last lot of the personnel and soldiers involved in the site preparations passed by the OP. Soon afterwards, the all-clear was given to conduct the test as the site had been fully evacuated.
Amongst the 20 men present, one young man, Muhammad Arshad, the Chief Scientific Officer, who had designed the triggering mechanism, was selected to push the button. He was asked to recite “All Praise be to Allah” and push the button. At exactly 3:16 p.m. Pakistan Standard Time (P.S.T.), the button was pushed and Muhammad Arshad stepped from obscurity into history.
As soon as the button was pushed, the control system was taken over by computer. The signal was passed through the air-link initiating six steps in the firing sequence while at the same time bypassing, one after the other, each of the security systems put in place to prevent accidental detonation. Each step was confirmed by the computer, switching on power supplies for each stage. On the last leg of the sequence, the high voltage power supply responsible for detonating the nuclear devices was activated.
As the firing sequence passed through each level and shut down the safety switches and activating the power supply, each and every step was being recorded by the computer via the telemetry which is an apparatus for recording readings of an instrument and transmitting them via radio. A radiation-hardened television camera with special lenses recorded the outer surface of the mountain.
As the firing sequence continued through its stages, twenty pairs of eyes were glued on the mountain 10 kilometres away. There was deafening silence within and outside of the OP.
The high voltage electrical power wave simultaneously reached, with microsecond synchronization, the triggers in all the explosive HMX lenses symmetrically encircling the Beryllium/Uranium-238 (2) reflector shield and the ball of Uranium 235 (3) around the initiator core in all five devices.
When the electrical current ran through the wires to the lenses, an explosion was triggered in all five of the devices. Because of the symmetrical nature of the placement of the explosives, a spherically imploding shock wave was set off, instantly squeezing the Berylium/Uranium-238, the Uranium-235, and the initiator. The Berylium/Uranium-238 shield was pushed inward by the explosion, compressing the grapefruit-sized ball of Uranium-235 to the size of a plum in a microsecond. The Uranium-235 went from a subcritical to a supercritical density, and the initiator at the centre was similarly squeezed. The process of atoms fissioning - or splitting apart - began.
Neutrons released from the initiator began striking and bombarding the Uranium-235 at an extremely rapid rate. In each instance in which a neutron hit a Uranium atom, the atom split, creating two more neutrons, which in turn hit two more atoms, which split into four neutrons, which found four new atoms, thus splitting into eight neutrons, sixteen, thirty-two, sixty-four, one hundred and twenty-eight, two hundred and fifty-six and so on. This was the runaway chain reaction. With the splitting of each atom, a terrific amount of energy was released along with a variety of lethal atomic particles.
A short while after the button was pushed, the earth in and around the Ras Koh Hills trembled. The OP vibrated. Smoke and dust burst out through the five points where the nuclear devices were buried. The mountain shook and changed colour as the dust from thousands of years was dislodged from its surface, its dark granite rock turning white as de-oxidisation occurred from the fierce radioactive forces operating from within. A huge thick cloud of beige dust then enveloped the mountain.
In the OP, shouts of “Nara-e-Takbeer” and “Allah-o-Akbar” (God is Great) went up.
The time-frame, from the moment when the button was pushed to the moment the detonations inside the mountain took place, was thirty seconds. For those in the OP, watching in pin-drop silence with their eyes focused on the mountain, those thirty seconds were the longest in their lives. It was the culmination of a journey which started over 20 years ago. It was the moment of truth and triumph against heavy odds, trials and tribulations. At the end of those thirty seconds lay Pakistan’s date with destiny.
Sources in the Directorate of Technical Development, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, said that the tests were performed with devices buried deep into the bellies of rocky mountains in Chagai range. "Observers present at the test site reported that the mountain structure -- originally composed of black granite rocks -- changed colour into greyish white in a split second due to the intense heat produced by the test,"
The immense shock wave produce was detected and monitored by Seismic centres in the US, Russia, Australia and many other countries, said the Directorate of Technical Development. A statement issued by the PAEC Directorate of Technical Development said that it had fulfilled its mission by not only successfully producing a variety of potential nuclear devices, but also by performing perfect hot tests which resulted in near expected yields and providing invaluable scientific data.
The statement said: "The mission has, on the one hand, boosted the morale of the Pakistani nation by giving it an honourable position in the nuclear world, while on the other hand it validated scientific theory, design and previous results from cold tests. This has more than justified the creation and establishment of DTD 20 years back.
"Through these critical years of nuclear device development, the leadership contribution changed hands from Mr. Munir Ahmed Khan to Dr Ishfaq Ahmad and finally to Dr Samar Mubarakmand (Member Technical).
These gifted scientists and engineers along with a highly-dedicated team worked logically and economically to design, produce and test an extremely rugged device for the nation which enable the Islamic Republic of Pakistan from strength to strength. By the grace of Almighty Allah, the PAEC as an organization has proven to be the pride of the Pakistani nation."[lxxxvi]
Interestingly, soon after the 1998 tests when the CTBT debate had surfaced in Pakistan, A.Q. Khan told the people that there was no harm for Pakistan in signing the CTBT while Munir Ahmed Khan in an article in The News, titled "Let us face realities on CTBT", dated 29th, November, 1998, Islamabad, was of the view that " Any claim that CTBT will not adversely affect the further development of Pakistan’s nuclear capability is, therefore wrong. If it were so, the US and others would not insist on India and Pakistan signing the CTBT. …CTBT is aimed at keeping the level of Indian and Pakistani arsenals to that of the mid 1960s." Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood was one of the most vocal opponents of Pakistan signing the CTBT. He resigned from the PAEC in protest over reports that the government was considering signing the CTBT under American pressure.
