binzaman
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lolzzzz so you are the next indian PM. Cos you can change the statements quickly.. Best of Luck
Mumbai Attacks
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lolzzzz so you are the next indian PM. Cos you can change the statements quickly.. Best of Luck
ahmeddsid
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Naaah, I am better off in the RAW!lolzzzz so you are the next indian PM. Cos you can change the statements quickly.. Best of Luck
Silverfalcon
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Riddle :
Who is the country that kills its own people, and then does a propaganda saying that some other country has done it ?
Hint : it starts with an I ends with an I
no reward for giving the correct answer, as even a 3 year old knows it
Who is the country that kills its own people, and then does a propaganda saying that some other country has done it ?
Hint : it starts with an I ends with an I
no reward for giving the correct answer, as even a 3 year old knows it
Last edited:
ahmeddsid
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sure, next drama in about 2 weeks time, dress rehearsals are going on, we are thinking of broadcasting it first on TV to see the public reaction, If it gets good TRP ratings, then We will go on full scale Production. We are hiring Spot/light boys, you can apply 
binzaman
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sure, next drama in about 2 weeks time, dress rehearsals are going on, we are thinking of broadcasting it first on TV to see the public reaction, If it gets good TRP ratings, then We will go on full scale Production. We are hiring Spot/light boys, you can apply
Jo Garajtay hain woh barastay nahi
nwmalik
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as wise people say
"prevention is better than cure"
or
"stitch in time saves nine"
but maybe there are no wise people in RAW and other indian intelligence agencies.
But mistakes can occur. And with so much info which is available, much of which in the end not correct or useful, looking back is easy to say important information was missed.
But the problem is the indian attitude. Pakistan is responsible for all that goes wrong in india.
"prevention is better than cure"
or
"stitch in time saves nine"
but maybe there are no wise people in RAW and other indian intelligence agencies.
But mistakes can occur. And with so much info which is available, much of which in the end not correct or useful, looking back is easy to say important information was missed.
But the problem is the indian attitude. Pakistan is responsible for all that goes wrong in india.
IceCold
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Dude have you even bothered to read the article that i just posted. It clearly says India had the intelligence 5 days back, who stopped them from not acting? Did Pakistan do it, NO, so why coming on us to do this do that. Clearly the GOI had other intentions in mind and that is why they purposely did not act inorder for them to create what ever Drama India wanted to isolate Pakistan and give it a bad name.
After this i have not doubt left that this one is yet again another one of GOI makings that they usually do create in order to cause whatever damage that they may to Pakistan and suspending everything from trade to CBMs and threatening for a military action adds to this thinking.
GO and question your own government and not us. We are done providing justifications.
afriend
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Brother.. there more things than this, the sketchs of the places attacked on 26/11 was recovered from the people who attacked CRPF camp long before the 26/11 happened.. But still indian inteligence failed to adequately decode and act upon the infromation.. All the information that you said does point only to one thing the indian inteligence faliure..!!!! That doesnt take away the fact that the handler and masterminds are from pakistan Brother... Giving pakistan a bad name is not as important as keeping our brand clean..!!! And one thing we agree atleast, that we are done providing and hearing justifications.. there is not going to be any visisble change in your approach..!!! Only god can help us now..!!!!
ejaz007
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More Evidence Of Lashkar Role, More Evidence Of Our Bungling
By HARINDER BAWEJA
Ruptured Silence Blood splayed on the platforms in the CST after the shootout Photo Deepak Salvi' What makes terrorism particularly threatening at this moment is the impression of vulnerability combined with the display of greater sophistication in techniques and methodologies of terrorist outfits. The challenges before us are to demonstrate that we have both the capability as well as the sophisticated instrumentalities to anticipate and overcome the shifts and changes in terrorist methods. We cannot, therefore, afford to conceptualise narrowly. We must not react merely to immediate events.
This is the underlying message contained in the Home Ministers letter inviting you to this meeting. It is important at this juncture to demonstrate our combined will, and for that we are effectively galvanising the internal security system to deal with future terrorist attacks. Technology is empowering nonstate actors across the globe and it is necessary for us to come up with a comprehensive strategy that combines the best of technological and human capabilities within the country to defeat terrorism in all its manifestations.
The Home Minister has already outlined a number of steps that have been taken in recent weeks to erect additional mechanisms to counter future terrorist attacks. The main message is that we need to break down barriers to informationsharing between the various agencies.
What I would add is that we need better intelligence and perhaps, more importantly, sophisticated assessment and analysis of the intelligence that is available. Complaints are often heard that the intelligence provided by the agencies is not actionable. All intelligence produced is actionable, though it may not always be specific. It depends on the capability and ingenuity of those who assess the information to further develop and convert the fragmentary pieces of intelligence into a complete whole and for those who have to act on it to possibly pursue each and every lead.
Excerpts from Prime Minister Manmohan Singhs opening remarks at the inaugural session of the Conference of Chief Ministers on Internal Security on 6 January.
IF THE Prime Minister chose to pointedly focus on the crucial issue of information-sharing between various agencies, it was with a reason. He knew that vital and critical intelligence had simply been ignored. It lay unattended in various files, in the offices of different premier intelligence agencies. He is aware that if all the intelligence that came in two months before the Mumbai terror attack on 26/11 had been put through a sophisticated assessment and analysis, senior officers could well have been able to join the dots and zero in on the fact that terrorists were going to use the sea route to come into Mumbai and attack five-star hotels. Incredibly, sources in the highest quarters in New Delhi have told TEHELKA that the mobile numbers that were used by the Mumbai terrorists were available with the Intelligence Bureau at least five days before 26/11.
Highly placed sources shared the contents of a Secret note that contains 35 mobile numbers. Of the 35 SIM cards, 32 had been purchased from Kolkata and three from Delhi, by overground workers of the Lashkar-e-Toiba, and sent to Azad Kashmir by mid- November. The precise contents of the Secret note could not have been more direct: The numbers given below have been acquired from Kolkata by overground workers (OGWs) and have been sent through Pakistan trained militants based in Kashmir to ***. These numbers are likely to emerge in other parts of the country. These numbers need to be monitored The note contains more: These numbers need to be monitored and the information taken from these numbers regarding the contents of the conversation, current locations of the call detail records are required for further developing the information. The monitoring is possible at Kolkata.
Highly placed sources reveal that this crucial and stunning piece of information was received by the Intelligence Bureau (IB) on 21 November, at least five full days before Ajmal Amir Kasav, the lone surviving terrorist and his nine accomplices got off the inflatable dinghy at Mumbais Badhwar Park on the evening of 26/11. The Prime Minister and Home Minister are aware that for all the five crucial days that the numbers were available, they were not being monitored. The lapse is all the more critical because at least three of the 32 numbers contained in the Secret note, were the exact same cell numbers that the Mumbai terrorists used to keep in touch with their handlers in Pakistan. It is well possible that the terrorists only activated their mobile numbers after reaching Mumbai but that does not excuse the fact that the numbers were not put under surveillance despite the knowledge that they had been sent to trained militants in ***.
This was perhaps uttermost in the Prime Ministers mind while he was addressing the conference of chief ministers on internal security. That is perhaps why he emphasised this: All intelligence produced is actionable, though it may not always be specific. It depends on the capability and ingenuity of those who assess the information to further develop and convert the fragmentary pieces of intelligence into a complete whole and for those who have to act on it to possibly pursue each and every lead. He knew that crucial information was available, which if analysed, could have been converted into a complete whole. The agencies had failed in monitoring the vital numbers.
On 18 September, for example, the Research and Analysis Wing had intercepted a satellite phone conversation which clearly indicated that a hotel at the Gateway of India in Mumbai would be targeted. Crucially, the intercept also revealed that the sea route would be used to launch this operation. Again, on 24 September, RAW recorded another conversation. This time, the hotels were mentioned by name and they included the Taj, the Sea Rock Hotel and the Marriott hotel. If these inputs were being analysed, it would have become clearer that hotels in Mumbai would be attacked and that the sea route would be used.
Security breached The ease with which Mumbai came under attack brought back the question of internal security PhotoReuters
THIS IS not all. Again on 19 November, RAW picked up another piece of conversation in which a voice
said, We will reach Bombay between nine and 11. RAW tracked the coordinates of the call and frighteningly discovered that it came from the sea near Mumbai. RAW passed on this vital piece of information to the IB who in turn sent it to the Navy but the terrorists, who were first aboard the hijacked trawler MV Kuber and subsequently on the inflatable dinghy, still managed to sail into Badhwar Park, ironically, almost at the promised time: between nine and 11.
They were off only by less than an hour or so, for according to the dossier which the Ministry of External Affairs has handed over to
The numbers given below have been acquired from Kolkata by overground workers (OGWs) and have been sent through Pakistan trained militants based in Kashmir to ***. These numbers are likely to emerge in other parts of the country. These numbers need to be monitored
35 SIM cards were sent to the LeT and the IB was informed five days ahead.
Three of these numbers were used in Mumbai
DELHI NUMBERS
9 9 1 0 7 1 9 4 2 4
9 9 1 0 7 9 9 9 1 0
9 9 1 0 7 6 4 1 3 6
KOLKATA NUMBERS
9 8 7 4 3 7 9 2 4 6
9 8 7 4 3 7 9 2 5 1
9 0 5 1 4 2 8 3 8 0
9 0 5 1 4 2 8 3 7 8
9 0 5 1 4 2 8 3 7 5
9 0 5 1 4 2 8 3 8 4
9 0 5 1 4 2 8 3 7 9
9 0 5 1 4 2 8 3 8 1
9 0 5 1 4 2 8 3 8 2
9 0 5 1 0 3 2 1 7 4
9 8 7 4 9 7 2 7 6 7
9 8 7 4 9 7 2 7 6 9
9 0 5 1 5 0 9 1 7 8
9 0 5 1 2 9 4 1 7 9
9 8 8 3 4 0 3 4 5 8
9 8 8 3 2 6 8 3 5 8
9 8 0 4 4 7 3 8 2 9
9 8 0 4 4 7 3 8 2 8
9 8 0 4 4 7 3 8 3 1
9 0 0 7 6 2 1 6 7 5
9 0 0 7 6 2 5 7 1 0
9 0 0 7 6 2 1 6 7 6
9 0 0 7 5 6 0 9 9 5
9 0 0 7 7 8 7 1 3 8
9 0 0 7 7 8 7 1 3 7
9 0 0 7 6 2 5 7 1 1
9 0 0 7 7 6 6 3 7 6
9 0 0 7 6 2 1 6 7 1
9 0 0 7 5 6 1 0 1 6
9 0 0 7 5 6 0 4 1 9
9 0 0 7 5 6 0 4 1 7
9 7 4 8 2 9 2 0 8 9
Pakistan, the 10 terrorists arrived at Badhwar Park at 8.30 pm. The dossier says, The ten terrorists performed watch duties on board MV Kuber. Log sheets maintained by them have been seized. The MV Kuber reached a point four nautical miles off Mumbai at 1600 hours on November 26, 2008. As soon as it was dark, the team leader, Ismail Khan, contacted their handler in Pakistan, who directed them to kill Amar Singh Solanki, the captain of MV Kuber. After killing Solanki, the terrorists along with their weapons and IEDs, boarded the inflatable dinghy. They traversed the last four nautical miles to Mumbai in about one hour and 15 minutes, reaching the locality of Badhwar Park (Cuffe Parade) in South Mumbai at about 2030 hours.
If the intelligence was being analysed and not ignored and if the Secret note which the IB received on November 21 had been connected with RAWs intercepts, and the numbers had been put under surveillance, an alert intelligence apparatus may have been able to connect the activation of the Kolkata numbers with the arrival of terrorists in Mumbai. Were the phones activated at 1600 hours or at 2030 hours? The answer to this question was not known, at least, on the day of the attack.
SOURCES REVEAL that the numbers were not being monitored. It is only after Ajmal Kasav and his accomplice Ismail Khan (the 10 had broken up into five pairs) had killed 58 passengers at Chhatrapati Shivaji Stadium, after ATS Chief Hemant Karkare had been shot dead alongwith two other officers; after the remaining four pairs had lodged themselves at their intended targets (Nariman House and the Taj and Oberoi Hotels) that someone in the IB woke up to the fact that it had received a list of phone numbers. Quick calls were then made to Kolkata, the service providers alerted and the blood curdling truth soon hit home at least three of the 35 numbers that ought to have been monitored, were being used by the terrorists.
It was only after this that the Mumbai Police was alerted and the process of recording the conversations began. The dossier of evidence provided to Pakistan emphasises the fact that the terrorists were using mobile phones to stay in touch with their handlers in Pakistan. It however, does not go into the details of which numbers the terrorists were using or how they were procured. The dossier says, Even while the terrorists had occupied the target buildings and the security forces were engaging them, the terrorists were in contact with their controllers/ handlers over mobile telephones. They also used mobile telephones belonging to hostages/victims. Shortly after the attack on Taj Mahal Hotel, Indian agencies were able to intercept mobile telephone calls made from and to the Hotel. The controllers/ handlers used the virutal number to contact a mobile telephone with one of the terrorists [obviously one of 35 numbers]. This conversation was intercepted and thereafter, all calls made through the virtual number [being used by the handlers] were also intercepted and recorded.
The dossier also contains excerpts from these recordings. The intercepted conversations are listed as per the location of the terrorists and also have a timeline. The timing reveals also therefore that the entire procedure of recording the conversations started, not on 26/11, the day of the attack, but in the early hours of 27/11. For example, one of the intercepts, located at Hotel Taj Mahal was recorded on 27/11 at 0126 hours and it reads:
Caller: Are you setting the fire or not?
Receiver: Not yet. I am getting a mattress ready for burning.
Caller: What did you do to the dead body? [Probably Solanki, the captain of MV Kuber]
Receiver: Left it behind.
Caller: Did you not open the locks for the water below? [Probably of MV Kuber]
Receiver: No, they did not open the locks. We left it like that because of being in a hurry. We made a big mistake.
Caller: What big mistake?
Receiver: When we were getting into the boat, the waves were quite high. Another boat came. Everyone raised an alarm that the Navy had come. Everyone jumped quickly. In this confusion, the satellite phone of Ismail got left behind.
The terrorists were not the only ones who had made a mistake. The intelligence agencies too had made crucial mistakes. It is clear from the above transcript that the handlers were able to call the terrorists in Mumbai because part of their advance planning included sourcing SIM cards from India. Ironically, the numbers were available with the handlers of intelligence, but they were simply not monitored. The casual attitude with which information is gathered but not analysed and acted on is what makes India a soft state. Another reason why, in the same address to the Chief Ministers, the Prime Minister stressed the need for zero tolerance saying it is imperative to effectively galvanising the internal security system to deal with future terrorist attacks. Technology is empowering non-state actors across the globe and it is necessary for us to come up with a comprehensive strategy that combines the best of technological and human capabilities within the country to defeat terrorism in all its manifestations.
Covert operations are key to gathering advance information and keeping pace if not staying at least one step ahead with what terrorist groups are planning. In this case, in a superb covert operation, Indian forces had managed to penetrate the ranks of the Lashkar-e- Toiba and plant 35 SIM Indian cards with them. In other words, the SIM cards used by the Mumbai terrorists were like Trojan horses in the LeT ranks. But in a terrible communication and execution bungle the scrupulous follow-up monitoring of the SIMs that should have taken place was not done. And now, ironically, despite the gravity of the Mumbai attack and the Prime Ministers call for information- sharing between various agencies, the agencies are once again engaged in a blame game, with the IB blaming the Jammu and Kashmir Police for having provided the SIM cards in the first place!
THE TRUTH of the matter is that the J&K police is hardly to blame since it passed on the details of the mobile numbers to the IB. Having been shown up and embarrassingly caught out for not monitoring the numbers, the rivalry has reached tragic proportions. Mukhtar Ahmed, the J&K police constable who travelled from Srinagar to Kolkata to procure the SIM cards (used to infiltrate the LeT), has been arrested and jailed. In a knee-jerk reaction, the agencies have also temporarily deactivated all the mobile numbers instead of putting them under surveillance, a move that could perhaps yield further intelligence!
The government has launched a massive diplomatic effort against Pakistan through credible evidence that it has succeeded in getting. A similar offensive is needed to ensure that the different intelligence agencies work in tandem and not at cross-purposes. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh emphasised precisely this when he said, The information available from diverse sources, thereafter needs to be properly channelised to reach a common point such as the recently revitalised Multi- Agency Centre (MAC) in Delhi for collation and analysis. It will, hence, be necessary to establish centers locally, at the state and lower levels across the country, to collate all the available information which might have a bearing on a potential terrorist situation.
In fact, if there is one important lesson post 26/11, it is this that the diverse agencies work on a coordinated manner to process information, for if there is one thing that will help prevent future attacks, it will be advance intelligence.
Tehelka - India's Independent Weekly News Magazine
By HARINDER BAWEJA
Ruptured Silence Blood splayed on the platforms in the CST after the shootout Photo Deepak Salvi' What makes terrorism particularly threatening at this moment is the impression of vulnerability combined with the display of greater sophistication in techniques and methodologies of terrorist outfits. The challenges before us are to demonstrate that we have both the capability as well as the sophisticated instrumentalities to anticipate and overcome the shifts and changes in terrorist methods. We cannot, therefore, afford to conceptualise narrowly. We must not react merely to immediate events.
This is the underlying message contained in the Home Ministers letter inviting you to this meeting. It is important at this juncture to demonstrate our combined will, and for that we are effectively galvanising the internal security system to deal with future terrorist attacks. Technology is empowering nonstate actors across the globe and it is necessary for us to come up with a comprehensive strategy that combines the best of technological and human capabilities within the country to defeat terrorism in all its manifestations.
The Home Minister has already outlined a number of steps that have been taken in recent weeks to erect additional mechanisms to counter future terrorist attacks. The main message is that we need to break down barriers to informationsharing between the various agencies.
What I would add is that we need better intelligence and perhaps, more importantly, sophisticated assessment and analysis of the intelligence that is available. Complaints are often heard that the intelligence provided by the agencies is not actionable. All intelligence produced is actionable, though it may not always be specific. It depends on the capability and ingenuity of those who assess the information to further develop and convert the fragmentary pieces of intelligence into a complete whole and for those who have to act on it to possibly pursue each and every lead.
Excerpts from Prime Minister Manmohan Singhs opening remarks at the inaugural session of the Conference of Chief Ministers on Internal Security on 6 January.
IF THE Prime Minister chose to pointedly focus on the crucial issue of information-sharing between various agencies, it was with a reason. He knew that vital and critical intelligence had simply been ignored. It lay unattended in various files, in the offices of different premier intelligence agencies. He is aware that if all the intelligence that came in two months before the Mumbai terror attack on 26/11 had been put through a sophisticated assessment and analysis, senior officers could well have been able to join the dots and zero in on the fact that terrorists were going to use the sea route to come into Mumbai and attack five-star hotels. Incredibly, sources in the highest quarters in New Delhi have told TEHELKA that the mobile numbers that were used by the Mumbai terrorists were available with the Intelligence Bureau at least five days before 26/11.
Highly placed sources shared the contents of a Secret note that contains 35 mobile numbers. Of the 35 SIM cards, 32 had been purchased from Kolkata and three from Delhi, by overground workers of the Lashkar-e-Toiba, and sent to Azad Kashmir by mid- November. The precise contents of the Secret note could not have been more direct: The numbers given below have been acquired from Kolkata by overground workers (OGWs) and have been sent through Pakistan trained militants based in Kashmir to ***. These numbers are likely to emerge in other parts of the country. These numbers need to be monitored The note contains more: These numbers need to be monitored and the information taken from these numbers regarding the contents of the conversation, current locations of the call detail records are required for further developing the information. The monitoring is possible at Kolkata.
Highly placed sources reveal that this crucial and stunning piece of information was received by the Intelligence Bureau (IB) on 21 November, at least five full days before Ajmal Amir Kasav, the lone surviving terrorist and his nine accomplices got off the inflatable dinghy at Mumbais Badhwar Park on the evening of 26/11. The Prime Minister and Home Minister are aware that for all the five crucial days that the numbers were available, they were not being monitored. The lapse is all the more critical because at least three of the 32 numbers contained in the Secret note, were the exact same cell numbers that the Mumbai terrorists used to keep in touch with their handlers in Pakistan. It is well possible that the terrorists only activated their mobile numbers after reaching Mumbai but that does not excuse the fact that the numbers were not put under surveillance despite the knowledge that they had been sent to trained militants in ***.
This was perhaps uttermost in the Prime Ministers mind while he was addressing the conference of chief ministers on internal security. That is perhaps why he emphasised this: All intelligence produced is actionable, though it may not always be specific. It depends on the capability and ingenuity of those who assess the information to further develop and convert the fragmentary pieces of intelligence into a complete whole and for those who have to act on it to possibly pursue each and every lead. He knew that crucial information was available, which if analysed, could have been converted into a complete whole. The agencies had failed in monitoring the vital numbers.
On 18 September, for example, the Research and Analysis Wing had intercepted a satellite phone conversation which clearly indicated that a hotel at the Gateway of India in Mumbai would be targeted. Crucially, the intercept also revealed that the sea route would be used to launch this operation. Again, on 24 September, RAW recorded another conversation. This time, the hotels were mentioned by name and they included the Taj, the Sea Rock Hotel and the Marriott hotel. If these inputs were being analysed, it would have become clearer that hotels in Mumbai would be attacked and that the sea route would be used.
Security breached The ease with which Mumbai came under attack brought back the question of internal security PhotoReuters
THIS IS not all. Again on 19 November, RAW picked up another piece of conversation in which a voice
said, We will reach Bombay between nine and 11. RAW tracked the coordinates of the call and frighteningly discovered that it came from the sea near Mumbai. RAW passed on this vital piece of information to the IB who in turn sent it to the Navy but the terrorists, who were first aboard the hijacked trawler MV Kuber and subsequently on the inflatable dinghy, still managed to sail into Badhwar Park, ironically, almost at the promised time: between nine and 11.
They were off only by less than an hour or so, for according to the dossier which the Ministry of External Affairs has handed over to
The numbers given below have been acquired from Kolkata by overground workers (OGWs) and have been sent through Pakistan trained militants based in Kashmir to ***. These numbers are likely to emerge in other parts of the country. These numbers need to be monitored
35 SIM cards were sent to the LeT and the IB was informed five days ahead.
Three of these numbers were used in Mumbai
DELHI NUMBERS
9 9 1 0 7 1 9 4 2 4
9 9 1 0 7 9 9 9 1 0
9 9 1 0 7 6 4 1 3 6
KOLKATA NUMBERS
9 8 7 4 3 7 9 2 4 6
9 8 7 4 3 7 9 2 5 1
9 0 5 1 4 2 8 3 8 0
9 0 5 1 4 2 8 3 7 8
9 0 5 1 4 2 8 3 7 5
9 0 5 1 4 2 8 3 8 4
9 0 5 1 4 2 8 3 7 9
9 0 5 1 4 2 8 3 8 1
9 0 5 1 4 2 8 3 8 2
9 0 5 1 0 3 2 1 7 4
9 8 7 4 9 7 2 7 6 7
9 8 7 4 9 7 2 7 6 9
9 0 5 1 5 0 9 1 7 8
9 0 5 1 2 9 4 1 7 9
9 8 8 3 4 0 3 4 5 8
9 8 8 3 2 6 8 3 5 8
9 8 0 4 4 7 3 8 2 9
9 8 0 4 4 7 3 8 2 8
9 8 0 4 4 7 3 8 3 1
9 0 0 7 6 2 1 6 7 5
9 0 0 7 6 2 5 7 1 0
9 0 0 7 6 2 1 6 7 6
9 0 0 7 5 6 0 9 9 5
9 0 0 7 7 8 7 1 3 8
9 0 0 7 7 8 7 1 3 7
9 0 0 7 6 2 5 7 1 1
9 0 0 7 7 6 6 3 7 6
9 0 0 7 6 2 1 6 7 1
9 0 0 7 5 6 1 0 1 6
9 0 0 7 5 6 0 4 1 9
9 0 0 7 5 6 0 4 1 7
9 7 4 8 2 9 2 0 8 9
Pakistan, the 10 terrorists arrived at Badhwar Park at 8.30 pm. The dossier says, The ten terrorists performed watch duties on board MV Kuber. Log sheets maintained by them have been seized. The MV Kuber reached a point four nautical miles off Mumbai at 1600 hours on November 26, 2008. As soon as it was dark, the team leader, Ismail Khan, contacted their handler in Pakistan, who directed them to kill Amar Singh Solanki, the captain of MV Kuber. After killing Solanki, the terrorists along with their weapons and IEDs, boarded the inflatable dinghy. They traversed the last four nautical miles to Mumbai in about one hour and 15 minutes, reaching the locality of Badhwar Park (Cuffe Parade) in South Mumbai at about 2030 hours.
If the intelligence was being analysed and not ignored and if the Secret note which the IB received on November 21 had been connected with RAWs intercepts, and the numbers had been put under surveillance, an alert intelligence apparatus may have been able to connect the activation of the Kolkata numbers with the arrival of terrorists in Mumbai. Were the phones activated at 1600 hours or at 2030 hours? The answer to this question was not known, at least, on the day of the attack.
SOURCES REVEAL that the numbers were not being monitored. It is only after Ajmal Kasav and his accomplice Ismail Khan (the 10 had broken up into five pairs) had killed 58 passengers at Chhatrapati Shivaji Stadium, after ATS Chief Hemant Karkare had been shot dead alongwith two other officers; after the remaining four pairs had lodged themselves at their intended targets (Nariman House and the Taj and Oberoi Hotels) that someone in the IB woke up to the fact that it had received a list of phone numbers. Quick calls were then made to Kolkata, the service providers alerted and the blood curdling truth soon hit home at least three of the 35 numbers that ought to have been monitored, were being used by the terrorists.
It was only after this that the Mumbai Police was alerted and the process of recording the conversations began. The dossier of evidence provided to Pakistan emphasises the fact that the terrorists were using mobile phones to stay in touch with their handlers in Pakistan. It however, does not go into the details of which numbers the terrorists were using or how they were procured. The dossier says, Even while the terrorists had occupied the target buildings and the security forces were engaging them, the terrorists were in contact with their controllers/ handlers over mobile telephones. They also used mobile telephones belonging to hostages/victims. Shortly after the attack on Taj Mahal Hotel, Indian agencies were able to intercept mobile telephone calls made from and to the Hotel. The controllers/ handlers used the virutal number to contact a mobile telephone with one of the terrorists [obviously one of 35 numbers]. This conversation was intercepted and thereafter, all calls made through the virtual number [being used by the handlers] were also intercepted and recorded.
The dossier also contains excerpts from these recordings. The intercepted conversations are listed as per the location of the terrorists and also have a timeline. The timing reveals also therefore that the entire procedure of recording the conversations started, not on 26/11, the day of the attack, but in the early hours of 27/11. For example, one of the intercepts, located at Hotel Taj Mahal was recorded on 27/11 at 0126 hours and it reads:
Caller: Are you setting the fire or not?
Receiver: Not yet. I am getting a mattress ready for burning.
Caller: What did you do to the dead body? [Probably Solanki, the captain of MV Kuber]
Receiver: Left it behind.
Caller: Did you not open the locks for the water below? [Probably of MV Kuber]
Receiver: No, they did not open the locks. We left it like that because of being in a hurry. We made a big mistake.
Caller: What big mistake?
Receiver: When we were getting into the boat, the waves were quite high. Another boat came. Everyone raised an alarm that the Navy had come. Everyone jumped quickly. In this confusion, the satellite phone of Ismail got left behind.
The terrorists were not the only ones who had made a mistake. The intelligence agencies too had made crucial mistakes. It is clear from the above transcript that the handlers were able to call the terrorists in Mumbai because part of their advance planning included sourcing SIM cards from India. Ironically, the numbers were available with the handlers of intelligence, but they were simply not monitored. The casual attitude with which information is gathered but not analysed and acted on is what makes India a soft state. Another reason why, in the same address to the Chief Ministers, the Prime Minister stressed the need for zero tolerance saying it is imperative to effectively galvanising the internal security system to deal with future terrorist attacks. Technology is empowering non-state actors across the globe and it is necessary for us to come up with a comprehensive strategy that combines the best of technological and human capabilities within the country to defeat terrorism in all its manifestations.
Covert operations are key to gathering advance information and keeping pace if not staying at least one step ahead with what terrorist groups are planning. In this case, in a superb covert operation, Indian forces had managed to penetrate the ranks of the Lashkar-e- Toiba and plant 35 SIM Indian cards with them. In other words, the SIM cards used by the Mumbai terrorists were like Trojan horses in the LeT ranks. But in a terrible communication and execution bungle the scrupulous follow-up monitoring of the SIMs that should have taken place was not done. And now, ironically, despite the gravity of the Mumbai attack and the Prime Ministers call for information- sharing between various agencies, the agencies are once again engaged in a blame game, with the IB blaming the Jammu and Kashmir Police for having provided the SIM cards in the first place!
THE TRUTH of the matter is that the J&K police is hardly to blame since it passed on the details of the mobile numbers to the IB. Having been shown up and embarrassingly caught out for not monitoring the numbers, the rivalry has reached tragic proportions. Mukhtar Ahmed, the J&K police constable who travelled from Srinagar to Kolkata to procure the SIM cards (used to infiltrate the LeT), has been arrested and jailed. In a knee-jerk reaction, the agencies have also temporarily deactivated all the mobile numbers instead of putting them under surveillance, a move that could perhaps yield further intelligence!
The government has launched a massive diplomatic effort against Pakistan through credible evidence that it has succeeded in getting. A similar offensive is needed to ensure that the different intelligence agencies work in tandem and not at cross-purposes. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh emphasised precisely this when he said, The information available from diverse sources, thereafter needs to be properly channelised to reach a common point such as the recently revitalised Multi- Agency Centre (MAC) in Delhi for collation and analysis. It will, hence, be necessary to establish centers locally, at the state and lower levels across the country, to collate all the available information which might have a bearing on a potential terrorist situation.
In fact, if there is one important lesson post 26/11, it is this that the diverse agencies work on a coordinated manner to process information, for if there is one thing that will help prevent future attacks, it will be advance intelligence.
Tehelka - India's Independent Weekly News Magazine
Pk_Thunder
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UK supports prosecution of suspects in Pakistan
NEW DELHI: Rejecting Indias demand for extradition of suspects of the Mumbai attacks, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband has said the UK supports their prosecution in Pakistan as they have broken the law of that country.
We will support their prosecution under Pakistani law, because they have broken the law in Pakistan. Its Pakistani law they have broken as well as international decency and common sense, Mr Miliband told CNN-IBNs Karan Thapar.
There was no extradition treaty between India and Pakistan for handing over suspects, he said.
The British foreign secretary said it had to be ensured that Pakistani judicial system takes its course and those found guilty were punished there.
Responding to a question about disappointment in India that he had not endorsed its stand on extradition, Mr Miliband said he had endorsed Indias anguish that the attacks had come from across the border and that the perpetrators of these terrible crimes be brought to justice.
But I think given that we all have worked so hard for an independent, sovereign judicial system in Pakistan we should let it take its own course, he said.
He, however, said: We have absolutely no doubt about origin of the Mumbai attacks. The origins are in Pakistan.
He said the Pakistani authorities had detained these people and if there is evidence, they should be prosecuted. I say there is evidence, let them be prosecuted and if they are found guilty let them be punished.
He said terrorism has taken life of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto and many other Pakistanis. They (Pakistan) need to do it for their own good.
When asked to comment on Prime Minister Manmohan Singhs view that official agencies of Pakistan could have been involved in the Mumbai attacks, Mr Miliband said: We dont have evidence to show that attacks were directed by the Pakistani government.
When asked about Mr Singhs statement that Pakistan was using terrorism as an instrument of state policy, he said: I have no evidence of Pakistani state directing terrorist activities and I will never make that claim without that evidence. What I know is Pakistan has a very serious terrorism problem.
He rejected any contention for imposing sanctions on Pakistan by the UK and said: I dont think punishing Pakistani people with economic sanctions is going to induce a sort of change.
He said the UK would use all appropriate mechanism to make a difference but made it clear that military stick would not help. There is serious need for reform from within Pakistan.
On the Pakistani proposal for a joint investigation, he said the two countries should cooperate but we are not for any particular version of how to cooperate.
Salahadin
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Jo Garajtay hain woh barastay nahi
well said yara they can say whatever they want.. may be kasab is a pakistani but how did he the only one got captured and how did there top police official died with a (bullet in the back mind you that) when they were to bring Major Phuriot to justice for shamjuta express there are many thing i can go on and on.. But india is more responsible of these attack than pakistan.. if any pakistan non sate actor was also involved which i doubt it.
AgNoStiC MuSliM
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Respecting the rule of law and due process can only be repulsive to those who don't give a hoot about such things, and as such, the only ones who have something to be ashamed about here are the ones pushing for unconstitutional and illegal action.
Let me remind you that the GoP did indeed confirm Kasab's identity herself. What is left is to try the suspects for perpetrating/assisting the Mumbai attacks, and that cannot be done without extensive cooperation and sharing of evidence by India. All three of the main suspects have been arrested and are being investigated as we speak, under Pakistan's preventative detention laws. The JuD has had their assets seized after the UN determination. What is left is building a case with evidence linking them to Mumbai, and on that count it is India that has been irresponsible, uncooperative and belligerent.
The implication is that you are predisposed to be critical of most things related to the Muslim world, even if your positions support illegal and unconstitutional acts and policies, especially if Israel and India are the other party. You have born that out with your irrational and invalid support of Indian demands as well as your one sided support for, and justification of, Israeli actions in Gaza.
I don't have to 'denigrate' you here, those are your positions. It is surprising that you consider my calling you out on those positions as 'denigrating you' - apparently even you realize how morally reprehensible your positions are then, despite your public stance on the issues.
You are not saying anything sensible - you have not shown how Pakistan's position of following due process and her laws, in rejecting extradition and the demanding evidence from India linking the suspects to the Mumbai attacks is a 'flawed position'. You have merely presented your opinion that somehow in Solomons eyes Pakistanis have 'lost' and that their position is 'not sensible'.
A mer statement of opinion from you, without showing us how Pakistan's position is 'insensible', is tripe.
Since nothing that occurred in Mumbai was the GoP or her institutions fault, there is nothing to take responsibility for here by Pakistanis or the GoP.
Where our responsibility lies is in punishing the alleged perpetrators, and on that count it is the Indians who have refused to act responsibly and cooperate with Pakistan in sharing evidence, forming joint investigations and
instead started beating war drums.
I think it is Indians and India that need to apologize for their belligerent and hostile attitude towards Pakistan from day one. It is India that needs to realize that she shoudl back of the unsubstantiated and atmosphere poisoning allegations being made by her leadership, and it is India that needs to humbly accept that Pakistan is a sovereign nation, and that any investigation against Pakistani nationals in Pakistan shall be conducted by Pakistan under Pakistani laws.
India needs to respect Pakistani sovereignty and humbly cooperate and share evidence with Pakistan - that is how India can take responsibility for her actions and try and change the atmosphere she has poisoned.
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