Mujib Bahini vs Mukti Bahini

[Ammyy]

Keep following this thread and you should get the answer.

Why? Is there any problem to identify your own freedom fighters?

 

[kalu_miah]

Why? Is there any problem to identify your own freedom fighters?

I am not here to answer your questions that is filled with your own agenda. If you are interested in information, just follow the thread.

 

[Ammyy]

I am not here to answer your questions that is filled with your own agenda. If you are interested in information, just follow the thread.

Anyone can easily understand purpose of this VS thread.

And you already cleared my doubt.

There are so many Bangladeshi (belongs to a specific group ) who believe that they were better in Pakistani control.

 

[kalu_miah]

Anyone can easily understand purpose of this VS thread.

And you already cleared my doubt.

There are so many Bangladeshi (belongs to a specific group ) who believe that they were better in Pakistani control.

Quit trying to put label on me. You guys have already tried it, calling me and others Jamat, Rezakar etc. They all fell flat. I am here to point out some facts to our countrymen that they might find interesting. There is nothing wrong with knowing about history, specially our own.

@Loki Please delete irrelevant posts in this thread and watch how this Indian troll is trying to derail the thread with irrelevant questions and trying to put label on people.

 

[Ammyy]

Quit trying to put label on me. You guys have already tried it, calling me and others Jamat, Rezakar etc. They all fell flat. I am here to point out some facts to our countrymen that they might find interesting. There is nothing wrong with knowing about history, specially our own.

@Loki Please delete irrelevant posts in this thread and watch how this Indian troll is trying to derail the thread with irrelevant questions and trying to put label on people.

One of your most recent posts
http://www.defence.pk/forums/bangladesh-defence/239614-monster-breathes-air.html#post4036585

Where you called

Terrorist state of India

You complaining to mod??? WTF.......... People like you always post against India and Indians.

In my recent post I said

There are so many Bangladeshi (belongs to a specific group ) who believe that they were better in Pakistani control.

I really dnt know you belongs to that group who dnt want to be a part of Independent Bangladesh.

 

[kalu_miah]

One of your most recent posts
http://www.defence.pk/forums/bangladesh-defence/239614-monster-breathes-air.html#post4036585

Where you called

You complaining to mod??? WTF.......... People like you always post against India and Indians.

In my recent post I said

I really dnt know you belongs to that group who dnt want to be a part of Independent Bangladesh.

Its not for an Indian to decide who belongs where among Bangladeshi's.

 

[Ammyy]

I asked a simple question to thread OP

But don’t know how this question becomes off topic for this thread???

@kalu_miah

According to you which one is more patriotic towards Bangladesh?? and made more contribution for independence of your nation ??

Can any sane Bangladeshi reply to this question?

 

[Md Akmal]

I asked a simple question to thread OP

But don’t know how this question becomes off topic for this thread??? Can any sane Bangladeshi reply to this question?

@ Definitely it was Mukti Bahini. It was this Mukti Bahini which finally killed Sk Mujibur Rahman. Majority memebers of Mukti Bahini were not happy with the activities of Mujib Nagar Govt, the activities of Mujib Bahini and fininally the very intension of the Indian Govt. Soon secretly a grouping of Mukti BaHini started. Even many Mukti Bahini wanted a bulk surrender and release Mujib from the prison. Inside the Govt of Bangladesh there was a strong group under the leadership of Khondokar Mushtak Ahmed to have a liaison with the American Govt for the quick return. Even a central meeting was also helt some where in Shiliguri where all the Sector Commander including all Mukti Bahini were present. RAW came to know this fact soon they enterfereed. Even Mushtak gave speech in that gathering but that conference was a failure as most of the members were favour of contnueing of fighting. For the assassination of Mujib, no Jamaati or Muslim Leaquer or Pakistani or USA were involved. It was this Mukti Bahin and a big portion of Awami Leaque which made this revolution.

 

[kalu_miah]

Laments of a Mujib Bahini sympathizer promoting Muktijuddher Chetona (Spirit of the Liberation War of 1971) about jail killings in 1975:
Know your friends and foes | Opinion

More propaganda from a Mujib Bahini leader Bimal Pramanik, about 1975 killings and how Mukti Bahini, the real freedom fighters, are anti-Liberation:
http://articles.timesofindia.indiat...dia-bangladesh-relations-caretaker-government

 

[kalu_miah]

Holiday

Liberation War: The view from inside–XI

'Muktijudder Purbapar: Kothopokathan' (Liberation War—the view from inside), an important book published in 2009 by 'Prothoma' in Bengali, was based on conversations, sponsored by 'Muktijuddha Gabeshana Kendra' as its oral history project on Bangladesh Liberation War 1971. The recording of the interaction was done in 2002. The three participants were insiders in the operations of the war in 1971, having specific areas of responsibilities. They are: (1) Air Vice Marshal (retired then Group Capt) AK Khandker, Deputy C-in-C of the Bangladesh Forces; (2) Muyeedul Hasan, a former journalist and affiliated to National Awami Party, who helped Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed on policy planning relating to strategic issues; and (3) Wing Cdr (retired) S. R. Mirza, Director General Youth Camps who died in 2012. Their recollections provide objective and frank narration of the situation, and also fascinating insight of other unknown areas of Bangladesh liberation war which was not done before. We are providing a condensed English translation by Mumtaz Iqbal of various chapters and we trust our readers will find it useful.
—Editor

Chapter–10


MUJIB BAHINI


PART- I
MUYEEDUL HASAN (MH): Let’s now discuss the Mujib Bahini.
A. K. KHANDKER (AKK): I first heard about the Mujib Bahini (MB) probably in June from one of Col. Osmany many visitors that a special unit called the C-in-C’s special force was to be formed. When I raised this matter with Col. Osmany, he didn’t answer directly but I gathered from his comments that such a force would indeed be established, with his approval.
S. R. MIRZA (SRM): Barrister Amirul Islam has written that Tofael Ahmed proposed to Col. Osmany that he would be able to mobilize competent youths for military training provided he received permission to do so. Col. Osmany agreed, and issued a letter giving Tofael full authority to recruit.
MH: Some background information regarding this letter is appropriate. The Bangladesh government-in-exile was formed in April. Organising the liberation war required many young men. The youth leaders said that they could recruit them from inside Bangladesh and the youth camps. The new government approved this proposal on 18 April and entrusted this task to the four youth leaders including Sheikh Fazlul Huq Moni and Tofael Ahmed. At that time, nobody within the cabinet or outside had any reservations about this decision. Thus, Col. Osmany signed the letter.
AKK: While I did not know about the letter referred to by S. R. Mirza, I did have some idea of the background described by Muyeedul Hasan. I did not hear that Col. Osmany raised any objection to the raising of the special force but rather it had his full consent. Thereafter, Col. Osmany and I did not discuss this matter for quite some time.


The Mujib Bahini
Around end July-early August, two trained guerrilla fighters — one called Montu, the other probably Khusro — visited me in my office. They explained they were MB members trained at a secret location in India. I responded: “I don’t know anything about your organization. But you must be, or will be, under the sector commands.”
They laughed but didn’t say anything.
Shortly thereafter, Col. Osmany started receiving complaints from various sector commanders that some youth leaders were trying to lure their trained guerrilla fighters to join their organization. The commanders had disagreements — even clashes — with these youth leaders about the process and programmes for infiltrating their sector guerrillas inside Bangladesh. The commanders enquired from headquarters who were these youth leaders, what authority they had and pointed out that it would be difficult to conduct war if this situation continued.


Ministerial deliberations
Following these complaints, Col. Osmany became extremely angry when he realized that the Mujib Bahini would not be under his command. He informed Prime Minister Tajuddin about this matter over which heated cabinet discussions took place when the ministers were assured that this force should remain under the Bangladesh government’s unified control.
However, my impression is that not all of them agreed on this point; some of them had doubts or suspicions about this force; a few were already aware of its existence. I can not document these impressions that I gathered from listening to the ministerial deliberations.
Based on the commanders’ reports, other sources and my own experience made it clear to me that the Mujib Bahini was much more interested, eager and active in creating conditions for it to play a major political and military role in an independent Bangladesh than in fighting during the Liberation War. But I did not know then what were their post-war aims or objectives, or whether they were to be given certain specific responsibilities. But I understood this much that the wartime leadership would use the services of the Mujib Bahini to implement certain tasks as warranted by circumstances.


Few of its leaders took part in combat
It is difficult to state that all members of the Mujib Bahini fought. Certainly very few of its leaders took part in combat. But the ordinary recruits fought well in some places and quite a number were wounded or killed. But we do not know whether the bulk of the Mujib Bahini fought in the war.
The trained Mujib Bahini recruits were well armed with more modern weapons and ammunition than our guerrillas. Later we heard that the Indian authorities had approved the supply of this equipment, otherwise this would not have been possible.
The Mujib Bahini was directly trained by veteran Indian counter-insurgency expert Major General S. S. Uban. As he has chosen to maintain his silence, there are many aspects of the MB that have not been revealed. As far as I know, the Bangladesh cabinet had sought clarification from high-level Indian officials on how this force was raised without its knowledge or consent. They were also informed that this development had caused serious problems amongst us.
I had heard that Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had said that she would look into this matter. But I came to know that nothing much was done. I feel that the Indians were not averse to having such a force in existence and under their control. At that time, the Naxalites were quite active in West Bengal and gradually becoming stronger. Should some of our leftist freedom fighters start cooperating with the Naxals, or if our liberation movement was captured by left wingers, then the Indian authorities could use the Mujib Bahini to attempt to control the situation. Accordingly the Indian government did not make any effort or take any measures that would satisfactorily resolve the Mujib Bahini issue. Actually, it was probably part of Indian strategy to keep the Mujib Bahini outside the control of the Bangladesh Government or armed forces.
Osmany’s bitterness about Mujib Bahini
This division within our armed forces upset and angered our sector commanders and others, especially Col. Osmany. He repeatedly queried why all the Bangladesh fighters including the Mujib Bahini could not be under central control under his command? He remained bitter about this matter throughout the war.
Complaints about the Mujib Bahini came in writing and verbally from sector commanders, their deputies and even from ordinary guerrillas and freedom fighters. These ranged from the MB forcing the guerrillas to work as their agents; attempting to snatch away their weapons which happened in a few cases; and in some places forcibly diverting the guerrillas from their assigned missions to another objective.
Such incidents happened in the sectors, border areas and even inside Bangladesh. At that time, we lacked many facilities. We did not have the manpower or resources to establish a proper administrative structure in all areas.
Neither the Bangladesh military command nor I personally had any contact with the MB headquarters. They operated independently. We were neither informed nor aware of their activities. Throughout the war—-especially at its concluding stages—- it became abundantly clear to us that the MB’s policy was to conserve its strength, which its leadership would use to carve out a significant political role after Bangladesh became independent.


Secret training
It was only after considerable delay that we were only able to get limited information on the secret training provided to the MB; the equipment it received; where they were sent secretly or what were their activities. Our data was based on the sector commanders’ reports sent at different times from different places. The two Mujib Bahini members I met in June were polite but pointed out they were not under Bangladesh command. We estimated the MB’s strength in December to be around 4,000 but later learned that the actual number was between 9,000 to 12,000. I do not know the correct figure.
SRM: All the Mujib Bahini recruits came from middle-class families but not from poor,
farming or working class backgrounds. By contrast, nearly 70 per cent of the freedom fighters or guerrillas came from different classes, with a high proportion from peasant households. This differential pattern of recruitment is because the MB’s main role was to prevent the leftists from taking over the Liberation War.
I spoke to quite a number of Mujib Bahini cadres and found them to be educated, well-behaved and coming from good families. I had no knowledge nor was I informed of the areas from which the Mujib Bahini recruited its youths. Although I was the Director-General of the Youth Camps, even then I was told nothing nor was I associated with the recruitment process. The potential recruits were identified even before the youths were registered in the youth reception centres. The MNAs and MPAs visited and often stayed at the youth camps and refugee reception centres. But none of them ever mentioned that they screened the young men for induction into the MB, I learnt about this much later, when the MB had finished their training and were being sent inside Bangladesh through the various sectors without informing the commanders. It was only then that we started receiving information about their activities.


A big mistake
My personal opinion is that this was a big mistake. There was only one liberation war being fought. Therefore, I saw no logic in creating a separate force. I also had the feeling that this would store up future trouble. Had the war become protracted, its leadership might have swung towards the leftist political parties. The MB was probably formed to prevent this from happening.
I heard from a number of freedom fighters that the MB had killed a number of leftist politicians inside Bangladesh or suspected of being left sympathizers Indian Major General S. S. Uban was a counter-insurgency and guerrilla warfare expert who specialized in the management and control of dissidents and/or rebel soldiers from countries, whether friendly to India or otherwise, who had taken shelter in India and using them as warranted by circumstances. It was Uban who directed the MB’s training. This force would be used if required to counteract and suppress other guerrilla entities after independence. The MB was a right-wing reactionary armed group.
MH: The Bangladesh government had established its own military command structure which controlled the reorganization of the regular army units and the recruitment and training of freedom fighters for guerrilla operations inside Bangladesh. The military reported to the Prime Minister- cum-Minister of Defence Tajuddin Ahmed who was responsible to the cabinet.
MB’s existence as an independent organisation operating outside the Bangladesh chain of command was unknown to the Bangladesh government since it was established without its concurrence or permission. When it became known that an entity called the Bangladesh Liberation Force (BLF) or MB was active, then none of the Awami League (AL) leaders dared protest or criticize it. For the four MB leaders—Sk. Fazlul Haq Moni, Sirajul Alam Khan, Abdur Razzak and Tofael Ahmed—were very influential amongst the young AL cadres and were known to be close to, and enjoyed the confidence of, Sheikh Mujib.
Most of the MNAs and MPAs elected in the 1970 general elections were new Awami Leaguers who had the money to contest the elections. But they were also not person who would join the Liberation War. They had joined the AL to become MNAs and MPAs, not with any other motive. That they would have to wage war for independence did not figure in their calculations. Supporting the Six Points was as far as they were prepared to go.
When it became clear in March that the Pakistani junta was gearing up for a military response, then these vacillating MNAs and MPAs became fretful, not knowing what to do. Thus, in order to maintain party unity and discipline, the old student leaders came to the forefront and assumed a prominent role. After the military crackdown of 25 March, a large number of the MNAs and MPAs did not cross the border or join the liberation war, but remained underground in East Pakistan. With the announcement of a general amnesty in September, some of them surrendered to the Pakistani authorities while the remainder continued to hide.


Sheikh Mujib’s decision
I have mentioned earlier that Sheikh Mujib’s decision to remain at his house and court arrest by the Pakistanis was taken without consulting any of the top party leaders. He also did not leave behind any directive as to who would succeed him in his absence and the political objective that the AL would pursue.
Would there be a collective leadership by committee? What strategy should it follow? What programme would it adopt? What would be the respective roles of the veteran party officials and the youth leaders?
Nobody knew the answers to these crucial questions. Tajuddin heard a rumour around 24 or 25 March that the youth leaders were to go the residence of former Barisal MP Chittranjan Sutar in Bhowanipore, Calcutta in case of any danger.
On 1 April while en route to Delhi from Calcutta, Tajuddin Ahmed had gone to the Bhowanipore address in search of these student leaders but couldn’t meet any one of them. After returning from Delhi, he went to the same address again. There, he not only met the student leaders and their supporters but also some senior party officials including Kamruzzaman.
Near Bhowanipore’s Gaja Park was a big house on Rajendra Road that was the office and guest house of India’s spy agency RAW (Research and Analysis Wing). Apart from the four student leaders, their coordinator RAW agent Chittaranjan Sutar also lived there. Thus, they were already aware of Tajuddin’s visit to Delhi.
Upon reaching the rest house, Tajuddin was subject to a barrage of criticism. Who had authorized him to go to Delhi? On what authority did he meet Mrs. Gandhi? etc. etc. Only Barrister Amirul Islam and some of the senior AL leaders supported Tajuddin’s initiative.


Hostile student leaders
Maintaining his composure in the face of the student leaders’ hostility, Tajuddin informed those present that discussion in Delhi at the highest levels of government had resulted in an understanding being reached. Accordingly, the measures necessary for becoming independent would be broadcast on 11 April through the Akash Bani station of All India Radio. But the student leaders, with Chittaranjan Sutar’s help, sent a message—also signed by some MNAS and MPAs—- to the Indian government demanding cancellation of Tajuddin’s proposed broadcast.
All these developments occurred a month or so before I reached Calcutta in the first week of May. Towards end-May, I became involved in coordinating some important sensitive and complex policy issues with Indian officials in Delhi. As a result, in July, I would meet Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed almost every day at 6:30 a.m. for discussions.
Around mid-July, he first raised the subject of Mujib Bahini with me. By that time, I had heard from various sources that a special force had been organized led by Sk. Fazlul Huq Moni, Sirajul Alam Khan and others that reported neither to our Government nor military headquarters. Not only that, but the Mujib Bahini leaders opposed the formation of the cabinet right from the start while their activities had resulted in a great deal of confusion.
Tajuddin stated that Col. Osmany had said that the Mujib Bahini would remain under his command. This did not happen. Moreover, the Mujib Bahini leaders had been carrying on a political campaign that included castigating the government-in-exile as illegal; that this was established without the permission or sanction of Bangabandhu; and that it should be dissolved forthwith.
SRM: I first heard about the MB when our military headquarters started receiving accusations against them from the sector commanders. They wanted to know its background; why its members had come to their sectors; the commands were busy waging war using regulars and freedom fighters. In that case, what was the role of the MB? Its activities must be stopped. A number of unfortunate incidents had taken place involving the MB. A sub-sector commander, Capt. Najmul Huda mentioned that one night, when a band of MB fighters was traversing through his area to enter Bangladesh, it was stopped by the India BSF and spent the whole night in captivity. Numerous such incidents had occurred.


Great secrecy
AKK: Many people did not know about the MB since it was established under great secrecy and its presence was kept a tight secret. It’s my belief that a considerable number of the MB’s ordinary members did not know the reasons or the aims behind its formation, although they did the brunt of the fighting. I had the opportunity to meet many of the rank and file who had been wounded in combat. Only the MB’s top echelon leadership had a clear idea of its purpose and goals. I can state with certainty that we had limited information or data at that time about the MB because of the secrecy surrounding its ctivities.
MH: As mentioned earlier, Tajuddin Ahmed told me about the MB in mid-July when I was scheduled to go to Delhi. Then, Henry Kissinger had visited the Indian capital after which he left for Islamabad from where he secretly flew to China. Indian officialdom was highly agitated following the Beijing trip of Kissinger. It was against this background that Tajuddin told me, amongst other objectives, to gather detailed information about the MB.
At that time, I did not know much about this entity and I asked Tajuddin to brief me about it. He said that the MB had been raised separately at a special facility located at Chakrata, near Dehra Dun; that it functioned under its leaders; that it had engaged in combat independently outside the jurisdiction of Bangladesh’s military command; and that it had clashed with the personnel including the freedom fighters of the sector commands. He also gave me details of what had transpired at the very beginning of the liberation war.
But on this visit to Delhi, which was a short one, I did not have the opportunity to discuss about the MB in detail with any Indian official. However, P. N. Haksar gave me some positive and hopeful information in advance about the negotiations with the Soviet Union over the Bangladesh issue that he was then coordinating. I rushed back to Calcutta to convey and discuss this vital piece of information with our Prime Minister.
To be quite candid, at that time I did not attach much importance to the MB as I was unfamiliar about the depth and divisive impact of its activities. For I had also witnessed considerable factionalism within the AL, with each faction busy promoting its own narrow interests. The leader of each faction had his own separate office; plenty of funds; and considered himself to be the only person endowed with all the qualities to be the prime minister! Under the circumstances, should the MB leaders act or behave in a similar manner, then that was nothing to be surprised about.


Smear campaign
From about mid-August, more complaints started coming in about the MB from different quarters. One was that the Mujib Bahini was using arms to force ordinary guerrillas to join it, resulting in clashes in some instances. Simultaneously its leaders mounted a smear campaign against Tajuddin.
Declaring that the MB was the real freedom fighters nominated by Sheikh Mujib, its leaders accused Tajuddin of having usurped power through conspiracy; of having maneuvered to set up a government-in-exile so as to provide the pretext for the Pakistani junta to condemn Mujib to death as a traitor; of creating so much confusion amongst the cabinet, commander-in-chief, regular soldiers and freedom fighters that the Indian government would never support or recognize the Bangladesh liberation movement. The prospects of returning to Bangladesh under the leadership of the present government-in-exile were getting increasingly uncertain, and the only practical path open to them was to join the MB.


Haksar and RAW chief Kao
In the middle of August, Tajuddin Ahmed again discussed the issue of MB with me. He had returned to Calcutta the previous day from Delhi. He mentioned that he attempted to discuss the MB’s undisciplined activities and political propaganda with P. N. Haksar and RAW chief R. N. Kao. He told them in no uncertain terms that he believed that the MB’s leadership was carrying out its activities at the behest and patronage of a powerful segment in the Indian government, and that it was imperative for this situation to be remedied immediately.
But both Haksar and Kao remained absolutely silent during Tajuddin’s remonstration. Thus this approach caused Tajuddin grave anxiety. On the one hand, India was supporting and helping the Bangladesh government and freedom fighters. On the other, it was also assisting the MB. Consequently, the real policy and intention of the Indian government was patently unclear.
Tajuddin once again asked me to gather as much information as possible on the MB’s origin and composition, how it was controlled and what were its real objectives. By then, we had a fairly good idea of the differences in view and approach of the left and right-wing elements amongst the top officials of the Indian establishment. We ascertained that the MB was controlled by RAW, which reported to the Prime Minister’s office, and whose main function was to gather foreign intelligence. RAW also had the capability to conduct clandestine operations for which it had its own special forces.


Special Frontier Force
RAW’s predecessor was the Intelligence Bureau (IB). Following the Sino-Indian War of 1962, a commando force called Special Frontier Force (SFF) was created from Tibetan rebels fleeing south-western Tibet to conduct guerrilla warfare in occupied Tibet. The US spy agency CIA funded, equipped and trained the SFF. Brigadier, later Major General S.S. Uban, then commanding a mountain division, raised the SSF.
A large contingent of US instructors provided direct training to the Tibetans at a special camp constructed by the CIA at Chakrata near Dehra Dun, where the MB was also trained. The CIA provided the SFF with modern weapons that even the Indian Army did not possess, and which later was seen in the hands of the Mujib Bahini. An aviation unit serving the SSF was probably based near Agra. We also received intermittent news that the MB leaders were transported to different places in chartered SSF aircraft.
On the other hand, an Indian army officer told me half in jest that the SSF was not able to create any disturbance in Tibet in any place at any time! Be that as it may, we heard that the MB was the second special force raised by Maj. Gen. Uban. We wondered what he would be able to achieve with his second baby.
Uban was the Inspector General or IG of the SSF.
(To be continued)

 

[kalu_miah]

Mujib Bahini was a brainchild of RAW - Mombu the Culture Forum

The Indian Govt. formed three Bangladesh-related committees during our
liberation war -- 1) for the preparation of war, 2) liason with the
Provisional Bangladesh Govt, and 3) providing support to the freedom
fighters. While the first and last one were military in nature, the
second one was for political manipulations. The political committee
worked as a bridge between the governments of Bangladesh and India.
D.P. Dhar, chairman of the Planning Commission in the Foreign Affairs
Ministry, was made the chief of the political committee. On the other
hand, Army Chief General Shaym Maneckshaw was appointed as chief of
one of the military committees. However, D.P. Dhar had an overlapping
duty in the military council. The intelligence committee was headed by
the deputy-chief of the Indian Army. Maneckshaw assimilated the RAW
[Research and ****ysis Wing] members in this group. Nevertheless,
Maneckshaw had the final say on everything. The joint intelligence
committee took up the chore of forming a special force called Mujib
Bahini. RAW was given the responsibility to make their plan a success.
General Maneckshaw himself took up the chore of directing this force.
He sought expert help from Major General Uban.

Major General Uban gave a detailed account of the creation and
directing of Mujib Bahini in his book 'Phantoms of Chittagong'. The
first batch of Mujib Bahini received their training at Tanduar -- a
camp located 1.5 kilometers away from an Indian military academy at
Deradun. Training started on May 29, 1971. Another camp was started at
Jaflong near the city of Tura in Meghalaya. About 10,000 members of
Mujib Bahini were given training. Training was stopped on November 20,
1971. Mujib Bahini was created in the month of May but Tajuddin Ahmad
was not aware of it until August, 1971. Later General Maneckshaw
informed Tajuddin that this force had been created to serve a special
purpose of the Indian Army. A large number of the freedom fighters
were leftist-thinking people. Thinking that these leftist-minded
people might stand in the way of Indian imperialism after the
independence of Bangladesh, this special force was created after the
name of Sheikh Mujib.

did not see eye to eye with Mujeeb Bahini leaders and treated every
case of their complaints as frivolous. Colonel Osmany took his orders
from his own government and though outwardly friendly to these
leaders, did not relish the idea of their running a separate Bahini
called Mujeeb Bahini which was not under his overall command. General
Aurora of the Eastern Command who was ultimately responsibilities for
coordinating the whole operation was also unhappy since Mujeeb Bahini
was not put directly under his command, this despite the fact that I
had assured him as a soldier in command of Mujeeb Bahini, that the
Bahini would carry out all the tasks given by him for execution within
Bangladesh Territory, and that I would remain in constant touch with
General Aurora to keep him posted with the results. He was not
satisfied, since I myself was not being put under his direct command.
General Aurora failed to understand the reasons for this peculiar
command structure in spite of my best efforts at explanation."
[Phantoms of Chittagong by S. S. Uban, pp. 31-32].

General Maneckshaw had jurisdiction over Mujib -- not General Aurora.
This force was created to carry out the evil design of Indian Govt. As
such, Bangladesh Govt. did not have any control over them. Ex-Awami MP
M.A. Mohaimen wrote, "Indian Army reserved a special status for Sheikh
Fazlul Haque Moni. They were given special training under the guidance
of General Uban. Many times they quarrelled and even engaged in armed
confrontations with the liberation fighters. Although they used to
claim themselves to be socialists, they could never tolerate the
leftists at all. They were totally against the providing of armed
training to the young members of communist party and NAP [National
Awami Party]. The rightist-thinking people in the Indian
administrative and political groups were very sensitive about
providing training to the freedom fighters of Bangladesh. Trainees
with leftist orientation were looked with utter suspicion. Gathering
of strength by the socialists in independent Bangladesh was taken as
reason for danger on the part of India. It was their support that
worked tremendously behind the training of Mujib Bahini. Right from
the outset, Tajuddin Saheb repeatedly requested the Indian Govt. to
bring this force under the control of Bangladesh command, but to no
avail. … Till to-date, it remains shrouded in mystery as to why a
separate force was given birth to while simultaneously providing
training to the freedom fighters without the knowledge of Bangladesh
Govt." [Dhaka-Agartala-Mujibnagar by M.A. Mohaimen, pp.96-97].

"One day Mr. P. N. Haksar, the Principal Secretary of the Prime
Minister, sent a message to me that on the request of Sheikh Mujeebur
Rahman, the Prime Minister had agreed to my going to Dacca as Personal
Advisor to the Sheikh and that I should proceed forthwith.

It was a matter of great honour for me to be sent for me by name as
the advisor to Sheikh Mujeeb who made the biggest news at that time in
the world. On arrival in Dacca, I was received at the airport by Mr.
Samad, the Sheikh's Foreign Minister, who insisted on giving me a cup
of tea at the airport before sending me to the city.

Sheikh Mujeeb received me very well and said that I should stay at his
official residence which I politely declined. He had no vacant room in
his own house. Otherwise I have no doubt he would have liked me to
stay with the whole family, all of whom by now know me very well …
He discussed this idea with me and finding me in agreement issued
orders for this force, which he named Jatiya Rokhkhy Bahini (JRB or
National Security Force) to be raised initially with a strength of
12,000 officers and men. In order to make the best use of it, he kept
it under his own command and garrisoned it at Dacca. He selected
Colonel Nuruzzaman, an extremely efficient officer, to command the
Force and requested me to do all I could to help organise, train and
equip this Force.

It took me some time to convince the Indian authorities about our role
in training and equipping the Force after the war of liberation was
over. Fortunately my Government agreed to this request of the
Bangladesh Government and leaders of this Force were trained in our
establishment." [Phantoms of Chittagong by S. S. Uban, pp. 138-140].

What we find from the above is that Sheikh Mujib appointed an Indian
as his personal advisor. General Uban formed Rakhkhi Bahini (Security
Force) but unfortunately it could not provide security to the life of
Sheikh Mujib.

Ex-Awami League MP ('71) M.A. Mohaimen wrote about the destructive
impact of Mujib Bahini in these words, "In the morning hours of
December 16, I came to know that General Niazi, along with all of his
soldiers, would surrender to the Indian Forces at Dacca Race Course
Ground in the afternoon of that day. Upon hearing this, I rushed to 8
Theatre Road [Calcutta] to meet Tajuddin Saheb. I heard that he had
left for Dacca by then or at least was preparing to leave. But upon my
arrival there, I found Tajuddin Saheb sitting there in regular attire.
On being quentioned about his departure for Dacca, he replied that he
would not go. I was quite surprised on hearing this reply. Our country
is about to achieve independence after a long struggle; the enemy
force is about to surrender but the Prime Minister of Provisional
Government would not be physically present at the surrender ceremony.
I could not figure out the matter at all. Being inquired about the
reason he replied, 'You know my attitude toward Sheikh Moni and Mujib
Bahini. I came to know from my well-wishers in the army that total
anarchy prevails in Dacca at this time. Right at this time, it is not
safe at all on my part to be present in any public gathering in Dacca.
… So, my well-wishers are saying that they will inform me after the
situation in Dacca comes under their control I shall be able to go to
Dacca within a day or two.' When I asked if Osmani Saheb was heading
for Dacca, he replied that he will not go either. I realized that the
reason behind Osmani's not going to Dacca was same as that of
Tajuddin's since Mujib Bahini was not in good terms with him either.
When asked as to who among us were going, he replied that the decision
had not been made. It sounded very abnormal to me that nobody would
represent the Provisonal Government at such an important ceremony like
surrendering. I felt down pondering over the matter that our absence
[at the surrender ceremony] would make our contribution and stance in
the liberation war insignificant one. Now people would find that it
was the Indian Army who is to be credited for everything -- we were
nobody." [Dhaka-Agartala-Mujibnagar by M.A. Mohaimen, pp.160-161].

Books published from India regarding the independence of Bangladesh
usually state that Indian Army liberated Bangladesh. There is hardly
any mention of liberation forces comprising of Bangladeshi nationals.
Usually intelligentsia tend to side with the leftist camp. Indian
Govt. formed Mujib Bahini to annihilate the leftists of Bangladesh.
Maybe, this is why judicial probe into the murder of intellectualists
just before the independence never got off the ground.

 

[Mattrixx]

I asked a simple question to thread OP

But don’t know how this question becomes off topic for this thread???

Can any sane Bangladeshi reply to this question?

mukti bahini and mujib bahini's purpose was same. I cant differ them but as u said, both are patriotic towards Bangladesh.
Where mujib bahini's technique was guerrilla warfare and used to take part in special operation. They kept
the political relation. They used to hit pakistan army frequently where majority of Mukti bahini was in preparation.
Mukti bahini was the mass ppl who trained by east Bengal regiment's army. They were the actual power to
uproot Pakistan army.

 

[Mattrixx]

@ Definitely it was Mukti Bahini. It was this Mukti Bahini which finally killed Sk Mujibur Rahman. Majority memebers of Mukti Bahini were not happy with the activities of Mujib Nagar Govt, the activities of Mujib Bahini and fininally the very intension of the Indian Govt. Soon secretly a grouping of Mukti BaHini started. Even many Mukti Bahini wanted a bulk surrender and release Mujib from the prison. Inside the Govt of Bangladesh there was a strong group under the leadership of Khondokar Mushtak Ahmed to have a liaison with the American Govt for the quick return. Even a central meeting was also helt some where in Shiliguri where all the Sector Commander including all Mukti Bahini were present. RAW came to know this fact soon they enterfereed. Even Mushtak gave speech in that gathering but that conference was a failure as most of the members were favour of contnueing of fighting. For the assassination of Mujib, no Jamaati or Muslim Leaquer or Pakistani or USA were involved. It was this Mukti Bahin and a big portion of Awami Leaque which made this revolution.

@ Majority of bangladshi and all freedom fighters loved sheikh mujib. But they were unhappy as the way
the government was operating. Some armed personal formed a group. Their intention was not to kill him
but to halt him from power. But they feared his popularity so they had to kill him.
ISI,CIA was involved in that killing. Jamat was involved in that too as they are most beneficiary from that.
From the result of his killing it was clear that the power gone to anti independence power as after that
anti BD alliances quickly started to give BD recognition.
The party which struggled long to independent BD and some small groups suddenly become more pro BD.
That doesnt make any sense. There was only game of throne.
Mujib done a great mistake by keeping the jamati and bihari. This group never wanted BD. And they
still doing the same conspiracy towards BD.

 

[animelive]

@ Majority of bangladshi and all freedom fighters loved sheikh mujib. But they were unhappy as the way the government was operating. Some armed personal formed a group. Their intention was not to kill him but to
halt him from power.
But they feared his popularity so they had to kill him.
ISI,CIA was involved in that killing. Jamat was involved in that too as they are most beneficiary from that.
From the result of his killing it was clear that the power gone to anti independence power as after that anti
BD alliances quickly started to give BD recognition.
The party which struggled long to independent BD and some small groups suddenly become more pro BD.
That doesnt make any sense. There was only game of throne.
Mujib done a great mistake by keeping the jamati and bihari. This group never wanted BD. And they still
doing the same conspiracy towards BD.

What wrong did Mossad and MI5 did? infact i heard James bond was himself behind the curtains

 

[mb444]

Mujib Bahini is the same as rakhi Bahini. They had one aim. Impose and maintain indian hedgemony over BD. They never fought anywhere against pakistani forces. They were trained by the Indians to control mujib nagar government. The were the safeguard against a truly independent Bangladesh post liberation war. Their loyalty was not to Mujib although they bore his name. Their loyalty was to their paymasters accross the border, re tofail et al. They were the dagger on mujibs back and rope around mujibs hand and the gag on his mouth.

Happily they failed spectacularly, particularly when mujib rejected the treaty agreement that mujibnagar govt signed with india. However there are periods to this day where the remnant of this AntiBangladesh forces continue to hinder the development of the nation.