What is happening in Western Sahara? (April 2018)
April 11, 2018 07:08Views: 2430
by a long-time observer of the Western Sahara conflict *
A first since 1991: Morocco threatens to conduct a major military operation in Western Sahara, against the Polisario Front. A threat brandished by officials and immediately taken up by the traditional relays of civil society: the Moroccan press goes up a notch, political parties are involved and the subject makes headlines local and regional media.
So far, Morocco has regularly protested against the activities of the Polisario Front in areas under its control, but has never stirred the threat of military attacks in these areas.
What exactly happened? Chronology of highlights
- At the beginning of March 2018, the Polisario Front held a large national internal meeting in the locality of Bir Lehlu. In his closing address, Saharawi President Brahim Ghali said that "the venue for this event was a clear message to the enemies and friends"
[ SPS 12.03.18 ] . It was not the first time that the Polisario Front held an internal meeting in the territories of Western Sahara under its control.
- On the sidelines of the holding of this national meeting, the Saharawi President receives the credentials of the ambassadors of Cuba
[ SPS 09.03.18 ] and Namibia
[ SPS 09.03.18 ] https://www.spsrasd.info/news /es/articles/2018/03/08/14099.html to the SADR, with residence in Algiers, 08 March 2018 still in the locality of Bir Lehlu.
- In mid-March 2018, Saharawi media announced the intention of the Polisario Front to transfer some seats of vital institutions in the territories under its control (including that of the Ministry of Defense of the SADR).
- On April 1, 2018, more than two weeks after these announcements, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Morocco Nasser Bourita convened the Foreign Affairs Committees of the two chambers of Parliament to examine alleged violations of the ceasefire. fire by the Polisario Front. The statements of some parliamentarians at the end of this meeting even call for military actions against the Polisario (air strikes).
[ MAP 01.04.18 ]
- A letter of protest is immediately sent by the Permanent Representation of Morocco in New York to the Security Council. The letter complains of "cease-fire violations" committed by the Polisario Front (situation in Guergerat and recent statements).
- The letter qualifies these developments as "Casus belli".
[ Quid.ma 02.04.18 ] Military maneuvers are engaged in southern Morocco. It is not clear, however, whether they have been planned for a long time or decided following this escalation.
- On two occasions, the Spokesman of the UN Secretary-General confirms that Minurso has not detected any violation of the cease-fire agreement and thus denies, indirectly, the Moroccan version, while calling for restraint .
[ UN Pressbriefing 04.04.18 ] and
[ UN Pressbriefing 05.04.18 ]
- On 04 April 2018, the revised and corrected version of the annual report of the UN Secretary-General on Western Sahara is made public
[ S / 2018/277 ] . It refers to facts representing violations of the agreement according to the terms of the report, committed on both sides. The latest Moroccan accusations did not find an echo in the report, which constitutes an indirect denial.
- On April 9, 2018, a meeting of political party leaders is held in El Ayoune, to mark "the national consensus" and the need to fight back against the alleged violations. The meeting adopts the "Laayoune Declaration".
[ Express MAP 09.04.18 ]
Why is the Moroccan attitude incoherent?
A multitude of reasons can be invoked, among which:
- The accusations of Morocco are not clear and precise and sometimes change depending on their source. They all mention violations of the ceasefire agreement, sometimes protesting against the situation at "Guerguerat" which dates from several months, but also against the recent decision to transfer Saharawi institutions to the territories controlled by the government. Polisario Front, which is not a novelty either.
- Morocco cultivates ambiguity in the territories described as "lying to the East of the Wall". Indeed, the buffer zone or demilitarized constitutes a band of 5km to the East and to the South of the Wall of 2700 km which separates the Western Sahara in two parts. Outside this band, these are territories administered by the Polisario Front since the signing of the ceasefire in 1991.
- The announcement to transfer some Saharawi institutions to the liberated territories is an extension of an already existing situation. For years, these territories have been home to civilian and military institutions of the SADR: the commands of the military regions of the People's Liberation Army of Saharawi, most of the Polisario Front troops, Navarra Hospital and El Mahfoud School. Ali Beiba of Tifariti
[ El Mundo 18.12.2011 ] and the monument sheltering the burial of Fire Mohamed Abdelaziz
[ Jeune Afrique 03.06.13 ]
- More still, military maneuvers, with live bullets, are organized every year by the Polisario Front in the regions under its control, in particular to Aghouinit
[ video ] .
- The cyclical incidents provoked by Morocco in the run-up to each annual meeting of the Security Council throw a serious discredit on its intentions. Remember the cold, then the withdrawal of trust to Christopher Ross in 2012
[ Le Monde 18.05.2012 ] , the anti-American campaign in 2013
[ Le Figaro 22.04.2013 ] (after the inclusion of the enlargement proposal the Minurso for Human Rights), the campaign against Ban Ki-Moon in 2016
[ Orient XXI March 2016 ] and the Guerguerat incident in 2017.
- On social networks, Sahrawi activists found inconsistencies in the speeches of representatives of Moroccan civil society, even those officials, with confusion in the names of cities in the territory or in their location on the.
[On videos posted by these activists, Moroccan officials could be seen calling for countering violations in the "Nefertiti" region, instead of "Tifariti"]
- The Kingdom of Morocco wishes, probably, to ensure that the return to political negotiations, advocated by the successive resolutions of the Security Council and delayed by Morocco, becomes an end in itself and not a means to reach a lasting solution .
An attempt at analysis
Several lines of thought can be invoked to explain the recent attitude of the Chérifien Kingdom:
- The first track, which is the most obvious, but which remains plausible, as every April, Morocco tries to create secondary problems, doing sensational at the expense of the essential, to divert the Attention of the Security Council on the main problem, namely to organize direct discussions to find a political solution allowing the self-determination of the Saharawi people.
- The second being a serious crisis in the Palace, especially with the illness (serious?) The King, his divorce (presumed or effective?) With Selma Bennani, his prolonged absence from the country and the media (according to the press, since the end of January 2018), hence the need, even the imperative, to "diversion" by playing on the unifying element in order to avoid any slippage of the situation. Let us remember that the Green March allowed, at the time, Fire Hassan II to put an end to a series of coups.
So track n ° 2: the Palace wants to federate the Moroccan people by making war on the "Big bad wolf": the Polisario Front, to stay and go beyond the area of turbulence?
- Track 3 is that the Palace wants to finish with the social challenges at Rif and Djerada. Disorders amplified by a difficult economic situation, characterized by a very high internal and external debt, but especially, disorders that begin to be long-term. Does the Palace wish to divert the eyes of the Moroccan population towards the traditional enemy that is, more or less, a consensus in Morocco: the Polisario?
- The fourth track, the most interesting, is that Morocco is part of this process, in an international dynamic whose contours are still imprecise. Let us remember the recent visit of Minister Bourita to Israel, a country that Morocco does not officially recognize, a visit whose purpose and issues have not been disclosed. Mystery!
Moreover, faced with the Moroccan threats to attack the Polisario, France observes a complicit silence. Morocco would never have made such a declaration without the consent of Paris. Is this an attempt to titillate Algeria, who does not want the French G5 in the Sahel? And whose military doctrine is refractory to any military intervention beyond the borders?
Moreover, with the announced US disengagement from Syria, we are faced with an attempt to create new hotbeds of tension to deflect the attention and attention of the international community, and thus allow the parties involved in the Syrian conflict to to dash " ?
- 5th and last track: Would Morocco have been seduced by the Turkish military intervention in the north of Syria against the Kurdish movements constituting rear bases of the PKK? Beyond the merits, or not, of this operation called "Olive branch" launched in late January 2018, it is interesting to note that the international community has never obstructed or condemned its progress.
Turkey took advantage of the confusion of the Syrian crisis and the tensions between the various parties involved (notably the United States and Russia) to take action and achieve a major strategic objective. So far, Turkey is doing well vis-à-vis the international community.
What do the Saharawis think?
The return to war will certainly have a human, military, financial, but also political and diplomatic cost.
The Saharawi refugees, especially those from the new generation of the Polisario Front, are back to the wall, twenty-seven years after the conclusion of a ceasefire with a view to organizing a referendum of self-determination that will surely not not the day.
Honestly, the likelihood that Morocco will end its threats is minimal. But one thing is certain, the Saharawi people have been waiting impatiently, for several years, for such an opportunity to resume the armed struggle. It is only an open secret, because this reference is even included, for some years, in the UN reports, especially those of the Secretary General.
The nuance to be grasped is that the Saharawis do not want to fire the first shot. The breakdown of a ceasefire agreement will have a considerable political cost, which the initiating party will have to bear. The defensive position would be much more comfortable for Sahrawis vis-à-vis the international community.
The war will have negative consequences for the Saharawis, but will also hurt very much in Morocco, whose relations with its allies of the Golf are not any more fixed. Also, John Bolton's recent return to business in the United States of America has been described as bad news by the Moroccan Royal Palace. The United States could distance itself from Morocco in favor of a more balanced position.
Moreover, observers and experts in the dossier believe that Algeria has always displayed reservations regarding the return of the Saharawi people to the armed struggle. This is explained by the fact that the other Algerian borders with the Sahel, Libya and Tunisia are already disturbed by the activities of terrorist groups.
However, these reservations focus on the return to war on the initiative of the Polisario Front and will certainly be lifted in the event of a clear and direct rupture of the cease-fire by Morocco.
