Critical Questions by
Richard M. Rossow
Published June 30, 2023
Indian prime minister Narendra Modi was in Washington, D.C. from June 21 to 23 for his first state visit, where he engaged with various U.S. stakeholders. The joint statement released on June 22 contains a multitude of announcements aimed at furthering U.S.-India cooperation in defense, critical technologies, space, clean energy, and intercultural ties.
The lead-up to the visit was contentious—members of Congress and human rights groups demanded that the Biden administration use the visit to highlight growing concerns about India’s track record on a range of social issues. Other groups saw the visit as an opportunity to push India to take a harder stance on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. However, in the end, the Biden administration chose to focus—publicly—on areas of cooperation.
Q1: There were dozens of announcements during the visit. Which ones stand out and why?
A1: After a decades-long divide, building trust remains a critical element in accelerating U.S.-India strategic cooperation. While relations have steadily improved over the past two decades, progress has been erratic due to India’s lingering concerns about embracing the United States unequivocally.
First, India wants to avoid becoming entangled in U.S.-led confrontations in parts of the world where it has nominal interests. Second, India wants to see that the “Indo-Pacific” has more emphasis on security concerns in the Indian Ocean region and the South Asian landmass. Third, India wants access to sensitive defense technologies that can help the nation become self-sufficient in producing high-end defense equipment.
The United States and India made notable progress in all three fronts. First, on global tensions, the Biden administration chose to engage India on critical strategic matters despite its differing views over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
On the second point—Indian Ocean—both countries agreed to initiate an Indian Ocean Dialogue later this year. Other steps, such as the sale of Sea Guardian drones and increasing cooperation on maritime domain awareness, will provide India the tools to contribute to regional security.
Third, on technology transfer, the two countries had a range of announcements. General Electric entered an agreement with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited to manufacture F-414 jet fighter engines to support India’s combat aircraft manufacturing abilities. Additionally, a collaborative platform, “INDUS-X,” was created to bring together stakeholders such as policymakers, academics, researchers, and startups from both countries. While startup programs may take longer to gestate, jointly developing strategic technologies from inception should be easier than negotiating for the less-than-market-rate transfer of mature technologies from the United States’ private sector.
Q2: What were the biggest surprises from the visit?
A2: There was tremendous anticipation over announcements related to the initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET), which was jointly launched in January 2023 to further defense and strategic partnership. As expected, there were several announcements to support technology transfers, and joint innovation in critical technologies such as 6G development, space cooperation, and mineral supply chains.
However, there were also some unexpected pleasant surprises. Commercial policy engagements between U.S. and Indian policymakers, bilaterally and at multilateral forums like the World Trade Organization (WTO), have typically been mired with tensions and have had few positive outcomes. To redress this, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) announced the agreed-upon termination of six pending WTO disputes between the nations, on the sidelines of the state visit.
Another important commercial announcement is the agreement to start a dialogue related to government procurement. Restrictions on government procurement had led to a deterioration in commercial relations earlier.
The two governments also announced concrete steps to improve people-to-people ties. The United States secured approval to establish new consulates in the Indian cities of Ahmedabad and Bengaluru. India announced it would open a new consulate in Seattle by year end and secured the approval to establish two additional new consulates in the United States. The United States also announced a relaxation of the renewal process for holders of H-1B and L1 visas. This is a tremendous step for the technology services firms that comprise an important backbone for U.S.-India commercial ties.
Q3: There were plenty of “transactions” during the visit. Should the United States seek balance in terms of give and take with India?
A3: The United States has a significantly larger economy, a more advanced defense sector, and a larger stake—at least today—in maintaining global security. So, the United States should generally be willing to give more than it expects in return. On the other hand, India brings access to a large and developing market, as well as its ability to manage Chinese influence in the region. Both elements are crucial for U.S. commercial and defense interests.
Q4: What are the more tangible ways India is supporting U.S. interests?
A4: India is finding concrete ways to contribute to regional security. India provided vital support to prodemocratic forces in Maldives and Sri Lanka in recent years that helped eject pro-China leaders. Indian shipyards have started to offer basic repair services to U.S. Navy vessels in the Indian Ocean. The Indian Air Force has led humanitarian evacuations during a range of crises in the Middle East. The United States is India’s largest partner for military exercises, and an increasingly large supplier of vital defense equipment. To the extent that India continues to open foreign investment and removed trade barriers, it may also become a viable alternative to U.S. companies seeking to pivot from China and diversify supply chains.
Q5: Where is the bilateral agenda the weakest? How can the two sides improve relations?
A5: Both nations still have a difficult time making meaningful progress on commercial policy issues. The resolution of the WTO disputes is helpful. However, there is no agreement or framework for what the future of our commercial relationship should look like, much less any concrete action to bring this vision forward. The United States would do well to copy the work the Australian government did in 2018 with the release of the India Economic Strategy. The private sector on both sides should be a meaningful part of this conversation.
Commercial ties remain robust, with around $130 billion in annual goods trade and healthy foreign investment flows in both directions. Relaxing policy impediments, such as U.S. visa restrictions and trade barriers, as well as trade and investment barriers in India, will help cement the commercial relationship. Improved business linkages will provide much-needed ballast during periods when we are misfiring on strategic cooperation.
There is also much potential for headway on bilateral subnational cooperation. New consulates are important, but beyond that, state- and city-level leaders in both nations are finding new ways to decarbonize their local economies, provide basic services to citizens, and further social and economic development through regional partnerships.
Q6: Why is the Biden administration engaging India so deeply when India will not condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine?
A6: If the invasion went worse for Ukraine, or was destabilizing the region, the Biden administration might have chosen to reduce the intensity of engagement with India. But the United States has found that nominal support to Ukraine, with allies and partners, has been sufficient to blunt the Russian offensive. India’s voice or vote would not have played a significant role in how Russia has prosecuted the fight. India has also been able to assuage some concerns by actively calling for peaceful resolution at different international forums. India’s relations with the key players might also become useful to help build an eventual roadmap for ending the conflict.
While U.S. officials would love for India’s position on the Russian invasion to continue to strengthen, there is a unique opportunity to widen and deepen cooperation, and they have chosen to take advantage.
Russia’s ineffective military campaign has also underscored the fact that China presents the only real state-led threat to global security, and the United States and India are steadily deepening their partnership bilaterally and through forums like the Quad to improve the likelihood of peace and tranquility in the region. So long as this strategic relationship continues to grow, it is unlikely that a U.S. administration will press India to take a hard line on Russia.
Q7: Human rights was expected to be a big topic, yet was relegated to the sidelines. How does the Biden administration balance these concerns with a forward-looking agenda?
A7: It is unlikely that direct public statements by Biden administration leaders on concerns about India’s recent human rights record would yield much benefit. More likely, India would reduce its engagement with the United States. U.S. administrations may choose differently in the future, but for now, it is clear the United States sees enough upside in its relationship with India to avoid triggering a massive disruption.
These issues were a key topic of conversation in private meetings. And, of course, both the president and vice president publicly discussed the importance of tolerance, freedom of expression, and other values which have been foundational for both nations.
Richard M. Rossow is senior adviser and the Chair in U.S.-India Policy Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
Richard M. Rossow
Published June 30, 2023
Indian prime minister Narendra Modi was in Washington, D.C. from June 21 to 23 for his first state visit, where he engaged with various U.S. stakeholders. The joint statement released on June 22 contains a multitude of announcements aimed at furthering U.S.-India cooperation in defense, critical technologies, space, clean energy, and intercultural ties.
The lead-up to the visit was contentious—members of Congress and human rights groups demanded that the Biden administration use the visit to highlight growing concerns about India’s track record on a range of social issues. Other groups saw the visit as an opportunity to push India to take a harder stance on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. However, in the end, the Biden administration chose to focus—publicly—on areas of cooperation.
Q1: There were dozens of announcements during the visit. Which ones stand out and why?
A1: After a decades-long divide, building trust remains a critical element in accelerating U.S.-India strategic cooperation. While relations have steadily improved over the past two decades, progress has been erratic due to India’s lingering concerns about embracing the United States unequivocally.
First, India wants to avoid becoming entangled in U.S.-led confrontations in parts of the world where it has nominal interests. Second, India wants to see that the “Indo-Pacific” has more emphasis on security concerns in the Indian Ocean region and the South Asian landmass. Third, India wants access to sensitive defense technologies that can help the nation become self-sufficient in producing high-end defense equipment.
The United States and India made notable progress in all three fronts. First, on global tensions, the Biden administration chose to engage India on critical strategic matters despite its differing views over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
On the second point—Indian Ocean—both countries agreed to initiate an Indian Ocean Dialogue later this year. Other steps, such as the sale of Sea Guardian drones and increasing cooperation on maritime domain awareness, will provide India the tools to contribute to regional security.
Third, on technology transfer, the two countries had a range of announcements. General Electric entered an agreement with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited to manufacture F-414 jet fighter engines to support India’s combat aircraft manufacturing abilities. Additionally, a collaborative platform, “INDUS-X,” was created to bring together stakeholders such as policymakers, academics, researchers, and startups from both countries. While startup programs may take longer to gestate, jointly developing strategic technologies from inception should be easier than negotiating for the less-than-market-rate transfer of mature technologies from the United States’ private sector.
Q2: What were the biggest surprises from the visit?
A2: There was tremendous anticipation over announcements related to the initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET), which was jointly launched in January 2023 to further defense and strategic partnership. As expected, there were several announcements to support technology transfers, and joint innovation in critical technologies such as 6G development, space cooperation, and mineral supply chains.
However, there were also some unexpected pleasant surprises. Commercial policy engagements between U.S. and Indian policymakers, bilaterally and at multilateral forums like the World Trade Organization (WTO), have typically been mired with tensions and have had few positive outcomes. To redress this, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) announced the agreed-upon termination of six pending WTO disputes between the nations, on the sidelines of the state visit.
Another important commercial announcement is the agreement to start a dialogue related to government procurement. Restrictions on government procurement had led to a deterioration in commercial relations earlier.
The two governments also announced concrete steps to improve people-to-people ties. The United States secured approval to establish new consulates in the Indian cities of Ahmedabad and Bengaluru. India announced it would open a new consulate in Seattle by year end and secured the approval to establish two additional new consulates in the United States. The United States also announced a relaxation of the renewal process for holders of H-1B and L1 visas. This is a tremendous step for the technology services firms that comprise an important backbone for U.S.-India commercial ties.
Q3: There were plenty of “transactions” during the visit. Should the United States seek balance in terms of give and take with India?
A3: The United States has a significantly larger economy, a more advanced defense sector, and a larger stake—at least today—in maintaining global security. So, the United States should generally be willing to give more than it expects in return. On the other hand, India brings access to a large and developing market, as well as its ability to manage Chinese influence in the region. Both elements are crucial for U.S. commercial and defense interests.
Q4: What are the more tangible ways India is supporting U.S. interests?
A4: India is finding concrete ways to contribute to regional security. India provided vital support to prodemocratic forces in Maldives and Sri Lanka in recent years that helped eject pro-China leaders. Indian shipyards have started to offer basic repair services to U.S. Navy vessels in the Indian Ocean. The Indian Air Force has led humanitarian evacuations during a range of crises in the Middle East. The United States is India’s largest partner for military exercises, and an increasingly large supplier of vital defense equipment. To the extent that India continues to open foreign investment and removed trade barriers, it may also become a viable alternative to U.S. companies seeking to pivot from China and diversify supply chains.
Q5: Where is the bilateral agenda the weakest? How can the two sides improve relations?
A5: Both nations still have a difficult time making meaningful progress on commercial policy issues. The resolution of the WTO disputes is helpful. However, there is no agreement or framework for what the future of our commercial relationship should look like, much less any concrete action to bring this vision forward. The United States would do well to copy the work the Australian government did in 2018 with the release of the India Economic Strategy. The private sector on both sides should be a meaningful part of this conversation.
Commercial ties remain robust, with around $130 billion in annual goods trade and healthy foreign investment flows in both directions. Relaxing policy impediments, such as U.S. visa restrictions and trade barriers, as well as trade and investment barriers in India, will help cement the commercial relationship. Improved business linkages will provide much-needed ballast during periods when we are misfiring on strategic cooperation.
There is also much potential for headway on bilateral subnational cooperation. New consulates are important, but beyond that, state- and city-level leaders in both nations are finding new ways to decarbonize their local economies, provide basic services to citizens, and further social and economic development through regional partnerships.
Q6: Why is the Biden administration engaging India so deeply when India will not condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine?
A6: If the invasion went worse for Ukraine, or was destabilizing the region, the Biden administration might have chosen to reduce the intensity of engagement with India. But the United States has found that nominal support to Ukraine, with allies and partners, has been sufficient to blunt the Russian offensive. India’s voice or vote would not have played a significant role in how Russia has prosecuted the fight. India has also been able to assuage some concerns by actively calling for peaceful resolution at different international forums. India’s relations with the key players might also become useful to help build an eventual roadmap for ending the conflict.
While U.S. officials would love for India’s position on the Russian invasion to continue to strengthen, there is a unique opportunity to widen and deepen cooperation, and they have chosen to take advantage.
Russia’s ineffective military campaign has also underscored the fact that China presents the only real state-led threat to global security, and the United States and India are steadily deepening their partnership bilaterally and through forums like the Quad to improve the likelihood of peace and tranquility in the region. So long as this strategic relationship continues to grow, it is unlikely that a U.S. administration will press India to take a hard line on Russia.
Q7: Human rights was expected to be a big topic, yet was relegated to the sidelines. How does the Biden administration balance these concerns with a forward-looking agenda?
A7: It is unlikely that direct public statements by Biden administration leaders on concerns about India’s recent human rights record would yield much benefit. More likely, India would reduce its engagement with the United States. U.S. administrations may choose differently in the future, but for now, it is clear the United States sees enough upside in its relationship with India to avoid triggering a massive disruption.
These issues were a key topic of conversation in private meetings. And, of course, both the president and vice president publicly discussed the importance of tolerance, freedom of expression, and other values which have been foundational for both nations.
Richard M. Rossow is senior adviser and the Chair in U.S.-India Policy Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
