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Regional competition likely to drive India-Bangladesh relations despite prime minister's pre-election rhetoric
IHS Jane's Intelligence Weekly
25 May 2014
India's new Prime Minister Narendra Modi, left, takes the oath of office at the presidential palace in New Delhi on 26 May. Source: PA
Key Points
Narendra Modi was sworn in as Indian prime minister yesterday (26 May) following the landslide victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA).
While most regional leaders were present at the ceremony, a noticeable absentee was Bangladeshi prime minister Sheikh Hasina. Instead, she was in Japan, where her government was promised USD5.9billion in aid over the next five years. Historically, relations between India and Bangladesh have been cordial; India intervened on the side of erstwhile East Pakistan during its war of independence against West Pakistan in 1971 and was the first country to recognise the new nation of Bangladesh. The relationship is asymmetric in that Bangladesh is almost completely surrounded by India, requiring it to maintain good relations with its neighbour.
In 2013, bilateral trade between India and Bangladesh stood at USD5.3 billion, with the balance clearly in favour of India. Bangladesh imported Indian goods worth USD4.2 billion, while exports to India amounted to only USD563 million. The amount imported through informal channels is estimated to be approximately one-and-a-half times higher than the formal imports and further deepens the trade imbalance between the two countries. However, India recognises the potential for a more practical transit route to its northeast states through Bangladesh. It also has an interest in maintaining co-operation to tackle Indian militants hiding across the border, as well to as to grow Indian business in the country and counter growing Chinese influence.
Despite this, there are contentious issues between the two countries, including the Land Boundary Agreement, the Teesta River Water Sharing Accord, and illegal migration into India. In Bangladesh, these are politically charged national issues, while they normally hold mostly regional significance in India, especially in India's West Bengal state. But the BJP's tactical gains in the 2014 election in the state are likely to elevate the significance of the issues for the new Indian central government.
Internal politics in Bangladesh
Bangladesh's political stability is precarious. The Awami League (AL) government in Bangladesh fended off months of nationwide anti-government protests to win the election in January, which was boycotted by the main opposition Bangladesh National Party (BNP). Crucially, the AL had to withstand intense international pressure to hold a more inclusive election, and to a large extent, the diplomatic support provided by India allowed this to happen. The extent of such support stems from the AL's close personal ties to India's outgoing ruling party, the Indian National Congress.
The continued support of India will be important in the coming year as IHS assess that there is a high risk of the BNP reviving its anti-government protest movement to press for another, more inclusive, election (see Bangladesh: 21 February 2014: Lower levels of political instability and civil unrest in Bangladesh likely to be short lived). Combative rhetoric by Modi on various occasions in the election campaign, especially on illegal Bangladeshi immigration, coupled with statements by other senior BJP figures indicated the new government will be less co-operative. Moreover, according to an IHS source in Dhaka, several senior BJP figures have interpreted the relationship between the AL and Congress as the "personalisation of foreign policy". While this will probably result in less forceful diplomacy, IHS assesses there are several factors that will continue to drive BJP support for the AL. The BJP will be aware of the main Bangladeshi opposition BNP's anti-India stance - relations between the two countries have cooled under previous BNP governments. It will ultimately be in India's interest, whether under Congress or BJP, to continue diplomatic support for the AL.
Migration and border management
Illegal movement of Bangladeshis into India has been a key irritant in India-Bangladesh relations for a number of years. Since partition in 1947, families have lived on both sides of the border and are able to move relatively freely, particularly into India. During the election campaign, the migration issue featured prominently in speeches by Modi and other senior BJP leaders. The issue has notably been called a "silent invasion" in India by the BJP and others. In a meeting with the Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs on 20 May, Modi issued instructions to set up a new cell within the ministry to specifically deal with illegal immigration from Bangladesh and Pakistan. Moreover, the right-wing nationalist Rashtriya Swamsevak Sangh (RSS), a key pillar of the BJP, has specifically asked Modi to address the issue.
FORECAST
The numbers involved in such migration make wholesale deportation almost impossible. Although there are no reliable independent figures, Indian government estimates in 2004 suggested there were more 12 million Bangladeshis living illegally in India's Assam, Bihar, and West Bengal states. However, given the RSS's influence in the BJP (the new home minister, Rajnath Singh, has held positions in the RSS before), there is likely to be a significant push for reducing illegal migration. This may include heightened security by the Indian Border Security Force (BSF), which has previously spurred strong public resentment in Bangladesh. An increase in the use of lethal force by the BSF to stop people crossing the border is likely to further increase this resentment. In particular, this would probably increase violence against Bangladesh's Hindu minority. Similar unrest peaked last year during anti-government protests, with Hindu communities (and Buddhists in Chittagong) often targeted by protesters in arson attacks. Extensive property damage is likely to be costly for the Bangladeshi government too: the AL committed to rebuilding several Buddhist temples that were destroyed by protesters and, with the help of private donors internationally, largely has done so.
On the other hand, the Teesta river and land disputes over water flow from Bangladesh to India are likely to remain unresolved. The previous Indian government was unsuccessful in finding a solution for the Teesta dispute due to opposition from the Trinamool Congress state government in West Bengal, which vetoed a proposed treaty in 2011 over concerns that it would lead to water shortages in the state. Moreover, the previous agreement is also likely to be reviewed by the BJP government because of fears that it may lead to water shortages in India. Bangladesh is likely to continue its support for Indian businesses, encouraging investment in smaller infrastructure projects and energy development. In April 2014, both sides made significant progress in beginning an energy corridor through Bangladesh, probably leading to further energy integration. Co-operation is also likely to continue in counter-terrorism. Several militant groups operating in India's northeast are based in Bangladesh, including factions of the United Liberation Front of Assam and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland, which have been severely weakened by Bangladeshi operations. Islamist militancy in Bangladesh is not an immediate concern for India, but if this does increasingly become an issue, India would rely on a friendly Bangladeshi government to counter the threat.
(1233 words)
Regional competition likely to drive India-Bangladesh relations despite prime minister's pre-election rhetoric
IHS Jane's Intelligence Weekly
25 May 2014
India's new Prime Minister Narendra Modi, left, takes the oath of office at the presidential palace in New Delhi on 26 May. Source: PA
Key Points
- The Bharatiya Janata Party's victory in the Indian election means that the ruling Awami League party in Bangladesh has lost a strong government ally in India's Congress party.
- Despite pre-election pledges for strong action against illegal Bangladeshi immigration and criticism of the 'special relationship' between Congress and the Awami League, the BJP is likely to maintain strong relations with Bangladesh in government.
- The Bangladeshi government is likely to continue favouring Indian business domestically, particularly in infrastructure and energy, and assisting in counter-terrorism efforts. Attacks on assets linked to Hindus are likely to increase in Bangladesh if the BJP government does push against illegal migration from Bangladesh.
Narendra Modi was sworn in as Indian prime minister yesterday (26 May) following the landslide victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA).
While most regional leaders were present at the ceremony, a noticeable absentee was Bangladeshi prime minister Sheikh Hasina. Instead, she was in Japan, where her government was promised USD5.9billion in aid over the next five years. Historically, relations between India and Bangladesh have been cordial; India intervened on the side of erstwhile East Pakistan during its war of independence against West Pakistan in 1971 and was the first country to recognise the new nation of Bangladesh. The relationship is asymmetric in that Bangladesh is almost completely surrounded by India, requiring it to maintain good relations with its neighbour.
In 2013, bilateral trade between India and Bangladesh stood at USD5.3 billion, with the balance clearly in favour of India. Bangladesh imported Indian goods worth USD4.2 billion, while exports to India amounted to only USD563 million. The amount imported through informal channels is estimated to be approximately one-and-a-half times higher than the formal imports and further deepens the trade imbalance between the two countries. However, India recognises the potential for a more practical transit route to its northeast states through Bangladesh. It also has an interest in maintaining co-operation to tackle Indian militants hiding across the border, as well to as to grow Indian business in the country and counter growing Chinese influence.
Despite this, there are contentious issues between the two countries, including the Land Boundary Agreement, the Teesta River Water Sharing Accord, and illegal migration into India. In Bangladesh, these are politically charged national issues, while they normally hold mostly regional significance in India, especially in India's West Bengal state. But the BJP's tactical gains in the 2014 election in the state are likely to elevate the significance of the issues for the new Indian central government.
Internal politics in Bangladesh
Bangladesh's political stability is precarious. The Awami League (AL) government in Bangladesh fended off months of nationwide anti-government protests to win the election in January, which was boycotted by the main opposition Bangladesh National Party (BNP). Crucially, the AL had to withstand intense international pressure to hold a more inclusive election, and to a large extent, the diplomatic support provided by India allowed this to happen. The extent of such support stems from the AL's close personal ties to India's outgoing ruling party, the Indian National Congress.
The continued support of India will be important in the coming year as IHS assess that there is a high risk of the BNP reviving its anti-government protest movement to press for another, more inclusive, election (see Bangladesh: 21 February 2014: Lower levels of political instability and civil unrest in Bangladesh likely to be short lived). Combative rhetoric by Modi on various occasions in the election campaign, especially on illegal Bangladeshi immigration, coupled with statements by other senior BJP figures indicated the new government will be less co-operative. Moreover, according to an IHS source in Dhaka, several senior BJP figures have interpreted the relationship between the AL and Congress as the "personalisation of foreign policy". While this will probably result in less forceful diplomacy, IHS assesses there are several factors that will continue to drive BJP support for the AL. The BJP will be aware of the main Bangladeshi opposition BNP's anti-India stance - relations between the two countries have cooled under previous BNP governments. It will ultimately be in India's interest, whether under Congress or BJP, to continue diplomatic support for the AL.
Migration and border management
Illegal movement of Bangladeshis into India has been a key irritant in India-Bangladesh relations for a number of years. Since partition in 1947, families have lived on both sides of the border and are able to move relatively freely, particularly into India. During the election campaign, the migration issue featured prominently in speeches by Modi and other senior BJP leaders. The issue has notably been called a "silent invasion" in India by the BJP and others. In a meeting with the Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs on 20 May, Modi issued instructions to set up a new cell within the ministry to specifically deal with illegal immigration from Bangladesh and Pakistan. Moreover, the right-wing nationalist Rashtriya Swamsevak Sangh (RSS), a key pillar of the BJP, has specifically asked Modi to address the issue.
FORECAST
The numbers involved in such migration make wholesale deportation almost impossible. Although there are no reliable independent figures, Indian government estimates in 2004 suggested there were more 12 million Bangladeshis living illegally in India's Assam, Bihar, and West Bengal states. However, given the RSS's influence in the BJP (the new home minister, Rajnath Singh, has held positions in the RSS before), there is likely to be a significant push for reducing illegal migration. This may include heightened security by the Indian Border Security Force (BSF), which has previously spurred strong public resentment in Bangladesh. An increase in the use of lethal force by the BSF to stop people crossing the border is likely to further increase this resentment. In particular, this would probably increase violence against Bangladesh's Hindu minority. Similar unrest peaked last year during anti-government protests, with Hindu communities (and Buddhists in Chittagong) often targeted by protesters in arson attacks. Extensive property damage is likely to be costly for the Bangladeshi government too: the AL committed to rebuilding several Buddhist temples that were destroyed by protesters and, with the help of private donors internationally, largely has done so.
On the other hand, the Teesta river and land disputes over water flow from Bangladesh to India are likely to remain unresolved. The previous Indian government was unsuccessful in finding a solution for the Teesta dispute due to opposition from the Trinamool Congress state government in West Bengal, which vetoed a proposed treaty in 2011 over concerns that it would lead to water shortages in the state. Moreover, the previous agreement is also likely to be reviewed by the BJP government because of fears that it may lead to water shortages in India. Bangladesh is likely to continue its support for Indian businesses, encouraging investment in smaller infrastructure projects and energy development. In April 2014, both sides made significant progress in beginning an energy corridor through Bangladesh, probably leading to further energy integration. Co-operation is also likely to continue in counter-terrorism. Several militant groups operating in India's northeast are based in Bangladesh, including factions of the United Liberation Front of Assam and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland, which have been severely weakened by Bangladeshi operations. Islamist militancy in Bangladesh is not an immediate concern for India, but if this does increasingly become an issue, India would rely on a friendly Bangladeshi government to counter the threat.
(1233 words)
