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Michael Rubin, teacher to FBI, US and NATO militaries, makes controversial remarks about Pak Army

Yep

We are a poor nation but from the Soviets to the American's plus NATO to a 1.4 billions India we have screwed alot of nations

They are angry LOL These coward nations had no problems with ganging up against Pakistan for almost two decades. This nexus had no qualms about promoting Hindustan as their police officer of the region at the expense of others. Little they can do now other than plan covert attacks.
 
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June 28, 2020
by Michael Rubin


The ball is now in Islamabad’s court.

View attachment 646397
Earlier this month, Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa, Pakistan’s army chief-of-staff, visited Kabul to meet both with President Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, the chairman of the High Council for National Reconciliation,  and the Afghan government’s point man on intra-Afghanistan negotiations with the Taliban. Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Director-General Lt. Gen. Faiz Hameed and Pakistan’s special envoy on Afghanistan Muhammad Sadiq accompanied Bajwa. According to a statement released by the Afghan presidency, Ghani and Bajwa agreed “the soil of either country should not be used against the other.”

Such a sentiment is laudable, but there has traditionally been a gulf between what Pakistani leaders promised to do in the interest of peace and what they actually did.

First and foremost, if Bajwa is serious, Pakistan should no longer allow its soil to be used as a safe-haven for Taliban leaders. After the September 11, 2001, terror attacks, the late Mulla Omar, founder of the Taliban, lived in Quetta and headed the so-called Quetta Shura. The Peshawar Shura has long supported the Haqqani Network, which supports Taliban operations in northern and eastern Afghanistan. The Haqqani Network also dominates the Miran Shah Shura, headquartered in Pakistan’s North Waziristan district. Pakistani authorities often counter that they too are victims of Islamist terrorism; that is true, but it does not excuse Pakistan hosting groups that sponsor similar bloodshed in Afghanistan. Nor does the Taliban gain any legitimacy when its leaders have lived longer in Pakistan than anywhere else. There is no getting around the fact that allowing Taliban leaders to live and plot terrorism from safe-havens in Quetta, Peshawar, and Miran Shah makes Bajwa’s promises empty. Special Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad’s failure to address Pakistan’s Taliban safe-havens directly may be the U.S.-Taliban deal’s most fatal flaw.

Pakistani authorities often say they deserve more credit than they receive in Western capitals because they have hosted millions of Afghan refugees for decades. In bilateral meetings, Pakistani officials often demand Afghanistan do more to catalyze refugee return. But, refugees will not return absent security, and so here Pakistan appears to be responsible for creating the Catch-22. Once again, until Pakistan ceases its support for the Taliban, it will never make progress on refugee return.

Taliban terrorism has killed thousands of Afghan civilians. The vast majority of explosives used by the Taliban in car bombs and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs) use precursor chemicals that come from two fertilizer plants in Pakistan. Even though Afghanistan long ago outlawed imports of ammonium nitrate, Pakistani border police regularly allow shipments to proceed without any real check. U.S. officials have long sought to monitor these shipments, but the Trump administration’s drawdown of forces has negatively impacted the Pentagon and intelligence community’s ability to do so and the problem remains ongoing. It is not enough to simply close safe-havens in their territory. If Pakistan wanted peace in Afghanistan—and if Khalilzad’s diplomacy is to be more substantive than symbolic—then Pakistan must stop exporting to the Taliban the means to build bombs.


Not every problem is military. For Afghanistan to be stable, its economy must wean itself off international assistance. Pakistan’s protectionism, however, is undercutting the ability of Afghanistan’s agricultural and manufacturing sectors to grow. Pakistan today allows only fifty trucks daily of Afghan produce across its border. This is a pittance for Pakistan, a country of more than two hundred million people, and it undercuts the ability of Afghan farmers to make an honest living without turning to narcotics or terrorism, both of which Pakistani authorities say they fear bleeding across the border. Once again, if Bajwa was serious and not simply lying for a diplomatic audience, opening up the Pakistani market to Afghan goods would help build neighborly, peaceful relations.

The ball is now in Islamabad’s court. It is time for Pakistan’s civilian government, and the military and ISI leadership which wield great influence over its policy, to recognize that the reason no one in Afghanistan and few in the international community take its diplomatic promises seriously is that the road map is clear to how to fulfill them, but Pakistan so far refuses to even start moving in the right direction.


Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, where he researches Arab politics, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Iran, Iraq, the Kurds, terrorism, and Turkey. He concurrently teaches classes on terrorism for the FBI and on security, politics, religion, and history for U.S. and NATO military units.
Of course the ball is in Pakistan's court and we will.kick.it the.way we want to


Btw is that Corbin guy suffering from memory loss his own country USA is making deal with Taliban and releasing their prisoners ;)
 
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Of course the ball is in Pakistan's court and we will.kick.it the.way we want to


Btw is that Corbin guy suffering from memory loss his own country USA is making deal with Taliban and releasing their prisoners ;)

US deals with Taliban are Halal. Pakistani deals with Taliban are Haram. Welcome to good Taliban bad Taliban policy of the Yanks.
 
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June 28, 2020
by Michael Rubin


The ball is now in Islamabad’s court.

View attachment 646397
Earlier this month, Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa, Pakistan’s army chief-of-staff, visited Kabul to meet both with President Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, the chairman of the High Council for National Reconciliation,  and the Afghan government’s point man on intra-Afghanistan negotiations with the Taliban. Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Director-General Lt. Gen. Faiz Hameed and Pakistan’s special envoy on Afghanistan Muhammad Sadiq accompanied Bajwa. According to a statement released by the Afghan presidency, Ghani and Bajwa agreed “the soil of either country should not be used against the other.”

Such a sentiment is laudable, but there has traditionally been a gulf between what Pakistani leaders promised to do in the interest of peace and what they actually did.

First and foremost, if Bajwa is serious, Pakistan should no longer allow its soil to be used as a safe-haven for Taliban leaders. After the September 11, 2001, terror attacks, the late Mulla Omar, founder of the Taliban, lived in Quetta and headed the so-called Quetta Shura. The Peshawar Shura has long supported the Haqqani Network, which supports Taliban operations in northern and eastern Afghanistan. The Haqqani Network also dominates the Miran Shah Shura, headquartered in Pakistan’s North Waziristan district. Pakistani authorities often counter that they too are victims of Islamist terrorism; that is true, but it does not excuse Pakistan hosting groups that sponsor similar bloodshed in Afghanistan. Nor does the Taliban gain any legitimacy when its leaders have lived longer in Pakistan than anywhere else. There is no getting around the fact that allowing Taliban leaders to live and plot terrorism from safe-havens in Quetta, Peshawar, and Miran Shah makes Bajwa’s promises empty. Special Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad’s failure to address Pakistan’s Taliban safe-havens directly may be the U.S.-Taliban deal’s most fatal flaw.

Pakistani authorities often say they deserve more credit than they receive in Western capitals because they have hosted millions of Afghan refugees for decades. In bilateral meetings, Pakistani officials often demand Afghanistan do more to catalyze refugee return. But, refugees will not return absent security, and so here Pakistan appears to be responsible for creating the Catch-22. Once again, until Pakistan ceases its support for the Taliban, it will never make progress on refugee return.

Taliban terrorism has killed thousands of Afghan civilians. The vast majority of explosives used by the Taliban in car bombs and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs) use precursor chemicals that come from two fertilizer plants in Pakistan. Even though Afghanistan long ago outlawed imports of ammonium nitrate, Pakistani border police regularly allow shipments to proceed without any real check. U.S. officials have long sought to monitor these shipments, but the Trump administration’s drawdown of forces has negatively impacted the Pentagon and intelligence community’s ability to do so and the problem remains ongoing. It is not enough to simply close safe-havens in their territory. If Pakistan wanted peace in Afghanistan—and if Khalilzad’s diplomacy is to be more substantive than symbolic—then Pakistan must stop exporting to the Taliban the means to build bombs.


Not every problem is military. For Afghanistan to be stable, its economy must wean itself off international assistance. Pakistan’s protectionism, however, is undercutting the ability of Afghanistan’s agricultural and manufacturing sectors to grow. Pakistan today allows only fifty trucks daily of Afghan produce across its border. This is a pittance for Pakistan, a country of more than two hundred million people, and it undercuts the ability of Afghan farmers to make an honest living without turning to narcotics or terrorism, both of which Pakistani authorities say they fear bleeding across the border. Once again, if Bajwa was serious and not simply lying for a diplomatic audience, opening up the Pakistani market to Afghan goods would help build neighborly, peaceful relations.

The ball is now in Islamabad’s court. It is time for Pakistan’s civilian government, and the military and ISI leadership which wield great influence over its policy, to recognize that the reason no one in Afghanistan and few in the international community take its diplomatic promises seriously is that the road map is clear to how to fulfill them, but Pakistan so far refuses to even start moving in the right direction.


Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, where he researches Arab politics, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Iran, Iraq, the Kurds, terrorism, and Turkey. He concurrently teaches classes on terrorism for the FBI and on security, politics, religion, and history for U.S. and NATO military units.
A dude who 'teaches classes on terrorism for the FBI and on security, politics, religion, and history for U.S. and NATO military units' has such a flawed views and erroneous understanding of strategic affairs. No wonders US policies are consistently failing in this region. I have just picked just a few cases from the above article.

"Pakistani authorities often say they deserve more credit than they receive in Western capitals because they have hosted millions of Afghan refugees for decades. In bilateral meetings, Pakistani officials often demand Afghanistan do more to catalyze refugee return."

Either this dude is incapable of comprehending things in full or the "Pakistani authorities" he's been talking to were cowards and lying. Pakistani nation-state is not seeking any credits for hosting Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Pakistanis have always demanded that their national interests in Afghanistan must be respected and secured at all costs. Pakistanis have suffered the most, after Afghans themselves, from the continued death and destruction unleashed by foreign powers in Afghanistan. Those wars were not Afghans' choice neither of Pakistanis. Rather those wars were imposed on Afghan people due to global strategic games of world powers. Soviets invaded and occupied Afghanistan against the wishes of fiercely freedom-loving Afghans. Then US-Nato invaded and occupied our neighboring country, thus, bringing another long and massive wave of death and destruction. Both the Afghan people and Pakistani nation share the same national interests and those interests are in direct conflict with those of the invading/occupying powers (i.e. first USSR and then US-Nato). The Afghan crisis becomes amicable as soon as US ends its occupation and leaves or beaten, humiliated, and expelled by Afghan Taliban from this region.

"Taliban terrorism has killed thousands of Afghan civilians. The vast majority of explosives used by the Taliban in car bombs and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs) use precursor chemicals that come from two fertilizer plants in Pakistan. "

This is a pure lie. This bloody idiot is lying. When it comes to Afghanistan, Americans love to live in delusions just like Indians do when it comes to deal with Pakistan. It's not Taliban - but rather occupying US-Nato forces, their hired murderers of Blackwater, and Afghan touts of occupation forces - who have killed hundreds of thousands of innocent Afghans in their own houses. Daisy cutters were not used by Afghan Taliban. The war criminals are the US forces.

"Not every problem is military. For Afghanistan to be stable, its economy must wean itself off international assistance. ..."

The fist and foremost condition for peace in Afghanistan is that US forces stop the bloodshed in Afghanistan and leave that country.
 
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This guy is still living the 9/11 2001. Bomb them back to the stone age era.
June 28, 2020
by Michael Rubin


The ball is now in Islamabad’s court.

View attachment 646397
Earlier this month, Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa, Pakistan’s army chief-of-staff, visited Kabul to meet both with President Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, the chairman of the High Council for National Reconciliation,  and the Afghan government’s point man on intra-Afghanistan negotiations with the Taliban. Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Director-General Lt. Gen. Faiz Hameed and Pakistan’s special envoy on Afghanistan Muhammad Sadiq accompanied Bajwa. According to a statement released by the Afghan presidency, Ghani and Bajwa agreed “the soil of either country should not be used against the other.”

Such a sentiment is laudable, but there has traditionally been a gulf between what Pakistani leaders promised to do in the interest of peace and what they actually did.

First and foremost, if Bajwa is serious, Pakistan should no longer allow its soil to be used as a safe-haven for Taliban leaders. After the September 11, 2001, terror attacks, the late Mulla Omar, founder of the Taliban, lived in Quetta and headed the so-called Quetta Shura. The Peshawar Shura has long supported the Haqqani Network, which supports Taliban operations in northern and eastern Afghanistan. The Haqqani Network also dominates the Miran Shah Shura, headquartered in Pakistan’s North Waziristan district. Pakistani authorities often counter that they too are victims of Islamist terrorism; that is true, but it does not excuse Pakistan hosting groups that sponsor similar bloodshed in Afghanistan. Nor does the Taliban gain any legitimacy when its leaders have lived longer in Pakistan than anywhere else. There is no getting around the fact that allowing Taliban leaders to live and plot terrorism from safe-havens in Quetta, Peshawar, and Miran Shah makes Bajwa’s promises empty. Special Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad’s failure to address Pakistan’s Taliban safe-havens directly may be the U.S.-Taliban deal’s most fatal flaw.

Pakistani authorities often say they deserve more credit than they receive in Western capitals because they have hosted millions of Afghan refugees for decades. In bilateral meetings, Pakistani officials often demand Afghanistan do more to catalyze refugee return. But, refugees will not return absent security, and so here Pakistan appears to be responsible for creating the Catch-22. Once again, until Pakistan ceases its support for the Taliban, it will never make progress on refugee return.

Taliban terrorism has killed thousands of Afghan civilians. The vast majority of explosives used by the Taliban in car bombs and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs) use precursor chemicals that come from two fertilizer plants in Pakistan. Even though Afghanistan long ago outlawed imports of ammonium nitrate, Pakistani border police regularly allow shipments to proceed without any real check. U.S. officials have long sought to monitor these shipments, but the Trump administration’s drawdown of forces has negatively impacted the Pentagon and intelligence community’s ability to do so and the problem remains ongoing. It is not enough to simply close safe-havens in their territory. If Pakistan wanted peace in Afghanistan—and if Khalilzad’s diplomacy is to be more substantive than symbolic—then Pakistan must stop exporting to the Taliban the means to build bombs.


Not every problem is military. For Afghanistan to be stable, its economy must wean itself off international assistance. Pakistan’s protectionism, however, is undercutting the ability of Afghanistan’s agricultural and manufacturing sectors to grow. Pakistan today allows only fifty trucks daily of Afghan produce across its border. This is a pittance for Pakistan, a country of more than two hundred million people, and it undercuts the ability of Afghan farmers to make an honest living without turning to narcotics or terrorism, both of which Pakistani authorities say they fear bleeding across the border. Once again, if Bajwa was serious and not simply lying for a diplomatic audience, opening up the Pakistani market to Afghan goods would help build neighborly, peaceful relations.

The ball is now in Islamabad’s court. It is time for Pakistan’s civilian government, and the military and ISI leadership which wield great influence over its policy, to recognize that the reason no one in Afghanistan and few in the international community take its diplomatic promises seriously is that the road map is clear to how to fulfill them, but Pakistan so far refuses to even start moving in the right direction.


Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, where he researches Arab politics, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Iran, Iraq, the Kurds, terrorism, and Turkey. He concurrently teaches classes on terrorism for the FBI and on security, politics, religion, and history for U.S. and NATO military units.
 
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A dude who 'teaches classes on terrorism for the FBI and on security, politics, religion, and history for U.S. and NATO military units' has such a flawed views and erroneous understanding of strategic affairs. No wonders US policies are consistently failing in this region. I have just picked just a few cases from the above article.

"Pakistani authorities often say they deserve more credit than they receive in Western capitals because they have hosted millions of Afghan refugees for decades. In bilateral meetings, Pakistani officials often demand Afghanistan do more to catalyze refugee return."

Either this dude is incapable of comprehending things in full or the "Pakistani authorities" he's been talking to were cowards and lying. Pakistani nation-state is not seeking any credits for hosting Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

I can point out plenty of posts on PDF from Pakistanis taking credit for hosting Afghan refugees
 
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