Really Brother I get headaches watching Russian convoy movement-
Editor's note: Don't miss our comprehensive guide to Russia's war against Ukraine. Russia’s military buildup along the border with Ukraine has
warontherocks.com
I just include a sample, but the rest is in the link about the logistics of the Russian Army.
Lt. Col. Alex Vershinin commissioned as a second lieutenant, branched armor, in 2002. He has 10 years of frontline experience in Korea, Iraq, and Afghanistan, including four combat tours. Since 2014, he has worked as a modeling and simulations officer in concept development and experimentation field for NATO and the U.S. Army, including a tour at the U.S. Army Sustainment Battle Lab, where he led the experimentation scenario team.
FEEDING THE BEAR: A CLOSER LOOK AT RUSSIAN ARMY LOGISTICS AND THE FAIT ACCOMPLI
ALEX VERSHININ
NOVEMBER 23, 2021
COMMENTARY
"Most of these wargames, such as
RAND’s Baltic study, focus on
fait accompli, an attack by the Russian government aimed at seizing terrain — then quickly digging in. This creates a dilemma for NATO: launch a costly counter-attack and risk heavy casualties and possibly a nuclear crisis or accept a Russian
fait accompli and undermine faith in the credibility of the alliance. Some analysts have argued that these seizures are much more likely to be
small in size, limited to one or two towns. While that scenario should, of course, be studied, the concern about the feasibility of a
fait accompli in the form of a major invasion still stands.
While the Russian army definitely has the combat power to achieve these scenarios, does Russia have the logistics force structure to support these operations? The short answer is not in the timelines envisioned by Western wargames. In an initial offensive — depending on the fighting involved — Russian forces might reach early objectives, but logistics would impose requirements for operational pauses. As a result, a large land grab is unrealistic as a
fait accompli. The Russian army has the combat power to capture the objectives envisioned in a
fait accompli scenario, but it does not have the logistic forces to do it in a single push without a logistical pause to reset its sustainment infrastructure. The Russian Aerospace Forces (with a sizable tactical bomber and attack aircraft force) and attack helicopters can also pick up fire support to alleviate artillery ammunition consumption.
NATO planners should develop plans focusing on exploiting Russian logistic challenges rather than trying to address the disparity in combat power. This involves drawing the Russian army deep into NATO territory and stretching Russian supply lines to the maximum while targeting logistics and transportation infrastructure such as trucks, railroad bridges, and pipelines. Committing to a decisive battle at the frontier would play directly into Russian hands, allowing a shorter supply to compensate for their logistic shortfalls."
Railroads and Russian Logistics Capabilities
Russian
army logistics forces are not designed for a large-scale ground offensive far from their railroads. Inside maneuver units, Russian sustainment units are a size lower than their Western counterparts. Only brigades have an equivalent logistics capability, but it’s not an exact comparison. Russian formations have only three-quarters the number of combat vehicles as their U.S. counterparts but almost three times as much artillery. On paper (not all brigades have a full number of battalions), Russian brigades have two artillery battalions, a rocket battalion, and two air defense battalions per brigade as opposed to one artillery battalion and an attached air defense company per U.S. brigade. As a result of extra artillery and air defense battalions, the Russian logistics requirements are much larger than their U.S. counterparts.