Lost in Afghanistan?

[fatman17]

Lost in Afghanistan?

Gen. McChrystal offers a plan for victory that shows how the Bush administration botched the job—and how the mission might be a bridge too far.

—By David Corn

Mon September 21, 2009

The United States has been prosecuting the war in Afghanistan for nearly eight years—and still doesn't know what it's doing.

That's the basic message of the assessment submitted to the Pentagon and the White House by Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top US and NATO commander in Afghanistan. The Washington Post got hold of and posted a copy of the 66-page report—which President Barack Obama has already reviewed—and the newspaper focused on McChrystal's conclusion that he soon needs additional military and civilian forces in support of a revived strategy or "risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible." McChrystal doesn't sugercoat. He notes the "overall situation is deteriorating"—thanks to the resilience of a growing insurgency and a loss of confidence among Afghans in their own government and the international community—but he does state that some form of victory is possible, with those extra resources and a profound shift in strategy toward counterinsurgency operations that emphasize building connections between the Afghan populace and US, NATO, and Afghan security forces. "The key takeaway," he writes, is an "urgent need for a significant change to our strategy and the way that we think and operate."

McChrystal describes all that would be necessary for this new-and-improved strategy to work, such as beefing up Afghan security forces, dealing with the ineptitude and corruption of the Afghan government, and redefining "the nature of the fight." To some much of this will seem like a bridge too far. But what jumps off these declassified pages is line after line indicating that the US and NATO forces in Afghanistan have truly botched the mission so far. In other words, thank you, George W. Bush and Dick Cheney.

McChrystal notes that US and NATO forces—known as ISAF, for International Security Assistance Forces—have really screwed the pooch to date:

ISAF is a conventional force that is poorly configured for [counterinsurgency], inexperienced in local languages and culture, and struggling with challenges inherent to coalition warfare. These intrinsic disadvantages are exacerbated by our current operational culture and how we operate.

Pre-occupied with protection of our own forces, we have operated in a manner that distances us—physically and psychologically—from the people we seek to protect. In addition, we run the risk of strategic defeat by pursuing tactical wins that cause civilian casualties or unnecessary collateral damage. The insurgents cannot defeat us militarily; but we can defeat ourselves.


So the United States has spent $440 billion on the war in Afghanistan only to field a force not up to the task and that has failed. And he lists areas where these failures have occurred: "how we traverse the country, how we use force, and how we partner with the Afghans." The commander doesn't hold back: "our conventional warfare culture is part of the problem."

McChrystal fully unloads on this point:

ISAF has not sufficiently studied Afghanistan's peoples whose needs, identities and grievances vary from province to province and from valley to valley. This complex environment is challenging to understand, particularly for foreigners. For this [counterinsurgency] strategy to succeed, ISAF leaders must redouble efforts to understand the social and political dynamics of areas all regions of the country and take action that meets the needs of the people, and insist that [Afghan] officials do the same.


That is some admission. US forces have been engaged in Afghanistan for longer than the length of US involvement in World War I and II, and they are still essentially clueless. And the insurgents, he adds, "out perform" Kabul and the ISAF at information operations.

The problem is big and deep, according to McChrystal. US and NATO forces, in adopting a counterinsurgency tactic of protecting and bonding with the Afghan public, will have to forge new connections with the Afghan people while standing up an Afghan security force and interacting with a corrupt Afghan government that alienates the public. And there's no time for a gradual ramp-up on these fronts: "Success will require a discrete 'jump' to gain the initiative, demonstrate progress in the short term, and secure long-term support."

In this assessment, McChrystal does not offer a solution to one of the most daunting problems he identifies. "Eventual success requires capable Afghan governance capabilities and security forces," he states. He explains that the US and NATO forces have become identified with the feckless Afghan government:

The public perceives that ISAF is complicit in these matters, and that there is no appetite or capacity—either among the internationals or within [the Afghan government]—to correct the situation. The resulting public anger and alienation undermine ISAF's ability to accomplish its mission. The [insurgents'] establishment of ombudsmen to investigate abuse of power in its own cadres and remove those found guilty capitalizes on this [Afghan government] weakness and attracts popular support for their shadow government.


Ponder that. The top commander in Afghanistan is acknowledging that the insurgents have more transparency and accountability in their shadow government than does the government he must rely upon for success.

While McChrystal's study calls for doubling the size of Afghan's military after it increases over the next year from its current level of 90,000 to 134,000 troops—though none of this might be feasible—he doesn't propose how to clean up and bolster the Afghan government. McChrystal says that the "ISAF can no longer ignore or tacitly accept" abuse of power or corruption. But what happens if there is no competent Afghan government to work with? Then does any of the rest of this matter?

Something else is missing from the paper: any historical reference. McChrystal cites no example of a similar campaign that has succeeded. Last week, Sen. Jim Webb (D-Virginia) made this point during a Senate hearing, saying, "We run the risk...of allowing our success to be defined by something that has never happened before and something we can't totally control." McChrystal appears to be working without a successful model.

McChrystal is a widely respected commander—even though he's been implicated in the detainee abuse scandal and the cover-up of Pat Tilman's death by friendly fire. And it's certainly his job to figure out how to win in Afghanistan. But what if doing so is not possible? McChrystal's paper does outline a theoretical path to success. Yet a clear-eyed reading of it suggests that the odds of victory are quite long, with so many essential factors beyond the control of the United States and NATO. In being so candid about all the problems, McChrystal has provided ammunition to those who worry that it's the mission itself that might be the problem.

You can follow David Corn's postings and media appearances via Twitter.


ouch! ouch!

 

[H2O3C4Nitrogen]

^^

The WAR is being hit hard in the press . Can such media bashings be taken as the eventual preparations of the pullout or withdrawal of ISAF from Afghanistan ? .

This is for sure the objectives of the ISAF has been seriously limitized by the deteriating condition of the WAR.

 

[AHMED85]

it is impossible for America to win the war in Afghanistan. even the America will sand their more tropes in Afghanistan the insurgency is more spreading.
hare is only one strategy for America to make a dialogue in Ashia nor to make angry any one.

 

[H2O3C4Nitrogen]

^^

The US still have the potential to win this war . But the problem is that this war has a low priority as compared to the Objectives in IRAQ. They want to cope with the limited resources and still want to slowly peruse their objectives . However the growing militancy may become a monster who can return to haunt them again .

 

[H2O3C4Nitrogen]

8 years in, Obama weighs Afghanistan options


By BEN FELLER (AP)

WASHINGTON — On the eighth anniversary of the beginning of the war in Afghanistan, President Barack Obama is gathering his national security team for another strategy session.

Obama is examining how to proceed with a worsening war that has claimed nearly 800 U.S. lives and sapped American patience. Launched after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks to defeat the Taliban and rid al-Qaida of a home base, the war has lasted longer than ever envisioned.

House and Senate leaders of both parties emerged Tuesday from a nearly 90-minute conversation with Obama with praise for his candor and interest in listening. But politically speaking, all sides appeared to exit where they entered, with Republicans pushing Obama to follow his military commanders and Democrats saying he should not be rushed.

Obama said the war would not be reduced to a narrowly defined counterterrorism effort, with the withdrawal of many U.S. forces and an emphasis on special operations forces that target terrorists in the dangerous border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Two senior administration officials say such a scenario has been inaccurately characterized and linked to Vice President Joe Biden, and that Obama wanted to make clear he is considering no such plan.

The president did not show his hand on troop increases. His top commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, has bluntly warned that more troops are needed to right the war, perhaps up to 40,000 more. Obama has already added 21,000 troops this year, raising the total to 68,000.

Obama also gave no timetable for a decision, which prompted at least one pointed exchange.

Inside the State Dining Room, where the meeting was held, Obama's Republican opponent in last year's presidential race, Sen. John McCain, told Obama that he should not move at a "leisurely pace," according to people in the room.

That comment later drew a sharp response from Obama, they said. Obama said no one felt more urgency than he did about the war, and there would not be nothing leisurely about it.

Obama may be considering a more modest building of troops — closer to 10,000 than 40,000 — according to Republican and Democratic congressional aides. But White House aides said no such decision has been made.

The president insisted that he will make a decision on troops after settling on the strategy ahead. He told lawmakers he will be deliberate yet show urgency.

"We do recognize that he has a tough decision, and he wants ample time to make a good decision," said House Republican leader John Boehner. "Frankly, I support that, but we need to remember that every day that goes by, the troops that we do have there are in greater danger."

What's clear is that the mission in Afghanistan is not changing. Obama said his focus is to keep al-Qaida terrorists from having a base from which to launch attacks on the U.S or its allies. He heard from 18 lawmakers and said he would keep seeking such input even knowing his final decision would not please them all.

Obama's emphasis on building a strong strategy did not mean he shed much light on what it would be. He did, though, seek to "dispense with the more extreme options on either side of the debate," as one administration official put it. The official spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss details of the closed-door meeting.

The president made clear he would not "double down" in Afghanistan and build up U.S forces into the hundreds of thousands, just as he ruled out withdrawing forces and focusing on a narrow counterterrorism strategy.

"Half-measures is what I worry about," McCain, R-Ariz., told reporters. He said Obama should follow recommendations from those in uniform and dispatch thousands of more troops to the country — similar to what President George W. Bush did during the 2008 troop "surge" in Iraq.

Public support for the war in Afghanistan is dropping. It stands at 40 percent, down from 44 percent in July, according to a new Associated Press-GfK poll. A total of 69 percent of self-described Republicans in the poll favor sending more troops, while 57 percent of self-described Democrats oppose it.

The White House said Obama won't base his decisions on the mood on Capitol Hill or eroding public support for the war.

"The president is going to make a decision — popular or unpopular — based on what he thinks is in the best interests of the country," press secretary Robert Gibbs told reporters.

The Associated Press: 8 years in, Obama weighs Afghanistan options

 

[jin]

If analyesed both approaches of McChrystal and Biden, the net result come unpredictable. By multiplying forces and resources to protect the populac and uplilfting the capabilities of Afghan forces are contradictory assignments.
First of all from whom they want to protect to whom, if they say pukhtoon to be protected from Taliban then they still have not studied their failures.
On the other hand if they think that by developing socio-economic condition in a decade at least, they will change the whole mindset? is also a question.
And till that long, will US-Nato prepared to sustain such rate of fatality?

By strengthening Afghan forces which is consist of NA, will they ever be able to conquer pukhtoon areas permanantly is also a question.

If study Joe Biden so called approach, will it workout when it hurting the sovergnity of Pakistan? I dont think Pakistan will extend the cooperation to that extent. Instead if US started this mischief, will US be able to takeout all insugency throuh Drones and special ops? Never.If suppose US allowed with full force into FATA will she be able to meet with success keeping in mind the geography and people?

Being student, i dont see any success in Afghanistan till they dont include the whole segment of Taliban or Pakhtoons unconditionally and compromise in the structure of governance... means inclusion of Islamic Sharia.
T