We need to stop blaming ourselves and the civilian parties and military establishment need to stop blaming each other. I have done sufficient research on the history of how Pakistan broke and while our leaders miscalculated, the real culprits were the Awami League with their victimhood mentality, Six Points and ethno-nationalism.
We need to first clear our narrative as we ourselves don't know what it is. I will do an attempt here. So bear with me. It is long.
@Baibars_1260
Bengali leaders like Mujib and Suhrawardy had wanted a separate East Pakistan even in 1947. Mujib in his own memoirs written in the 1960s mentions hat he had wanted
two Pakistans as a Pakistan Movement activist. Lets not forget that no matter how much people say that Bengalis voted for Pakistan in 1946, the truth is there were two factions in the Bengal branch of the Muslim League. There was the conservative branch of Khawaja Nazimuddin and Nurul Amin which wanted one Pakistan 9and remained loyal even in 197) but the more popular branch was the socialist branch of Abul Hashim and Suhrawardy which had tried in 1947 to get a separate Bengali state.
It was this socialist branch which won votes for the Pakistan idea in the 1946 elections. So it was for economic reasons that Bengalis voted for Pakistan and even then it was not necessarily for one Pakistan. They almost got an independent Bengal but when the Hindu Bengalis of Calcutta refused to live with them and demanded partition of the province the Muslim Bengalis were left with no choice but to join West Pakistan. East Bengal, a backward hinterland to Calcutta's mills, could not have survived on its own so the Bengali Muslim legislators in 1947 voted to join Pakistan.
After Pakistan was achieved Bengalis started making illogical demands over language. Urdu was selected as a neutral state language in an ethnically and linguistically diverse country but even though it was a decision for neutrality, Bengalis started playing the victim card as if their language was being suppressed even though they were left free to keep Bangla as a provincial language. They would not be content until Bangla was declared our second state language. If you think about it, it was an arrogant demand made on the basis of being a "majority." Imagine Punjabis demanding today to impose their language on the entire country just because they are a majority. That is what Bengalis did.
There was the alienation of Bengalis in the 1950s when the Muslim League civilian government dismissed the United Front which won the 1954 elections in East Bengal. The Muslim League believed in greater centralisation whereas United Front wanted autonomy. A Bengali military man Iskander Mirza was sent as governor there and it was he who repressed the Bengali politicians. Then in 1955 Awami Muslim League dropped "Muslim" from its name to become Awami League and many important West Pakistani politicians left that party and Bengali nationalists started coming to the fore. Then in 1956-57 we had a Bengali Awami League government under Shaheed Hussain Suhrawardy which was dismissed by a Bengali president Iskander Mirza.
Next Ayub Khan took over. He developed the whole country including East Pakistan. He built their premier dam (Kaptai Dam), their mills, bridges, hospitals, colleges etc. All zilla roads were built of concrete under his rule. Bengal used to be one of the poorest regions of India, but under the Pakistan Army's rule they rose to have a GDP per capita which was greater than India's. Bengalis had low levels of education before partition so even until 1961 most civil servants in East Pakistan were West Pakistanis. But Pakistan Army increased the representation of Bengalis in the civil service so much that by 1970, the civil service in East Pakistan was almost entirely dominated by Bengalis. Their representation in the military also increased five-fold under Pakistan.
I do not deny the feudal mindset of the West Pakistani establishment, the unequal level of development which led to disparities between the two wings and even within West Pakistan itself, the discrimination against Bengalis for being poor, dark and Hindu like (the Muslim elite of Bengal used to have the same views of ordinary Bengalis as West Pakistanis did) but when you look at the big picture the lot of Bengalis had improved significantly under Pakistan. But Bengalis like Mujib did not appreciate or understand this.
They were already used to racism from their ow elite (Mujib was middle class) and besides there was also a great deal of affection for Bengalis among West Pakistanis as well (just as it is even today between all ethic groups of Pakistan, we have racist stereotypes of each other but still love each other and get over ethnic fights fairly quickly)
The fact that Pakistan and Pakistan Army gave unprecedented development to East Bengal which it could not even match for thirty/forty years as independent Bangladesh was not appreciated except by loyalists Bengalis such as Professor Syed Sajjad Hussain who point out that Bengali nationalists could not deny they owed their careers to the Pakistani central government.
Its not hard to understand why this was the case. Lets look at what two Bengali writers say about the Bengali mindset:
Gholam Wahed Chowdhury says: "
The Bengalis are noted for a negative and destructive attitude rather than for hard work and constructive programmes; they also have a tremendous tendency to put the blame on others."
Nirad Chaudhri says: "๐๐ถ๐ต ๐ช๐ฏ ๐ต๐ฉ๐ช๐ด ๐ข๐ต๐ต๐ช๐ต๐ถ๐ฅ๐ฆ ๐ ๐ด๐ฆ๐ฆ ๐ข ๐ด๐ช๐ฎ๐ช๐ญ๐ข๐ณ๐ช๐ต๐บ ๐ช๐ฏ ๐ข๐ญ๐ญ ๐๐ฆ๐ฏ๐จ๐ข๐ญ๐ช๐ด, ๐๐ช๐ฏ๐ฅ๐ถ ๐ฐ๐ณ ๐๐ถ๐ด๐ญ๐ช๐ฎ, ๐ต๐ฐ ๐ค๐ฐ๐ถ๐ณ๐ต ๐ด๐ถ๐ง๐ง๐ฆ๐ณ๐ช๐ฏ๐จ ๐ช๐ฏ ๐ฐ๐ณ๐ฅ๐ฆ๐ณ ๐ต๐ฐ ๐ฏ๐ถ๐ณ๐ด๐ฆ ๐ด๐ฆ๐ญ๐ง-๐ฑ๐ช๐ต๐บ ๐ฃ๐บ ๐ธ๐ข๐บ ๐ฐ๐ง ๐ฆ๐ฎ๐ฐ๐ต๐ช๐ฐ๐ฏ๐ข๐ญ ๐ด๐ข๐ต๐ช๐ด๐ง๐ข๐ค๐ต๐ช๐ฐ๐ฏ."
In other words they had a habit of victimhood. This can also ben seen in Mujib's memoirs when he expresses the grievance against Pakistan because his provincial language was not made the state language of the whole Pakistan.
Ayub Khan was also disappointed with Bengali ingratitude. He wrote in his diary entries:
โI am surprised at the Bengali outlook. It does not conform to any rational yardstick. They were exploited by the caste Hindus, the Muslim rulers and even the British. It was at the advent of Pakistan that they got the blessing of freedom and equality of status and a real voice in the running of their government. . . any normal people should have recognized and rejoiced at this blessing. Instead, they urge to fall back on their Bengali past. This can only result in their complete absorption by Hindu West Bengal influenceโ (Jan-March 1968)
Perhaps it was because of his disappointment with their ungrateful attitude that at one point he sought his adviser Altaf Gauhar's opinion on asking Bengalis to leave the federation. The reply from a Bengali was interesting. He said that the Bengalis were the majority province so they were the "real" Pakistan and if West Pakistan wanted to secede from "Pakistan" it was welcome to do so.
This reply shows that even the Bengali understanding of Pakistan was self-centred and they didn't care for West Pakistan being with them or not. In other words they did not care for United Pakistan.
The Awami League incited the Bengali population with exaggerated and even false propaganda against the government and whipped up ethno-nationalist sentiment. Meanwhile, our population under Bhutto decided on the suicidal path of overthrowing Ayub Khan's government even though he was an able administrator. Pakistan had remained united for two decades without a single national election. It was an election which finally gave the framework for the Bengali nationalists to break Pakistan.
The 1970 elections were held on the basis of the Legal Framework Order which was promulgated by Yahya Khan under martial law. All contesting parties were signatory to it including Mujib. The document outlined that any future constitution of Pakistan would have to preserve Islamic ideology and give sufficient financial powers to the federal government for it to be able to fulfil its duties. Despite signing the LFO, Mujib would condemn it in his election campaign and he conducted his election campaign on the basis of Six Points. Under the Six Points, the government would not have no rights to collect taxes independently (it would be reliant on provincial governments) and the federal government would have been left a paper tiger. Even many Bengalis (right-wingers) opposed the Six Points scheme. So in this sense, the Six Points did not get on well with the LFO which was the legal basis for the elections of 1970. Some sources claim that Mujib had promised Yahya Khan that he would change the Six Points after the elections.
In the 1970 election campaign Mujib, in violation of the martial law regulations, ran a year long campaign of hate against West Pakistan and Biharis, using abusive terms for them like "shala." They intimidated right-wing Bengali leaders such as Nurul Amin, Fazlul Quader Chowdhury, etc and the right-wing pro-government parties such as Muslim League and Jamaat e Islami so they would not be able to campaign properly for the elections.
When the Bhola cyclone hit Bengali leaders like Mujib and Maulana Bashani used the opportunity to do propaganda against the government even while Pakistani soldiers were aiding and providing relief to the cyclone survivors. The Army got no appreciation for its effort, neither did West Pakistanis who aided the relief efforts. The unaffected Bengalis themselves were stealing the Pakistan Army's aid packages and they ended up in Dhaka and Calcutta's marketplaces instead of for the relief victims. But Mujib and the Awami League never appreciated, only criticised the government's relief efforts. While Pakistani soldiers would be helping victims, Bengalis standing nearby would complain that nothing was being done.
Mujib and his party did exaggerated propaganda about "exploitation" against West Pakistan to win support fir its Six Points scheme. Pakistani soldiers would often be abused, even in 1970. Bengali soldiers of the Pakistan Army were following Mujib and becoming more distant from their West Pakistani colleagues despite friendly overtures. Many Bengalis at this time already wanted an independent Bangladesh even though Mujib and the Awami League's campaign was on the basis of autonomy and Six Points.
Official Indian radio was already running Bengali programs ("Apar Bangla, Opar Bangla") which incited Bengali ethno-nationalist sentiment in East Pakistan. But Mujib already had a "my way or high way" mindset at this point. His reply to a journalist in 1970 who asked him if he stood for just autonomy or independence was "Independence? Not yet" Clearly this man was no patriot. He would break Pakistan if he did not get what he wanted.
There are also loyalist Bengalis who have said that Mujib's real intention was secession. G.W Chowdhury who was Yahya Khan's Bengali adviser, claims he and Yahya Khan overheard a tape-recording where Mujib was heard saying his real intention was to establish Bangladesh after the elections were over when no one could challenge him. The loyalist Bengali ex-governor Abdul Monem Khan also claims that during the 1965 war when he was governor of East Pakistan, Mujib had asked him to seize the opportunity in the war to declare independence form Pakistan.
After he "won" the elections he straight out refused to compromise on the Six Points, despite at one point telling Yahya he would. The military junta, like the old Muslim League civilian governments of the 1950s, believed in a stronger centralisation of the state and while they and Bhutto were happy to give autonomy to East Pakistan, the Six Points were too radical for them as it virtually left the federal government redundant. They planned on arresting the Awami League leaders if they did not compromise on the Six Points during negotiations.
When Yahya Khan used his presidential right under the LFO to postpone the National Assembly session over this constitution-making issue, Mujib did an act of treason by revolting against the federal government in March and establishing his own parallel government (although he did not declare independence, which makes his act even worse since he established a parallel government in full knowledge that the Pakistan government was still the legal authority).
During this time our soldiers and non-Bengali Pakistanis in the province were abused, humiliated, even murdered and raped by Bengalis. They also tore the national flags, rioted, raised Bangladeshi flags and demanded the creation of Bangladesh. Students at Dhaka University and villages throughout East Pakistan were doing armed training to take on the Pakistan Army.
The Bengali nationalist students and Mujib's colleague were pressuring him to declare independence. He resisted because he wanted a confederation. His colleagues like the communist Tajuddin Ahmed were worse than he was. However, his adviser Dr Kamal Hossain says Mujib wanted to keep negotiations ongoing so he could enter the National Assembly as Prime Minister and legally separate the two wings of Pakistan. This was exactly what Bhutto feared, that with the help of ethno-nationalist parties from West Pakistan such as ANP, Mujib would push through a constitution based on the Six Points. Mujib already had the support of ethno-nationalist parties like ANP.
When Yahya Khan offered to hold a National Assembly session on 25 March, Mujib said he would not attend it until martial law was revoked. This would have created a legal "lacuna" and until the National Assembly convened, power would have devolved to the provinces and in this lacuna any of the small provinces in West Pakistan such as NWFP or Balochistan could have used the opportunity to secede. (Remember, ANP in NWFP is only loyal to Pakistan out of a "legal" relationship. Their heart was not in it, hence they opposed the creation of Pakistan before 1947. This was a very real fear at the time).
Further on during the negotiations, Bengali soldiers and East Pakistan Rifles soldiers were deserting, such as at Joydevpur on 19 March. Mujib and the Awami League refused to compromise during the March negotiations when Bhutto and Yahya Khan flew to talk to him. The Awami League eventually started demanding a confederation (effectively a division into two states) on 23 March, which was a violation of the LFO they were signatory to - which had demanded a single federation. Tajuddin Ahmed said there would be no compromise on this. Eventually, Yahya Khan gave the go-ahead to the Army to restore the government's writ over the province, arrest Awami League leaders and disarm Bengali soldiers.
Because of what they had suffered in the preceding weeks, the troops acted excessively when they started Operation Searchlight in Dhaka. As soon as that happened, the Bengali soldiers throughout the province mutinied almost simultaneously as if they had pre-planned this. Its known that the Bengali soldiers were mainly loyal to Awami League and that Mujib had appointed the Bengali veteran soldier MAG Osmani as "commander of the revolutionary forces" in March and that Brigadier Majumdar and others had approached Mujib a few times in March asking to do a "first strike" - although he stalled for the final outcome of the negotiations.
This is when the massive atrocities on both sides unfolded, as the Bengali troops committed mass killings and rapes of non-Bengalis and the Pakistani troops retaliated in kind, especially against Hindus, while they cleared the province of the rebel soldiers and police over April and May. Many of the Pakistani soldiers were angry and thirsty for revenge after the abuse they had endured at the hands of Bengalis in March. This was the reason they started hating Bengalis and for the rest of the year many of them had a cold, even arrogant and at times atrocious, attitude towards Bengalis.
The rebel soldiers and police fled to India as the Pakistan Army retook control of the province as did most of the Awami League leaders (except for Mujib and Dr Kamal who the Army was able to arrest) who ran away to India and lost no time in declaring independence and a "provisional government for Bangladesh." MAG Osmani in early April became leader of the "Mukti Bahini" - made up of these rebel soldiers/police, nationalist students, Awami Leaguers and the mainly Hindu refugees. Indian soldiers were also infiltrating in the province at this time (possibly even earlier). But I won't cover India's role here because that is another aspect.
The Pakistan Army for the rest of the year ran the civil administration of the province with the aid of loyal elements of the East Pakistani population i.e. Bihari Muslims and right-wing Bengali Muslims who opposed the Awami League. One of the runaway Awami League politicians Khondaker Mushtaq tried to negotiate with Pakistan to keep the country united under the Six Points framework. But the communist hardliner Tajuddin Ahmed who was "Prime Minister" of this "provisional government" did not want to compromise with Pakistan at all and just wanted independent Bangladesh. Mujib at this time was on trial for treason. Massive international propaganda was done against Pakistan by India and the Awami League.
Around June the Mukti Bahini (led in important operations by the Indian infiltators) started infiltrating the province and ambushing the Pakistan Army, and the local population became caught up in the conflict between the Mukti Bahini and Pakistan Army. Atrocities were committed by both for real or suspected aid to the other combatting side. Some Awami Leaguers and rebel Bengali policemen returned from India, surrendered to the Pakistan Army and joined the loyalist Bengali-Bihari civil administration under the loyalist governor Dr Abdul Motaleb Malik Eventually, India invaded on 22 November and bypassed most of the Pakistan Army positions (they were concentrated in fort-like cantonments distant from each other, thus leaving vast expanses of territory between them open for the Indians to bypass on their way to Dhaka). And that is how Bangladesh was created on 16 December, ironically while a Bengali politician (Nurul Amin) was Prime Minister of Pakistan.
Allegedly failing to practice Islam was not the reason for the breakup. Don't know which fool said it. Many Islamic Empires have broken up such as the Delhi Sultanate, even the Rashidun caliphate which splintered into three in the lifetime of Hazrat Usman (razi allahu anhu)
It wasn't because of the lack of Islam that Pakistan broke. It was because of a lack of pan-Islamic feelings in East Pakistanis who preferred to think of themselves as Bengalis first since day one. I recall reading an opinion poll from the late 1960s where a social scientist found that most educated West Pakistanis put religion first before ethnic identity. The survey found the opposite result for educated Bengalis.
But here are some lessons we can learn:
1. Control the education system: One of the main reasons the urban middle class of Pakistan is so patriotic is because of the Pakistan Studies curriculum which emphasises the two nation theory. This factor was not strong in East Pakistan. A lot of teachers and professors there were Hindus, and they had a large role in turning Bengali Muslim students into ethno-nationalists. A similar situation can be seen in remaining Pakistan today, where you notice that many ethno-nationalists and critics of the state come from the liberal and private English medium institutions, schools and universities
2. Teach proper history. We are fed on a diet of lies about a glorious pre-colonial Islamic past. This is the reason people do not appreciate Pakistan. If they knew the socio-economic conditions of their ancestors they woudl feel grateful for what they have in Pakistan today. One of the reasons Bengalis never appreciated Pakistani development of their province was because the Awami League used to preach the myth of a glorious and prosperous Bengali past ("Sonar Bangla.") When in fact Pakistan gave Bengalis a say in government and unprecedented development. They had faced far worse exploitation and under-representation under their prior British and pre-colonial Muslim feudal rulers.
3. Teach and ingrain the religious importance of obedience and loyalty to the state (even with "oppressive" rulers) among students (who are our future adult citizens). One of the Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report's recommendations was to ingrain respect for democratic values among Pakistani military academy students. This is strange, given that Pakistan in 1969-71 was under martial law and between 1958-1971 Pakistan was under military rule.
It was not a democratic country. And martial law was first implemented in the country by president Iskander Mirza even before its first ever military coup by Ayub Khan. Pakistan's commitment to democracy stems from the 1973 Constitution, which was written after 1971. Even the 1962 Constitution did not provide for universal democracy.
So why should the military have been asked to respect democratic values as if it was a lack of democracy which broke Pakistan? Pakistan stayed united for two decades without a single national-level election. Had Bhutto (with the help of Generals) not led a movement for democracy and agitation to remove Ayub Khan in 1968, Pakistan would not have broken over an election. Surely, it is the civilians who ought to be taught obedience to authority. This is what Islam demands - obey the ruler even if he whips your back.
4. Quit the self-blame. The Army and PPP's supporters each blame the other for breaking Pakistan. They accuse each other of being too power hungry to make a compromise with the Awami League. Stop this. It may be true that the Army wanted to retain power or that the PPP was hungry for power. But there have been multiple times after 1971 when civilian politicians clashed with the military establishment yet the country never broke.
The reason is simple. There was no ethnic nationalism in any party. The political parties like PPP and PML-N which clashed with the military establishment are all-Pakistan parties, even if they have some regional focus. They don't have a mindset that they will go the separatist route of they don't get what they want. Mujib did exactly that, as shown by his 1970 interview where he replied "Not yet" to a journalist's question on whether he wanted independence.
The Awami League was a Bengali nationalist party whose election campaign was for Bengalis and Bengali autonomy. It whipped up hatred in its election campaign against West Pakistan and non-Bengalis, in violation of martial law regulations which prohibited inciting regional hatred or talking against the ideology of Pakistan. It further showed its mindset later when Mujib refused to visit West Pakistan and said West Pakistan could make its own constitution. Awami League's interest was in Bengal first and last. They put Bengali interests over a United Pakistan.
Some allege that the Army held elections hoping and tried to influence the result in favour of a hung parliament which would allow the Army a share in power in a future democratic setup (although they did not interfere in the Awami League's rigging of elections in East Pakistan). Brigadier Abdul Rehman Siddiqui claims in his book that a member of the Army said to him "Lets back Bhutto" because he would not touch the Army's role in a future democratic setup since he had won elections in Punjab where most soldiers came from and would therefore not interfere with the Army's power.
Had the Awami League been sensible they would have gone into the Army's good books like Bhutto did. After all the Army was the authority at the time and the fountainhead of power. The Army had held the elections under
martial law (whose regulations of the elections Mujib and the Awami League had violated with impunity). Why did Mujib abuse them? If he had sense he would be reasonable with them. He knew they were against him because of his Six Points and yet made no compromise on that. The Awami League turned a political issue over power-sharing and constitution making into an ethnic issue. It had already done so in the elections and also with its propaganda in the 1960s.
And when Yahya Khan, after postponing the assembly session on 1 March, offered Mujib again to hold a National Assembly session Mujib put forth the condition of removing martial law - with no consideration to West Pakistani fears about the potential for secession by the smaller provinces of NWFP and Balochistan. When Yahya Khan came to talk him in March Mujib still refused to budge on his Six Points (despite indicating to Yahya Khan earlier in January that he would compromise on the Six Points if he held the National Assembly meeting) and eventually made even more radical demands for confederation.
And as talks were being held Mujib did a number of provocative acts such as using the Bangladeshi flag on his car, saluting a parade of Bengali servicemen by his house, not caring for the burning of the Pakistani flag, which made Yahya Khan give the final go-ahead to take back control of the province from the Awami League and restore the federal government's authority (called Operation Searchlight).
In March 1971 all political parties including PPP and Bhutto supported the military action in East Pakistan. It was not until the Army did not fulfil Bhutto's demand that they start the transfer of power to his PPP that Bhutto started criticising the Army, saying there would have been no crisis if power had been "transferred earlier." This is where it seems the blame game between the PPP and the military supporters started.
Maybe the Army and Bhutto miscalculated their handling of Mujib and the Awami League. Maybe they should not have postponed the national assembly meeting and waited for a session where Yahya Khan could refuse to authenticate a constitution based on the Six Points or maybe they should have tried continuing negotiations with Mujib instead of giving the go-ahead for Operation Searchlight. But the fault for creating the crisis rests with the Awami League.
With its propaganda about exploitation to incite the population against the government, their hateful election campaign and the fact they never compromised on the Six Points, which was the main reason the Army was against them. Then there was the treasonous parallel government of the Awami League, the separatist leanings of Mujib's colleagues and the very fact that Mujib played with the fore of secessionism and nationalism to extract his demands. He did nothing substantial to allay the Army and Bhutto's concerns that his intentions were not for secession. He did everything which increased their concerns and provoked them. Such as demanding the revocation of martial law before the National Assembly meeting and the use of Bangladeshi flags and doing nothing about the insults to the Pakistani flag.
5. Do not abuse, boycott or hurt the Army and especially not the soldiers. The Awami League's and the Bengalis' abuse of the Army and soldiers in the years and months preceding 1971 is what caused the soldiers; to lose control. The same Army which developed East Pakistan and which provided relief to Bengali cyclone survivors turned abusive and arrogant towards the Bengali civilians after what they had endured at civilian hands.
If we abuse our own Army, they will lose their morale and harm us out of hurt they suffer at our hands. This is an especially important lesson today as PDM supporters at times do not refrain from abusing the Army and even soldiers, thus causing emotional hurt to men who are putting their lives on the line for us. When soldiers lose morale, they harm civilians. Imagine putting your life on the line for your people, only for them to abuse and attack you. How would you feel? Its very easy in such a situation for armies to turn on their people.
