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Lessons from 1965 and 1971 wars

There are dozens of books written by Pakistani Officers Post 71 so I dont think anyone can fault them for that. Most are introspective in nature and do not succumb to the temptation of playing for the home gallery.

Siddiq Salik wrote another book (in urdu) on his POW experiences. But as it was very shortly after the event (74 or 75) the book is full of bile and and a distorted perception. The Witness to surrender book is actually better.

Venkat,

Actually I have read both the urdu one (Hamain yaran dozukh) and "Witness to Surrender". The bile that you talk of should not be perceived as such. It was his own description of being a PoW and the mental anguish that he went through while in it (being in an Indian PoW camp was no vacation, I think you would agree). He writes about being so isolated that a newspaper wrapper that he found in the prison was his sole outlet to what else was happening around him and he savored every word of it and read it over and over to pass his days)....if anything its a study of human psychology when it is subjected to complete deprivation from social and literary contact.

The urdu one actually is a lose translation of Witness to Surrender. The difference is that the urdu one mostly deals with his own experiences and thoughts during the 1971 war and the aftermath, while "WTS" deals with what went on overall as the author was a PR officer who got to sit in a lot of the meetings etc. in the HQ Eastern Command. (Unlikely beginnings mentioned below has certain conflicts with the information in WTS).

A couple more books worth reading:

"Unlikely beginnings" (Maj Gen Abubakar Usman Mitha) has a whole chapter dedicated to the 1971 war among other things....this book for me at least has been a most excellent read about the culture of the Pakistan Army, its wars etc. Also gives you an insight on the caliber of officer corps within the Pakistan Army (I can say without a shadow of doubt that the author was probably one of the finest Army officers of his time in the entire sub-continent.)

The 1971 Indo-Pak War : A Soldier's Narrative by Maj Gen Hakeem Arshad Qureshi is another excellent reading. Both of the above books are factual and provide a very good background on the 1971 war. This specific book is also good because Qureshi sahib has a lot of data/newspaper cuttings etc. in his book.

Overall I agree with you that there is no dearth of introspective books on the Pakistani wars written by Pakistani authors.
 
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Also Brigadier Z A Alam's series in Defence Journal - The Way it Was. I believe it was published as a book as well.

Niazis book is another one though it was more of a personal defence document - unbelieable in many parts.

I think i may have read Maj Gen Abu Mithas book I think. Was he known as 'Abu' - i vaguely recollect that he opted for India in 47 but changed over to Pakistan soon after a couple of years because he didnt like how it went in India
 
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Also Brigadier Z A Alam's series in Defence Journal - The Way it Was. I believe it was published as a book as well.

Niazis book is another one though it was more of a personal defence document - unbelieable in many parts.

I think i may have read Maj Gen Abu Mithas book I think. Was he known as 'Abu' - i vaguely recollect that he opted for India in 47 but changed over to Pakistan soon after a couple of years because he didnt like how it went in India

Brig Z A Alam's (another very competent officer and one of seven brothers, all served in Pakistan Army, Airforce with distinction!) complete book was never printed in the DJ, only parts of it. I have not read the complete one as of yet, but have it on my list.

Not sure about your Maj Gen Mitha opting story..his case was a straight over transfer to PA when give the option (at least that is what is in his autobiography) back in 1947.

(Here is a brief bio from the book:
Maj.Gen. A.0. Mitha

Maj.-Gen. A.0. Mitha was born in 1923 to a wealthy and politically influential Memon family of Bombay. He was commissioned from the Indian Military Academy in 1942 and served on the Burma Front, and as a volunteer in the Indian Parachute Regiment. He opted for Pakistan in 1947.

He served as General Staff Officer (GSO) 3 and 2 in the Army Headquarters, Delhi and after qualifying from the Staff College, Quetta as GSO 1 in GHQ Pakistan. He was Brigade Major in 1952 and Colonel Staff to GOC-in-C in 1962.

He came to prominence when appointed to raise the Special Services Group (SSG)-probably the only Pakistan Army officer with the experience to do so. This made him a legend not only in the Army, but also with the Navy and Air Force. He left his mark on hundreds of young cadets when he commanded the Pakistan Military Academy from 1966-8. In 1965 he commanded an Infantry Brigade in East Pakistan and was also active there in early 1971 as Deputy Corps Commander. He also commanded the elite 1 Armoured Division from 1968-70. He was Quartermaster General at GHQ when prematurely retired by the civilian Chief Martial Law Administrator, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in December 1971.

In the course of his military career, he was awarded the Hilai-i-Jur'at, Sitarai-Pakistan, and Sitara-i-Quaid-i-Azam. Maj.Gen. A.0. Mitha died in December 1999.
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I have not read Niazi's book so I can't comment on it.
 
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(Here is a brief bio from the book:
Maj.Gen. A.0. Mitha
Burma Front, and as a volunteer in the Indian Parachute Regiment. He opted for Pakistan in 1947. on it.


I think its the same gent. I read about him being one of the first officers in the indian para regiment which was being set up.

The story was that he decided to opt for india at the last moment because his family was staying back in india. But after an year or two, he did not like the way things were turning out and opted back to pakistan. he married a christian lady whos family was in india as well. So a unique case where his parents and his wifes parents are in india but he was in pakistan.

i also remember reading he was prematurely retired.
 
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I think its the same gent. I read about him being one of the first officers in the indian para regiment which was being set up.

The story was that he decided to opt for india at the last moment because his family was staying back in india. But after an year or two, he did not like the way things were turning out and opted back to pakistan. he married a christian lady whos family was in india as well. So a unique case where his parents and his wifes parents are in india but he was in pakistan.

i also remember reading he was prematurely retired.

Rest assured, he did not opt or stay in the IA. He went over to Pakistan in March of 1948 (Pg 115 of his book). He left a very wealthy family in Bombay who first told him that they would move to Karachi but changed their minds and stayed in Bombay. This was the reason he stayed back a few more months.

And his case was not unique in that sense. There were very many Pakistani officers who had their families and those of their spouses in India...most of the Pakistani Muhajir officers were in this league.
 
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Rest assured, he did not opt or stay in the IA. He went over to Pakistan in March of 1948 (Pg 115 of his book). He left a very wealthy family in Bombay who first told him that they would move to Karachi but changed their minds and stayed in Bombay. This was the reason he stayed back a few more months.

And his case was not unique in that sense. There were very many Pakistani officers who had their families and those of their spouses in India...most of the Pakistani Muhajir officers were in this league.

Where was he in the period Aug 47 to March 48 ? Out of the Army?
 
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Where was he in the period Aug 47 to March 48 ? Out of the Army?


No he was in the Army. He physically moved to Pakistan in March 48 for reasons that I have mentioned in the earlier posts, but had opted for PA as soon as the option to opt came up. Not all officers and men left on the eve of 14th August. There were understanable circumstances for many which allowed them to stay back for a short duration of time. There was even an agreement that men/officers would be allowed to go back and forth between the two countries in order to facilitate their settlement and disposal of personal property/assets but after the 48 war, all such things were put an end to.

The bottom line is that Maj Gen Mitha chose Pakistan when offered. He stayed back a for a few months due to his family situation. Back then it was not a case where as soon you opted, you had to go over. You may want to re-read the book if you doubt what I am saying.
 
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few months due to his family situation. Back then it was not a case where as soon you opted, you had to go over. You may want to re-read the book if you doubt what I am saying.

OK I dont have the book with me. But I did ask a friend from whom I had borrowed it in the first place. This is what he wrote back overnight.

I have the book with me and I can probably qutoe the page numbers soon. But I do remember what was written in it. Basically the author wrote that he first opted for the pakistan army but changed his mind and requested Maj Gen Anil Rudra (Then a Col or a Brig) in the Supreme Command HQ to withdraw his request for the PA.

Later on he changed his mind. Why? He was not comfortable with India's brand of secularism. He specifically mentions being uncomfortable with the inroads of Hindu traditions in the government operations , for ex - putting tilak on Nehrus forehead at independence - which he interprets as a non-secular action.

The author then once again called Anil Rudra and told him he changed his mind and that he would go to Pakistan. Inspite of Rudra's attempt to convince him otherwise, he now stuck to his decision of going to Pakistan. In all fairness, allthis could have happened before August 15 1947. He does not say when the interaction took place clearly. It maybe that he decided to withdraw his request before Independence and then went back to his old request after independence. I will have to take a closer look and tell you for sure.

But it was not a question of him opting for Pakistan and staying with that decision. he was definitely in the middle ground and atleast once withdrew the request. All this is mentioned in the book

Maybe you can verify the above and give your ideas
 
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jawed wattoo kundian staEs:

Assalamoalaikum,

1965 war finished on 23 sep-1965, Pakistan won that war. So Today is memorable day of that war. So Mubarak Ho...
Pakistan has another battle tomorrow with India inn South Africa in Cricket field.
Thnx

WebMaster states:
Its not a war, rather a competition. The best team will win. 1965 war was a different story, we were attacked.
http://www.defence.pk/forums/members-introduction/7414-winning-1965-war-today.html#post101715

An incorrect statement.

What was OP Gibraltar?

Pakistan India War of 1965 - War in Kashmir - 1/3 (1965)


By: Athar Osama

The origins of the 1965 War between Pakistan and India, its conduct over the course of several weeks, and its consequences are quite complex for one to be able to do justice with it. Add on top of that the fact that countries engage in one-upmanship to try to make exaggerated accusations of who started the war and claims of victory after it ends, primarily in order to manage “public opinion” at home, and it really gets very difficult and tricky. One additional unfortunate factor in lack of quality reporting on the 1965 War was the attempt by Pakistani leadership—both military and civilian—to attempt to destroy the evidence of the circumstances that actually led to this war. General K. M. Arif, in his biography “Khaki Shadows: Pakistan 1947-97” for instance writes that in the immediate aftermath of the 1965 War:

“Pakistan suffered a loss of a different kind…Soon after the War the GHQ ordered all the formations and units of the Pakistan Army to destroy their respective war diaries and submit completed reports to this effect by a given date. This was done…Their [the war diaries’] destruction, a self-inflicted injury and an irreparable national loss, was intellectual suicide.”

— General Khalid Mehmood Arif, Vice Chief of Army Staff, Pakistan Army

One does not destroy war diaries since it is history of the unit and is proudly maintained, unless one has something to hide! Even that is sacrilege!

CONTROVERSY: Why Gohar Ayub is wrong about 1965 —Khalid Hasan

India feels the compulsion to prove Kashmiri acquiescence to justify occupation, Pakistan to account for the miscarriage of its plans. Neither acknowledges the fact that Kashmiris did rise on their own against India in 1964. A senior intelligence official told Nehru: “Prime Minister, from what I have seen, Kashmir is not a part of India” ( Gohar Ayub in his book)

Not only are Gohar Ayub’s recent “revelations” entirely without basis, but their timing, one hopes unintended, has been most unfortunate. To denounce the Kashmiris for having let down Pakistan in 1965 on the eve of the visit of Hurriyat leaders to Azad Kashmir and Pakistan says little for Mr Ayub’s judgment or sensitivity. He accuses the Kashmiris of betraying those who had gone in to liberate them. Since Mr Ayub has made a very grave allegation, let me state on the basis of my own knowledge and study of Operation Gibraltar that the planners and executors of that well-intentioned and poorly planned action had refused to take the Kashmiri leadership on this or that side of the ceasefire line into confidence. When the Pakistani and Azad Kashmiri guerillas, many of them serving army officers, surfaced on the Indian side and began carrying out acts of sabotage, the Kashmiris were no less surprised than the Indians. They could have been Indian agents provocateurs, as far as the Kashmiris were concerned. Still, many of them offered the infiltrators food and shelter and assistance, actions that were punished by the Indians after the 17-day war ended. Thousands of Kashmiris were pushed into Pakistan and Azad Kashmir. Some of them remained in miserable conditions in refugee camps for years thereafter. Few of them were able to rebuild their lives.

As M Yusuf Buch has so brilliantly argued, it is open to question who in Pakistan counted on an insurgency in the Valley at the time. There are different versions, none wholly plausible. The situation in Kashmir in 1964-65 has been misrepresented in both Pakistan and India for opposite psychological reasons. India feels the compulsion to prove Kashmiri acquiescence to justify occupation, Pakistan to account for the miscarriage of its plans. Neither acknowledges the fact that Kashmiris did rise on their own against India in 1964. When Nehru sent a senior intelligence official to Srinagar, he came back with the candid report, “Prime Minister, from what I have seen, Kashmir is not a part of India.” The agitation in Kashmir in 1964 was directed by the Committee of Action in Srinagar. Mr Ayub’s insinuation that the Kashmiris were in a way reconciled to Indian occupation is regrettable. Popular uprisings follow their own dynamism. They need their own impulse and are sustained by their own strategy. They abort if they lack native political guidance. To ignore this principle is to plan for failure.

My cousin KH Khurshid, who heard about Operation Gibraltar before it was launched, made desperate efforts in Rawalpindi to have it called off. He could not see President Ayub Khan but he saw several people in government. He failed to convince any of them that Operation Gibraltar would fail, bring havoc to the Kashmiris and embroil Pakistan in a war it did not intend to fight. And what was the result of his efforts? Intelligence agents and police commandos burst into the private residence of the highly respected Kashmiri leader, Mirwaiz Maulvi Muhammad Yusuf, where Khurshid was holding a meeting with him, picked up Khurshid, threw him into a jeep and locked him up in the notorious Dalai Camp. He thus became the first inmate of that old Dogra-built facility. Khurshid’s predictions turned out to be correct. Operation Gibraltar and its immediate offspring, the 1965 war, were both unmitigated disasters. Had there been no 1965 war, East Pakistan may still have been a part of Pakistan.

Mr Gohar Ayub has also heaped much abuse on Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. He has repeated the myth that Mr Bhutto assured President Ayub Khan that India would not cross the international dividing line. Assuming such an assurance was indeed extended by Mr Bhutto to Ayub, did not the president have enough foresight and wisdom to conclude that if pressed, India would not hesitate to hit back wherever it could. Mr Bhutto was the foreign minister of Pakistan, not the president. It was Ayub Khan who took all the decisions and it is he on whose shoulders the responsibility of giving the green light to Operation Gibraltar rests. The buck stopped at his desk. While I can sympathise with a son’s attempt to exonerate his father, the fact is that the responsibility for the 1965 misadventure is squarely that of Ayub Khan. If he was given bad advice, the onus for accepting bad advice was and is on him. Why did he not reject the bad advice and the “doctored” information he was given?

In a soon-to-be-published book, Pakistani journalist Husain Haqqani, who has been able to access a good deal of unpublished material in Washington, writes about the 1965 war: “The Pakistani people were told by the state that they had been victims of aggression and that the aggression had been repelled with the help of God. The propagation of this view needed the help of religious leaders and groups. But in discussions with American diplomats, Ayub Khan acknowledged that the war had begun as a result of Pakistan’s forays in Kashmir. The war ended within 17 days with a UN-sponsored ceasefire and was far from decisive. But official propaganda convinced the people of Pakistan that their military had won the war.” Tashkent punctured that balloon before long.

According to Haqqani, “The Tashkent agreement made no mention of Pakistan’s demand for a plebiscite in Kashmir either, which made the people wonder why Pakistan’s ‘military victory’ did not bring it any gain in territory or at least the promise of a future favourable settlement . Once it became known that the initiation of the war had been a blunder, the Pakistani establishment blamed Bhutto for advocating the guerrilla foray which led to the war. The official account is, however, replete with inaccuracies. For example, Bhutto is accused of hyping up reports from Kashmir that the people would rise up for ‘liberation’ if a fuse was lit in the Kashmir Valley. But the Foreign Office, which Bhutto headed at the time, had no role in reporting on the situation inside Kashmir. That was the task of Pakistan’s intelligence services. To cover their irrational exuberance in reporting on the ground situation in Kashmir, the intelligence services later fed falsified accounts to the media of how Bhutto had been the brains behind the war.”

Khalid Hasan is Daily Times’ US-based correspondent. His e-mail is khasan2@cox.net
Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan

Ayub misled nation in ’65 war: Nur Khan

From our correspondent

8 September 2005


ISLAMABAD — The 1965 war was based on a lie in which Ayub Khan and his generals misled the nation that India rather than Pakistan had provoked the war and that “we were the victims of Indian aggression”, Air Marshal Nur Khan, a war hero who led the country’s air force at the time, has said.

He said a coterie of army generals including its chief Gen Musa decided to send 8,000 infiltrators from the Pakistan army into India-held Kashmir in an abortive bid to foment Kashmiri revolt with vain hope that India would not retaliate and attack Pakistan.

Both the air force and the navy as also most of army commanders were kept in the dark and when the invasion came on September 6, 1965 with Lahore being the first Indian target, all of them, including the Lahore commander were taken by surprise.

The ‘Operation Gibraltar’, code name for infiltration into Kashmir proved a disaster as the local population did not cooperate and even helped the Indian forces to capture or kill almost all of 8,000 Pakistan army troops sneaking into the occupied territory.

Sharing his memoirs with Dawn on the 1965 war, which is celebrated as a victory in Pakistan on September 6 every year, Air Marshal (retired) Nur Khan said President Field Marshal Ayub Khan was petrified when only on the second day after India chose to attack Lahore on September 6, 1965, his army chief informed him he has another two days’ of ammunition left with him.

That was the extent of preparation in the Army. And the information had shocked Gen Ayub so much that it could have triggered his heart ailment, which overtook him a couple of years later. Ayub’s son Gohar Ayub Khan recently sparked a fierce controversy in both countries by claiming that an Indian brigadier had sold his country’s secret war plans to Ayub Khan for only Rs20, 000. His critics say the state of preparedness of Pakistan army at the time of invasion belies his claim.

Nur Khan led the air force to a heroic feat of completely dominating the air within hours of the start of the war, which it maintained till Soviet Union and the United Nations intervened to enforce a ceasefire 17 days later.

Nur Khan had replaced Asghar Khan only 43 days before the war and came close to resigning the very day he took command of Pakistan Air Force on July 23, 1965, when he learned about Operation Gibraltar. He thought the operation was a great folly that would sure provoke India to retaliate by expanding the war to international borders beyond Kashmir.

“Rumours about an impending operation were rife but the army had not shared the plans with other forces,” Air Marshal Nur Khan said. He said that he was the most disturbed man on the day, instead of feeling proud.

Air Marshal (retired) Asghar Khan while handing over the command to Nur Khan had not briefed him about any impending war because he was not aware of it himself. So, in order to double check, Nur Khan called on the then Commander-in-Chief, General Musa Khan.

Under his searching questions Gen Musa wilted and with a sheepish smile admitted that something was afoot. Lt. Gen. Malik Akhtar Hussain who led the operation said the same thing. Nur Khan’s immediate reaction was that this would mean war.

A still incredulous Nur Khan was shocked when on further inquiry he found that except for a small coterie of top generals, very few in the armed forces knew about ‘Operation Gibraltar’. He asked himself how good, intelligent and professional people like Musa and Malik could be so ‘naive, so irresponsible’.

For the air marshal, it was unbelievable. Even the then Lahore garrison commander had not been taken into confidence. And governor of West Pakistan, Malik Amir Mohammad Khan of Kalabagh did not know what was afoot and had gone to Murree for vacations.

It was at this point that he felt like resigning and going home. But then he thought such a rash move would further undermine the country’s interests. Therefore, he kept his cool and went about counting his chickens — the entire air force was too young and too inexperienced to be called anything else then — and gearing up his service for the D-day.

The miracle that the PAF achieved on September 6, to a large extent, is attributed to Nur Khan’s leadership. He led his force from up front and set personal example by going on some highly risky sorties himself. But he credits Asghar Khan for turning the PAF as a highly professional, well oiled and dedicated fighting machine since he was named its chief in 1957.

The performance of the Army did not match that of the PAF mainly because the leadership was not as professional. “They had planned the ‘Operation Gibraltar’ for self-glory rather than in the national interest. It was a wrong war. And they misled the nation with a big lie that India rather than Pakistan had provoked the war and that we were the victims of Indian aggression”, Air Marshal Khan said.

This in short is Nur Khan’s version of 1965 war, which he calls an unnecessary war and says that President Ayub for whom he has the greatest regard should have held his senior generals accountable for the debacle and himself resigned.

Khaleej Times Online - Ayub misled nation in ’65 war: Nur Khan
 
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