Operation Searchlight
Operation Searchlight was a planned military extermination carried out by the Pakistan Army to curb the Bengali nationalist movement in erstwhile East Pakistan in March 1971. Ordered by the government in West Pakistan, this was seen as the sequel to "Operation Blitz" which had been launched in November 1970. The original plan envisioned taking control of the major cities on March 26, and then eliminating all opposition, political or military, within one month. Prolonged Bengali resistance was not anticipated by Pakistani planners. The main phase of Operation Searchlight ended with the fall of the last major town in Bengali hands in mid-May. The operation also precipitated the 1971 Bangladesh atrocities. These systematic killings enraged Bengalis, who declared independence from Pakistan, and caused refugees to flee to India.
The violence resulting from Operation Searchlight was one of the precipating factors of the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971, which led to full fledged Indian retaliation augmented by the Mukti Bahini on Pakistani occupation forces in Bangladesh, resulting in Pakistan Army's unconditional surrender to the joint command of Indian Army and Mukti Bahini on December 16, 1971.
BACKGROUND
After the Awami League had won a decisive majority (capturing 167 out of 300 seats) in the 1970 Pakistan parliamentary elections, the Bengali population expected a swift transfer of power to the Awami League based on the Six Point Programme. On February 28, 1971, Yahya Khan, the President of Pakistan, postponed the national assembly meeting scheduled for March. The Awami League, in response to the postponement, launched a program of non cooperation (largely outlined in the March 7th Awami League rally) which was so successful that the authority of the Pakistan government became limited to the cantonments and government institutions in East Pakistan. Clashes between civilians and the Pakistani Army, and between Bengali and Bihari communities erupted and became commonplace. President Yahya Khan flew to Dhaka to hold talks with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, leader of the Awami League in March, and was later joined by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then the leader of Pakistan Peoples Party, which had secured the second largest share of seats in the elections. Unwilling to transfer power to the Awami League (fearing a transfer of power would erode the economic dominance of West Pakistan), or to lose face by backing down in face of the non cooperation movement, the Pakistani generals decided on a military crackdown.
The operational plan
The planning process
The plan was drawn up in March 1971 by Major General Khadim Hussain Raza, GOC 14th Division, and Major General Rao Farman Ali, as a followup of decisions taken at a meeting of the Pakistani army staff on 22 February. The 16th infantry division from Quetta and the 9th division from Kharian, West Pakistan, were ordered to prepare to move to East Pakistan in mid-February also as a result of that meeting.
Before putting the plan into action, senior Pakistani officers in East Pakistan who were unwilling to support the military attack on civilians, Lt. General Shahabzada Yakub Khan, GOC East Pakistan, and the governor of East Pakistan, Vice Admiral S.M. Ahsan, were relieved of their duties. Lt. Gen. Tikka Khan became the Governor and GOC of East Pakistan. On March 17, General Raza was given authority to plan the operation via telephone by General Hamid, COS, Pakistan Army. On the morning of March 18, General Raza and Major General Rao Farman Ali wrote the plan at the GOC's office at Dacca cantonment. The plan was written on a light blue office pad with a lead pencil by General Farman containing 16 paragraphs spread over five pages.
General Farman defined the operational premises and conditions for success, while General Khadim dealt with the distribution of forces and tasks assigned to the individual brigades and other units. It assumed that the Bengali Army and other military units would revolt at the onset of operations and the planners suggested that all Bengali units under arms should be disarmed prior to commencing the operation, and the political leadership arrested during a planned meeting with the President, General Yahya Khan. No operational reserves were earmarked. The handwritten plan was reviewed with General Hamid and Lt. General Tikka Khan on 20 March at the flag staff house. General Hamid objected to the immediate disarming of regular army Bengali units, but approved the disarming of the EPR, armed police and other para-military formations. Yahya Khan refused to sanction the arrest of Awami League leaders during a meeting with him, as the plan had proposed. The amended plan was approved and distributed to various area commanders.
The Operation was to start on the night of 25 March 1971 in Dacca, and other garrisons were to be alerted via phone about their zero hour to start their activities. General Farman Ali commanded the forces in Dhaka, while the rest of the province was commanded by General Khadim. Lt. General Tikka Khan and his staff were present in the 31st field command center, to supervise and support the command staff of the 14th division.
Major components of the plan
Operational premises
As outlined by the Pakistani planners, the operation aimed to eliminate the Awami League apparatus and any civilians and personnel of the armed forces supporting the Awami League movement in defiance of martial law. Cunning, surprise, deception and speed was emphasised as crucial for success. Use of free and greater force was authorised. Search and assault of civilian areas and Hindu areas also were authorised.
Requirements for success
1. Operation to be launched simultaneously all across East Pakistan.
2. Maximum number of political and student leaders, and those among cultural organizations and teaching staff to be arrested.
3. Operation must achieve 100% success in Dhaka. Dhaka University would be occupied and searched.
4. Free and greater use of fire authorised for securing cantonments.
5. All internal and international communications to be cut off, including telephone, television, radio and telegraph.
6. All East Pakistani (Bengali) troops to be neutralised by seizing weapons and ammunition.
7. To deceive the Awami League, President Yahia Khan to pretend to continue dialogue, even if Mr. Bhutto disagrees, and to agree to Awami League demands.
The designated centers of offensive operations under that plan were Dacca, Khulna, Chittagong, Comilla, Jessore, Rajshahi, Rangpur, Saidpur and Sylhet, areas where West Pakistani army units were concentrated. Pakistani Army units and paramilitary elements in other areas of East Pakistan were to maintain control of their respective areas and await reinforcements during the initial phase of the operation. Once Dhaka had been secured, the 9th and 16th divisions from Pakistan were to be airlifted into East Pakistan as reinforcements. Cities with airfields (Chittagong, Syhlet, Jessore, Rangpur, Comilla) would be reinforced via C-130 airplanes or heliborne troops directly from Dhaka.
Although the plan did not specify the time needed to subdue East Pakistan, it was assumed that after the arrest of the political leadership and disarming of the Bengali military and paramilitary units, civilians could be terrorised into submitting to martial law within a week. Lt. Gen. Tikka Khan estimated that no resistance would remain after April 10th.
Composition of Pakistan Armed Forces in East Pakistan
The 14th infantry division was the only Pakistan Army division stationed in East Pakistan in March 1971. This division had four infantry brigades attached to it, instead of the normally alloted three brigades. The 57th infantry brigade (under Brig. Jahanzab Arbab - W.Pakistani) was headquartered in Dacca, the 53rd (Brig. Iqbal Shafi- W.Pakistani) was in Comilla, the 23rd (Brig. Abdullah Khan Malik - Pakistani) in Rangpur and the 107th (Brig. A.R. Durrani - W.Pakistani) was in Jessore. Brig. M.H. Mozumdar, a Bengali, was in command of the Chittagong area. Normally, each brigade contained 3 or 4 infantry battalions and a field artillery regiment and various support elements.
The four brigades of the 14th Infantry division had 12 infantry regiments (regiments normally had 915 soldiers each) containing purely West Pakistani personnel (mainly hailing from Punjabi, Baluch, Pathan and Sindhi background) before March 25, 1971. This division also had 5 field artillery regiments, a light anti aircraft regiment, a commando battalion (the 3rd), all of which contained a majority of Pakistani personnel, in various East Pakistani bases. The only armoured regiment in East Pakistan, the 29th Cavalry in Rangpur, was a mixed unit. 20% of the East Pakistan Rifles (EPR) personnel were also from West Pakistan, while the support elements of the various units and cantonments were mostly of mixed nationality. Most of the individual unit commanders and majority of the officers were from West Pakistan.
The Pakistan Air Force had 20 F-86 Saber Jets and 3 T-33 Trainers at the Dacca airbase. The Army aviation wing had a squadron of 4 Mi-8 and 4 Allouette III helicopters posted in East Pakistan. C-130 Hercules planes were transferred to Dhaka for the operation from West Pakistan. Airfields were located in Chittagong, Comilla, Lalmonirhut near Rangpur, in Salutikor near Sylhet, in Jessore and near Thakurgaon.
The Pakistan Navy had 4 gunboats (Rajshahi, Jessore, Comilla and Sylhet) a patrol boat (Balaghat) and the destroyer PNS Jahangir in East Pakistan. PNS Babur, flagship of the Pakistan Navy would visit East Pakistan after the operation started. Major naval bases were located in Dhaka, Chittagong and Mongla.
Pakistan Army Bengali units in East Pakistan
6 regular army Bengali infantry regiments were present in East Pakistan in March 1971. The 1st East Bengal Regiment (EBR) was in Jessore, attached to the 107th Brigade. The 2nd EBR was in Joydevpur north of Dacca, attached to the 57th Brigade. The 3rd EBR was in Saidpur with the 23rd Brigade, and the 4th EBR was in Comilla with the 53rd Brigade. The 8th EBR was preparing to ship to West Pakistan and was at 75% strength in Chittagong. The East Bengal Regimental Center (EBRC) in Chittagong housed 2,000 Bengali troops including the newly raised 9th EBR. The 10th EBR, a training unit, was in the Dacca cantonment attached to the 14th Division. Bengali officers commanded the 1st, 2nd and the 10th EBR, while the rest were under Pakistani officers.
Other Bengali forces
The East Pakistan police was majority Bengali, with some Pakistani officers. The East Pakistan Rifles (EPR), a 15,000 strong (80% Bengali) paramilitary force, was divided into 17 operational wings (each wing contained 3 to 6 companies of 150 men each) in 7 sectors (headquartered in Dacca, Mymenshingh, Jessore, Rajshahi, Dinajpur, Sylhet and Chittagong) and was deployed around the country. The EPR companies were often divided into sections (15-20 soldiers) and platoons (20-35 soldiers) and deployed in camps near the border or in border outposts. Unlike regular army units, EPR companies were commanded by JCO/NCOs (army companies normally were commanded by Captains or Major ranked officers), and EPR wings contained only light anti-tank weapons and mortars as artillery weapons. EPR Headquarters and 2,500 EPR troops were posted in Dhaka. The majority of the EPR officers were from West Pakistan, serving on deputation from the regular army for 2 to 3 years.
Pre operational steps implementation
The planners needed to ensure that all Pakistani unit commanders became aware of their role prior to commencing operation, which had to be done while maintaining complete secrecy. The concentration of forces and allocation of supplies, as well as arrival of reinforcements from West Pakistan and briefing of Area commanders had to be carried without raising suspicion. On 24 and 25 March, a group of Pakistani Generals, accompanied by General Hamid, General Mittha, the Quartermaster General, and Col. Saadullah, Principal Staff Officer, visited major garrisons via helicopter and personally briefed garrison commanders and senior West Pakistani officers on the operation.
Secrecy had been strictly maintained; only a few Lt. Colonels learned about the plan beforehand on a need to know basis. Although some Bengali officers had become suspicious of the all West Pakistani officer briefings, no one outside the briefings learned the details beforehand.
Managing logistics
Maj. Gen. Qamar Ali Mirza and Brig. Harrison arrived from West Pakistan during the second week of March to arrange the logistical details, mainly because the non cooperation program was hampering food supply to the cantonments. The main ammunition depots were located in Rajendrapur near Dhaka and 9000 tons of arms and ammunition were in Chittagong abroad MV Swat, so it was decided to speed up the unloading of the ship. Pakistani troops started arriving in Dacca via PIA flights carrying "special passengers", in addition to the 13 FF and 22 Baluch which had already arrived. The planners also had to make arrangements to house and feed these additional arrivals - a fact that was noted by Bengali officers in the army supply units, but ultimately nothing threatening to the plan came of this.
Shuffling of armed forces personnel
The army also took steps to enhance their chances of success by relocating Bengali officers away from sensitive areas, and bringing Pakistani troops to the cities. The departure of two Pakistani army units, the 25th Punjab and the 20th Baluch was delayed, and the 13th Frontier Force and the 22nd Baluch regiments were flown to Dhaka from West Pakistan. To maintain secrecy, no major reinforcements were initially sent to the other garrisons in East Pakistan before March 25.
Brig. Mozumdar, who had refused to fire on Bengal civilians blocking the unloading of MV Swat was relieved of his post on 24 March and Brig. M.H. Ansari (West Pakistani) took command of Chittagong area. Maj. Khaled Musharraf, Brigade Major of the 57th Brigade, was sent to 4th Bengal in Comilla as 2IC on March 22nd. Lt. Col. Masudul Hasan (CO 2nd EBR) was relieved of his post. Pakistanis refrained from mass transfer of Bengali officers, as that might have compromised security of the plan. Bengali officers were urged to take leave (although all leave had been cancelled since February 1971), while West Pakistani officers were told to stay put. Families of West Pakistani officers and soldiers were evacuated from East Pakistan, and when possible families of some West Pakistani civilians were brought into the cities.
Dispersion of Bengali units before March 25
Denied permission by General Hamid to disarm the regular Bengali army units en masse before the crackdown, the Pakistani command employed other ploys to minimise the threat of these formations.
Bengali units were sent out of the cantonments, or were broken into smaller units and deployed away from each other, and cut off from the main radio and wireless communication grid before or on 25 March. Bengali officers were sent on leave, or were posted away from command centers or units directly involved in the operation. In some cases, West Pakistani officers took command of Bengali formations. Some Bengali soldiers were sent on leave, and some were disarmed on various pretexts whenever possible without raising alarm.
The 1st EBR (at 50% strength), was sent out of Jessore cantonment to Chaugacha near the border for winter training, where they stayed until March 29. Companies of the 2nd EBR were disbursed around areas outide Dacca and their radio communication net was shut off. The 3rd EBR had its companies disbursed around Ghoraghat, and at Parvatipur outside the Saidpur cantonment. The 4th EBR units were deployed between Brahmanbaria and Shamshernagar. Only in Chittagong did the regular army Bengali units remain in their respective bases.
West Pakistani EPR troops were posted in the cities whenever possible, while Bengali EPR troops were sent to the border outposts. Most EPR units were away from the main action areas, and would need at least a day to reach the major cities. The EPR wireless net was shut off on the night of March 24 or 25.
Operation Searchlight: March 25/26 to April 10
This is a brief description of the units engaged and the result of Pakistani military action from March 25 until April 10, when the operation was supposed to end. This only covers events in the areas that were the major focus of Operation Searchlight, not the Bengali resistance throughout East Pakistan. In some areas, Pakistani assault and mass murders started clashes with the Bengali forces on 25 March. In other areas, no clashes took place until as late as the 30 March.
Dhaka
Pakistani troops in Dhaka, commanded by Maj. Gen. Farman, had the following objectives:
Impose curfew at 0110 hrs and close telephone/telegraph/radio station and shut all presses down
Seal off the city by taking over road, rail and river communication and patrol river
Arrest Sheikh Mujib and 15 top Awami League leaders during operation
Conduct house to house search in Dhanmondi and Hindu areas
Subdue Dhaka University, EPR HQ and Rajarbagh police line, disarm 2nd and 10th EBR
Take over and protect Ammunition factory at Gazipur and Arms depot at Rajendrapur.
Pakistani forces: In addition to the Eastern Command HQ, the headquarters of the 14th division and the 57th brigade were also located in Dacca cantonment. The regular army units present were: the 57th Brigade containing: 18th and 32nd Punjab (C.O: Lt. Col. Taj) regiments, 13th Frontier Force regiment, 22nd Baluch regiment, 604th Intellegence unit and the 31st Field Artillery Regiment (CO: Lt. Col. Zahid Hassan). 14th division HQ had the following units attached to it: 43rd Light Ack-Ack regiment (CO: Lt. Col. Shaffat Ali - Pakistani), elements of the 3rd Commando Battalion (CO: Lt. Col. Z.A. Khan - Pakistani), 19th Signal Regiment (CO: Lt. Col. Ifthekhar Hussain -Pakistani) and the 149th infantry workshop. PAF personnel were stationed at the Tejgaon airport. Also, a squadron of at least 14 M24 Chaffee tanks from the 29th Cavalry regiment was stationed in Dhaka. In addition to these units, other support elements (engineering, supply and medical units) of the 57th brigade, the 14th division and the Eastern Command HQ were located in Dacca.
Bengali forces: The 10th EBR (C.O: Lt. Col. Moyeeduddin - Bengali) was stationed in the Dacca cantonment. 2,500 EPR troops were attached with the EPR HQ (the 13th, 15th and 16th wings, plus the EPR HQ wing and signals wing) at Pilkhana. Each EPR wing contained 3 companies, although most EPR troops were at Pilkhana, 2 companies were deployed in Mirpur, two at the President house and one at the Governor house in the city. W.Pakistani Brig. Nissar Ahmad Khan was the director general of all EPR while Lt. Col. Anwar Hossain Shah (W. Pakistani) commanded EPR Dhaka sector troops. The Rajarbag police line housed at least 2,000 armed police. 2nd EBR (C.O: Lt. Col. Rakib - Bengali) was at Joydevpur to the north of Dhaka, with one company in Tangail and one at Mymensying and a small detachment at Gazipur. EPR 2nd wing HQ (C.O - Capt. Qamar Abbas - W. Pakistani) was also at Mymensingh, containing no Bengali officers.
Course of events: Bengali EPR officers were detained by the Pakistanis in Pilkhana and the troops were mostly ordered to stand down and relax, while 22nd Baluch took over security duties at Pilkhana on March 25th morning hours. Rumor spread in the city after dusk that Yahia Khan had left and Awami League volunteers put up makeshift barricades in the streets, but these did not cause any significant delay to Pakistani troop movements. The volunteers manning the barricades were the first civilians to be shot by Pakistani troops. Although the operation was to start at 0110 hours, Pakistani troops moved out at 11:30 PM from Dacca cantonment. The army was given a 6 hour deadline to achieve its goal in Dhaka. 13th Frontier Force maintained the security of the cantonment and the 43 light Ack Ack took over airport security during the operation.
The 10th Bengal was easily disarmed in the cantonment and later eliminated. The 31st Field was deployed in the second capital of Dacca city itself and secured the northern part of the city. Pakistani Army troops quickly shut off all communication channels in Dacca before commencing the operation. The commandos easily captured Sheikh Mujibur Rahman at the beginning of the crackdown, but most of the Awami League senior leadership managed to evade capture and left the city by 29th of March.
The 22nd Baluch at the EPR HQ attacked and subdued the disorganised resistance of the mostly disarmed EPR after an all night battle. Pakistanis captured the EPR troops posted at Mirpur, the President House and the Governor house without resistance, but many managed to flee while some were executed.
Contingents from the 18th and 32nd Punjab regiments assaulted the Dacca University area, subdued the light resistance from the Awami League volunteers, killed unarmed students present in the resident halls, also murdered some professors, then moved on to attack the Hindu areas and the old town on the morning of March 26th. The Police at Rajarbag, aided by Awami League volunteers, put up a stout resistance, but were eventually overcome and most survivors were captured or scattered. Pakistani forces had used artillery and armour liberally, disregarding civilian safety altogether during the operation. The city was secured before dawn and a curfew was imposed. Surviving EPR and police fled the city, some crossed the Buriganga river to gather at Jingira. Sporadic attacks on the army took place during March 26-April 5,, but barring the failure to arrest Awami league leaders, the army had achieved its objectives. Pakistani soldiers also destroyed the Shaheed Minar, offices of the Daily Ittafaq, Daily People and the Kali temple at Ramna, which had no military value.
Captured Bengali soldiers, EPR and police personnel were either executed or imprisoned without trial. From March 26 to April 6, in an operation dubbed "GREAT FLY-IN" PIA Boeings and C 130 Transports would fly the 9th (made of the 27th, 313ed and 117th Bdes)and 16th (34th and 205th bdes) divisions (a total of 5 Brigade Hqs, containing 16 infantry battalions) to Dacca, and elements of these formations would be flown to various locations in East Pakistan to reinforce Pakistani garrisons. 2 Mortar batteries and 2 wings each of EPCAF and West Pakistan Rangers, accompanied by a considerable number of Tochi and Thal Scouts were also deployed.
Pakistan army lifted the curfew for 2 hours on 27th March, when thousands of civilians left Dacca for the countryside. Pakistani troops began to move out of the city after March 26th, taking up positions at Demra to the east, Tongi to the north, Narayangaung to the south, to block road access to the city. By April 10th, Pakistani Army had taken over the area between the Padma to the south and Tangail-Narshindi to the north.
Mymensingh-Joydevpur
The 2nd EBR was posted in Joydevpur to the north of Dhaka, and had detachments posted in the Gazipur Ordnance factory (which had a small arsenal)and Rajendrapur Munitions factory (also housed an ammunition depot). Pakistani planners had feared that this unit could launch attacks on Dhaka Airport or the cantonment itself and disrupt the operation during the early hours of March 25/26, when Dhaka garrison had no reserve forces to spare. Although Lt. Col. Masudul Hasan had informed Maj. K M Shafiullah of the Pakistani crackdown on March 26th via telephone, the unit did not take any action until March 27th. Pakistani troops took control of the Rajendrapur factory on March 26th and began to replinsh munitions from that depot.
EPR 2nd wing (4 companies, one in Mymenshing, while other were posted to the north at Naqshi, Karaitoli and Lengura) was HQed at Mymenshing, along with a company of 2 EBR and a mixed company of W. Pakistani soldiers. The Pakistani unit attacked the EPR company on March 27th but was wiped out on March 28th. Other 2nd Wing companies neutralised Pakistani soldiers (either arrested them and sent them across the border or killed them) and deployed in towns to the east and west of Mymensingh by March 29th. The 2nd EBR, under Major Shafiullah, revolted on 27th March, partially looted the Gazipur armory and regrouped at Mymensingh on 30th March. Shafiullah took command of 2nd EBR and 7 EPR companies (4 from 2nd wing and 3 made out of EPR, police, Mujahid and Answer personnel), and deployed his forces at Tangail, Bahadurabad, Sirajgaung, and Gaffargaon. 3 EPR companies were sent to Dacca to conduct sneak attacks, while the 2nd EBR moved via Kishorgaung and Narshindi to attack Dacca. Maj. Shafiullah canceled the plan on 31 March and joined the forces of Khaled Mosharraf north of Comilla with the 2nd EBR troops.
Pakistani forces (27th Brigade) moved north from Dacca on April 1st, one column headed for Tangail while the other for Narshindi. EPR forces ambushed them near Tangail, but Pakistanies broke through despite heavy casualties and Tangail fell on April 9th. Two columns headed north from Tangail, one towards Jamalpur and the other towards Mymensingh. Despite being repeatedly ambushed by Bengali forces, Jamalpur fell on April 14 and Mymensingh by April 22nd.
PAF bombed Narshindi on April 6th, dispursing the EPR forces, and the army column (31st Baluch) attacked EPR positions near Narshindi on 8th April. This was repulsed, but the next attack, aided by artillery and Saber jets, broke through on April 9th and Narshindi fell on April 12th. Mopping up action was conducted by the 27th Brigade, which secured Mymensingh, Sylhet and part of Comilla division by June.
Chittagong
Chittagong housed the only oil refienry in East Pakistan, had a large fuel depot, was the largest seaport and MV Swat, with 9000 tons of arms and ammunition was in port. Bengali units substantially outnumbered the West Pakistani Chittagong garrison, which was a cause of concern for Pakistani planners. Bengali officers of EPR and EBR had discussed a preemptive strike on Pakistan forces, but the senior Bengali officers (Lt. Col M.R. Choudhury -Chief Instructor, EBRC) and Major Ziaur Rahman (2IC, 8 EBR), dissuaded Captain Rafiq (Sector Adjutant, EPR) from rebelling in the belief that the Pakistani army would not take action against civilians. Attempts to unload arms and ammunition from MV Swat were a partial failure during March 20-25th, as civilian protestors blocked any attempt to take the arms to the cantonment and many were shot by the army. Brig. Mazumdar was relieved of his post because of this failure.
Pakistani units were given the following objectives in Chittagong:
Disarm EBRC units, 8 EBR, EPR and police units
Seize police armory, radio station and telephone exchange
Liaise with Pakistani Navy
Arrest Lt. Col. MR Chaudhury and Awami League leaders.
The Chittagong garrison was to be reinforced by the bulk of 53rd Brigade troops from Comilla on March 26th.
Pakistani forces: The Chittagong cantonment is located to the north of the city, while the Naval base was near the airport on the south end of the city. The port facilities are positioned between the airport and the naval base. The 20th Baluch regiment (CO: Lt. Col. Fatami-Pakistani), minus its advance party, was the only army unit present in the cantonment besides a company from the 31st Punjab and elements from the 3rd Commando battalion. These were supported by a section of 6 M24 Chaffee tanks from the 29 Cavalry. The Pakistani Navy (under Commodore Mumtaz) had 300 troops and the PAF had an unknown number of personnel at the naval base and at the airport respectively. Also, some commandos were operating in civilian clothing in the city.[23] EPR had about 300 Pakistani troops in Chittagong EPR HQ. PNS Jahangir, a destroyer, and the gunboat PNS Rajshahi was also present in Chittagong.
Bengali forces: The East Bengal Regimental Center (EBRC - Commanded by Lt. Col. Shaigri- Pakistani), located in the cantonment housed 2,000 Bengali troops, including the newly raised 9th EBR. The 8th EBR (CO: Lt. Col. Rashid Janjua, Pakistani) was at 50% strength and stationed outside the cantonment. EPR Chittagong Sector (C.O: Lt. Col. Abdul Aziz Sheikh - W. Pakistani) had the 11th (5 companies), 14th (4 companies)and the 17th wings(4 companies) attached to it. Sector HQ was at Halishahar south of the cantonment, where a company from each wing in addition to HQ company, nearly 600 Bengali and 300 Pakistani troops were billeted. Other 14th Wing companies were deployed at Ramgarh, Taindong and Sajek, to the north and east of Chittagong. 17th wing had 2 companies at Kaptai and 1 at Rangamati. 11th Wing had a company at Cox's Bazar, Teknaf, Barkal and Maislong areas. The Dampara police line housed a substantial police contingent. A company of Bengali troops were deployed to unload munitions from the MV Swat at the port. An EPR platoon guarded the airport.
Course of events: Brig. Ansari supervised the unloading of arms from MV Swat during the daytime of March 25th. The Bengali troops worked through the night and was joined by some Bengali troops by midday March 26th. Naval personnel secured the "MV Swat" and arrested or executed all Bengali troops present inthe jetty in the evening. The intervention of Commodor Mumtaj (W. Pakistani) kept Bengali naval personnel at the Naval base safe from harm. Just after dusk on March 25th, Navy personnel had taken control of the airport and arrested all EPR personnel present there. Communication networks had been partially shut down before the attack.
EPR troops, under Captain Rafiqul Islam, revolted after learning of the crackdown in Dacca and took control of parts of the city, which they held until April 3. This is the only instance where Bengali units launched a preemptive strike against the Pakistanis during the operation. They arrested all the Pakistani EPR soldiers posted at the EPR HQ. Captain Rafiq deployed his troops in Agrabad (100 soldiers), Railway Hill (150) and Court hill (a platoon). The rest guarded the EPR HQ. Around 4:00 March 26th, Major Bahar (CO 53rd Brigade Signal Company -Bengali), warned Captain Rafiq of the Pakistani reinforcements moving towards Chittagiong. Captain Rafiq sent an EPR platoon to set up ambush at Kumira, 12 miles north of the city. Captain Bhuyan (EBRC), took a mixed force Police/EPR/EBR personnel) and took command at Kumira, bolstering the force to company strength. All EPR companies stationed outside Chittagong were ordered to gather in the city.
Around 11:30PM on 25th March the 20th Baluch had launched a surprise attack on EBRC, killing or capturing more than 1,000 Bengali troops (including Lt. Col. M.R. Chowdhury) and scattering the rest, securing the cantonment. A few survivors made their way to 8 EBR and begged for help. Major Ziaur Rahman was away, making his way to port to unload ammunition from MV Swat while Major Mir Shawkat Ali was ordered to take a company to the port. Upon hearing of the attack, 8th EBR revolted and left the city to regroup at Kalurghat and did not take part in the initial battles in Chittagong. Pakistani officers attached to 8 EBR were killed. Major Zia incorporated the EPR companies coming from Kaptai and Cox's Bazar into his force - leaving Captain Rafiq without reinforcements.
Pakistani reinforcements coming from Comilla (under Brig. Iqbal Shafi) were successfully ambushed at Kumira at 7:00 PM on March 26th, and lost all contact with the division and brigade HQ. By 27th March, most Bengali troops outside Chittagong city had assembled near the Kalurghat bridge, away from the battle in the city, where Major Zia had set up command. The Kalurghat Radio station, which was used to declare the independence of Bangladesh on behalf of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, was operated until March 31, when it was silenced by air strikes.
The Pakistani force ambushed at Kumira made contact with the Pakistani troops in Chittagong on 29 March. Using artillery, naval guns and airstrikes, Pakistani troops took effective control of the city by April 3rd, and by April 6th, all Bengali troops had left the city to regroup in 2 areas, at Kalurghat (1,000+ Bengali troops of the EPR and EBR), and at Kumira, north of the city, thus cutting the Chittagong-Comilla highway link. By the 10th of April, Pakistani troops were poised to launch a three pronged coordinated attack to drive the Bengali troops from their positions.
Comilla
Comilla is on the strategically important Dhaka-Chittagong highway and a crucial road link. Pakistani objectives were:
Disarm 4 EBR, EPR and police
Secure town, telephone exchange and arrest Awami League leaders
Pakistani forces: 53rd Brigade HQ (Brig. Iqbal Shafi) was located in the Comilla cantonment, which also contained the 24th Frontier Force regiment (CO: Lt. Col. Shahpur Khan), 3rd Commando Battalion (Lt. Col. Z.A. Khan) minus elements, the 53rd Field Artillery Regiment (CO: Lt. Col. Yaqub Malik), 2 120 mm mortar batteries, the 40th Field ambulance (CO: Lt. Col. Zahangir - Bengali) troops and Engineering company troops.
Bengali forces: The 4th EBR (Lt. Col. Khijir Hayat - Pakistani) was at Brahmanbaria, 50 miles north of Comilla, with a company under Major Khaled Mosharraf at Shamshernagar. Support and supply troops were in the Comilla cantonment. The EPR 1st wing HQ was in Comilla and units were posted around Akhaura, north east of the city.
Course of Events: The Pakistanis easily arrested and imprisoned or executed Bengali troops in Comilla cantonment, then wiped out the police in Comilla city on 26 of March. The EPR HQ wing was warned of the attack and most EPR personnel managed to escape. A convoy of 80 to 100 vehicles bearing the 24th Frontier Force, the mortar batteries, commando troops and the engineers started for Chittagong after Comilla was secured. An engineering company had been sent to Feni on March 25th to secure the road. This column was ambushed by the EPR 12 miles from Chittagong on 26 March evening. The 4th EBR, led by Major Shafaat Jamil, foiled a plot to disarm their Bengali officers, and under Maj. Khaled Musharraf, revolted on 27 March. They took over areas immediately north and south of Comilla with the aid of EPR troops and civilian volunteers. The 3rd Commando battalion attacked and eliminated the 4th EBR rear party in the cantonment on 29 March.
Nearly 1000+ Bengali soldiers and their families, including doctors posted at the CMH, were killed on the orders of Lt. Col. Malik by 30th March in Comilla. Pakistanis maintained control of the city and the airfield throughout the operation. By April 10, Bengali troops still controlled major cities in Comilla, Noakhali and Syhlet. Pakistani 27th, 313th, and 117th Brigades were attacking these positions. Comilla was reinforced by helibourne troops from April 2nd, but their efforts to breakout from the city were foiled by Bengali fighters. The first major success of the Pakistani Comilla contingent came on April 19, when Akhaura fell to them.
Sylhet
Pakistani objectives were:
Secure Radio station and exchange
Secure Kean bridge and airport
Disarm EPR and police, arrest Awami league leaders
Pakistani forces: The 31st Punjab regiment minus 1 company was in located Syhlet. This unit was attached to the 53rd brigade. One company was at Shamshernagar, presumably to ambush the 4th Bengal company under Khaled Mosharraf, and another was at Maulavibazar, presumably moving to Brahmanbaria to subdue the rest of 4th Bengal. These companies were delayed enroute by barricades thrown up on the roads by Bengalies. The remnant of 31st Punjab was in Sylhet.
Bengali forces EPR troops attached to EPR sector HQ (CO: Lt. Col. Sekandar -W. Pakistani) and 1 company from the 3rd wing was deployed in Sylhet city. The rest of the companies from the 12th and 3rd wings were deployed near the border. EPR 1st wing, part of the Sylhet sector, was in Comilla.
Course of events: The Pakistanis maintained control of the airfield and the cantonment throughout the operation. Bengali forces drove back the Pakistanies from Shemshernagar and Sherpur by April 2nd. 31 Panjad launched an attack on the EPR Sunamgaung position and routed the EPR. There were sporadic clashes around the city, which the Pakistanis evacuated on April 7 to take up positions at the airfield. They would remain surrounded by Bengali forces until 10 April when the Pakistanis, reinforced via air transport by the 313th brigade, counterattacked and retook Sylhet city. Bengali fources attacked Shalutikar airfield, but were replused. Major C.R. Dutta commanded the Bengali forces, with Major Shafiullah commanding in the area between the commands of C.R. Dutta and Khaled Musharraf in Comilla.
Jessore
Pakistani army Jessore contingent were given the following objectives:
Disarm 1st EBR, EPR sector HQ and police
Secure town, telephone exchange and arrest Awami League leaders
Maintain control of cantonment and airfield
Reinforce Khulna if required.
Pakistani forces: The 107th Brigade HQ was in Jessore. It had the 26th Baluch regiment, the 27th Baluch regiment minus a company, elements of the 22nd Frontier Force, the 55th Field Artillery Regiment and elements of the 24th Field Artillery Regiment and various support and supply formations attached to the brigade.
Bengali forces: The 1st EBR (Lt. Col. Rezaul Jalil - Bengali) was in winter training away from the cantonment. The unit was at 50% strength, as it was preparing to move to West Pakistan. Other than support and supply troops in the cantonment, there were armed police in the city. EPR sector HQ was located nearby. 7th Field ambulence was in the cantonment. EPR sector HQ troops and a platoon from EPR 5th wing was in the city.
Course of events: No clashes took place in Jessore cantonment or city during March 25-27. 1st EBR returned to the cantonment on 29 March, unaware of the crackdown in Dhaka. When ordered to disarm, this unit revolted, and lost more than 50% of its present strength before breaking out of the cantonment. Pakistanis maintained full control of the airfield, and the cantonment without any problems. After clashes with sector EPR troops, Pakistani troops left the city. Jessore cantonment and airfield (used to receive reinforcements via air from April 6th) would be surrounded by Bengali forces, made up of EPR troops and Bengali volunteers, until early April. Efforts to break out of Jessore or receive supplies from Khulna were foiled by Bengali forces. By 10 April, this scenario had not changed.
Khulna
Pakistan army Khulna detachment had the following objectives:
Secure town, Telephone exchange and Radio Station.
Disarm EPR Wing HQ and police line
Arrest Awami League and Communist leaders.
Pakistani forces: The 22d Frontier Force regiment (75% strength-CO Lt. Col. Shams) was posted in Khulna, attached to the 107th brigade. Non Bengali EPR troops from EPR 5 wing.
Bengali forces: 5th EPR wing (4 companies) was HQed at Khulna. The Wing did not have any Bengali officers attached to it. One company ws posted in Khulna itself, while the others were posted at Satkhira, Kaliganj and Kalaroa, to the south-east and north-west of Khulna. 2 platoons were posted in the sector HQ at Jessore. There were a number of police in the city as well.
Course of events: Pakistani forces maintained their positions throughout the operation, and had arrest the Bengali EPR personnel in Khulna on 25 March. Some of the political leaders had also been arrested. There were sporadic clashes in the city, but by March 28th, Khulna was under firm Pakistani control. A Pakistan troop column from Jessore had reached the city after brushing aside two clumsy ambushes by a mixed force of volunteers and police on March 28th. Operation Searchlight had anticipated Jessore garrison reinforcing Khulna, but ironically the Khulna detachment was requested to provide reinforcements for Jessore.
March 28- April 10: Khulna cut-off
EPR forces outside the city learned of the crackdown on March 26th and revolted. Many of the captured EPR personnel managed to escape from Khulna and joined their compatriots. One company from kaliganj joined the EPR 4 wing, whil the other 3 took positions on the Khulna - Jessore highway. EPR troops ambushed a Pakistani column heading for Jessore on March 30th, a few individuals managed to reach Jessore. On April 4, Bengali fighters from Barisal launched an unsuccessful attack on the Khulna Radio station located outside the city. Khulna garrison remained isolated until the end of April.
Khushtia
Pakistani objectives were to secure the town, establish a presence and take control of the telephone exchange.
Pakistani forces: A company from the 27th Baluch.
Bengali forces: EPR 4th Wing, armed police and Bengali volunteers.
Course of events: The Pakistani company took control of the town on March 26th. EPR trops, under the command of Maj. Abu Osman Chowdhury, were joined by police and civilian volunteers, and annihilated the Pakistani troops by 30 March. Kusthia would remain under Bengali control until April 16.
Rajshahi
The objectives allocated for the Pakistani garrison in Rajshahi were:
Disarm police and EPR Sector HQ
Secure Radio station and telephone exchange
Arrest Awami League leaders and secure University/Medical college
Pakistani forces: The 25th Punjab regiment (CO: Lt. Col. Shafqat Baluch) minus 1 company, attached to the 23rd brigade. Pakistani EPR troops from EPR sector HQ.
Bengali forces: EPR 6th wing was at Nawabganj to the west of Rajshahi. This wing did not have any senior Bengali officers and contained 4 companies located at Charghat, Godagari, Mankosha and at the wing HQ at Nawabganj. EPR 7th wing (5 companies) was located at Naogaon (CO: Major Nazmul Huq- Bengali) to the north of Rajshahi, with one company posted at the wing HQ, and the other 4 to the north and west of Naogaon between Panchbibi and Rohanpur. EPR sector HQ troops at Rajshahi contained no Bengali officers. Police and Bengali volunteers were also present in Rajshahi. Pakistani oficers had posted non Bengali personnel at the Sector HQ kotes and communication center during the second week of March.
Course of events: The CO of 25 Punjab, Lt. Col. S. Baluch was away and joined his unit on 25th of March. As per the plan, he sent a company to Pubna, a town to the east of Rajshahi sitting on the vital roab link to Dhaka, on the same day to establish Pakistani presence. Pakistan troops began patrolling Rajshahi from March 25th, and the situation was normal, if tense the following day. Benmgali police had dug bunkers expecting an attack, but nothing happened. EPR 6 Wing troops at Nawabgaung did not face anything unusual during March 25 -26. The situation at Naogaon was different. Bengali troops at Rohanpur had clashed with Pakistani troops on March 23rd, and on March 26th soldiers at Naogaon revolted after receiving news of the countrywide Pakistani crackdown. The Bengali troops managed to imprison all Pakistani personnel while they were at dinner. Major Nazmul Huq joined his troops and began assembling the wing companies at Naogaon.
Situation Explodes: March 27
25th Punjab took defensive positions near the Rajshshi police line and EPR HQ on March 27th. Although a truce was negotiated between the police and Pakistani army, an attack was launched on the police lines after 12:00 PM, which fell after a 3 hour battle. Rajshahi police had contacted the EPR at Naogaon prior to the Pakistani attack, but received no help as EPR troops could not cover the 60 mile distance in time. But as the news of this Pakistani attack alerted the Bengali EPR soldiers, and they began to take measures. Pakistani EPR troops relocated to the cantonment the same day with most of the arms from the sector HQ, while some took position at the circuit house. Warned by the non Bengali sector adjutant Captain Ishaq, some Bengali EPR troops revolted, armed themselves, and sporadic clashes took place after dark which led to nothing. Bengali EPR personnel left Rajshahi the following day. The situation during March 28 April 2 was uneventful except for thousands of civilians leaving the city to escape Pakistani retribution and prosecution.
Pakistani EPR troops suddenly attacked Bengali troops at Nawabgaung on the same day, but were forced to surrender after a 3 hour battle. The 6 wing soldiers contacted Major Nazmul Huq at Naogaon and also joined the revolt.
Escalation of hostilities: March 28 - March 29
The 25 Punjab company in Pabna was deployed in small detachments around the town. A mixed force of Bengali EPR, police and volunteers attacked the company on March 27th, and which caused casualties on both sides (including the company CO Captain Asghar and Lt. Rashid, 3 JCOs and 80 Pakistani troops). After a botched Heli evacuation attempt, Major Aslam led 2 platoons from Rajshai to Pabna on March 28th and extricated the survivors. This column was ambushed near Ishardi on March 29th by a Bengali force under Captain Rashid, lost 40 soldiers including Major Aslam, and only 18 soldiers ultimately reached Rajshahi after 3 days.
The 23rd Field company in Bogura was deployed in 2 groups, one guarding the ammunition dump while the other patrolling the town without incident during March 25 March 29. Attempts to reinforce this group from Rangpur had not succeeded. A Bengali EPR company under Captain Gias moved to Bogura, 35 miles from Naogaun on March 28th morning, reaching the place in the evening. With the aid of 200 armed police and several hundred civilian volunteers, a Pakistani patrol was ambushed on March 29th, and surviving Pakistanis fled to Rangpur. Captain Gias left Bogura the following day. Local Bengali fighters attacked the ammunition dump on April 1, put surviving Pakistani troops in jail and freed the town.
Ring around Rajshahi
After securing Pabna and Bogura, Major Nazmul Huq focused on Rajshahi, around which Bengali fighters had been gathering since March 28th. After keeping a small reserve at Naogaon, Major Nazmul Huq concenterd a mixed force of EPR, Police and volunteers around Rajshahi by April 1st. Captain Gias commanded a mixed force of almost 1,000 fighters from Nawabgaung while Captain Rashid led another 1,000 from Panba to Rajshahi. Sporadic clashes with Pakistanis started on the following day. A three pronged attack was launched on the town, with Captain Gias attacking from the south, Captain Rashid from the east and another group from the northwest on April 4th. After a fierce 4 hour battle causing severe casualties on both sides, Pakistani forces left the town and took up a strong defensive position around the cantonment at Sapura, using minefields and barbed wire to beef up the place. Between April 1 - April 5, the PAF had launched airstrikes to little effect on Rajshahi. Bengali fighters launched several attacks on the cantonment between April 6 - April 10, and although the Pakistanis were ultimately confined in an area only 800 yards square, the Punjab regiment managed to survive. Rajshahi town remained free until April 15th. On April 10th, 3 EPR companies took position to block the Pakistani 57th infantry brigade at Nagarbari. Pakistani forces softened the position by airstrikes on April 10th, a launch borne forced probed it the following day. At night Pakistani assult force crossed the Jamuna and secured the position, forcing the battered remnants of Bengali fighters to flee towards Pabna. Brig Arbab began cleaving a path of terror and destruction as he headed for Rajshahi with the 57th brigade.
Rangpur-Saidpur
Pakistani Army objectives for Rangpur were:
Secure both towns, Telephone exchange and Radio station in Rangpur.
Diasarm 3 EBR at Saidpur and EPR Sector HQ at Dinajpur
Secure Ammo dump at Bogura
Arrest Awami League leaders in Rangpur
Pakistani forces: HQ of the 23rd Brigade was at Rangpur. A small cantonment was located at Saidpur, to the west of Rangpur. Most of the 26th Frontier Force (C.O: Lt. Col. H.A. Qureshi - W.Pakistani), and the 29th Cavalry (55 Tanks, 50% Bengali personnel, CO: Lt. Col. Shagir -W.Pakistani) was at Rangpur. A company of the 26th Frontier Force was stationed at Dinajpur. 23rd Field was stationed in Saidpur with a detachment posted in Bogura. Both cantonments had support and supply units stationed in their premises.
Bengali forces: 3rd EBR (C.O: Lt. Col. Fazle Karim - W.Pakistani) HQ was in Saidpur, with 2 companies in Ghoraghat and 1 in Parvatipur, south west and south east of Rangpur respectively. 3 EPR wings were stationed at Thakurgaon (9th Wing), Dinajpur (8th Wing and sector HQ) and Rangpur (10th Wing). Each wing each had 4 infantry companies, but also had mortars and anti tank guns in their armory. Lt. Col. Tariqul R. Qureshi (W. Pakistani) was the EPR sector commander.
Course of events: Pakistani troops attacked the EPR sector HQ and took over Rangpur on the 26 March after most EPR troops left for Lalmanirhut. 3rd EBR elements and Bengali troops were attacked at Saidpur on 31 March, and survivors joined the EPR at Dinajpur. The 26th Frontier Force had attacked the EPR at Dinajpur on the 28th, but were driven out by 31 March. Thakurgaon was freed by the EPR 8th wing on 28 March. Bengali personnel of 29th cavalry were disarmed and arrested after 31 March and executed. Bengali troops took control of Bogura on 28 March, Pakistani survivors fled to Rangpur.
Pakistani forces maintained control of Saidpur and Rangpur throughout the operation. Heliborne forces from Dhaka reinforced these bases. An attack was launched to retake Lalmonirhut on April 1st, which fell on April 4th. This enabled C 130 Heracles planes to fly in further reinforcements. Pakistani forces spread out from Saidpur to the west, north and south, and by April 10th, had retaken some of the minor towns in Bengali hands.
Aftermath
By the dawn of 10 April, Pakistani forces had gained control of Dhaka, Rangpur - Saidpur, Comilla, Chittagong, and Khulna. Their forces had lost or abandoned Rajshahi, Sylhet, Pabna, Dinajpur, Mymenshing and Kushtia. The vital airfields and all the cantonments remained under Pakistani control, while the rest of the province was unoccupied and outside government control. The Bengali resistance had put up an unexpected stiff resistance and had managed to derail the initial Pakistani estimate of pacifying East Pakistan by April 10th . The initial successes were not sustainable as the Bengali forces began to suffer from lack of trained men, officers, coordination among scattered troops and lack of central command structure, proper supplies (despite limited aid from BSF). Pakistani army had airlifted the 9th and 16th infantry division to Bangladesh by April 10th and was poised to seize the initiative. Gen. Niazi, who took command of Pakistan forces in Bangladesh on April 11, obtained a brief from Gen. Raza (the departing GOC) and implemented the following strategy:
Clear all the big cities of insurgents and secure Chittagong.
Take control and open all river, highway and rail communication network.
Drive the insurgents away from the interior of the country
Launch combing operations across Bangladesh to wipe out the insurgent network.
Against this strategy Bengali field commanders opted to go with holding as much area for as long as possible,[35] The Bengali leadership hoped to keep the Pakistanis confined into the cities, while the Bangladesh government in exile sought diplomatic recognition and the resistance prepared for eventual guerrilla warfare[36] and awaited the expected Indian military intervention.[37] Lacking everything except unskilled volunteers, Mukti Bahini fought a conventional battle against an enemy enjoying superiority in number of trained men, firepower, and complete air superiority and played to the strength of Pakistanis. Choosing to attack Bengali forces all over Bangladesh simultaneously, Gen. Niazi concentrated battalion and brigade size forces on company and battalion size defense positions repeatedly, used air strikes and artillery to soften targets, and employed Heli-borne troops to outflank positions and hammered through to reach chosen objectives. Pakistani troop convoys were repeatedly ambushed, but these only delayed the Pakistani advance temporarily. By using their superiority of weapons and command of air ruthlessly, with little regard for safety of civilians and often targeting civilian areas to spread terror, the Pakistani army began to fan out of their bases and take over the province. By late April, all the major cities had fallen, by mid May all major towns had been captured and by mid June the battered remnant of Bengali fighters had been driven across the border into India. The Bengali resistance, suffering from a lack of trained men, proper logistics and coordination, lost the conventional battle against the Pakistan forces.
Temporary Pakistani occupation
Lt. General A.A.K Niazi had been posted as GOC East Pakistan Command on April 11, 1971, while Gen. Tikka Khan was retained as the governor of the province. General Khadim Raza was relieved from the command of the 14th division, and General Farman continued to serve as advisor on civilian affiars to the governor.
The Pakistan Army in East Pakistan, after being reinforced by "Operation GREAT FLYIN", was reorganised to run the counter insurgency operation. The 9th division (HQ Jessore, Maj. Gen. Shaukat Riza commanding) was given the 57th (HQ in Jhenida) and 107th (HQ in Jessore) brigades for controlling Kushtia, Jessore, Khulna, Faridpur, Barisal and Patuakhali districts. The 16th Division (HQ Natore, Maj. Gen. Nazar Hussain Shah commanding) was given the 23rd (HQ Rangpur), 205th (HQ Bogura) and 34th (HQ Nator) brigades and was to control Dinajpur, Rangpur, Bogura, Pabna and Rajshahi districts. The 14th division (HQ Dacca, Maj. Gen. Rahim Khan) controlled the rest of the province with the 27th (HQ Mymenshingh), 313th (HQ Sylhet), 117th (HQ Comilla) and the 53rd (HQ Chittagong) brigades.
E.P.C.A.F (East Pakistan Civil Armed Force) was organized to replace the EPR. Commanded by Maj. Gen. Jamshed, this force contained 17 combat wings, 7 sector wings (Sector Hqs at Dacca, Mymeshingh, Jessore, Rajshahi, Dinajpur, Comilla and Chittagong), totalling an estimated 20,000 personnel (West Pakistanies and Biharis), serving under the command of Pakistani army officers. The force was deployed to patrol the border, maintain internal security and support army operations.
Razakars and Shanti Committees were formed to support the army occupation. Mostly recruited from Bengalis and ex-EPR servicemen, an estimated 40,000 Razakers (against a target of 100,000 recruits) of mixed effectiveness was eventually fielded. Al-Badr and Al-Shams, formed by Jaamat-i-Islami, contributed another 5,000 members each. Pakistan also deployed hundreds of West Pakistani civilians and 5,000 police to support the occupation.
Creation of Mukti Bahini
The initial resistance, which started on March 26, functioned without any central command structure. Senior Bengali army officers met at Teliapara in Sylhet on April 10, and selected Col. (ret) M.A.G Osmani as commander of Bengali armed forces. On April 11 Osmani designated four sector commanders: Major Zia for the Chittagong area, Major Khaled Mussarraf for Comilla, Major Shafiullah for Sylhet and Major Abu Osman Chowdhury for Jessore area. The Bangladesh government in exile was formed by the Awami League leadership on April 17 at Meherpur in Kushtia, which confirmed Col. Osmani as commander of Mukti Bahini (regular armed forces and insurgents) under the authority of Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed. Bangladesh Forces Headquarters were set up in Kolkata (Calcutta) with Col. MAG Osmani as commander in chief, Lt. Col. MA Rab as Chief of Staff (based in Agartala, Tripura), and Group Captain AR Khandker as deputy Chief of Staff. The Bengali resistance, after being driven out of Bangladesh, began reorganizing to focus on irregular warfare.
Bengali refugees in India
A few thousand people sought refuge during April and May, mostly the resistance. However, as Pakistani army operations spread throughout the province, refugees fleeing to India increased. Ultimately approximately 10 million people would leave East Pakistan, and about 6.7 million were housed in 825 refugee camps. An estimated 7.3 million would be in West Bengal, and 1.5 million in Tripura. The rest were mainly in Assam and Bihar. The temporary presence of this large foreign population created economic (the cost of feeding, housing and medical care), social (tensions between locals and refugees) and national security (arms falling in the hands of Mizo and Naga rebels) concerns for India.
India: silent supporter or active antagonist?
The main reason Generals Farman and Yakub had opposed any military action against civilians in East Pakistan was the fear of an Indian attack, which the Pakistan army was woefully unprepared to meet in March 1971. After the crackdown, Tajuddin Ahmed met with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on April 3rd, 1971 and asked for all possible aid, by which time the Indian government had already opened East Pakistan border and the BSF was offering limited aid to the Bengali resistance. The issue of direct military intervention was discussed between the Indian military and political leadership in April 1971. The case for intervention was based on the following:
Until April 10th, most of Bangladesh was outside Pakistani control, and the troops were bottled up in a few cities and was facing fierce resistance. It is likely the Indian army, with proper air support, could have quickly taken control of most of the province by aiding the Mukti Bahini.
Indian Eastern Naval contingent (1 aircraft carrier and several warships) could have imposed a blockade of the province and cut off supplies from the sea, as the Pakistan Naval arm in the east only contained 1 destroyer and 4 gunboats.
Pakistani forces were flying in crucial reinforcements from West Pakistan during March 26 May 2 and were dependent of the supply depots located in Dhaka, Chittagong, and Narayanganj for fuel and ammunitions. Most Pakistani garrisons were cut off from each other and reliant on supplies through airlifts. The Indian Air Force, vastly outnumbering the Pakistan Air Force Eastern contingent, could have cutoff the air-links and destroyed the supply depots (as it did in December 1971).
Against this, the military leadership had to consider the following:
Indian army did not have a suitable force available for action in April 1971, and would have to assemble one from forces deployed in other areas for such an operation. Could an adequate force be put in place without jeopardizing the security of the northern and western borders of India in time to make a difference in East Pakistan?
Could a logistical network be established around East Pakistan to support the combat force operation before Pakistani army took over the province?
Should the Indians fail to gain a quick victory, was the army and the government ready (logistically, politically, diplomatically and otherwise) for a longer war, especially during the monsoon season in Bangladesh which would favor the defenders?
Intervening in East Pakistan would make India the aggressor in International circles. Was India ready to diplomatically meet the international reaction and had India ensured the cooperation of a superpower as a diplomatic ally and arms supplier, crucial for running a long war?
Although some of the Bengali leadership hoped for and expected an Indian military operation at the earliest, a view also shared by some Indian officers, Indian army eastern command decided in the present condition such a move was unadvisable, and a full attack could only take place after November 15th, 1971 at the earliest, only after deliberate and extensive preparations, which was further elaborated to the Indian cabinet by Gen. Sam Manekshaw. Indian leadership decided not to directly intervene, but chose to get involved: Eastern command took over responsibility for East Pakistan operations on April 29th, and on May 15th launched Operation Jackpot, a full fledged operation to arm, train, equip, supply and advise the Mukti Bahihi fighters engaged in guerrilla warfare against the Pakistan armed forces.
Bengali Civilian casualties
The killings which began on 25 March 1971 and sparked the Bangladesh Liberation War led to the deaths of at least 26,000 people, as admitted by Pakistan (by the Hamoodur Rahman Commission)[51] and as many as 3,000,000 as claimed by Bangladesh (from 1972 to 1975 the first post-war prime minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, mentioned on several occasions that at least three million died). In some areas Bengali civilians had killed Biharis, and abandoned houses were looted by Bengalis and Biharis alike.
The genocide also included killing of serving Bengali senior army officers of the rank of Lt. Colonel and above in East Pakistan within the first few days of Operation Searchlight. The martyrs included Col. Badiul Alam, Lt. Col. MA Qadir, Lt. Col. SA Hai, Lt. Col. MR Choudhury, Lt. Col. (Dr.) Ziaur Rahman, Lt. Col. NA M. Jahangir and another dozens of senior majors who were cold-bloodedly executed by April 1971. Also, around a hundred junior officers and thousands of unfortunate captured Bengali soldiers, including members of the East Pakistan Rifles and Police, serving in East Pakistan were slaughtered. After the defeat of the Pakistan Army, there was a call to try nearly 200 Pakistani POWs for war crimes, but no trials took place.
Evaluation and Importance
The Pakistani army maintained operational security, for the most part, before the operation commenced. They also airlifted 2 infantry divisions (the 9th and the 16th) to Bangladesh in a span of 4 weeks after March 26, despite a ban on flights over India.
The disorganized initial resistance of Bengali units was crushed by mid June, and the country was under Pakistani control. As insurgent activity slacked off in July, civilians returned to work and trade resumed, and Pakistanis could claim the country was almost "normal". On the surface, Operation Searchlight had achieved most of its goals.
The Pakistanis failed to capture the Awami League political leaders during the operation, which was a crucial part of the plan. The political leadership moved to India, and using their networks and popular support in Bangladesh, effectively organized the insurgency.
The survival of the Awami League political apparatus permitted India to channel aid through a structured organization, rather than dealing with various resistance groups competing for their support. The Awami League included elected members of parliament who claimed to be legitimate representatives of the people, thus enhancing the credibility of the organization in international circles. Bengali army officers worked under civilian leaders, so there was no serious struggle for power in the resistance. While civilian leadership ran the administration and coordinated logistics, army personnel fought the war and trained freedom fighters.
Pakistani planners assumed that if the political leadership was captured, the Bengali armed units disarmed, and the civilians sufficiently terrorized, after a month no organized resistance would remain in East Pakistan. Their assumptions were proven wrong in the long run. The political leadership escaped to organize the resistance and lobby for international support, Bengali soldiers formed the core of the armed resistance, and civilians, despite the terror campaign, supported the insurgency with logistics, intelligence and volunteers for the irregular warfare.
Operation Searchlight included no followup plan. Anticipating a relatively quick success, Pakistani planners did not plan for a long irregular war or the eventual involvement of India. Pakistan had no regular troops to spare after stationing 4 divisions in Bangladesh by November 1971 since they needed to maintain parity with the Indian army in the west. With the EPR and police defecting, a large number of para military units were needed to police the country. Siddique Salik estimated that Pakistan needed at least 250,000 to 300,000 troops, but even after organizing the Razakars (estimated strength 40,000), Pakistan could field only 150,000 (45,000 regular army, rest paramilitary units) soldiers in Bangladesh.
The eventual strain of combating the insurgency caused Pakistan to attack India on the 3 December 1971, with the objective to stop Indian support for the Mukti Bahini. This attack initiated the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, which concluded with the unconditional surrender of Pakistan forces on 16 December.
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KIT Over n Out
