Lack of understanding of security situation in J&K: A major obstacle to future strategy

[Zarvan]

WISDOM & VALOUR - THE GENERAL'S VIEWS
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain

The twitter world last weekend was all livid with Dr Farooq Abdullah, the National Conference patron, for his statement targeting the Indian Army, at a press conference. The former J&K CM is believed to have stated that even if the entire Indian Armed Forces are ready to fight, they will not be able to control the militants and militancy in Kashmir. “We must have a dialogue with militants only after which we will be able to find a solution”, is what he is believed to have stated.

So what should we make of this statement? Twiterrati extensively retweeted celebrity anchor Gaurav Sawant's tweets which quoted my recent articles on J&K and my strong belief that we are at the Last Mile in fighting J&K militancy; that is a completely different perception than Dr Abdullah's.

Public perception was negative about Dr Abdullah's statement for two reasons. First, the fact that he said ‘Hindustan ki Fauj' giving an impression that J&K was a different entity to India. That is what we used to hear colloquially from most Kashmiris and continue to do so even today. ‘Aap kya India se aayen hain’ was a common refrain which most tourists would remember. To hear something similar from a former Union Minister, former J&K CM and a known nationalist probably hurt public sensitivities.



Perhaps benefit of doubt could be given due to the fact that ‘Hindustan ki Fauj’ is a literal translation of ‘Indian Army' and most references to the soldiers, even by soldiers themselves, is with the term Indian Army and not mere Army. Most strategic analysts and media personalities also refer to soldiers by that term which I do believe is used for convenience to differentiate our Army from that of Pakistan because the two are deployed eyeball to eyeball and have deep interests in the conflict zone.

The Army also has a long standing practice of referring to all its flag officers as belonging to Indian Army (IA) to differentiate them from the arms/services/regiments that they originally belong to, at middle and junior ranks. So probably Dr Abdullah got carried away by use of colloquialism. What everyone wishes is that he could have used the most acceptable term, ‘Hamari Fauj' and probably entered into an intellectual debate on the capability of our Army to achieve full and firm victory over militancy/terror in J&K.

Many of our Army's officers experienced in handling insurgencies/militancies/terror could join issue with shades of opinion on the Last Mile and the meaning of Victory in such long standing military engagements. In fact, even on Twitter, a fewer older and senior leaders was unhappy with my notion of the Last Mile and felt that I was trivialising the military situation ostensibly because the threats were very much still existent and engagements were continuing with casualties being suffered by the Army.



Seldom do we find informed debates on the military situation in J&K and analyses of where we are and where we are going in military terms. The importance of that understanding among political leaders, civil administration, diplomatic corps and intelligence agencies is as essential as it is among the military leadership itself. Without clarity there, the next steps in our national strategy will remain only tentative even after a good year in the field and two successive and successful electoral exercises.

The unfortunate tendency is to over read trends from events. Loss of two brave heart Commanding Officers this year and recent events around Kupwara and Tangdhar appear to being misread by public opinion and even some in media. Our public by and large is hugely appreciative of the Army and its professionalism but in an affectionate way is increasingly expressing concern for the loss of senior officers in operations which it thinks should not be happening while the Army and analysts continue to believe that there is nothing worrisome about the situation; casualties do take place and our officers live with ethos of leading from the front.

These are things which happen as we draw closer to conflict termination because units and their leaders try harder than ever to prevent militants escaping dragnets after contacts. Lesser the number of terrorists more the tendency of own casualties, this is a phenomenon no one can deny. There are solutions to this that I shall outline subsequently and these are nothing new; all professionals know and understand them.

Perhaps Dr Abdullah also got led away by recent operations in which the Army suffered casualties. Being an old hand he should have known what the professionalism of the Army is and he has many friends within the force who could have explained the situation over a drink. The unfortunate part is that in recent years he sometimes tends to go against rationale. His statements on the AFSPA debate were almost as unfortunate as those of his brother, Mustafa Kamal. Even then he targeted the Army as he has done this time.

At that time he insinuated grave human rights violations by the men in olive green and this time aspersions are being caste on their professionalism and caliber to deliver. This article does not have the scope to explain in detail the history of the J&K militancy and how effectively it has been dealt with by the Army.

That will be explained in a set of separate articles. Besides Dr Abdullah I did come across one or two more comments in social media that the Army has never had J&K under control in the last 30 years or so. It was an insinuation which prompted me to write and contest it last week in the article related to Late Colonel Santosh Mahadik's martyrdom.

Yet, I cannot leave uncontested Dr Abdullah's perception, and I hope he will take this as a purely professional commentary. He has to remember that this not just a militancy that we are fighting; we call it that for convenience; this has been and continues to be a full blown Proxy War, aided and abetted by a neighbour who has taken upon itself to seek retribution against the Indian nation and plan to divest it of a territory which is legitimately Indian.

Any nationalist will stand by this statement. We have a professional Army which has fought 25 years to bring the situation to what it is. Many sacrifices have been made along the way. From a strength of a couple of thousand terrorists who roamed the countryside in the 90s the Army aided by the intelligence agencies, the J&K Police and the CAPFs have all worked extremely hard to reduce the quantum to a few hundreds. The back of terrorism and militancy has been broken and the conflict situation has transformed from a difficult period of Conflict Initiation, Conflict Progression and Conflict Stabilisation to one of Conflict Transformation.



Anyone who knows what conflict is all about should also know that this is one of the most difficult stages of Conflict where norms and tactics change. The ratio of achievements against losses dips significantly at this stage. The next steps are more in the psychological domain and even as the Army battles infiltrating terrorists and newly formed radical groups, it also awaits initiatives in the non military domain. Victory (which I will explain in a subsequent article more comprehensively) is not about killing the last terrorist; that won't happen. It’s all about cementing the military success and making it impossible for the adversary to gain a psychological foothold and influence the population. That is done through a minimum consensus on the political front and an outreach to the grassroots, something missing in all these years of military confrontation.

Hopefully it is something happening in the current political dispensation more avidly. I do wish that Dr Abdullah, with all his deep knowledge of J&K had spoken of the rampant radicalization of the next generation and how that will need to be addressed through a campaign of education and engagement; ideas on that are far and few although it’s not as if the whole issue of radicalization started just yesterday.

We have been found wanting in this field even as the Army fought the military campaign. Delhi is abuzz with seminars on the entire issue of radicalization and steps needed to counter that in the context of Daesh and its larger aims. However, J&K perhaps needs greater emphasis although I am firmly of the belief that Daesh's influence in J&K is negligible and will not take root. While ideas on how to counter it seem to be taking shape, there is a dearth of people and agencies who can implement and take responsibility.

Dr Abdullah should be taking the lead in this. The Army has weakened the militants to a great extent, it has the counter infiltration grid well under control to prevent proliferation of numbers and military wherewithal is in critically short supply to them. I may even remind the public that the last major IED related incident took place on 20 July 2008, when a Srinagar bound Army bus was targeted killing nine jawans. There haven’t been major strikes thereafter although IEDs have been used in some locations. So any more insinuations against the Army's control over militancy are really meaningless.

Yes, South Kashmir's new militancy seems to be worrying some people. Less military and more social has to be the approach to counter this. I am aware the Army and J&K Police have already embarked on some measures but this needs the push of both Central and State governments through more social initiatives.



While I have defended the Army's position I do think that it is time the Army defended itself. Too many people attempt to make it the whipping boy because it is seen to be a quiet organisation which seldom defends itself. Loose commentaries by people who do not know enough about conflict, especially the new and hybrid variety, tend to target the one organisation which has the complete trust and affection of the Indian people.

Subsequent pieces in this blog will examine the J&K situation more comprehensively, especially the methodology of marginalisation of the militants and their leaders and mentors.

Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain's Blog : Lack of understanding of security situation in J&K: A major obstacle to future strategy

@nair @GURU DUTT @SarthakGanguly @MilSpec @AUSTERLITZ @Water Car Engineer @third eye @Horus @Khafee @Gufi and others

 

[third eye]

While I have defended the Army's position I do think that it is time the Army defended itself. Too many people attempt to make it the whipping boy because it is seen to be a quiet organisation which seldom defends itself. Loose commentaries by people who do not know enough about conflict, especially the new and hybrid variety, tend to target the one organisation which has the complete trust and affection of the Indian people.

I agree.

I recall a stupid remark by Azam Khan during election time when he made a preposterous remark about only Mulsim troops having fought at Kargil.

Without getting involved in a one on one because you cannot wrestle with a pig , there is merit that the IA must move from being a silent arm to voicing itself.

 

[zebra7]

WISDOM & VALOUR - THE GENERAL'S VIEWS
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain

The twitter world last weekend was all livid with Dr Farooq Abdullah, the National Conference patron, for his statement targeting the Indian Army, at a press conference. The former J&K CM is believed to have stated that even if the entire Indian Armed Forces are ready to fight, they will not be able to control the militants and militancy in Kashmir. “We must have a dialogue with militants only after which we will be able to find a solution”, is what he is believed to have stated.

So what should we make of this statement? Twiterrati extensively retweeted celebrity anchor Gaurav Sawant's tweets which quoted my recent articles on J&K and my strong belief that we are at the Last Mile in fighting J&K militancy; that is a completely different perception than Dr Abdullah's.

Public perception was negative about Dr Abdullah's statement for two reasons. First, the fact that he said ‘Hindustan ki Fauj' giving an impression that J&K was a different entity to India. That is what we used to hear colloquially from most Kashmiris and continue to do so even today. ‘Aap kya India se aayen hain’ was a common refrain which most tourists would remember. To hear something similar from a former Union Minister, former J&K CM and a known nationalist probably hurt public sensitivities.



Perhaps benefit of doubt could be given due to the fact that ‘Hindustan ki Fauj’ is a literal translation of ‘Indian Army' and most references to the soldiers, even by soldiers themselves, is with the term Indian Army and not mere Army. Most strategic analysts and media personalities also refer to soldiers by that term which I do believe is used for convenience to differentiate our Army from that of Pakistan because the two are deployed eyeball to eyeball and have deep interests in the conflict zone.

The Army also has a long standing practice of referring to all its flag officers as belonging to Indian Army (IA) to differentiate them from the arms/services/regiments that they originally belong to, at middle and junior ranks. So probably Dr Abdullah got carried away by use of colloquialism. What everyone wishes is that he could have used the most acceptable term, ‘Hamari Fauj' and probably entered into an intellectual debate on the capability of our Army to achieve full and firm victory over militancy/terror in J&K.

Many of our Army's officers experienced in handling insurgencies/militancies/terror could join issue with shades of opinion on the Last Mile and the meaning of Victory in such long standing military engagements. In fact, even on Twitter, a fewer older and senior leaders was unhappy with my notion of the Last Mile and felt that I was trivialising the military situation ostensibly because the threats were very much still existent and engagements were continuing with casualties being suffered by the Army.



Seldom do we find informed debates on the military situation in J&K and analyses of where we are and where we are going in military terms. The importance of that understanding among political leaders, civil administration, diplomatic corps and intelligence agencies is as essential as it is among the military leadership itself. Without clarity there, the next steps in our national strategy will remain only tentative even after a good year in the field and two successive and successful electoral exercises.

The unfortunate tendency is to over read trends from events. Loss of two brave heart Commanding Officers this year and recent events around Kupwara and Tangdhar appear to being misread by public opinion and even some in media. Our public by and large is hugely appreciative of the Army and its professionalism but in an affectionate way is increasingly expressing concern for the loss of senior officers in operations which it thinks should not be happening while the Army and analysts continue to believe that there is nothing worrisome about the situation; casualties do take place and our officers live with ethos of leading from the front.

These are things which happen as we draw closer to conflict termination because units and their leaders try harder than ever to prevent militants escaping dragnets after contacts. Lesser the number of terrorists more the tendency of own casualties, this is a phenomenon no one can deny. There are solutions to this that I shall outline subsequently and these are nothing new; all professionals know and understand them.

Perhaps Dr Abdullah also got led away by recent operations in which the Army suffered casualties. Being an old hand he should have known what the professionalism of the Army is and he has many friends within the force who could have explained the situation over a drink. The unfortunate part is that in recent years he sometimes tends to go against rationale. His statements on the AFSPA debate were almost as unfortunate as those of his brother, Mustafa Kamal. Even then he targeted the Army as he has done this time.

At that time he insinuated grave human rights violations by the men in olive green and this time aspersions are being caste on their professionalism and caliber to deliver. This article does not have the scope to explain in detail the history of the J&K militancy and how effectively it has been dealt with by the Army.

That will be explained in a set of separate articles. Besides Dr Abdullah I did come across one or two more comments in social media that the Army has never had J&K under control in the last 30 years or so. It was an insinuation which prompted me to write and contest it last week in the article related to Late Colonel Santosh Mahadik's martyrdom.

Yet, I cannot leave uncontested Dr Abdullah's perception, and I hope he will take this as a purely professional commentary. He has to remember that this not just a militancy that we are fighting; we call it that for convenience; this has been and continues to be a full blown Proxy War, aided and abetted by a neighbour who has taken upon itself to seek retribution against the Indian nation and plan to divest it of a territory which is legitimately Indian.

Any nationalist will stand by this statement. We have a professional Army which has fought 25 years to bring the situation to what it is. Many sacrifices have been made along the way. From a strength of a couple of thousand terrorists who roamed the countryside in the 90s the Army aided by the intelligence agencies, the J&K Police and the CAPFs have all worked extremely hard to reduce the quantum to a few hundreds. The back of terrorism and militancy has been broken and the conflict situation has transformed from a difficult period of Conflict Initiation, Conflict Progression and Conflict Stabilisation to one of Conflict Transformation.



Anyone who knows what conflict is all about should also know that this is one of the most difficult stages of Conflict where norms and tactics change. The ratio of achievements against losses dips significantly at this stage. The next steps are more in the psychological domain and even as the Army battles infiltrating terrorists and newly formed radical groups, it also awaits initiatives in the non military domain. Victory (which I will explain in a subsequent article more comprehensively) is not about killing the last terrorist; that won't happen. It’s all about cementing the military success and making it impossible for the adversary to gain a psychological foothold and influence the population. That is done through a minimum consensus on the political front and an outreach to the grassroots, something missing in all these years of military confrontation.

Hopefully it is something happening in the current political dispensation more avidly. I do wish that Dr Abdullah, with all his deep knowledge of J&K had spoken of the rampant radicalization of the next generation and how that will need to be addressed through a campaign of education and engagement; ideas on that are far and few although it’s not as if the whole issue of radicalization started just yesterday.

We have been found wanting in this field even as the Army fought the military campaign. Delhi is abuzz with seminars on the entire issue of radicalization and steps needed to counter that in the context of Daesh and its larger aims. However, J&K perhaps needs greater emphasis although I am firmly of the belief that Daesh's influence in J&K is negligible and will not take root. While ideas on how to counter it seem to be taking shape, there is a dearth of people and agencies who can implement and take responsibility.

Dr Abdullah should be taking the lead in this. The Army has weakened the militants to a great extent, it has the counter infiltration grid well under control to prevent proliferation of numbers and military wherewithal is in critically short supply to them. I may even remind the public that the last major IED related incident took place on 20 July 2008, when a Srinagar bound Army bus was targeted killing nine jawans. There haven’t been major strikes thereafter although IEDs have been used in some locations. So any more insinuations against the Army's control over militancy are really meaningless.

Yes, South Kashmir's new militancy seems to be worrying some people. Less military and more social has to be the approach to counter this. I am aware the Army and J&K Police have already embarked on some measures but this needs the push of both Central and State governments through more social initiatives.



While I have defended the Army's position I do think that it is time the Army defended itself. Too many people attempt to make it the whipping boy because it is seen to be a quiet organisation which seldom defends itself. Loose commentaries by people who do not know enough about conflict, especially the new and hybrid variety, tend to target the one organisation which has the complete trust and affection of the Indian people.

Subsequent pieces in this blog will examine the J&K situation more comprehensively, especially the methodology of marginalisation of the militants and their leaders and mentors.

Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain's Blog : Lack of understanding of security situation in J&K: A major obstacle to future strategy

@nair @GURU DUTT @SarthakGanguly @MilSpec @AUSTERLITZ @Water Car Engineer @third eye @Horus @Khafee @Gufi and others

Excellent post. Few days earlier you was crying over the Indian stupid articles and post and the quality is worthless, but from the same site i.e ibnlive you have copy pasted so many articles for creating threads.

 

[Chika_Pika]

I agree.

I recall a stupid remark by Azam Khan during election time when he made a preposterous remark about only Mulsim troops having fought at Kargil.

Without getting involved in a one on one because you cannot wrestle with a pig , there is merit that the IA must move from being a silent arm to voicing itself.

Here in SP it is famous saying that Ajam ji's buffaloes are wiser than himself

 

[Khafee]

@Indus Falcon Your opinion.....?

 

[axisofevil]

Abdullah....quite foolishly forgets an important point. The Indian army has to fight with its hands tied behinds its back. Let politicians stop meddling, and allow the army to fight using whatever resources it has. Watch terror become extinct. Abdullah's are traitors and anti nationalists since since days of the British. That's why their kin and Rahul enjoy immense slanted coverage in the UK. They are tools to hold back India.


The Abdullahs wanted Kashmir to be independent, gather power for themselves and agitated against the king. Congress did everything to appease there fukkers. That's what Congress does. Appease with criminals who are against India even against the interests of the nation. Time and time again, India has reaped n o benefits with this stupid f-king party in power. Corruption is deeply ingrained in their psyche. Every media house, Bollywood, etc has been handed over to their friendly allies wen the License Raj started privatizing. These fukkers loot the country and were able to position themselves.