Qatar’s Changing Foreign Policy
Posted by: admin in Regional
9 hours ago - Thursday, 10 April 2014
Doha’s unfamiliar routine setbacks over a past year might press Qatar toward settlement with Saudi Arabia, notwithstanding their new spat.
In light of a benefaction Saudi-Qatari tensions over Doha’s conspicuous support of a Muslim Brotherhood, Kuwait’s Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmed al-Sabah predictably called for “Arab unity” during final week’s Arab League summit. For Saudi Arabia, a Brotherhood presents a vital hazard to a indication of governance given a organisation opposes a patrimonial appetite structures of a Arab monarchies, including of a House of Saud. Also, between a Egyptian military’s onslaught with a Brotherhood and Iran’s purported attempts to confine Saudi vital interests by ancillary Shia groups via a region, Riyadh found itself underneath siege, as it had not been means to successfully redefine a vital partnership with Washington over concentration policies on Syria and Iran. Within this context, Saudi Arabia’s vital maneuverability was singular and therefore sought to change events where it could, perfectionist that a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) allies approve with a unfamiliar routine priorities, that explains a new uncharacteristic preference to repel a envoy from Qatar. Despite a unused Saudi-Qatari differences over either a Brotherhood should be designated a “terrorist organization,” Doha has over a past year changed closer to Riyadh’s position on Syria by shortening a support for informal Islamist groups.
For Qatar, ancillary informal Islamist groups had formerly enabled it to carve out an eccentric unfamiliar routine by relocating it out of a shade of a strong neighbor. However, these groups’ disaster to seize a opportunities a Arab Spring combined has led Qatar to recur a approach. Also, final year a tides of a Syrian dispute began branch in preference of a Syrian government, as a rebels Qatar had upheld could not means a swell they had achieved. Similarly, a Egyptian predicament supposing another doctrine for Qatar when a Muslim Brotherhood, that Qatar’s before ruler, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, had easily bankrolled, was private from a presidency by a country’s military. These misadventures in Syria and Egypt seem to have taught Qatar’s new emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, an critical lesson: for his nation to keep some of a hard-won informal influence, strengthening ties with Saudi Arabia will be paramount, and Doha is left with small choice though to overcome a new open squabble with Riyadh. Given Qatar’s singular room to act, Sheikh Tamim will approaching over time be forced to follow in Riyadh’s footsteps. Despite a benefaction rift, a sheikh had already taken petrify stairs in a past year to revoke his support for informal Islamist groups.
This change can be partially explained by events in Syria and Sheikh Hamad’s disaster to predict a border of Russian and Iranian support for a Syrian government. Sheikh Hamad found himself increasingly exposed as his wide-ranging support for a rebels unsuccessful to move President Bassar al-Assad to his knees. This became quite apparent after supervision troops, in tighten team-work with Hezbollah fighters, successfully recaptured a strategically critical city of Qusayr in Jun 2013. As Iran and Saudi Arabia doubled down their support for a competing entities in Syria, a emir was serve outmaneuvered when Saudi-backed Ahmad Jarba transposed halt personality George Sabra as personality of a categorical opposition, defeating Qatar-backed opposition Ghassan Hitto. Sheikh Tamim has had small choice though to travel behind his father’s support for Islamist fighters. With a conditions changing, Saudi Arabia would take a lead on Arab support for Syrian insurgent groups, and Qatar would take a behind seat. Sheikh Tamim has also had to backtrack from a initial Saudi-Qatari adversary that left a Syrian National Coalition (SNC) divided. And fearing that Qatar’s support for Islamist rebels could lead to a U.S. and Saudi backlash, Qatar effectively adopted Riyadh’s position by job for GCC togetherness on Syria. Sheikh Tamim has also had to vigour demure Islamist SNC members to attend final month’s assent talks in Geneva.
These trends, it should be noted, were good in place before to a stream Saudi-Qatari rift. From hostile negotiations with Assad altogether, Qatar dispatched a unfamiliar minister, Khalid bin Mohammad al-Attiyah, to Geneva. Qatar’s space for ancillary Sunni Islamists inside Syria has indeed shrunk with a resumption of U.S.-Iran talks, partially explaining a 180-degree turnaround in ancillary a Geneva talks. Economic considerations might comment for some of a meditative behind this shift: Qatar shares a gas margin with Iran in a Persian Gulf, and might feel it needs Saudi insurance to say entrance to this margin in a eventuality that tellurian appetite markets respond adversely to a adversary with Iran in Syria. However, Qatar stays successful on a belligerent with nonconformist groups like Liwa al-Tawhid, that controls vast areas and coordinates with a al-Qaeda-linked Jabhat al-Nusra. It is also puzzled that Qatar will cut off appropriation for Islamist groups that reason onto vast swaths of territory, notwithstanding a controversial support for a settlement process.
Amid these developments, Qatar is confronting another geopolitical better in Egypt. From a opening of a Egyptian revolution, a Qatar-based Al-Jazeera channel had supposing auspicious coverage of a Muslim Brotherhood and their query for a presidency. Qatar became a usually Gulf kingdom to stake a Muslim Brotherhood government, and given a events of Jul 2013, Qatar’s picture has taken a large strike in Egypt given of this support. The arrest in Dec of nineteen Al-Jazeera reporters indicted of carrying links to “terrorist organizations” shows a earnest of a Egyptian-Qatari crisis. Although a Egyptian infantry has widely burst down on media freedoms, Field Marshal Abdel Fattah el-Sisi not usually sees Al-Jazeera as a Qatari unfamiliar routine apparatus though also has clearly not lost a narrow-minded coverage of a new showdown between a infantry and a Brotherhood.
Qatar has also had to stretch itself from other initiatives dear to a heart, including support for Hamas. In 2012, Sheikh Hamad became a initial Arab personality to revisit a Gaza strip, pledging $400 million in assistance to a Hamas government. Furthermore, Sheikh Hamad didn’t respect his initial oath to compensate Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas a follow-up revisit to Ramallah, highlighting his support for one Palestinian coterie over another. Given a GCC’s support for Abbas, Qatar has had to spin divided from any support for Hamas that would serve place them during contingency with a GCC allies and with Saudi Arabia in particular. Since his father’s policies in Syria and Egypt had backfired, Sheikh Tamim has so distant avoided a intensity enigma in Palestinian affairs.
These setbacks, joined with a benefaction Saudi-Qatari rift, have shown that Doha is incompetent to expostulate a informal tactful agenda. Qatar can no longer means to alienate Saudi Arabia, and Sheikh Tamim is left with small choice though to strech an bargain with Riyadh by coordinating destiny unfamiliar routine priorities. Given these constraints, Qatar is approaching to find to change a GCC accord on informal strategy, a transparent mangle from Sheikh Hamad’s demonstrated uneven approach. Improving ties with Iran is also approaching to be a priority for Sheikh Tamim, as fortitude in a Persian Gulf is a vital prerequisite for Qatar.
Sigurd Neubauer is a Washington, DC-based Middle East analyst.
Correction: An progressing chronicle of this essay settled that Saudi Arabia diminished a Qatari ambassador.
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