Instead of hitting the 'edit' button, I have accidentally deleted my earlier post. Guess, multitasking is not my cup of tea. Thankfully, I keep my Recycle Bin filled to the brim. Anyway, here it is again, with additions.
V.K. Menon UN Security Council (763 Meeting, 23 January, 1957):
With Pakistan's intransigence, and passage of time, the offer lapsed and was overtaken by events
I have the original UN document containing the full speech of Mr Menon at 763 meeting. Mr Menon had said nothing of that sort at that meeting, or the ones before and after that. What he had said is reproduced in entirety (only the para):
Now, this goes back to a very early period of the tumult. It was our hope that Pakistan would join us in settling the matter. At this point, I should like to say something that I shall have to repeat later. If an offer is made and it is not accepted at the time it is made, it cannot be held for generations over the heads of those who made it. It is quite true that at that time we told Pakistan: "Let us go to the United Nations together and ask for a plebiscite." They did not agree. When they did not agree, that offer lapsed. They cannot come here nine years later and say: "You mentioned the word 'plebiscite'." That is the position. We have made many offers to Pakistan at various times. Some of these offers may be reconsidered, if necessary, when the time comes. But, if an offer made to an opposing party is not accepted within a reasonable time, it cannot be maintained that it is still an open offer. The offer terminates when it is not accepted. In very many cases, we have said that explicitly; where we have not done so, it must be taken as the normal state of affairs.
He was referring to Mountbattens offer of plebiscite on 1st Nov, 1947, which, as you know, Jinnah had rejected.
"I wish to make it clear on behalf of my Government that under no circumstances can we agree to the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir"
Representative of India (M.C. Chagla) UN Security Council (1088 meeting, 5 February 1964):
Again I am quoting the entire para of Mr Chaglas comment, and leaving it without commenting on it.
Therefore, if I may sum up, our position on Jammu and Kashmir is clear and unambiguous. The two resolutions of the Security Council dealing with the plebiscite were conditional and contingent on Pakistan vacating its aggression, and that condition has not been complied with. It is really more than a condition. It was the very basis on which these two resolutions were founded, and the condition not having been complied with and the basis having disappeared, these resolutions are no longer binding on us. In any case, by the passage of time and various factors intervening - to which I shall draw attention a little later - they have become obsolete. We cannot possibly contemplate with equanimity of the threat to the integration of our country and the danger to our cherished principle of secularism by the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir. I wish to make it clear on behalf of my Government that under no circumstances can we agree to a plebiscite in Kashmir.
"Any plebiscite today would by definition amount to questioning the integrity of India. It would raise the issue of secession - an issue on which even the United States fought a civil war not so very long ago. We cannot and will not tolerate a second partition of India on religious grounds"
Nehru didnt say that.
Ms Gandhi, her daughter, the then PM of India had said that in New York, on
31 March, 1966.
On April 2, 1956, he himself had made statements at a press conference, which suggested that he had, indeed, ruled out a plebiscite. A question was put to him: "An inference has been drawn that you do not want now any plebiscite to be held in Kashmir. Is it correct?" Nehru replied: "Largely so; I shall explain myself. What I have said was that we have tried and discussed the question of plebiscite for six or seven years, but the preconditions have not been fulfilled. Meanwhile, other things have taken place, like the military aid etc., which have increased tremendously the difficulties of this problem. It is not that I am not willing to discuss this problem still further. But as a practical person I say this leads to a blind alley. We have, therefore, to discuss it from another point of view in regard to conditions that have arisen now and try to come to an agreement."
Offer of a settlement on the basis of the ceasefire line was the logical corollary. Nehru made this offer while addressing a public meeting in New Delhi on April 18, 1956. "I am willing to accept that the question of the part of Kashmir which is under you should be settled by demarcating the border on the basis of the present ceasefire line. We have no desire to take it by fighting."
Let me isolate what Nehru had said from what Noorani has narrated, just for better visibility:
Largely so; I shall explain myself. What I have said was that we have tried and discussed the question of plebiscite for six or seven years, but the preconditions have not been fulfilled. Meanwhile, other things have taken place, like the military aid etc., which have increased tremendously the difficulties of this problem. It is not that I am not willing to discuss this problem still further. But as a practical person I say this leads to a blind alley. We have, therefore, to discuss it from another point of view in regard to conditions that have arisen now and try to come to an agreement
There is nothing, absolutely nothing, in that comment that says, Nehru had rejected UNSC resolutions.
On Pakistan fulfilling its responsibilities, we have been over that several times already - negotiations between the UN India and Pakistan never reached a point where any side could start implementing its part of the bargain, so Pakistan was under no obligation to implement anything then, and especially not now given India's blatant rejection of the UNSC resolutions.
When India re-commits to the UNSC resolutions, we can re-start the process that ended without agreement, and hopefully arrive at a point where the resolutions can begin to be implemented by both sides. Till then the responsibility for non-implementation lies with India, since she unilaterally rejected the resolutions.
Funny, isnt it? Even though negotiations between the UN India and Pakistan never reached a point where any side could start implementing its part of the bargain (lets forget for the moment your tripartite canard that you have sneaked in) and even though Indias obligation begins only after Pakistan has discharged its own, yet, somehow the responsibility for non-implementation still lies with India. If this is your idea of humor, then believe me, it is working.
Regarding the ending of the process without agreement, Pakistan is as much responsible as India is. In any case, after Ayub's misadventure, the UNSC resolutions have became irrelevant, and from India's perspective, void. 'Re-commitment' to those resolutions is absurd, not just because it is no longer legally tenable, but because those resolutions are grossly inadequate to address the current situation. In fact the UNCIP had started doubting the viability of the resolutions as early as 1950.
That you still think that India and Pakistan can still reach an agreement on plebiscite as per UNSC resolutions reflects poorly on your understanding of the resolutions and the positions taken by both the countries in accordance to their interpretations.
So get over it.