Beginning of a new trend
By Dr Tariq Rahman
THE last fortnight has seen about half a dozen bombings leading to violent deaths in the country. The pattern followed is that of suicide attacks which were common in Palestine/Israel and then in Iraq.
Pakistan has seen a lot of sectarian violence in the last 20 years, attacks on the military leadership during the last five years and some suicide attacks. However, with so many incidents coming in a row, one fears that this may be the beginning of a new trend, a grisly beginning to an ending nobody knows.
While the sectarian nature of some attacks may be conceded, most are attacks on the symbols of the state or its ruling elite. Indeed, with the women students of Islamabad’s religious seminaries up in arms and the Jamaat-i-Islami condemning Musharraf’s Kashmir policy openly, the ongoing confrontation between parts of the state and the radical Islamists seems to have entered a new phase.
Whether we will be unsafe when we leave our homes, whether our children will be threatened with death in their schools or whether the state will descend into anarchy – these questions remain unanswered. But what has created such conditions can be given some partial answers. This is attempted below.
One answer is that the ruling elite of Pakistan itself dug the hole in which it finds itself. First, it passed the Objectives Resolution which did away with the theoretical basis of democracy (rule by the people – ‘demos’
by declaring that sovereignty lies with God. This looks fine on paper but, if you think about it, God’s will or intention or the meaning of His sacred texts will be interpreted by human beings. And, of course, these interpreters are the ulema – that, at least, is the claim of the religious forces in the country.
In short, without saying so, our founding fathers laid down the basis for a Sunni version of the Velayat-i-Faqih. However, being hypocritical, the ruling elite always denied real power to the ulema in the apparatus of the state.
The power rested with the bureaucracy and the military – later the military dominated other elitist groups – and they co-opted the ulema as well as the feudal landowners.
In order to curb ethnicity and to keep ruling East Bengal, Balochistan, Sindh and the NWFP, the military elite, which was predominantly Punjabi, kept using the symbols of Islam and Urdu.
However, when symbols are used by the education system, the TV, the radio and the press, they tend to become homogenised and widespread. Thus, the ordinary Pakistani became pro-war, anti-India, anti-Israel and anti-West.
All these positions were couched in the idiom of religion. Hence, purely secular, nationalistic endeavours – like ruling East Bengal and winning the whole Kashmir state for Pakistan – were made to appear as Islamic endeavours. That is why the resistance to General Musharraf’s deviation from some previous policies seems to be against Islam itself to some of his opponents. This is one of the many holes the ruling elite dug for itself.
During 1971 Yahya Khan’s government used the idiom of religion to suppress Bengalis. The militant organisations Al-Shams and Al-Badar were created and supported by the military. Then, during the Afghan war the American proxy war against the Soviet army was also called a jihad. Pakistan participated enthusiastically in it and militants fighting in the name of Islam came to Pakistan and some settled down here.
The effects of the Mujahideen victory in Afghanistan and the earlier Iranian revolution soon became visible in Pakistan where Islam was of the Barelvi type. It was mixed up with the veneration of the saints and was not of the hard, puritanical type. However, American and Saudi money increased the Deobandi and Ahl-i-Hadith presence so much that a harder, more radical and inflexible interpretation of Islam gained prominence at least in the NWFP and Balochistan. The Iranian revolution raised political consciousness and also gave Islamists the idea that they too could gain power in the modern world.
Then, most significantly, the Pakistani state (through the army and the intelligence agencies) began to use Islamic militants to fight a proxy war with India in Kashmir . Many of these militant groups were also anti-Shia. Thus, one fallout of the proxy war in Kashmir was the violence against the Shias which started during Ziaul Haq’s time and has not come to an end till now.
The organisations, trained in the battlegrounds of Afghanistan and Kashmir and brought up on the doctrine of hatred, challenged the state several times. When General Musharraf took power even earlier than 9/11, the journal Sahifa Ahle Hadith (Karachi) condemned him as a stooge of America. This position is reminiscent of Sayyid Qutb’s (1906-66) theory of ‘jahiliyah’ – that modern culture as well as the ruling elite in Muslim countries are like the pre-Islamic Arab society (i.e. sunk in ignorance).
Before 9/11, such vitriolic condemnation was unusual in Pakistan. After that event, when General Musharraf reversed the policy of proxy war in Kashmir and banned some Islamist organisations, it gained more currency and popular legitimacy.
General Musharraf sought to co-opt the clergy and created such a political vacuum (mainly by eliminating Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif) that Islam-oriented political parties came to rule the NWFP and Balochistan.
At the same time, he fought against the Taliban presence and influence in Waziristan and militants who were after his own blood in the country. Now that the Taliban influence has increased in the Pashtun areas in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, the government finds its writ no longer running in much of the tribal areas.
Not all the policies which have backfired are those of the opportunistic Pakistani ruling elite. Some are those of foreign powers. For instance, Israel’s unjust policies towards the Palestinians and America’s support of them, America’s occupation of Iraq and threat to Iran, Britain’s enhanced vigilance of its Muslim population, Europe’s mistrust of Muslims and, of course, Muslim resistance and intransigence to western values – all of these are contributing to the hardening of attitudes.
One of the lessons of the Iraq war which the militants seem to have learned is that indiscriminate violence and that of a highly ruthless kind, pay dividends. This is what is happening in Pakistan. The militant Islamists are striking out at targets which will spread terror. Low-paid employees are dying. One hopes that they do not become so disheartened that they lose heart in defending sensitive places.
There are several other related problems which may strengthen the militants further. First, our common people have been given a diet of nationalism and jingoism in the idiom of Islam for a long time. They may reject policies to create peace with India in relation to Kashmir with such intensity as to revive the proxy war in that region. This would strengthen the militants.
Second, there may be functionaries of state who still believe in using the militants in Kashmir. They may be biding their time in the hope that their previous policies will be revived some day. They too will keep militants powerful.
Third, General Musharraf, in order to eliminate the threat of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, will reduce the strength of the moderates and, indirectly, strengthen the Islamic forces as a whole.
Fourth, the United States may attack Iran, or let Israel do so, which will create more Islamic militants in Pakistan and elsewhere. And, lastly, the Americans will perpetuate such horrors in Iraq that its only response will be increased Islamic militancy all over the world with spillover effects in Pakistan.
As we can see, the ruling elite of Pakistan can change some of these variables but not all. Even those it can change it may not, because changes will be against powerful sections of the elite. Moreover, changes such as reducing the contents of textbooks which are anti-India and pro-war will be seen as playing into the hands of the US and will be resisted.
However, if changes are not made -- such as encouraging the genuine participation of all political leaders and parties in the political process, giving pro-peace messages through the media and incorporating these in textbooks, abandoning all forms of militancy in Kashmir — this country will slide into mayhem and anarchy.
Our airports, railway stations, bus stops, schools and hospitals will become unsafe. We do not want that to happen. Can we stop it from happening? Perhaps not, but we can at least understand what is at stake and oppose policies which make us so unsafe.
DAWN - Opinion; February 13, 2007
Else no doubts our resident Rambo would have been making the armies round the world bleed! Lucky for the armies! Instead he wants other people to die for a cause he isn't prepared to fight in himself! What heroism! Quelle héroïsme!
