Return to the back channel
Saturday, September 26, 2009
Asif Ezdi
As a presidential candidate, Obama publicly acknowledged the importance of resolving Kashmir. His interest of course was not in getting the Kashmiris their rights, but in winning Pakistan's full cooperation in supporting the US war in Afghanistan. He even did some loud thinking about appointing Bill Clinton as a special envoy on Kashmir. India immediately shot down the idea and Obama quickly and quietly dropped it. Also, Obama kept Pakistan-India relations out of Holbrooke's mandate in deference to Indian wishes.
While rejecting any US role in Kashmir, Delhi also told Washington that the back-channel dialogue initiated by Musharraf and Manmohan Singh in 2005 offered the best way of moving towards a settlement of the Kashmir issue. Also, if Washington wanted to be helpful, it should persuade the new government in Islamabad to resume these negotiations from the point reached in March 2007, when Musharraf's downward spiral began, stalling finalisation of the deal.
Since Musharraf's fall, the resumption of the back-channel dialogue has been the central strand of the Manmohan Singh government's Kashmir policy. A proposal to pick up the thread was made by Delhi to the new government in Islamabad shortly after Musharraf's exit. Zardari hinted at his press conference on September 9, 2008, the day he took oath as president, that Pakistan was not just willing but keen to reactivate the back channel. "[Because of] back-channel diplomacy," he said, "there will be good news before the Congress-led government in India goes for the election [in 2009]."
The Bombay attacks in November upset this time-table but did not scuttle the plan. Even after Delhi suspended the composite dialogue, it continued working behind the scenes to get the back-channel going again, leaving the diplomatic footwork mainly to Washington. Delhi's skilful diplomacy, in which Washington has fronted for India, has now borne fruit. The government's decision to appoint former Foreign Secretary Riaz Mohammad Khan as Pakistan's new representative in the back-channel dialogue means that the process is in place, though it cannot start in earnest before the resumption of the composite dialogue. Publicly though, both sides are not saying much.
The important question now is whether, as India would like, the resumed back-channel talks would take place on the basis of the five-point agreement worked out under Musharraf. Its central point was that there would be no redrawing of the Line of Control (LoC), apart from some minor adjustments. The remaining clauses provided for devolution of power to the regional level; a gradual reduction of Indian troops as the militants scaled down their activities; cooperative management of resources such as water and glaciers; and soft borders.
In other words, India would get what it has always sought: the renunciation by the people of Kashmir of their struggle for azadi and recognition by Pakistan of India's occupation of Kashmir as permanent. All that the Kashmiris would get are some powers locally, more open trade and travel across the LoC and a promise of withdrawal of some troops conditional upon the good behaviour of the population.
This is the settlement that Musharraf wanted to impose on the Kashmiris and which Kasuri naïvely continues to tout enthusiastically. It is essentially nothing but a rehash of the autonomy agreements reached by Sheikh Abdullah with the difference that Pakistan will also now become a party. If this settlement is finalised, it will not extinguish the Kashmiri people's desire for freedom and will meet the same fate as the earlier deals.
What is at stake is not how much power is devolved to the State Assembly or how much trade takes place between the two parts of the state. That is not why more than 100,000 Kashmiris have laid down their lives. They did it to win freedom for Kashmir and to maintain a separate identity, not only of the present generation of Kashmiris but also of the countless generations yet to come. The people of Pakistan are pledged to support the Kashmiris in this struggle. The government must, therefore, repudiate the deal made by Musharraf. It must decide a fresh approach after holding free and frank consultations with the Kashmiri leadership and a national debate within Pakistan.
While the back-channel dialogue with Pakistan forms the central strand of Delhi's Kashmir policy, it also realises that Kashmiri representatives, including at least some from the APHC, will have to be associated with any settlement before it can be finalised. However, Delhi is wary of holding any talks held in a tripartite format involving the participation of Kashmiris without first ensuring the support of the Kashmiri representatives. To win this backing, Delhi has been working hard on a prior deal with the APHC. It is holding out to them the prospect of a share of power in the state government if they settle for enhanced autonomy within the Indian constitution.
With this in view, Delhi has reportedly held a series of secret meetings with the APHC leadership this summer. Delhi is pinning its hopes on the moderate faction led by Mirwaiz Farooq. However, he is holding back because of indication that support for his faction is slipping. This was demonstrated during the mass protest triggered last year at the decision of the Srinagar authorities to transfer land to the Amarnath shrine.
In an article in the daily Hindu (Sept 5), Praveen Swami, a well-informed journalist on Kashmir politics, also wrote about the "stark fact" that the "realists" (that is, those who "want a negotiated end to a battle they cannot win") have never been in a weaker political position. "Even in his old-city Srinagar heartland, Mirwaiz Farooq's repeated calls to pro-Islamist youth to end their now-routine clashes with the police have been ignored. Sajjad Lone's historic decision to fight the Baramulla Lok Sabha elections ended in an ignominious defeat," Swami wrote.
Given this strong pro-azadi sentiment, it is no wonder that the APHC would like to get a nod from Islamabad before sitting down at the negotiating table with Delhi. There are reports in the Indian media that Pakistan is being asked, presumably through Washington, to endorse the talks. Delhi's decision to allow Geelani to visit his son in Pakistan is also meant to conciliate Kashmiri opinion and win it over to a dialogue with Delhi on its terms.
Delhi also realises that for the back-channel dialogue on Kashmir to take place, the composite dialogue has to be resumed. Therefore, behind a smokescreen of tough talk to pacify its domestic opinion, Delhi has been lowering the bar it had set for the resumption of these talks. For some time, the only condition it has been demanding is that Hafiz Saeed should be prosecuted. On 18 September, in a further climb-down, Indian Home Minister Chidambaram said that even "half a step is a good step."
But the Indian Government cannot afford another storm of the kind that broke out after Sharm el-Sheikh. It is therefore doubtful that the arrest of Hafiz Saeed on charges which are not directly related to Bombay would be enough. Still, a breakthrough at the upcoming meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the two countries in New York cannot be ruled out. A failure will not be a tragedy though. In any case, there will be an opportunity for a summit-level meeting two months later at the Trinidad CHOGM.
The veteran Indian columnist Prem Shankar Jha wrote in December 2007 that the back-channel agreement "conceded 95 per cent of India's conditions." He was being conservative. Actually it is 99 per cent. In a fair compromise, each side gives ground in more or less equal amount but when one party concedes virtually everything, as Musharraf was prepared to do, there can be no other name for it than a sell-out.
Pakistan now has a chance to walk away from this shameful betrayal of the Kashmiri aspirations. This opportunity must be seized. The Government has already said "Yes" to back channel diplomacy. It must say no to the deal that Musharraf was about to make.
The writer is a former member of the Pakistan Foreign Service. Email:
asifezdi@yahoo.com