The Kashmiris alone are enough to beat the Indians , just learn from the Chechens:-
How come the Chechens beat the mighty Russians despite being a minuscule ethnicity?
This question previously had details. They are now in a comment.
Alexandra Johnson, Passionate scholar of (Russo-)Chechen history
Updated Jul 2, 2017
TL;DR The Chechen victory can be attributed to a combination of three main factors: the use of guerrilla tactics, home-field advantage, and morale bred of the unique Chechen psyche.
Since Mark already talked about the first two, I’ll break down the latter since I personally think it played a bigger role (and is also significantly more complex to analyze).
I apologize in advance for the extremely long explanation that is to follow.
Now let’s begin with some history! In order to understand how the First Russo-Chechen War even came about, it’s essential to note that the conflict in Chechnya is one that has been continuously played out from the era of Russian expansion in the sixteenth century all the way up to the present day; and over this course of time, the roots of the Chechen conflict have transformed substantially. Originally an ethnic matter, the mid-twentieth century brought about the shift to a largely secular dispute born of a clash between rival nationalist ideologies and centering around two contending core principles: one the one hand, the Chechen right to national autonomy, and on the other, the right of the Russian Federation to protect what it believed was its territory.
When discussing Chechnya, most people tend to focus exclusively on the events of the past century as explanatory of the current crisis. Yet in order to truly understand the deep-seated roots of this conflict one must look much further back into the history of the Caucasus than most books explore. For starters, more than seventy native ethnic groups call this region their home—Chechens comprise the largest—and the languages they speak are mutually comprehensible and belong to the Nakh group of Caucasian linguistics.
Why is this important? Well the Nakh languages are related to the language of the Hurrians, the founders of the ancient kingdoms of Mittani and Urartu. This little tidbit gave rise to the claim that the Chechens are the descendants of these cultures and as such were the bearers of civilization when they moved north to their present location in the fourth century BCE. Additionally, the high moral demands of Chechen culture are signs that these people are actually the remnants of a highly developed ancient civilization.
These moral demands I speak of—and a very important aspect of Chechen culture to understand—are represented by the concept of
nokhchalla, which is essentially the code of honor obligatory to each Chechen.
Nokhchalla embodies basic core values of the Chechen people; values reflected in the vastly symbolic image of the wolf, which was chosen as the emblem of the Chechen republic after achieving de facto independence. An excellent explanation of the wolf’s esteemed qualities is that of Chechen author Lema Usmanov, who writes:“The lion and the eagle are both embodiments of strength, but they attack only the weak. The wolf is the only creature that dares to take on someone stronger than himself. The wolf’s insufficient strength is compensated for with limitless audacity, courage and adroitness. If, however, he has lost the battle he dies silently, expressing neither fear nor pain. And he always dies facing his enemy.”
Equally significant are its other qualities cherished by the Chechens: the wolf is loyal to its pack and will willingly sacrifice its life for them, and more important still the wolf loves freedom, cannot be tamed, and would sooner die fighting than surrender to its enemies. Perhaps nowhere else in history are the core values of a people displayed as adroitly and truthfully as they have been by the Chechens, who have adopted the wolfen psyche brilliantly in their centuries-long stand against the overwhelmingly greater force of the Russian military and government.
Why explain all of this? Because it’s important to acknowledge that ancient descent,
nokhchalla, and the image of the wolf came to embody that which the Chechens regarded as the centrality of their ethnic composite. Equality, freedom, and rejection of outside authority were concepts deeply embedded into the Chechen consciousness and thus have been retained throughout all stages of the centuries-long conflict with Russia. As a strong moral code for the Chechens, the
nokhchalla encompassed such demands as “chivalry, noble feelings, hospitality, honour, faithfulness in friendship, a spirit of self-sacrifice for the common good, courage in war, modesty in everyday life and yet vindictiveness bordering on inhumanity when fighting a treacherous enemy.” “Consequently,” author Moshe Gammer explains, “accepting Russian rule was to the Chechens more than losing freedom in the Western sense of the word: it was losing one’s manhood and—more important—one’s soul.”
When studying either the general Russo-Chechen conflict or any of the specific incidents encompassed within, it is absolutely essential to consider these qualities of the Chechen people in order to understand their continued resistance to the significantly superior Russian military force.
Now that I’ve explained a bit about Chechen culture, we’ll delve into the history of the actual conflict. Russian expansion into the Caucasus is believed to have begun in the mid 16th century under the rule of Ivan IV (‘Ivan the Terrible’ as he has often been referred), who married a Kabartay princess and thus believed himself justified in claiming sovereignty over Kabarda and the entirety of the Northern Caucasus region—a rationalization maintained by the Romanovs, the Bolsheviks, and the rest of Ivan IV’s successors. Similarly to recent years, the early centuries of Chechen conquest under Russia were marred by exceedingly one-sided accounts of Russian historiography serving largely as a means to demonize the Chechens. Although the Chechens were not wholly innocent in the conflict (they often raided Russian settlements, which in turn bolstered demand for Chechen pacification and offered justification for the Russians to embark on ‘punitive expeditions’), in the overall scheme of things they were in fact the victims.
The twentieth century saw much transformation in the Russo-Chechen conflict as a series of momentous events took place. The first of these was the forced deportation under Josef Stalin in 1944, during which time nearly half a million Chechen and Ingush people were taken from their homes and subject to a brutal twenty-day train ride (during which time many died from the horrific spatial, sanitary, and nutritional conditions) until they reached the frozen tundra of Kazakhstan and Kirgizia where the deportees were to be relocated. The deportation marked a significant era of turmoil for the future of Chechnya as the social change it forced led to shifts in the Chechen identity and many of the older generation—among whom the values of traditional Chechen society were the most strongly embedded—were killed. The disturbance of the social structure led to the destruction of the centuries-old Chechen clan system, and the severe loss of life the deportation incurred carved a fresh wound into the harrowing history of the Chechen struggle as they came to consider themselves victims of genocide. As one British journalist wrote:“The scar is deep not only on the generation which survived the train journey and the generation born in exile, but on their descendents. Because this was punishment based on race, the deportations have become part of the national identity of the Chechens, Ingush, Karachai and Balkars. Like Jewish Holocaust survivors, it is an event which quietly dominates both individuals’ lives and the nation as a whole. Everyone without exception is a victim. Even for those born after, the tragedy is impossible to put aside, since their parents, relatives, village and entire people suffered.”
In spite of this, the Chechens displayed a remarkable ability to preserve their culture (including language), their independent spirit, and their overall Chechen identity, which was largely attributable to their ethnic solidarity and sheer determination to survive. Thus, in 1957 when Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev proposed a repatriation of the deported, Chechens returned in force to their old homes bearing an even stronger national identity than they had previous to their departure. Yet upon returning, the Chechens found that extensive effort had been put into destroying all memories of their homeland; Russians had taken over their homes, mosques had been burned, monuments and inscriptions were destroyed, and even graveyards—immensely sacred places to a people who consider their ancestors as important as the living—were utterly desecrated.
The following decades were marked by pacification as the Chechens were subject to the process of ‘Sovietisation,’ wherein adoption of the Cyrillic alphabet was forced upon them and the destruction of all mosques meant an absence of organized religion. Hence once the 1990s rolled around, as a result of Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies of perestroika (“restructuring”) and glasnost (“openness”) and the subsequent dissolution of the USSR, Chechnya—like much of the former Soviet Union—saw an upsurge in religiosity due to these suffered years of Soviet oppression of religion.
Now Islam has been an important part of Chechen culture for centuries, but over the course of the Russo-Chechen conflict the interpretations of it changed significantly. Most religious communities in Chechnya adhere to Sufism, but some pockets became increasingly radicalized by the end of the 20th century. The key factors in this radicalization were the immensely destructive wars of the 1990s wherein Russia used grossly disproportionate force against the largely guerilla-based Chechen resistance, and the influence of Wahabism on resistance leader Shamil Basaev.
Basaev, who is known predominantly for his role in orchestrating the seizures of the Dubrovka theater and the Budennovsk maternity hospital, actually displayed an interest in radical Islam that predated the first Chechen war. Believing war with Russia to be imminent, in April-July 1994 Basaev and thirty of his fighters journeyed to Afghanistan and visited Khost—Al Qaeda’s main base—to undergo military training, and it was likely during this time that he became part of the Wahabi jihad that he soon spread to the Chechen resistance. Calling for an establishment of both a social and political Islamic order, the Wahabis publicly criticized Sufism as well as the political and traditional religious leadership for “‘deviations’ from ‘pure’ Islam.” Exemplified through Basaev, Wahabism contributed to the spread and popularization of Islamic language in politics and especially to demands for an Islamic state (imama) based on the shari’a. Essentially, Islam seemed to the war-ravaged people to be the only answer to the prevailing anarchy.
The path to war and the subsequent surge of radicalization have also been attributed to the conflicting personalities of Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Chechnya’s most famous military officer (later elected President) Major-General Dzhokar Dudaev. Despite the ubiquitous existence of Islam as an important piece of the Chechen identity, Chechnya under Dudaev was largely represented by secular nationalism; and although Dudaev had sworn in his presidency on the Qur’an and stated elsewhere that “the ‘ideal’ Chechen state would be one based on Islamic shari’a law,” Chechnya’s constitution was not formed upon these principles.
Initiating Chechen rule with this strong surge of secular nationalist rhetoric, as a leader Dudaev eventually began to display weakness in the form of arrogance, lack of tact and political experience, and an erratic temperament—qualities that not only began to alienate the Russian government, but many Chechens as well. President Yeltsin, who was similarly vain, was also ruthlessly power-hungry, which resulted in erratic changes of policy that confused the Chechen leadership and further strained any opportunity for compromise. One belief is that the immense personality clash was actually born of a status game, wherein Yeltsin would only agree to face-to-face negotiation if Dudaev respectfully acknowledged Yeltsin’s preeminence, and Dudaev would only negotiate on the grounds that Russia first met the precondition of acknowledging Chechnya’s sovereignty. Regardless of the root causes, the tension between the two leaders made negotiations impossible and further exacerbated the already heated conflict.
Arriving at this impasse, it became apparent to both sides that war was inevitable; and despite Dudaev’s panicked last-ditch efforts at negotiations, for Yeltsin it was too late to turn back.
The first Russo-Chechen war began in 1994 and lasted until 1996. It was an absolute bloodbath for Chechnya; however, the early part of the war saw many military disasters for the Russians, the most notable of which was the defense of Grozny—Chechnya’s capitol city—under the leadership of Basaev and his famous Abkhazia Battalion. By employing textbook military tactics, the Chechens were able to systematically annihilate the Russian 131st Motorized Infantry Brigade, destroy or capture approximately 200 of Russia’s 350 armored vehicles used in the assault, and kill over 500 Russian soldiers, culminating in the greatest losses the Russian military incurred in a single battle since World War II.
The resulting loss to Russia was not only of military capacity, but also of morale; and having realized that ground combat in the mountainous terrain put the Chechens at a distinct advantage, Russia turned instead to the reckless use of artillery and airpower as well as the abuse of prisoners and civilians. The damage sustained by Chechnya was a nearly unquantifiable loss of human life (estimates range from 25,000-80,000 dead and well over 100,000 wounded, the majority of both statistics having been civilians), extreme economic and political upheaval, the utter destruction of Grozny, the collapse of Chechnya’s modern infrastructure (industry, social services, housing, communications, etc.), and the displacement of several hundred thousand Chechens.
So to say that the Chechen resistance was “victorious” is up for interpretation since they initially held off the Russian forces despite being massively outnumbered, but eventually were absolutely slaughtered once the Russians resorted to excessive force. Yet in spite of this, Chechen morale remained stronger both throughout and beyond the First Chechen War. In fact, Basaev’s underdog victory in Grozny became a huge rallying cry for the resistance up through the Second Chechen War and carries on even today. The proud, resilient, and distinctly wolfen Chechen psyche has proven a valuable tool in their continued struggle against a vastly larger force, and is thus a crucial element to understanding Chechnya’s people, culture, and military history.
If you’ve made it this far: congratulations, you deserve a medal. But since I can’t transmit one over Quora, all you’ll walk away with is knowledge, my respect, and a source list.
Sources
- Usmanov, Lema. In Moshe Gammer, trans., The Lone Wolf and the Bear: Three Centuries of Chechen Defiance of Russian Rule, 5. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006. Originally published in Nepokorennaia Chechnia (Moscow: Izsatel’skii dom Parus, 1997).
- Smith, Sebastian. In Moshe Gammer, The Lone Wolf and the Bear: Three Centuries of Chechen Defiance of Russian Rule, 174. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006. Originally published in Allah’s Mountains: Politics and War in the Russian Caucasus (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1998).
- Gammer, Moshe. The Lone Wolf and the Bear: Three Centuries of Chechen Defiance of Russian Rule. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006.
- Hughes, James. Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007.
- Interview with Dudaev. In James Hughes, Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad, 66. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007. Originally from Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, 12 August 1992.
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Paul Galitsine
It’s an excellent answer, but I’m afraid the authors you cite fall foul of the ‘noble savage’ tro...
Denny Den, works at Xerox
Answered Apr 5
Before giving any explanations I have to say this was a remarkable victory. It is a true story of David against Goliath. Chechens have proved to everyone that they’re some of the finest warriors in the world.
Before I state the reasons why Chechen won, I’d like to mention the odds that were agaist them:
- 146 million Russia against round 1 million(max) chechen;
- Huge millitary power that threatened half of the world vs little nation nobody ever heard about;
- trained army with structure, every type of weapon(including nuclear) vs untrained bunch of civilian people armed mostly with ak47;
- Soldiers who...
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Mark Allen, Chief Misanthropic Officer
Answered Apr 28, 2017
One reason was that the Russian army did not have a modern doctrine for urban warfare that took into account guerrilla tactics. In the First Battle of Grozny, Chechen separatists could simply hide on a rooftop as Russian armored columns round the corner. The Chechens would fire a rocket-propelled grenade at a tank or armored personnel carrier, and pick off, one by one, Russian soldiers coming to the aid of their fallen comrades.
Also, while many Chechen fighters operated independently and arguably without discipline, several Chechen leaders had impressive Soviet military backgrounds that likely helped them predict tactics that could be expected of the Russians. Aslan Maskhadov served with various artillery regiments, while Dzhokhar Dudaeyev was a major general in the Soviet Air Force that served in Afghanistan.
There are several books on the subject that describe the war in greater depth.
Battle of Grozny (1994–95) - Wikipedia