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Kashmir: If progress is to be made, India must dictate the terms

Even the USA has failed in this endeavor!

And we don't have a fraction of the leverage that the USA has on the PA. We don't have to even go into the reasons for that.

Fact is that the PA has stuck to it's guns where it's core strategy is concerned and it has been able to play the US well for decades despite getting billions of dollars for supposedly being an ally, the most allied ally.

It can and does negotiate with a gun to it's own head and it has worked beautifully for it (from PA's perspective). So far!

In a way Musharraf's period provided some hope but unfortunately it couldn't go the distance in agreeing to the final resolution.

What has worked so far may not for very long. Nothing works forever. This represents a unique window of opportunity for the region.
 
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Sure in the long term but not with the current GoI/PM,the climate is not right for the GoI to pursue such things. There is already a heightened anti-Pakistan sentiment due to the 26/11 attacks (still very fresh in the minds of most Indians) then the repeated infiltration attempts and now the cross-border firing (not laying blame solely at Pakistan's door but it is about perception) added on top of that the current party in power was scathing of the past GoI for being "soft" on Pakistan with respect to all of the above so they can't be seen to u-turn now.


I think in 10-15 years time that India will feel secure enough in itself (as a military and economic power) and the electorate of India will be educated and mature enough to initiate serious and meaningful peace talks with Pakistan and stick at it (previous attempts have been derailed by terror attacks), just not today.

There is no rush. 10-15 years is nothing given the past history. The world can wait.
 
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Even the USA has failed in this endeavor!
The US never engaged with Pakistan at a strategic and long-term level, whether it be US-Pakistani concerns in Afghanistan or South Asia overall. US engagement with Pakistan was, and is, transactional and largely limited to throwing money at Pakistan.
 
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Actually Sir, the ART of international geopolitics makes everything possible, and I mean everything.

Sure, there must be a way. Just that no one has been able to figure it out so far.

Let's hope we have smarter people on both side who can make it happen. There are far more losers from the status quo than there are winners.
 
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How can it be labelled a "moot point"? And how can you so brazenly state that India's assertions that the multiplicity of power centres in Pakistan complicate and even hinder the talk/peace process, are unfounded? Show me another example where engaging one faction at the cost of another competing faction has worked out? If India engages the GoP (as it tried to in May with Nawaz Sharif) then the PA/ISI is going to try and sabotage such steps (Herat attack, IK drama etc).

So it is up to India to engage with all factions at once, act as the Jerry Springer of the region and get all the sides together, sat down and on the same page, even those factions that define themselves as the eternal nemesis of India? I can't see how this is even remotely reasonable to expect of India. It is and always has been for Pakistan to sort out its own internal issues/mess.
Please see my earlier response to Captain Popeye.
 
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The US never engaged with Pakistan at a strategic and long-term level, whether it be US-Pakistani concerns in Afghanistan or South Asia overall. US engagement with Pakistan was, and is, transactional and largely limited to throwing money at Pakistan.

And surely it has been that way for a reason?

Because the US interests and the Pakistani interests (the real ones) have not been aligned. Right from the word go?

You joined the CENTO and CEATO pacts because you wanted to use the goods against India. Even though those pacts were anti-communist pacts (and they obliged you to join the Vietnam war for example while USA was not obliged to join or help you in wars with India). So there was a yawning gap in expectations from the very beginning.

Same thing is true for the Afghan war (both during the USSR days and the current one). You had very different aims and you pursued them even when they were against what you professed to them.

So tell me what basis do you think is there for a strategic and long term relationship?
 
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And surely it has been that way for a reason?

Because the US interests and the Pakistani interests (the real ones) have not been aligned. Right from the word go?
Interests were indeed not completely aligned and the US insistence on continuing with a short term, transactional relationship based on aid dole-outs(I am focusing on the more recent US engagement with Pakistan post 9/11) was never going to bring those interests into alignment. It takes two to tango (requires the interests of both parties to be addressed to some extent), and the US had no interest in engaging with Pakistan in any substantive manner to bring the positions of the two nations into alignment.

My point being that US engagement with Pakistan is not a good template to follow.
 
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Interests were indeed not completely aligned and the US insistence on continuing with a short term, transactional relationship based on aid dole-outs(I am focusing on the more recent US engagement with Pakistan post 9/11) was never going to bring those interests into alignment. It takes two to tango (requires the interests of both parties to be addressed to some extent), and the US had no interest in engaging with Pakistan in any substantive manner to bring the positions of the two nations into alignment.

My point being that US engagement with Pakistan is not a good template to follow.

I agree. One because it is itself not a successful model and second because we don't have the same kind of leverage.

So it is back to how progress can be made on the Kashmir issue (and the Kashmir issue is only a symptom) and the wider relationship. At least to the extent that it is not overtly hostile even if it is not friendly.

That can happen when the constituencies that gain from peace can withstand and upend the constituencies that gain from hostility. That would also answer your point about "why does it matter 'who controls Pakistani foreign policy towards India'".

If the entity that controls "Pakistani foreign policy towards India" feels threatened by peace with India, nothing can come out of the process. Talking to powerless civilians is a waste of time.
 
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I agree. One because it is itself not a successful model and second because we don't have the same kind of leverage.

So it is back to how progress can be made on the Kashmir issue (and the Kashmir issue is only a symptom) and the wider relationship. At least to the extent that it is not overtly hostile even if it is not friendly.

That can happen when the constituencies that gain from peace can withstand and upend the constituencies that gain from hostility. That would also answer your point about "why does it matter 'who controls Pakistani foreign policy towards India'".

If the entity that controls "Pakistani foreign policy towards India" feels threatened by peace with India, nothing can come out of the process. Talking to powerless civilians is a waste of time.

Actually, the carrot-and-stick approach has worked very well with Pakistan to date for USA. Pakistan has done almost everything it was asked to do and received hefty payments for the services rendered. Thus, it worked well for both sides.
 
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Pakistan has done almost everything it was asked to do and received hefty payments for the services rendered. Thus, it worked well for both sides.
So US complaining and whining about "duplicity and double games", voiced as recently as the latest Pentagon briefing, are dishonest characterizations of the level of cooperation extended by Pakistan?
 
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Actually, the carrot-and-stick approach has worked very well with Pakistan to date for USA. Pakistan has done almost everything it was asked to do and received hefty payments for the services rendered. Thus, it worked well for both sides.

I will beg to differ that it has worked well.

Both sides are hugely disappointed with the relationship and the outcomes and it shows very clearly. Both don't have a good alternative (at least as of now) and so maintain a flimsy facade of normality.
 
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Seriously, what India should do is engage with the Pakistan Army in a sustained and positive way, just like USA does. Only then might things improve.

India pretty much did that when Musharraf was in power. India was told that the army completely backed Musharraf but it didn't turn out like that. The moment Musharraf left the picture, Kayani backed away from the deal (that Musharraf-MMS had worked out), the PPP government then did the same & wanted to change the parameters of the deal. NS is following the same pattern when harking back to Lahore declaration of 1999 as the basis for negotiations. This has pretty much wiped out any interest in India to work towards a deal on Kashmir because the Indian political class now believes that Pakistan might simply not be able to hold up its side of the bargain or that different entities might simply ignore it & do whatever they want to. That would entail an unacceptable risk where the GoI would have shown its hand and risk blowback if there is a terrorist attack or a pullback from agreed positions by Pakistan. In any case, there seems little appetite now in Pakistan for Musharraf's formula & when they finally do come around (because India will never offer anything more), they might find that India has simply moved on from there and might not be amenable for a deal.

Pakistan seems unable to offer India an united national position, merely offering up positions based on what the leader at that time is open to. This is risky because there is no guarantee (as in Musharraf's case) that he/she will retain the same level of influence. Unless that changes, there will be no real chances at any agreement.
 
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There are bigger threats to Pakistan than India today, according to the army green book of Pakistan the military seems to be figuring this out. Peace with India is not something the PA is against but if it is done in a way that they lose face it won't work.

Other threats are possible temporary (atleast in the minds of the officers in PA) and while that might need peace at least temporarily with India to sort out, it is still not clear that there is a complete long term shift in attitudes to relations with India.

We will never know what constitutes face saving for PA. It may be a price that India simply is unwilling to pay.
 
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I will beg to differ that it has worked well.

Both sides are hugely disappointed with the relationship and the outcomes and it shows very clearly. Both don't have a good alternative (at least as of now) and so maintain a flimsy facade of normality.

And yet the fact that both carry on with the relationship and continue to work with each other is proof enough that the approach is working. Nothing is perfect in international geopolitics.
 
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India pretty much did that when Musharraf was in power. India was told that the army completely backed Musharraf but it didn't turn out like that. The moment Musharraf left the picture, Kayani backed away from the deal (that Musharraf-MMS had worked out), the PPP government then did the same & wanted to change the parameters of the deal. NS is following the same pattern when harking back to Lahore declaration of 1999 as the basis for negotiations. This has pretty much wiped out any interest in India to work towards a deal on Kashmir because the Indian political class now believes that Pakistan might simply not be able to hold up its side of the bargain or that different entities might simply ignore it & do whatever they want to. That would entail an unacceptable risk where the GoI would have shown its hand and risk blowback if there is a terrorist attack or a pullback from agreed positions by Pakistan. In any case, there seems little appetite now in Pakistan for Musharraf's formula & when they finally do come around (because India will never offer anything more), they might find that India has simply moved on from there and might not be amenable for a deal.

Pakistan seems unable to offer India an united national position, merely offering up positions based on what the leader at that time is open to. This is risky because there is no guarantee (as in Musharraf's case) that he/she will retain the same level of influence. Unless that changes, there will be no real chances at any agreement.

All nations offer positions based on who their leader is at any given time, not just Pakistan. The sort of permanence that you seem to seek is not possible, but all nations continue to work at such important relationships despite changes of leadership.
 
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