Iran already got benefits from the JCPOA. 100s of billions of dollars of frozen Iranian funds were freed up into government hands.
the JCPOA is not perfect. nor is it anything resembling a grand bargain. but it was a solid first step. 2 sides that wouldnt even be seen in a room together, worked out a deal that removed the biggest propaganda chip out of zionist hands (nuclear Iran means the end of earth for their propaganda machines).
it also removed the sanctions responsible for over 90% of Iranian economic misery.t also removed security council sanctions on Iranian weapons impports. Iran gave up almost nothing in return. a small heavy water reactor was disabled, and temporary limits were set. Uranium enrichment was always the biggest nuclear dispute that the west would never yeild on, and they eventually did. Iran kept all its official nuclear breakout threshold intact.
This deal was in Irans favor. As sanctions was never about limiting Iranian nuclear program, but limiting IRAns geopolitical rise, and possibly even to break IRan. they cant handle a sanctions tied Iran, they know they will get eaten alive by a Iran that can trade and grow its economy to boot. thats why you saw how infuriated the sauds and zionists were, and how determined they were to kill the deal.
And to say that the west was going to use the deal to infiltrate into Iran is laughable. Iran has gone to extreme steps to shield itself from the cancer of western regime change engines.
power is strategically concentrated into hardline dominated offices like the supreme leader, guardian council, SNSC and of course the revolutionary guards.
actual western puppets and spies dont last long in Irans revolutionary system.
This man knows what he is talking about.
Aghayun, I would very much like to know your thoughts about another aspect not directly addressed in the quoted post.
In that post, the key point to me is the following sentence:
"power is strategically concentrated into hardline dominated offices like the supreme leader, guardian council, SNSC and of course the revolutionary guards."
In previous comments, I highlighted what I believe to be the reason for the differing strategies pursued respectively by western hardliners and liberals vis a vis Iran, knowing that their goal is identical, i.e. consists in defeating and destroying Iran.
But while western and zionist liberals believe that having Iran engage on the path of the JCPOA will ultimately lead to disarming Iran and/or to making it abandon its Resistance against zio-American imperialism, their hardline counterparts (such as the Likudniks in Occupied Palestine) are of the belief that the revolutionary, patriotic, sovereignist element of the IR (Supreme Leader, IRGC etc) is too entrenched in key institutions, and that it won't allow reformists and moderates to revise Iran's policies in a fundamental manner; therefore, these hardliners calculate, the JCPOA will only end up strengthening that same revolutionary element (including the IRGC) thanks to the economic benefits Iran could reap from it - which clearly, is not supposed to be the goal of the JCPOA in the minds of those who conceived and advocate it. And hence why these western and zionist hardliners oppose the deal and instead promote maximum pressure on Iran (knowing that they have no military option).
You seem to agree with that latter assessment. Which you are of course entitled to, especially as it remains a plausible hypothesis.
However, my question to you is the following: in all this, what do you make of the Iranian reformist / moderate factor? More exactly, what is your opinion on the points below:
1) Iranian reformists and moderates are clearly willing to give in to western demands on JCPOA's II and III intended to limit Iran's missile arsenal and regional influence. This is evidenced not just by statements from liberal figures such as Sadegh Zibakalam, but by the declarations of liberal policymakers and strategists such as Mostafa Tajzadeh and Said Hajjarian, as well as by high-ranking liberal officials such as the late Hashemi Rafsanjani ("in asr, asre mushakbazi nist", and his citation of post-WW2 Japan and Germany) and most importantly, Rohani himself, who in his famous Noruz address to the nation on Seda o Sima, explicitly expressed his wish to see Iran negotiate "bezudi barjame do va se" (JCPOA's II and III).
2) A JCPOA II on missiles would completely deprive Iran of its prime asset of deterrence against outside aggression. The enemy's goal being not only to limit the range of Iranian BM's in such a manner that they would no longer pose a threat to the zionist entity, but moreover, classified blueprints and technical specifications would have to be disclosed to the west, production sites opened to inspection, which would then allow the enemy to neutralize the effectiveness of Iran's remaining arsenal by fine-tuning and adapting its counter-measures accordingly.
A JCPOA III would lead to a disarmament of Iran's allies accross the region. An acceptation by Iran of FATF conditions - another thing Iranian liberals have systematically been advocating, would make it impossible for Iran to keep financing its allies, because it would lay bare all covert channels used to this effect (in addition to downright prohibiting any financial support for these movements).
3) If you agree with points 1) & 2), don't you think these same liberals could theoretically be capable of coercing the Supreme Leader, the IRGC and the revolutionaries into ceding on JCPOA's II and III? The way liberals would go about this, is to make use of the popular mandate they'll enjoy in case Zarif is elected as Iran's next president (which I'm afraid is increasingly likely since Biden prevailed over Trump), or in case sardar Dehghan is elected and worries expressed by some sovereignists about him turn out to be accurate.
Liberals will enjoy full backing from overseas enemy-controlled propaganda media, which would further increase pressures on the Leadership and the revolutionaries. Liberals could even threaten another fitna by instigation of popular uprising similar to the failed 2009 "colored revolution" attempt.
Another important criterion is the relative sway held by liberals over the economy: corrupt and influential liberals could use their economic influence to artificially alter the rial exchange rate (like they have been doing so far) in such a way as to serve their political agenda. Namely, weaken the rial when Leader and IRGC are standing firm against negiotiations on missiles and the region, so as to worsen the population's material plight and thereby push people to oppose the Leader's and the IRGC's stance, falsely portrayed as the main cause for economic suffering; and conversely, allow the rial to gain some value against the dollar whenever new concessions are made to the west, in order to have people believe that this is the only way forward.
Such a scenario would spell disaster if it ever came to pass, as it would essentially trigger a repeat of the Libyan scenario of disarmament followed by destruction.
I would very much appreciate your input on this: are liberals not willing to limit Iran's missile power and regional influence, and would this not endanger Iran's security and survival? And if yes, how can we be sure that these same liberals are not going to be able to have their way?
Thank you.
