Jihad & Ijtihad
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This is an article I wrote on the subject sometime ago. It was written for a particular audience in mind so bear with me while reading -
ISLAMIC IDEOLOGY THE GLOBAL SCENARIO & BANGLADESH
INTRODUCTION
The relationship between Islamic ideology, extremism and terrorism has been the source of much controversy and dispute between western scholars, policy makers and defenders of the faith who have all contested the subject on diametrically opposed grounds and perspectives. Some trace this new interest in Islam in the West to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 but this ignores the long and often violent history that has preceded this recent outbreak of hostility between these two great and antagonistic civilizations (see below). However, a careful reading of the literature on the subject will show that the antagonism primarily emanates from one side only, that is, from the West which views the challenge posed by Islam in apocalyptic terms and dismisses the debt it owes to Islam in the area of science, art and literature which spurred it towards its Enlightenment and Renaissance from the 14th Century onwards. The focus on Islam in recent years has been a direct consequence of this attitude which absolves the West from any blame in helping to create elements of extremism within the Islamic fold (through their encroachment and invasion of Muslim nations) and at the same time to point out the defects and deficiencies within Islamic ideology which is seen as being directly responsible for the growth of modern Islamist terrorism. To understand the relationship between Islamic ideology and extremism one must also prefigure the Western intervention in the Islamic consciousness which has now unhelpfully posited the idea of a moderate Islam against a fundamentalist Islam as if either were precisely definable within the broad umbrella of modern Islamic thought.
BACKGROUND TO WESTERN PERCEPTIONS OF ISLAM BEFORE AND AFTER 9/11 A HISTORY OF CONFLICTING IDEOLOGIES AND CIVILISATIONS
There are two simultaneous and contradictory dialogues on Islam with one presented by the West and the other an internal debate (or struggle) within the Islamic religion itself. The Wests negative attitude towards Islam is unfortunately still influenced by the Christian Crusades which lasted from the 11th to the 13th Century and was a consequence of the reaction of Christian Europe against Moslem Asia, which had been on the offensive since 632 not only in Syria and Asia Minor but in Spain and Sicily also. According to John L. Esposito, For the Christian West, Islam is the religion of the sword; for Muslims, the Christian West is epitomized by the armies of the Crusades. From the earliest decades of Islamic history, Christianity and Islam have been locked in a political and theological struggle, because Islam, in contrast to other worldly religions, has threatened the political and religious ascendancy of Christianity. That such sentiments still influence debate today was revealed immediately after the September 11 attacks on the United States when President Bush, warned the nation, This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while oblivious of the fact that bin Laden always referred to Christians as Crusaders. His statement raised protests by many Muslim leaders who accused him of conjuring up images of the worst conflict between Christians and Muslims. Similarly, Pope Benedict XVI ignited an uproar when he quoted the 14th century Emperor Manuel II Palaeologus who said that, Show me just what Mohammed brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached. In light of such provocative statements Muslims remain highly protective of their religion and this sentiment has been easily exploited by Islamic extremists as was the case during the Salman Rushdie affair and most recently in the Danish cartoon exhibition of the prophet and also from the perceived injustices arising out of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Wests ambivalence to the Kashmir issue and the Gujarat massacre.
The Western approach and attitude to Islam has, therefore, been less than accommodating and with the Clash of Civilization thesis and the 9/11 attacks the divide has merely widened. Prof. Samuel Huntington in his book, The Clash of Civilizations and the remaking of the World Order explains the antecedents to the conflict between Islam and the West and the future course of this rivalry, The causes of the renewed conflict between Islam and the West lie in fundamental questions of power and culture. Kto? Kovo? Who is to rule? Who is to be ruled? Put in such terms there appears very little room for compromise or conciliation as seems to be confirmed in his assertion that, So long as Islam remains Islam (which it will) and the West remains the West (which is more dubious), this fundamental conflict between two great civilizations and ways of life will continue to define their relations in the future even as it has defined them for the past fourteen centuries.
The book was of course written before the 9/11 attacks but his following graphic remark shows the predictability of those events, Militarily it has been largely a war of terrorism versus air power. Dedicated Islamic militants exploit the open societies of the West and plant car bombs at selected targets. Western military professionals exploit the open skies of Islam and drop smart bombs on selected targets. The Islamic participants plot the assassination of prominent Westerners; the United States plots the overthrow of extremist Islamic regimes. During the fifteen years between 1980 and 1995, according to the U.S. Defense Department, the United States engaged in seventeen military operations in the Middle East, all of them directed against Muslims. No comparable pattern of U.S. military operations occurred against the people of any other civilization. According, to this Clash of Civilizations thesis the cause of Islamic extremism and radicalism is directly related to the ideological and religious differences between Islam and the West as well as in the centuries old rivalry between the two faiths. This would suggest that Islamic extremism is a consequence of this conflict and not necessarily a natural outgrowth from Islamic ideology but a reaction to surrounding events external to Islam but having radical consequences internally to meet the challenge posed by the dominance and power of the West.
Another American writer, who has had immense influence in forming opinion about Islam in the United States and elsewhere after 9/11 has interpreted the rise of political or radical Islam in a less favourable light complaining about the inherent inadequacies and instinctive aggressiveness of the Islamic religion. In his book, The Crisis of Islam Prof. Bernard Lewis contends, Most Muslims are not fundamentalists, and most fundamentalists are not terrorists, but most present-day terrorists are Muslims and proudly identify themselves as such. Why the actions of a few extremists should taint the entire religion of Islam is never explained nor the underlying causes of Muslim resentment which breeds extremism and militancy. According to Prof. Lewis, the reason for the rise in militancy and radicalism in Islam has to do with the failure of Islamic societies to keep up with the West and the resulting powerlessness felt by the Muslim masses, In the course of the twentieth century it became abundantly clear in the Middle East and indeed all over the lands of Islam that things had indeed gone badly wrong. Compared with its millennial rival, Christendom, the world of Islam had become poor, weak, and ignorant. In the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the primacy and therefore the dominance of the West was clear for all to see, invading the Muslim in every aspect of his public and more painfully even his private life.
This interpretation of the decline of Islam has been condemned by Islamic scholars and prominent writers such as Edward Said who have described this type of writing as orientalist. This is a form of scholarship that advances views of other non-Western cultures, societies and civilizations as latently inferior and therefore controllable. Nevertheless, Prof. Lewis remains a significant influence on Western policy-making on Islam and his prescriptions on reformation of the Islamic religion appear to have been adopted by the US government to counter Islamic militancy, radicalism and extremism. Prof. Lewis provides in his controversial book What Went Wrong? the following condescending comparison, To a Western observer, schooled in the theory and practice of Western freedom, it is precisely the lack of freedom freedom of the mind from constraint and indoctrination, to question and inquire and speak; freedom of the economy from corrupt and pervasive mismanagement; freedom of women from male oppression; freedom of citizens from tyranny that underlies so many of the troubles of the Muslim world. But the road to democracy, as the Western experience amply demonstrates is long and hard, full of pitfalls and obstacles. Prof. Lewis, however, does not mention that many of the repressive Muslim regimes he impugns in his commentary have been tacitly supported by successive US governments to quell radical Islamist takeovers in a number of North African and Middle Eastern countries and most recently election results were criticized when the electorate voted in favour of radical Islamist party Hamas in Palestine and popular public street protests in favour of Hezbollah in Lebanon have been similarly dismissed.
This contradictory policy has not deterred Western governments from seeking out Muslim moderates to challenge the radical Islamist ideology professed by some groups and political parties. The search for Muslim moderates has, however, been hampered by the process of identification as explained by controversial writer Daniel Pipes, There is good news to report: The idea that militant Islam is the problem, moderate Islam is the solution is finding greater acceptance over time. But there is also bad news, namely growing confusion over who really is a moderate Muslim. This means that the ideological side of the war on terror is making some, but only limited, progress. Pipes provides his own quite unappealing example of what a Muslim moderate should be, With time, individual Muslims are finding their voice to condemn Islamist connections to terrorism. Perhaps most outstanding is an article by Abdel Rahman al-Rashed, a Saudi journalist in London: "It is a certain fact that not all Muslims are terrorists," he writes, "but it is equally certain, and exceptionally painful, that almost all terrorists are Muslims. We cannot clear our names unless we own up to the shameful fact that terrorism has become an Islamic enterprise; an almost exclusive monopoly, implemented by Muslim men and women." In other words, a Muslim moderate is one who is prepared to denigrate the entire Muslim ummah and submit to preconceived Western definitions about Islam and propagate obviously false characterizations about Muslims in general. Opposition to the idea of a moderate Muslim has understandably been voiced my prominent Muslim commentators like Radwan Masmoudi, who has argued that, The need for a new, progressive and modern interpretation of Islam for the 21st century is real and undeniable, as is the need for real reforms and democratization in Muslim societies. However, for that reinterpretation and reform to occur, the effort must be led by Muslims who are proud of their heritage, religion and culture and who are credible within their community.
In mid-2005 the Bush administration initiated a moderate Muslim outreach program which has so far met with limited success. The reason for this failure was explained by Lee Hamilton, vice-chairman of the 9-11 Commission, who said, Bush administration rhetoric is improving. Policy is moving in the right direction. They are articulating a new strategy. But the Bush administration is not going to accept the proposition that its support of Israel has contributed to the [Islamist] radicalism." Instead of directly confronting the issues raised by Lee Hamilton policy makers in the US have now come to the conclusion that moderate Islam really does not exist. The consequence of this turn around is described by Lawrence Auster, a leading neoconservative thinker, who states, [It's] not just that moderate Islam does not presently exist in any meaningful form. It's that moderate Islam cannot exist In the end, our refusal to face the truth about Muslims, our flattery of non-moderate ******* as "moderates," will convince them that we are saps lacking the wit and will to defend ourselves, which will increase their aggression against us Western criticism of and confrontation with Islam must be permanent ... Whatever the specific proposal may be, the basic civilizationist idea is to speak the truth about Islam, to confront Islam, and to contain Islam. It is to initiate a net out-migration of Muslims from the West and to isolate the Muslim world in its historic lands. It is to restore the Realm of Islam to the powerless and quiescent condition in which it resided during the early modern period. We of the West, along with other non-Muslim peoples, cannot be safe co-existing in this world with Islam, unless Islam has no ability and opportunity to affect us. While this is certainly an extreme version of current thinking in the US about the relationship between Islam and the West the likelihood of growing confrontation seems to be an accepted scenario in Western policy making towards Islamic countries and Muslim populations.
REFORMIST IDEOLOGIES WITHIN ISLAM
The reformist agenda within Islam appears to have been caused by the perceived decline of Islamic civilization in the face of Western onslaught and colonization but also as an internal struggle against the restrictions placed on independent reasoning in the formulation of legal rules with the Closing of the Gates of Ijtihad in the 10th Century. This episode in Islamic history has ultimately been blamed for the stagnation in Islamic thinking from that time onwards. Joseph Schacht, a specialist in Islamic legal history, narrates the consequences of the change, By the beginning of the fourth century of the hijra [approx. A.D 900] . the point had been reached when the scholars of all schools felt that all essential questions had been thoroughly discussed and finally settled, and a consensus gradually established itself to the effect that from that time onwards no one might be deemed to have the necessary qualifications for independent reasoning in law, and that all future activity would have to be confined to the explanation, application, and, at the most, interpretation of the doctrine as it had been laid down once and for all. This closing of the door of ijtihad, as it was called, amounted to the demand for taklid, a term [which] came to mean the unquestioning acceptance of the doctrines of established schools and authorities. N. J. Coulson describes the far-reaching consequences of this development, When the consensus of opinion in the tenth century asserted that the door of ijtihad was closed, Islamic jurisprudence had resigned itself to the inevitable outcome of its self-imposed terms of reference. Thus circumscribed and fettered by the principle of taqlid, jurisprudential activities were henceforth confined to the elaboration and detailed analysis of established rules. In other words, original thought was confined to, nothing more than abstract systematic constructions which affected neither the established decisions of positive law [i.e. Shariah] nor the classical doctrine of the usul al-fikh.
The Closing of the Gates of Ijtihad has been widely accepted as having actually occurred even amongst Muslim scholars with only one writer claiming that, while one finds in Islamic sources assertions about the closing of the doors of ijtihad by the tenth century, this was nothing more than a rhetorical device employed to resist the chaotic proliferation in new schools of thought and legal opinions. This unique perspective has not received very much scholarly acceptance or attention so far and the prevailing view remains that due to the resistance to change represented by the closing of the doors to ijtihad, Islamic societies gradually fell prey to political disintegration and social and moral decline and was unable to meet the challenges posed by the West through military conquest and colonization. As Rafiq Zakaria succinctly puts it, Everywhere Muslims found themselves utterly defeated and thoroughly demoralized It was at this time that the religiously minded Muslims, led by the ulema and the Sufis took up arms against the invaders. The leading lights of this movement - who tended to be influenced by Wahhabi teachings - included Abd al-Qadir who organized armed resistance against the French colonizers in Algeria; Muhammad Ahmad (1840-45) who led the rebellion against the British in Sudan; in Libya, Muhammad Ali al-Sanusi (1787-1859) drove the foreigners from his native land; in Somalia, Muhammad Abdullah Hasan (1863-1920) spearheaded the movement against the British; and in India the Wahhabi influenced intellectuals like Shah Wali Allah (1702-62), Sayyid Ahmed of Rae Bareli (1786-1831) and Hajji Shariat Allah (1781-1840) led the violent uprisings against foreign infiltration. The armed resistance initiated by these individuals and groups ultimately failed and were quickly subdued by the foreign forces. This failure was mainly due to the inability to wage modern warfare and to compete with the intellectual and scientific advances of the West. To quote the Marxist scholar, Maxime Rodinson, Christianity was made out to be by its very nature favourable to progress, and Islam to mean cultural stagnation and backwardness.
In their intellectual efforts to redress the imbalance between Islam and the West a schism was created amongst Muslims that has persisted to this day and is a principal cause of todays radicalism and terrorist off-shoots. In the highly motivated language of Prof. Bernard Lewis the situation is expressed in the following terms, For those nowadays known as Islamists or fundamentalists, the failures and shortcomings of the modern Islamic lands afflicted them because they adopted alien notions and practices. They fell away from authentic Islam, and thus lost their former greatness. Those known as modernists or reformers take the opposite view, and see the cause of this loss not in the abandonment but in the retention of old ways, and especially in the inflexibility and the ubiquity of the Islamic clergy. These, they say, are responsible for the persistence of beliefs and practices that might have been creative and progressive a thousand years ago, but are neither today. Amongst the modernist or reformist groups in this period were the towering intellectual personalities of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and his disciples, Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida and in South Asia Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Muhammad Iqbal. Central to Afghanis program for Islamic reform was his call for a reopening of the door of ijtihad, that would serve as the source of a renewal or renaissance that would restore Muslim political independence and the past glory of Islam. Similarly, Sayyid Ahmad Khan believed that the survival of Islam depended on the rejection of unquestioned acceptance (taqlid) of medieval interpretations of Islam and the exercise of ijtihad in order to produce fresh interpretations of Islam to demonstrate its relevance and validity for modern life. On the one hand, the modernists identified with premodern revivalist movements and called for the purification of internal deficiencies and deviations. On the other, they borrowed and assimilated new ideas and values from the West.
On the other side of the debate were equally notable and prominent figures which included ideologues and activists such as Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Maulana Maududi, Yusuf Qardawi, Ali Shariati and Ayatollah Khomeini. These Islamic intellectuals while adopting a traditionalist approach to Islam also claimed the right to go back to the fundamental sources to reinterpret (ijtihad) and reapply them to contemporary needs and conditions but they abhorred any suggestion of compatibility with the West. It was on this basis that Hasan al-Banna established the Muslim Brotherhood as a political entity in Egypt in 1939 with the purpose of liberating the Islamic homeland from alien control through jihad. But it was Sayyid Qutb (an acolyte of Maulana Maududi) who provided the real inspiration to the Brotherhood and radical Islamists in the Muslim world. According to Qutb, a society whose legislation does not rest on divine law is not Islamic, however ardently its members may proclaim themselves Muslim, even if they pray, fast and make the pilgrimage. Further he added, A society that creates a made-to-measure Islam other than that laid down by Allah and expounded by His Prophet, and called erroneously enlightened Islam cannot be considered as Islamic either. He also exhorted his followers to wage war on America and the West a sentiment that would be echoed decades later by Osama bin Laden and his intellectual mentor, Ayman Zawahiri. It was through the intellectual ferment created by Qutb and the Brotherhood in Egypt that other radical Islamist groups emerged such as Al Jihad, Al Gamaat al Islamiya and Al Takfir wa al Hijra. Of these, Al Jihad was the most prominent providing intellectual stimulus to its members that included Ayman Zawahiri who later formed the Al-Qaeda network with Osama bin Laden. Amongst the leaders of AL Jihad was the Islamist thinker Muhammad Abdul Salam Faraj who authored two books: Al Jihad: The Forgotten Pillar, and The Absent Obligation. According to Faraj, every true Muslim is obliged by his faith to struggle for the revival of the Islamic umma, and that the Muslim groups or leaders who have turned away from the Sharia are apostates. It is therefore sinful for a genuine Muslim to cooperate with an infidel ruler. Those who want to end the Order of Jahaliya and revive the Islamic umma are obliged to wage a jihad against the infidel state. The only acceptable form of jihad is the armed struggle; anything less implies cowardice or foolishness. A true Muslim must first confront the internal infidel and then the external infidel (i.e. the non-Muslim world at large). Straying from the course of jihad has led to the current sorry state of the Muslim world: divided, degraded and disdained. Such emotive statements have helped to spawn numerous radical Islamist groups around the world who have adopted the way of violent jihad to achieve their ideological goals and objectives. Amongst the aims of these groups included the restoration of Islamic government (in Muslim lands) especially after the failures of socialism or nationalism to effectively address the grievance felt by Muslims against the West. During this phase jihad was essentially aimed against apostate Muslim governments and societies rather than against the West. The next phase of their program was the offensive jihad against the infidels that started with the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing planned by the Egyptian cleric Shiekh Abdul Rahman that led to several other major attacks on Western interests in the following years including 9/11.
More recently (i.e. after 9/11) the emergence of radical groups influenced by Salafist ideological thinking has been of particular concern to Western policy makers as their views are now being exported from Muslim countries to the West with the obvious fear that various ideological forcesemanating from abroad, but also from within the West itselfwill conspire to radicalize portions of the Western Muslim population, resulting in a range of possible threats to the future of European and American democracy, from political challenges like the growth of parallel societies to the related security threat of homegrown jihad. Unlike their predecessors the Salafists adhere to a literalist interpretation of Islamic scripture and to a political theology that views Muslims in the West as travelers in enemy territory, a realm they variously speak of as a Land of Kufr or as a Land of War. The more moderate Wassatiyya movement instead espouses the use of ijtihad which has allowed its adherents to adopt a more pragmatic approach to the West but this has not prevented them from advocating defensive jihad in majority-Muslim countries and supporting political parties like Hamas and the insurgency against American forces in Iraq. To the consternation of many Western political commentators the Wassatiyya movement has been able to build-up a vast web of ideological institutions in the West: think tanks, media outfits, educational centers, and Sharia councils with the stated purpose of conquering the West not by the sword or armies, but by preaching and ideology. The difference in perspective between the Salafists and the Wassatiyya movement appears to rest upon the manner of use of ijtihad in interpreting Islamic legal sources but both the ideological movements - like their earlier counterparts the reformers and the fundamentalists - are essentially seeking a redress with the West. The terms of this debate have often led to the radicalization of certain sections of Muslims who feel most alienated, humiliated and insulted by what they perceive as injuries inflicted by the West on Islamic culture and society and find legal sanction for their violent actions through ideologically sanctioned acts and reprisals against Western targets and Muslim governments who are perceived to be supporting the Western agenda.
ISLAMIC IDEOLOGICAL TRENDS IN BANGLADESH
Bangladesh has largely been detached from the ideological disputes that have convulsed Islamic thought for more than a century. It is because of this relative detachment that it has remained for the most part immune from the radicalization that spread through out most of the rest of the Islamic world in its hostile encounters with the West. The reason for this unique position is the historical factors that introduced a more spiritual and tolerant version of Islam to the region. The fact that Islam came comparatively late to Bengal allowed for a more gradual process of conversion and assimilation which avoided the violent social unrest and painful disconnections that occurred elsewhere in the Indian subcontinent. In fact, it is only from the late sixteenth century and in particular only after the Mughal conquest (1574), that there is solid evidence of a Muslim peasant population anywhere in Bengal. Many theories have been put forwad concerning the manner in which Islam came to the eastern provinces of India (e.g. by the sword, forced conversions, an influx of Muslim settlers) but the most widely accepted version or explanation has been authoritatively advanced by Prof. Richard M. Eaton in his book The rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier. In the book Prof Eaton argues that, By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the dominant carriers of Islamic civilization in Bengal were not the urban ashraf, but peasant cultivators of the eastern frontier, who in extraordinary ways assimilated Islam to their agrarian worldview. This was achieved through novel initiatives promoted by the Mughal rulers in East Bengal but for reasons other than for proselytizing the local inhabitants to Islam as Prof. Eaton points out,
From Sylhet to Chittagong the [Mughal] government fused the political goal of deepening its authority among dependant clients rooted on the land, with the economic goal of expanding the arable land area. A principal instrument for achieving these goals was the land grant that aimed at the agricultural development of the forested hinterland Although Vaishnava temples, Saiva temples, and individual Brahmins received numerous forest grants, the bulk of these went to members of Islams religious gentry petty mullas, pilgrims returned from Mecca, preachers, and holy men (pirs) men who had overseen, or had undertaken to oversee, the clearing of forest and the construction of mosques or shrines. Although humble in physical appearance, these institutions became the nuclei of new communities, attracting local or distant labor for clearing the forest and working the rice fields included in the grants. These institutions also possessed considerable cultural influence, becoming the nuclei for the diffusion of Islamic ideals along the eastern frontier. In this way Islam gradually became associated with economic development and agricultural productivity.
This wedding of slow gradual conversion, assimilation and economic development through the activities of forest clearance and cultivation had pronounced effects on the reception of Islam in eastern Bengal amongst the local inhabitants. One of the most important consequences of this process was that, to a greater degree than elsewhere in India, Islam in Bengal absorbed so much local culture and became so profoundly identified with Bengals long-term process of agrarian expansion, that in its formative years the cultivating classes never seem to have regarded it as foreign. This method of absorption of Islamic teachings amongst the cultivating classes allowed a certain amount of progressiveness, tolerance and receptivity towards change that was absent elsewhere in India and in greater parts of the Islamic world. Another aspect that differentiated Bengal from other parts of the Islamic world was the influence of Sufi holy men who were intricately involved with the local inhabitants through their preaching and most importantly through forest clearance and cultivation and setting the up of religious institutions such as mosques and seminaries. Contrary to received wisdom, the more contemporary evidence of Sufis on Bengals political frontier portrays men who had entered the delta not as holy warriors but as pious mystics or freebooting settlers operating under the authority of charismatic leaders. No contemporary source endows them with the ideology of holy war; nor is there contemporary evidence that they slew non-Muslims or destroyed non-Muslim monuments.
By the nineteenth century, however, the outside world began to impinge upon the Muslims of Bengal - which was by then under British rule - with a revivalist Islamic movement influenced by Wahhabi teachings and led by intellectuals Shah Wali Allah (1702-62), Sayyid Ahmed of Rae Bareli (1786-1831) and Hajji Shariat Allah (1781-1840). Due to what he perceived as the impoverished and indigent state of Bengali Muslims caused by the policies of the British and the Zamindari class, Haji Shariatullah after returning from Mecca after 20 years preached Islamic virtues emphasising Faraiz or duties that were incumbent upon all Muslims to practise according to the teachings of orthodox Islam. However, the revivalist/reformist nature of the Faraizi Movement he started could be uncompromising and as Dr. Rafiuddin Ahmed points out, [The] movement not only professed reverence for the ethical principles embodied in the shariah but considered even any slight deviation as sacrilegious. What they wanted was total conformity and no concession. It was only a matter of time before such preaching became an issue for the British authorities. Although, the Faraizi Movement never became part of the wider Wahhabi Movement and did not openly advocate Jihad there was little doubt about its intent, there was a general feeling at that time that the real object of the Faraizis was the expulsion of the alien rulers and the restoration of Muslim power. The movement later clashed directly with the government when the British intervened in favour of the landlords to suppress peasant uprisings led by the Faraizis. Many of its members reportedly took active part in the Jihad.
The objectives of the Faraizi Movement were therefore in keeping with the wider ideological imperatives being played out in the Islamic world in the nineteenth century. This was also the case with the more militant Tariqah-i-Muhamaadiya Movement that belonged to the tradition of the Waliullahi School of Delhi and was, to all intents and purposes, an extension of the jihad movement launched by Shah Sayyid Ahmad (1786-1831) of Rae Bereli in northern India. Sayyid Ahmads purpose in launching the jihad was to rid Islam of Hindu practises, to end belief in the intercessionary power of saints and to establish an ideal Muslim community where Muslims could live according to the holy law. This was all very much in consonance with the wider struggle being waged in the Islamic world to purify Islam of alien elements and to overthrow foreign rule. Both the Faraizi and Tariqah-i-Muhamaadiya movements, however, eventually lost steam due to the sustained prosecutions of its leaders by the British and a generally hostile attitude to their ideological program by the ordinary Muslims they were attempting to reform. Contrary to their intentions the more progressive, tolerant and receptive Islam that had prevailed in Bengal since the 16th century began to reassert itself, as pointed out by Dr. Rafiuddin Ahmed, The reformists succeeded in converting only a fraction of the total Muslim population to their point of view; the vast majority remained steadfastly opposed to any new dogma and faithful to the traditional system, with its peculiar mix of Islamic dogma and local beliefs and practices.
It was only after more than a century that a new Islamic militancy emerged in what was now Bangladesh under the twin banners of the Jamaat-ul-Mujahidin (JMB) and the Ahle Hadith. Both of these groups had superficial Salafist tendencies but seem to have been inspired more by the jihadi peasant revolts instigated by the Faraizi and Tariqah-i-Muhamaadiya movements in the nineteenth century. From the documents and books obtained from the JMB and Ahle Hadith hideouts by law enforcement agencies it appears that both groups propagated the ideas of Abd al-Wahhab (after whom Wahhabism is named) and the writings of Ibn Tamiyyah. These two renowned Islamic thinkers were the intellectual driving force behind jihadi movements of the nineteenth century that sought to expel foreign rulers from their native lands and to purify Islam from alien accretions. Both the JMB and Ahle Hadith also followed the line taken by Sayyid Qutb and Muhammad Abdul Salam Faraj in seeking the overthrow of apostate governments and the reinstatement of Islamic rule under Shariah law. In their literature they have applied these ideas directly to the secular constitution and political framework of Bangladesh stating that, There is no evidence and acceptance in the Holy Quran and Shahid Hadith to maintain the regime under Democracy, Socialism, Communism, and Secularism etc. All these systems are manmade laws invented by the Kuffar. Each and every ism is a rival to the rule of Allah. In order to destroy the basic belief of Muslims these isms were composed by Kafirs, Mushriks and Jews. So, it is high time to think to earn escape for all Muslim concerns. The ideological weakness of this extremist position has been identified in an excellent essay by Shah Abdul Halim titled, Doctrinal Claims of Militants: An Examination in which he argues that, Muslims can rule without implementing Shariah if the circumstances are not in their favor or people are not ready for such reform or the situation is not healthy enough or conducive for such a transformation or change. Halim backs up this assertion with authoritative statements by eminent Islamic scholars such as Sheikh Rachid Ghannouchi and Dr. Yusuf al Qaradawi who are both associated with modern Muslim Brotherhood and the Wassatiyya movement.
Ultimately the militant agenda of the JMB and Ahle Hadith failed in Bangladesh due to the widespread disapproval of their violent tactics and methods but also because of their ideological intolerance and regressiveness. These were the exact same reasons that the Faraizi and Tariqah-i-Muhamaadiya movements failed more than a century ago. Muslim identity in Bangladesh has been on the whole progressive, tolerant and receptive and with Islam being a constant element of everyday life there was felt to be no necessity for violence which was clearly repellent to most people especially when democratic alternatives were available. The nature of Islamic sentiment in Bangladesh has been perfectly described by Prof. M. Rashiduzzaman in his article, Islam, Muslim Identity and Nationalism in Bangladesh where he states, The rituals of Islam (prayer, fasting in Ramadan, charity, annual pilgrimage to Mecca, marriages, funerals, etc.) were intertwined with the lives of average Bangladeshis. Radio and television transmitted the daily prayer calls. The blaring loudspeakers in the mosques were the daily reminders of the Islamic character of Bangladesh. Reverence for saints, veneration for Mazars (shrines) and Pirs/Sufis, although not favored by the sharia, was an old Bangladeshi tradition which continued to thrive as a significant manifestation of 'folk' Islam in Bangladesh. This statement exemplifies the egalitarian character of Islamic belief in Bangladesh that favours democratic, pluralistic and peaceful change rather than sudden, sporadic and violent upheaval. Bangladesh has shown that instituting democracy and an open society in a Muslim country although very difficult is not impossible. Such a liberal attitude is entirely consistent with Islamic doctrine as the, Qur'an advocates consultative governance and the practice of the Prophet, as enshrined in the Compact of Medina, treats minorities equally, and he governed by consent and consultation. Opposed to this view are militant groups like the JMB who make unilateral and dictatorial decisions to inflict violence upon the state and the people so that they may impose their highly personalized brand of Islam on the rest of society. Such a decision is made without the consent of the people and also without their consultation which goes against the basic premises of Islam and has been consistently rejected by the people of Bangladesh.
MBI Munshi
ISLAMIC IDEOLOGY THE GLOBAL SCENARIO & BANGLADESH
INTRODUCTION
The relationship between Islamic ideology, extremism and terrorism has been the source of much controversy and dispute between western scholars, policy makers and defenders of the faith who have all contested the subject on diametrically opposed grounds and perspectives. Some trace this new interest in Islam in the West to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 but this ignores the long and often violent history that has preceded this recent outbreak of hostility between these two great and antagonistic civilizations (see below). However, a careful reading of the literature on the subject will show that the antagonism primarily emanates from one side only, that is, from the West which views the challenge posed by Islam in apocalyptic terms and dismisses the debt it owes to Islam in the area of science, art and literature which spurred it towards its Enlightenment and Renaissance from the 14th Century onwards. The focus on Islam in recent years has been a direct consequence of this attitude which absolves the West from any blame in helping to create elements of extremism within the Islamic fold (through their encroachment and invasion of Muslim nations) and at the same time to point out the defects and deficiencies within Islamic ideology which is seen as being directly responsible for the growth of modern Islamist terrorism. To understand the relationship between Islamic ideology and extremism one must also prefigure the Western intervention in the Islamic consciousness which has now unhelpfully posited the idea of a moderate Islam against a fundamentalist Islam as if either were precisely definable within the broad umbrella of modern Islamic thought.
BACKGROUND TO WESTERN PERCEPTIONS OF ISLAM BEFORE AND AFTER 9/11 A HISTORY OF CONFLICTING IDEOLOGIES AND CIVILISATIONS
There are two simultaneous and contradictory dialogues on Islam with one presented by the West and the other an internal debate (or struggle) within the Islamic religion itself. The Wests negative attitude towards Islam is unfortunately still influenced by the Christian Crusades which lasted from the 11th to the 13th Century and was a consequence of the reaction of Christian Europe against Moslem Asia, which had been on the offensive since 632 not only in Syria and Asia Minor but in Spain and Sicily also. According to John L. Esposito, For the Christian West, Islam is the religion of the sword; for Muslims, the Christian West is epitomized by the armies of the Crusades. From the earliest decades of Islamic history, Christianity and Islam have been locked in a political and theological struggle, because Islam, in contrast to other worldly religions, has threatened the political and religious ascendancy of Christianity. That such sentiments still influence debate today was revealed immediately after the September 11 attacks on the United States when President Bush, warned the nation, This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while oblivious of the fact that bin Laden always referred to Christians as Crusaders. His statement raised protests by many Muslim leaders who accused him of conjuring up images of the worst conflict between Christians and Muslims. Similarly, Pope Benedict XVI ignited an uproar when he quoted the 14th century Emperor Manuel II Palaeologus who said that, Show me just what Mohammed brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached. In light of such provocative statements Muslims remain highly protective of their religion and this sentiment has been easily exploited by Islamic extremists as was the case during the Salman Rushdie affair and most recently in the Danish cartoon exhibition of the prophet and also from the perceived injustices arising out of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Wests ambivalence to the Kashmir issue and the Gujarat massacre.
The Western approach and attitude to Islam has, therefore, been less than accommodating and with the Clash of Civilization thesis and the 9/11 attacks the divide has merely widened. Prof. Samuel Huntington in his book, The Clash of Civilizations and the remaking of the World Order explains the antecedents to the conflict between Islam and the West and the future course of this rivalry, The causes of the renewed conflict between Islam and the West lie in fundamental questions of power and culture. Kto? Kovo? Who is to rule? Who is to be ruled? Put in such terms there appears very little room for compromise or conciliation as seems to be confirmed in his assertion that, So long as Islam remains Islam (which it will) and the West remains the West (which is more dubious), this fundamental conflict between two great civilizations and ways of life will continue to define their relations in the future even as it has defined them for the past fourteen centuries.
The book was of course written before the 9/11 attacks but his following graphic remark shows the predictability of those events, Militarily it has been largely a war of terrorism versus air power. Dedicated Islamic militants exploit the open societies of the West and plant car bombs at selected targets. Western military professionals exploit the open skies of Islam and drop smart bombs on selected targets. The Islamic participants plot the assassination of prominent Westerners; the United States plots the overthrow of extremist Islamic regimes. During the fifteen years between 1980 and 1995, according to the U.S. Defense Department, the United States engaged in seventeen military operations in the Middle East, all of them directed against Muslims. No comparable pattern of U.S. military operations occurred against the people of any other civilization. According, to this Clash of Civilizations thesis the cause of Islamic extremism and radicalism is directly related to the ideological and religious differences between Islam and the West as well as in the centuries old rivalry between the two faiths. This would suggest that Islamic extremism is a consequence of this conflict and not necessarily a natural outgrowth from Islamic ideology but a reaction to surrounding events external to Islam but having radical consequences internally to meet the challenge posed by the dominance and power of the West.
Another American writer, who has had immense influence in forming opinion about Islam in the United States and elsewhere after 9/11 has interpreted the rise of political or radical Islam in a less favourable light complaining about the inherent inadequacies and instinctive aggressiveness of the Islamic religion. In his book, The Crisis of Islam Prof. Bernard Lewis contends, Most Muslims are not fundamentalists, and most fundamentalists are not terrorists, but most present-day terrorists are Muslims and proudly identify themselves as such. Why the actions of a few extremists should taint the entire religion of Islam is never explained nor the underlying causes of Muslim resentment which breeds extremism and militancy. According to Prof. Lewis, the reason for the rise in militancy and radicalism in Islam has to do with the failure of Islamic societies to keep up with the West and the resulting powerlessness felt by the Muslim masses, In the course of the twentieth century it became abundantly clear in the Middle East and indeed all over the lands of Islam that things had indeed gone badly wrong. Compared with its millennial rival, Christendom, the world of Islam had become poor, weak, and ignorant. In the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the primacy and therefore the dominance of the West was clear for all to see, invading the Muslim in every aspect of his public and more painfully even his private life.
This interpretation of the decline of Islam has been condemned by Islamic scholars and prominent writers such as Edward Said who have described this type of writing as orientalist. This is a form of scholarship that advances views of other non-Western cultures, societies and civilizations as latently inferior and therefore controllable. Nevertheless, Prof. Lewis remains a significant influence on Western policy-making on Islam and his prescriptions on reformation of the Islamic religion appear to have been adopted by the US government to counter Islamic militancy, radicalism and extremism. Prof. Lewis provides in his controversial book What Went Wrong? the following condescending comparison, To a Western observer, schooled in the theory and practice of Western freedom, it is precisely the lack of freedom freedom of the mind from constraint and indoctrination, to question and inquire and speak; freedom of the economy from corrupt and pervasive mismanagement; freedom of women from male oppression; freedom of citizens from tyranny that underlies so many of the troubles of the Muslim world. But the road to democracy, as the Western experience amply demonstrates is long and hard, full of pitfalls and obstacles. Prof. Lewis, however, does not mention that many of the repressive Muslim regimes he impugns in his commentary have been tacitly supported by successive US governments to quell radical Islamist takeovers in a number of North African and Middle Eastern countries and most recently election results were criticized when the electorate voted in favour of radical Islamist party Hamas in Palestine and popular public street protests in favour of Hezbollah in Lebanon have been similarly dismissed.
This contradictory policy has not deterred Western governments from seeking out Muslim moderates to challenge the radical Islamist ideology professed by some groups and political parties. The search for Muslim moderates has, however, been hampered by the process of identification as explained by controversial writer Daniel Pipes, There is good news to report: The idea that militant Islam is the problem, moderate Islam is the solution is finding greater acceptance over time. But there is also bad news, namely growing confusion over who really is a moderate Muslim. This means that the ideological side of the war on terror is making some, but only limited, progress. Pipes provides his own quite unappealing example of what a Muslim moderate should be, With time, individual Muslims are finding their voice to condemn Islamist connections to terrorism. Perhaps most outstanding is an article by Abdel Rahman al-Rashed, a Saudi journalist in London: "It is a certain fact that not all Muslims are terrorists," he writes, "but it is equally certain, and exceptionally painful, that almost all terrorists are Muslims. We cannot clear our names unless we own up to the shameful fact that terrorism has become an Islamic enterprise; an almost exclusive monopoly, implemented by Muslim men and women." In other words, a Muslim moderate is one who is prepared to denigrate the entire Muslim ummah and submit to preconceived Western definitions about Islam and propagate obviously false characterizations about Muslims in general. Opposition to the idea of a moderate Muslim has understandably been voiced my prominent Muslim commentators like Radwan Masmoudi, who has argued that, The need for a new, progressive and modern interpretation of Islam for the 21st century is real and undeniable, as is the need for real reforms and democratization in Muslim societies. However, for that reinterpretation and reform to occur, the effort must be led by Muslims who are proud of their heritage, religion and culture and who are credible within their community.
In mid-2005 the Bush administration initiated a moderate Muslim outreach program which has so far met with limited success. The reason for this failure was explained by Lee Hamilton, vice-chairman of the 9-11 Commission, who said, Bush administration rhetoric is improving. Policy is moving in the right direction. They are articulating a new strategy. But the Bush administration is not going to accept the proposition that its support of Israel has contributed to the [Islamist] radicalism." Instead of directly confronting the issues raised by Lee Hamilton policy makers in the US have now come to the conclusion that moderate Islam really does not exist. The consequence of this turn around is described by Lawrence Auster, a leading neoconservative thinker, who states, [It's] not just that moderate Islam does not presently exist in any meaningful form. It's that moderate Islam cannot exist In the end, our refusal to face the truth about Muslims, our flattery of non-moderate ******* as "moderates," will convince them that we are saps lacking the wit and will to defend ourselves, which will increase their aggression against us Western criticism of and confrontation with Islam must be permanent ... Whatever the specific proposal may be, the basic civilizationist idea is to speak the truth about Islam, to confront Islam, and to contain Islam. It is to initiate a net out-migration of Muslims from the West and to isolate the Muslim world in its historic lands. It is to restore the Realm of Islam to the powerless and quiescent condition in which it resided during the early modern period. We of the West, along with other non-Muslim peoples, cannot be safe co-existing in this world with Islam, unless Islam has no ability and opportunity to affect us. While this is certainly an extreme version of current thinking in the US about the relationship between Islam and the West the likelihood of growing confrontation seems to be an accepted scenario in Western policy making towards Islamic countries and Muslim populations.
REFORMIST IDEOLOGIES WITHIN ISLAM
The reformist agenda within Islam appears to have been caused by the perceived decline of Islamic civilization in the face of Western onslaught and colonization but also as an internal struggle against the restrictions placed on independent reasoning in the formulation of legal rules with the Closing of the Gates of Ijtihad in the 10th Century. This episode in Islamic history has ultimately been blamed for the stagnation in Islamic thinking from that time onwards. Joseph Schacht, a specialist in Islamic legal history, narrates the consequences of the change, By the beginning of the fourth century of the hijra [approx. A.D 900] . the point had been reached when the scholars of all schools felt that all essential questions had been thoroughly discussed and finally settled, and a consensus gradually established itself to the effect that from that time onwards no one might be deemed to have the necessary qualifications for independent reasoning in law, and that all future activity would have to be confined to the explanation, application, and, at the most, interpretation of the doctrine as it had been laid down once and for all. This closing of the door of ijtihad, as it was called, amounted to the demand for taklid, a term [which] came to mean the unquestioning acceptance of the doctrines of established schools and authorities. N. J. Coulson describes the far-reaching consequences of this development, When the consensus of opinion in the tenth century asserted that the door of ijtihad was closed, Islamic jurisprudence had resigned itself to the inevitable outcome of its self-imposed terms of reference. Thus circumscribed and fettered by the principle of taqlid, jurisprudential activities were henceforth confined to the elaboration and detailed analysis of established rules. In other words, original thought was confined to, nothing more than abstract systematic constructions which affected neither the established decisions of positive law [i.e. Shariah] nor the classical doctrine of the usul al-fikh.
The Closing of the Gates of Ijtihad has been widely accepted as having actually occurred even amongst Muslim scholars with only one writer claiming that, while one finds in Islamic sources assertions about the closing of the doors of ijtihad by the tenth century, this was nothing more than a rhetorical device employed to resist the chaotic proliferation in new schools of thought and legal opinions. This unique perspective has not received very much scholarly acceptance or attention so far and the prevailing view remains that due to the resistance to change represented by the closing of the doors to ijtihad, Islamic societies gradually fell prey to political disintegration and social and moral decline and was unable to meet the challenges posed by the West through military conquest and colonization. As Rafiq Zakaria succinctly puts it, Everywhere Muslims found themselves utterly defeated and thoroughly demoralized It was at this time that the religiously minded Muslims, led by the ulema and the Sufis took up arms against the invaders. The leading lights of this movement - who tended to be influenced by Wahhabi teachings - included Abd al-Qadir who organized armed resistance against the French colonizers in Algeria; Muhammad Ahmad (1840-45) who led the rebellion against the British in Sudan; in Libya, Muhammad Ali al-Sanusi (1787-1859) drove the foreigners from his native land; in Somalia, Muhammad Abdullah Hasan (1863-1920) spearheaded the movement against the British; and in India the Wahhabi influenced intellectuals like Shah Wali Allah (1702-62), Sayyid Ahmed of Rae Bareli (1786-1831) and Hajji Shariat Allah (1781-1840) led the violent uprisings against foreign infiltration. The armed resistance initiated by these individuals and groups ultimately failed and were quickly subdued by the foreign forces. This failure was mainly due to the inability to wage modern warfare and to compete with the intellectual and scientific advances of the West. To quote the Marxist scholar, Maxime Rodinson, Christianity was made out to be by its very nature favourable to progress, and Islam to mean cultural stagnation and backwardness.
In their intellectual efforts to redress the imbalance between Islam and the West a schism was created amongst Muslims that has persisted to this day and is a principal cause of todays radicalism and terrorist off-shoots. In the highly motivated language of Prof. Bernard Lewis the situation is expressed in the following terms, For those nowadays known as Islamists or fundamentalists, the failures and shortcomings of the modern Islamic lands afflicted them because they adopted alien notions and practices. They fell away from authentic Islam, and thus lost their former greatness. Those known as modernists or reformers take the opposite view, and see the cause of this loss not in the abandonment but in the retention of old ways, and especially in the inflexibility and the ubiquity of the Islamic clergy. These, they say, are responsible for the persistence of beliefs and practices that might have been creative and progressive a thousand years ago, but are neither today. Amongst the modernist or reformist groups in this period were the towering intellectual personalities of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and his disciples, Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida and in South Asia Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Muhammad Iqbal. Central to Afghanis program for Islamic reform was his call for a reopening of the door of ijtihad, that would serve as the source of a renewal or renaissance that would restore Muslim political independence and the past glory of Islam. Similarly, Sayyid Ahmad Khan believed that the survival of Islam depended on the rejection of unquestioned acceptance (taqlid) of medieval interpretations of Islam and the exercise of ijtihad in order to produce fresh interpretations of Islam to demonstrate its relevance and validity for modern life. On the one hand, the modernists identified with premodern revivalist movements and called for the purification of internal deficiencies and deviations. On the other, they borrowed and assimilated new ideas and values from the West.
On the other side of the debate were equally notable and prominent figures which included ideologues and activists such as Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Maulana Maududi, Yusuf Qardawi, Ali Shariati and Ayatollah Khomeini. These Islamic intellectuals while adopting a traditionalist approach to Islam also claimed the right to go back to the fundamental sources to reinterpret (ijtihad) and reapply them to contemporary needs and conditions but they abhorred any suggestion of compatibility with the West. It was on this basis that Hasan al-Banna established the Muslim Brotherhood as a political entity in Egypt in 1939 with the purpose of liberating the Islamic homeland from alien control through jihad. But it was Sayyid Qutb (an acolyte of Maulana Maududi) who provided the real inspiration to the Brotherhood and radical Islamists in the Muslim world. According to Qutb, a society whose legislation does not rest on divine law is not Islamic, however ardently its members may proclaim themselves Muslim, even if they pray, fast and make the pilgrimage. Further he added, A society that creates a made-to-measure Islam other than that laid down by Allah and expounded by His Prophet, and called erroneously enlightened Islam cannot be considered as Islamic either. He also exhorted his followers to wage war on America and the West a sentiment that would be echoed decades later by Osama bin Laden and his intellectual mentor, Ayman Zawahiri. It was through the intellectual ferment created by Qutb and the Brotherhood in Egypt that other radical Islamist groups emerged such as Al Jihad, Al Gamaat al Islamiya and Al Takfir wa al Hijra. Of these, Al Jihad was the most prominent providing intellectual stimulus to its members that included Ayman Zawahiri who later formed the Al-Qaeda network with Osama bin Laden. Amongst the leaders of AL Jihad was the Islamist thinker Muhammad Abdul Salam Faraj who authored two books: Al Jihad: The Forgotten Pillar, and The Absent Obligation. According to Faraj, every true Muslim is obliged by his faith to struggle for the revival of the Islamic umma, and that the Muslim groups or leaders who have turned away from the Sharia are apostates. It is therefore sinful for a genuine Muslim to cooperate with an infidel ruler. Those who want to end the Order of Jahaliya and revive the Islamic umma are obliged to wage a jihad against the infidel state. The only acceptable form of jihad is the armed struggle; anything less implies cowardice or foolishness. A true Muslim must first confront the internal infidel and then the external infidel (i.e. the non-Muslim world at large). Straying from the course of jihad has led to the current sorry state of the Muslim world: divided, degraded and disdained. Such emotive statements have helped to spawn numerous radical Islamist groups around the world who have adopted the way of violent jihad to achieve their ideological goals and objectives. Amongst the aims of these groups included the restoration of Islamic government (in Muslim lands) especially after the failures of socialism or nationalism to effectively address the grievance felt by Muslims against the West. During this phase jihad was essentially aimed against apostate Muslim governments and societies rather than against the West. The next phase of their program was the offensive jihad against the infidels that started with the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing planned by the Egyptian cleric Shiekh Abdul Rahman that led to several other major attacks on Western interests in the following years including 9/11.
More recently (i.e. after 9/11) the emergence of radical groups influenced by Salafist ideological thinking has been of particular concern to Western policy makers as their views are now being exported from Muslim countries to the West with the obvious fear that various ideological forcesemanating from abroad, but also from within the West itselfwill conspire to radicalize portions of the Western Muslim population, resulting in a range of possible threats to the future of European and American democracy, from political challenges like the growth of parallel societies to the related security threat of homegrown jihad. Unlike their predecessors the Salafists adhere to a literalist interpretation of Islamic scripture and to a political theology that views Muslims in the West as travelers in enemy territory, a realm they variously speak of as a Land of Kufr or as a Land of War. The more moderate Wassatiyya movement instead espouses the use of ijtihad which has allowed its adherents to adopt a more pragmatic approach to the West but this has not prevented them from advocating defensive jihad in majority-Muslim countries and supporting political parties like Hamas and the insurgency against American forces in Iraq. To the consternation of many Western political commentators the Wassatiyya movement has been able to build-up a vast web of ideological institutions in the West: think tanks, media outfits, educational centers, and Sharia councils with the stated purpose of conquering the West not by the sword or armies, but by preaching and ideology. The difference in perspective between the Salafists and the Wassatiyya movement appears to rest upon the manner of use of ijtihad in interpreting Islamic legal sources but both the ideological movements - like their earlier counterparts the reformers and the fundamentalists - are essentially seeking a redress with the West. The terms of this debate have often led to the radicalization of certain sections of Muslims who feel most alienated, humiliated and insulted by what they perceive as injuries inflicted by the West on Islamic culture and society and find legal sanction for their violent actions through ideologically sanctioned acts and reprisals against Western targets and Muslim governments who are perceived to be supporting the Western agenda.
ISLAMIC IDEOLOGICAL TRENDS IN BANGLADESH
Bangladesh has largely been detached from the ideological disputes that have convulsed Islamic thought for more than a century. It is because of this relative detachment that it has remained for the most part immune from the radicalization that spread through out most of the rest of the Islamic world in its hostile encounters with the West. The reason for this unique position is the historical factors that introduced a more spiritual and tolerant version of Islam to the region. The fact that Islam came comparatively late to Bengal allowed for a more gradual process of conversion and assimilation which avoided the violent social unrest and painful disconnections that occurred elsewhere in the Indian subcontinent. In fact, it is only from the late sixteenth century and in particular only after the Mughal conquest (1574), that there is solid evidence of a Muslim peasant population anywhere in Bengal. Many theories have been put forwad concerning the manner in which Islam came to the eastern provinces of India (e.g. by the sword, forced conversions, an influx of Muslim settlers) but the most widely accepted version or explanation has been authoritatively advanced by Prof. Richard M. Eaton in his book The rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier. In the book Prof Eaton argues that, By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the dominant carriers of Islamic civilization in Bengal were not the urban ashraf, but peasant cultivators of the eastern frontier, who in extraordinary ways assimilated Islam to their agrarian worldview. This was achieved through novel initiatives promoted by the Mughal rulers in East Bengal but for reasons other than for proselytizing the local inhabitants to Islam as Prof. Eaton points out,
From Sylhet to Chittagong the [Mughal] government fused the political goal of deepening its authority among dependant clients rooted on the land, with the economic goal of expanding the arable land area. A principal instrument for achieving these goals was the land grant that aimed at the agricultural development of the forested hinterland Although Vaishnava temples, Saiva temples, and individual Brahmins received numerous forest grants, the bulk of these went to members of Islams religious gentry petty mullas, pilgrims returned from Mecca, preachers, and holy men (pirs) men who had overseen, or had undertaken to oversee, the clearing of forest and the construction of mosques or shrines. Although humble in physical appearance, these institutions became the nuclei of new communities, attracting local or distant labor for clearing the forest and working the rice fields included in the grants. These institutions also possessed considerable cultural influence, becoming the nuclei for the diffusion of Islamic ideals along the eastern frontier. In this way Islam gradually became associated with economic development and agricultural productivity.
This wedding of slow gradual conversion, assimilation and economic development through the activities of forest clearance and cultivation had pronounced effects on the reception of Islam in eastern Bengal amongst the local inhabitants. One of the most important consequences of this process was that, to a greater degree than elsewhere in India, Islam in Bengal absorbed so much local culture and became so profoundly identified with Bengals long-term process of agrarian expansion, that in its formative years the cultivating classes never seem to have regarded it as foreign. This method of absorption of Islamic teachings amongst the cultivating classes allowed a certain amount of progressiveness, tolerance and receptivity towards change that was absent elsewhere in India and in greater parts of the Islamic world. Another aspect that differentiated Bengal from other parts of the Islamic world was the influence of Sufi holy men who were intricately involved with the local inhabitants through their preaching and most importantly through forest clearance and cultivation and setting the up of religious institutions such as mosques and seminaries. Contrary to received wisdom, the more contemporary evidence of Sufis on Bengals political frontier portrays men who had entered the delta not as holy warriors but as pious mystics or freebooting settlers operating under the authority of charismatic leaders. No contemporary source endows them with the ideology of holy war; nor is there contemporary evidence that they slew non-Muslims or destroyed non-Muslim monuments.
By the nineteenth century, however, the outside world began to impinge upon the Muslims of Bengal - which was by then under British rule - with a revivalist Islamic movement influenced by Wahhabi teachings and led by intellectuals Shah Wali Allah (1702-62), Sayyid Ahmed of Rae Bareli (1786-1831) and Hajji Shariat Allah (1781-1840). Due to what he perceived as the impoverished and indigent state of Bengali Muslims caused by the policies of the British and the Zamindari class, Haji Shariatullah after returning from Mecca after 20 years preached Islamic virtues emphasising Faraiz or duties that were incumbent upon all Muslims to practise according to the teachings of orthodox Islam. However, the revivalist/reformist nature of the Faraizi Movement he started could be uncompromising and as Dr. Rafiuddin Ahmed points out, [The] movement not only professed reverence for the ethical principles embodied in the shariah but considered even any slight deviation as sacrilegious. What they wanted was total conformity and no concession. It was only a matter of time before such preaching became an issue for the British authorities. Although, the Faraizi Movement never became part of the wider Wahhabi Movement and did not openly advocate Jihad there was little doubt about its intent, there was a general feeling at that time that the real object of the Faraizis was the expulsion of the alien rulers and the restoration of Muslim power. The movement later clashed directly with the government when the British intervened in favour of the landlords to suppress peasant uprisings led by the Faraizis. Many of its members reportedly took active part in the Jihad.
The objectives of the Faraizi Movement were therefore in keeping with the wider ideological imperatives being played out in the Islamic world in the nineteenth century. This was also the case with the more militant Tariqah-i-Muhamaadiya Movement that belonged to the tradition of the Waliullahi School of Delhi and was, to all intents and purposes, an extension of the jihad movement launched by Shah Sayyid Ahmad (1786-1831) of Rae Bereli in northern India. Sayyid Ahmads purpose in launching the jihad was to rid Islam of Hindu practises, to end belief in the intercessionary power of saints and to establish an ideal Muslim community where Muslims could live according to the holy law. This was all very much in consonance with the wider struggle being waged in the Islamic world to purify Islam of alien elements and to overthrow foreign rule. Both the Faraizi and Tariqah-i-Muhamaadiya movements, however, eventually lost steam due to the sustained prosecutions of its leaders by the British and a generally hostile attitude to their ideological program by the ordinary Muslims they were attempting to reform. Contrary to their intentions the more progressive, tolerant and receptive Islam that had prevailed in Bengal since the 16th century began to reassert itself, as pointed out by Dr. Rafiuddin Ahmed, The reformists succeeded in converting only a fraction of the total Muslim population to their point of view; the vast majority remained steadfastly opposed to any new dogma and faithful to the traditional system, with its peculiar mix of Islamic dogma and local beliefs and practices.
It was only after more than a century that a new Islamic militancy emerged in what was now Bangladesh under the twin banners of the Jamaat-ul-Mujahidin (JMB) and the Ahle Hadith. Both of these groups had superficial Salafist tendencies but seem to have been inspired more by the jihadi peasant revolts instigated by the Faraizi and Tariqah-i-Muhamaadiya movements in the nineteenth century. From the documents and books obtained from the JMB and Ahle Hadith hideouts by law enforcement agencies it appears that both groups propagated the ideas of Abd al-Wahhab (after whom Wahhabism is named) and the writings of Ibn Tamiyyah. These two renowned Islamic thinkers were the intellectual driving force behind jihadi movements of the nineteenth century that sought to expel foreign rulers from their native lands and to purify Islam from alien accretions. Both the JMB and Ahle Hadith also followed the line taken by Sayyid Qutb and Muhammad Abdul Salam Faraj in seeking the overthrow of apostate governments and the reinstatement of Islamic rule under Shariah law. In their literature they have applied these ideas directly to the secular constitution and political framework of Bangladesh stating that, There is no evidence and acceptance in the Holy Quran and Shahid Hadith to maintain the regime under Democracy, Socialism, Communism, and Secularism etc. All these systems are manmade laws invented by the Kuffar. Each and every ism is a rival to the rule of Allah. In order to destroy the basic belief of Muslims these isms were composed by Kafirs, Mushriks and Jews. So, it is high time to think to earn escape for all Muslim concerns. The ideological weakness of this extremist position has been identified in an excellent essay by Shah Abdul Halim titled, Doctrinal Claims of Militants: An Examination in which he argues that, Muslims can rule without implementing Shariah if the circumstances are not in their favor or people are not ready for such reform or the situation is not healthy enough or conducive for such a transformation or change. Halim backs up this assertion with authoritative statements by eminent Islamic scholars such as Sheikh Rachid Ghannouchi and Dr. Yusuf al Qaradawi who are both associated with modern Muslim Brotherhood and the Wassatiyya movement.
Ultimately the militant agenda of the JMB and Ahle Hadith failed in Bangladesh due to the widespread disapproval of their violent tactics and methods but also because of their ideological intolerance and regressiveness. These were the exact same reasons that the Faraizi and Tariqah-i-Muhamaadiya movements failed more than a century ago. Muslim identity in Bangladesh has been on the whole progressive, tolerant and receptive and with Islam being a constant element of everyday life there was felt to be no necessity for violence which was clearly repellent to most people especially when democratic alternatives were available. The nature of Islamic sentiment in Bangladesh has been perfectly described by Prof. M. Rashiduzzaman in his article, Islam, Muslim Identity and Nationalism in Bangladesh where he states, The rituals of Islam (prayer, fasting in Ramadan, charity, annual pilgrimage to Mecca, marriages, funerals, etc.) were intertwined with the lives of average Bangladeshis. Radio and television transmitted the daily prayer calls. The blaring loudspeakers in the mosques were the daily reminders of the Islamic character of Bangladesh. Reverence for saints, veneration for Mazars (shrines) and Pirs/Sufis, although not favored by the sharia, was an old Bangladeshi tradition which continued to thrive as a significant manifestation of 'folk' Islam in Bangladesh. This statement exemplifies the egalitarian character of Islamic belief in Bangladesh that favours democratic, pluralistic and peaceful change rather than sudden, sporadic and violent upheaval. Bangladesh has shown that instituting democracy and an open society in a Muslim country although very difficult is not impossible. Such a liberal attitude is entirely consistent with Islamic doctrine as the, Qur'an advocates consultative governance and the practice of the Prophet, as enshrined in the Compact of Medina, treats minorities equally, and he governed by consent and consultation. Opposed to this view are militant groups like the JMB who make unilateral and dictatorial decisions to inflict violence upon the state and the people so that they may impose their highly personalized brand of Islam on the rest of society. Such a decision is made without the consent of the people and also without their consultation which goes against the basic premises of Islam and has been consistently rejected by the people of Bangladesh.
MBI Munshi
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DarkStar
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dear niaz
I understand your respect for Imam Ghazali, although he vehemently opposed the Mu'tazali. As you may know, he wrote "Tahaafatul FAlaasifa", the incoherence of the philsophers. But it is a mistake to think that the Mu'tazalis, who used some aspects of greek and helenistic logic, are identical to the philosophers of that same era, some of whom had views that even the Mu'tazalis would not subscribe to.
The main reason for the emergence of the Mu'tazali/ahl ul kalaam was due to the debate over the issue of iman and amal, and what makes one a kafir. The Mu'tazalis (as would the later Ash'aris) took what was in their view an opinon between the two extremes of opinions of the Kharajites (that a major sin makes one a kafir) and the murjiah (that mere profession of faith guaranteed salvation) and came up with the ingenious "Manzla baina AlManazliltain" ( the position between the two).
This meant, that while they accepted that a sinner would go to hell (just as the kharajites believed), in this world he would not be called a kafir, nor indeed a mumin. He could be known as just plain muslim, but the words mumin or kafir will not be affirmed.
Of course the above was a sigh of relief for the authorities, who relentlessly pursued any hint of kharajites doctrine among scholars.
The Mu'tazalites were also drawn to the debate about pre destination and free will, and took up a position that would be akin to the Qadarites(those who belived human free will is not affected by God's will) rather than the jabarites(who went to the extreme of claiming that humans have no will at all). This of course led to a 'rejection' of the concept of God's perfect Knowledge.
Perhaps, the most controversial of issues, which in the end precipitated the fall from grace of this group, was that of Divine attributes. In their 'rationalist' thinking, they claimed that God cannot be ascribed any attributes (like His Speech,Hearing, Seeing, Knowledge,drawing near, etc) as this would negate Tawhid and one would become a mushrik if such a belief was held.
Thus, the majority of muslims who believed that the Qur'aan was the uncreated word of God, were instantly classified as mushriks who believed in another God,i.e. the Qur'aan.
This culminated in the great KHalq Qur'aan debate, wether the Qur'aan is created or the speech of God. Sides were taken, and the Khalif Mamun initiated the Mihna. A muslim 'inquisition', in which Mu'tazalite doctrine was forced upon the clergy and populace. Basically, all the scholars of note were required to profess in teh Mu'tazalite belief system and affirm that the Qur'aan was not the uncreted word of God. Harsh punishments followed, as was seen in the examples of boht Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal and Muhammad bin Nuh, who were the only scholars in Baghdad that defied the royal decree. Imam Ahmad was tortured relentlessly and flogged, while the latter perished in confinement. It is to the Imam's courage and indefaitgability that we must give credit to for the survival of orthodox sunni belief.
It was only after the ascension to the throne of the Caliph Mutawakkil that IMam Ahmad was released, and the state forsook its policy of enforcement of the Mu'tazali belief system.
There was an immediate backlash amongst both clergy and laymen, as the harsh policies of the state in supposed promotion of Mu'tazali doctrine led to resentment and hostility towards the group. Caliph Mamun and some Mu'tazalis alleged associations with the Shia Muslim community also did not help in this regard, as many people came to see Mu'tazali doctrine synonymous with Ahl Tashiee belief, and blamed the Mu'tazalis for instigating the climate of fear and oppression during the dark days of the Mihna.
That was the downfall of the Mu'tazalis, who soon after fizzled out as a religious movement.
Another reason was that by this time, the intellectual attacks on Mu'tazilism by both the philosophers and traditionalists had increased in sophistication. The traditionalists (against common held belief) also used logic and rational argument to great effect in countering both the Mu'tazalis and Jahmis.
Renowned Orientalist and scholar of classical Islam, Sherman Jackson contends that the idea that there was a rationalist/traditionalist dichotomy was a fiction, and that they should instead be considered as different traditions of reason.
I fully concur with this view, and a study of islamic literature and polemics, and the great scholars that have expounded islam, shows that they were very rational people, employing logic, ratonalist thinking, analogical deduction, and critical debate.
I agree with you, but this ijtihad stopped due to a number of reasons, and hardly the fault of Ahmad bin Hanbal, or Ibn Taymiya.
The historical reasons for the demise of the Baghdad Caliphate will require a few more posts, but in short. The effect upon muslim culture, intellectual capacity, and the knowledge base of the 'sack of Baghdad' by the Mongols cannot be underestimated. Rivers running black with books, and red with blood, and pyramids of skulls you must have read of. Baghdad was the cutlural heart, intellectual lifeblood, religious center, and a magnet for the great and the good and the well learned. It had the most extensive libraries, and the biggest seminaries. Its loss inititated an era of immediate introversion, and clinging to age old certainties.
To them it must have looked like the end of the world was nigh. On the one side, the crusaders, on the other the mongols. Reading some of the chronicles of the time, you'd think they were recounting the last days of Islam.
The loss of life was immense, as well as the loss of scholars and institutions. Of those who were left, the watch word was consolidation. Affirming what scraps of knowledge of the past that we have left.
This led to wide spread adoption of the concept of "taqlid". Blind imitation, especially of scholars and schools of thought of the past. Any ijtihad was seen as suspicious in the light of the new order ( the non muslim tataars/mongols). There was also the specter of madhabi tensions between shafis and hanafis hanging in the air, what with the frequent riots in diffrent places, especially Nishabur, Rayy, Turkestan and even Baghdad itself.
It was thought the best way to resolve this, and to safeguard their religion from the perceived threat of the non muslim rulers and invaders, was to forumulate an understanding between the four dominant schools of thought at that time. And they did just that, many of the 'scholars' sitting down together, and affirming that they will stop all polemics against each other, accept each other as legitimate schools of thought within sunni islam, and promote the idea that the religion of Islam can only be correctly followed by subscribing to one of the four official Madhabs. Incidentally, they decided to 'close the gates of ijtihad', claiming that the previous scholars had done so much exhaustive work on the issue of ijtihad, that none was now needed, and they had the authority as the representatvies of the muslims to declare void any new ijtihad, while making "TAqleed" a cornerstone of muslim faith.
This happened long after Amad bin Hanbal, who was certainly not anti rationalist. However, he was a Muhaddis and a prolific writer on the subjects that were raised by jahmis and mu'tazalis in his day.
As for Ibn Taymiya, well his writings are numerous and should be appreciated by reading them oneself. I assure you, if you read him you will not cease to be amazed. Please reserve judgement on him, as he was the biggest propounder of ijtihad in his day.
There is no real difference between Ahmad ibn Hanbal and lets say, Shafie, or even Abu Hanifa with regard to the interpretation of Quran and Sunnah.
The main difference regarding interpretation between the traditionalists and mu'tazalis can be seen in the verses and ahdeeth regarding the Divine Attributes of Allah.
Apart from that, they had just as literal an understanding of Islamic Sharia as others.
LIke I said above, I do not agree with the premise that Ahmad bin Hanbal had anything to do with the stopping of ijtihad and the decline in scientific achievement.
My point was, that in any day and age, one will always find opponents to someobody's ideology, beliefs, person. No illustrious nor infamous person has
escaped this. If there are any specific critcisms of Ibn Taymiyas belief system, then that can be discussed.
The rejection of philosophy and knowledge by muslims was not a cause, but a symptom of their downfall. Their ecnomic, military, adminstrative weaknesses led to their downfall, and eventual appropriation of their knowledge based heritage. The major learning centers of the muslim lands, Cordoba, Baghdad, Qairowan, Rayy, NIshabur, Bukhara, Samarkand, suffered a great deal from reconquests, crusades, hordes and general mayhem, and that precepitated their fall from grace. The cause and effect was that of declining military, and economic power, which subsequently led to stagnation in innovation and knowledge, both ethereal and worldy.
I've enjoyed the debate so far, and appreciate the points you have put forward. I hope we can continue this in a spirit of mutual benefit.
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muse
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CII recommends changes to divorce laws
* Husband bound to divorce wife within 90 days of written request
* No law bars women from proceeding for Haj without mehram
By Tahir Niaz
ISLAMABAD: The Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) has recommended a law under which it will be mandatory for a husband to divorce his wife within 90 days if she submits a written demand for divorce.
If the husband fails to do so, the nikah would stand cancelled after the 90-day term lapsed, except if the wife withdrew her demand, the CII recommended in its 171st meeting here on Saturday. CII Chairman Dr Muhammad Khalid Masud chaired the meeting.
If the husband gave his wife assets and property and demanded them back at the time of divorce, the wife would have to return the assets except for dower and maintenance or else approach a court of law for the resolution of the conflict.
The council also proposed a Talaqnama form on the pattern of the nikah form. It also recommended the registration of divorce. The CII recommended that a single Hijri calendar should be devised.
Haj: Regarding women performing Haj without a mehram, the council said that no law prevented women from travelling inland and abroad. It observed Saudi laws were beyond its jurisdiction. The CII approved guiding principles for shariah enforcement to be tabled before religious scholars.
The CII chairman told the meeting that after his meeting with President Asif Ali Zardari a few days ago, Zardari had constituted a committee with the minister for parliamentary affairs as its head, to review the reports and recommendations of the council.
* Husband bound to divorce wife within 90 days of written request
* No law bars women from proceeding for Haj without mehram
By Tahir Niaz
ISLAMABAD: The Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) has recommended a law under which it will be mandatory for a husband to divorce his wife within 90 days if she submits a written demand for divorce.
If the husband fails to do so, the nikah would stand cancelled after the 90-day term lapsed, except if the wife withdrew her demand, the CII recommended in its 171st meeting here on Saturday. CII Chairman Dr Muhammad Khalid Masud chaired the meeting.
If the husband gave his wife assets and property and demanded them back at the time of divorce, the wife would have to return the assets except for dower and maintenance or else approach a court of law for the resolution of the conflict.
The council also proposed a Talaqnama form on the pattern of the nikah form. It also recommended the registration of divorce. The CII recommended that a single Hijri calendar should be devised.
Haj: Regarding women performing Haj without a mehram, the council said that no law prevented women from travelling inland and abroad. It observed Saudi laws were beyond its jurisdiction. The CII approved guiding principles for shariah enforcement to be tabled before religious scholars.
The CII chairman told the meeting that after his meeting with President Asif Ali Zardari a few days ago, Zardari had constituted a committee with the minister for parliamentary affairs as its head, to review the reports and recommendations of the council.
DarkStar
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Why should she give them back? I don't understand this. Where could they have got this from? Is this another example of erronous ijtihad by the semi qualified?
p.s. i don't disagree with the other points raised though.
Although the hajj without mehram issue is a religious one, and a majority of islamic scholarly opinon, for various reasons (including security) prohibits the hajj of a lone woman.
muse
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Dear Mr. Munshi:
A broad piece indeed, if I may offer an observation, while you have covered the opinon of the some Western scholars about ideas that have sought to be accepted as "islamic", and these are presented in a negative light, readers will note that you present a rather neutral tone when discussing Muslim scholars -- does this have to do with the "audience" you were referring to?
A broad piece indeed, if I may offer an observation, while you have covered the opinon of the some Western scholars about ideas that have sought to be accepted as "islamic", and these are presented in a negative light, readers will note that you present a rather neutral tone when discussing Muslim scholars -- does this have to do with the "audience" you were referring to?
BanglaBhoot
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Yes very well observed.
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Thanks for the extensive and insighful post.
However, I don't understand how these points that you have put forward constitute any ideological weakness with regards to the fundamental principle of establishing an Islamic State. As far as I know, these are facts acknowledged by certain political Islam parties too, namely the Jamate Islami and Ikhwanul Muslimeen, and their various offshoots.
While there maybe an Islamic argument against giving precedence and such importance to establishing a so called Islamic state the way radical islamic political parties do, I don't see how the principle is compromised by what has been quoted by you of Shah Abdul Halim.
BanglaBhoot
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The paper was written on behalf of a very high government official to a Western military audience. The perspective was meant to be somewhat ironic without upsetting the expectations of the listeners while at the same time putting them in their place. I hope that clarifies.
niaz
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My only observation on your articles is that Syed Ahmad Braelvi was not fighting against the foreigners (The English). His battles (Peshawar and Balakot) were with the Sikhs who are an indigenous people
Some historians have pointed out that the English may have even secretly facilitated his travel to Peshawar; Ranjit Singh was still alive and the English respected his military prowess. Any movement that lead to weakening of the Sikh state was good for the English.
muse
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Editorial: CIIs historic recommendations on talaq
The Council for Islamic Ideology (CII) under the chairmanship of one of Pakistans top scholars of Islam, Dr Khalid Masud, has recommended that divorce laws in the country be brought in line with the edicts of the Quran by giving the right of divorce to wives too. It says that a woman has the right to demand divorce and such a divorce would be deemed to go into effect 90 days after a woman has filed for separation, even if the man does not respond by that time.
Next, the CII has recommended the registration of divorce proceeding the same way as nikah on a new form that would safeguard the right of the woman under Quran. It wants the nikahnama amended too in order to describe in it the right of the wife to ask for divorce without being bequeathed the right to do so by the husband. The CII report says the husband must be made to register the first divorce too instead of the current practice of sending the woman a notice of three simultaneous talaqs. Only after the registration of the first talaq would the later talaqs become valid.
Another drawback for women has been addressed by the CII. A woman demanding divorce has to surrender assets given to her by the husband but not her dowry. The bridegroom should declare his assets at the time of his first marriage and give full details about his first wife and children in the nikahnama in case of a second wedlock. The practice today is that a woman approaching the court for khula (asking for divorce) is accused of possessing assets that were not given to her. Some husbands force wives to surrender their dowries too.
A CII delegation called on President Asif Ali Zardari, the constitutional appointer of the Council, and told him that only around 10 percent of the current Islamic legal provisions would need to be amended. The President responded by setting up a committee under Minister for Parliamentary Affairs Mr Babar Awan to look into the report and plan its implementation. This is where the battle for Quranic law will be fought and political reactions from the opposition would be carefully examined before going ahead with a truly revolutionary reform.
Of course, the PPP government will immediately come under pressure from a number of quarters. The non-religious political parties in the opposition may secretly agree with the CII recommendations but they will issue threatening statements against implementing them, calling the CII an extension of the Musharraf period. The religious parties will start issuing equally dangerous statements which the media mujahideen will highlight since the clergy of all stripes is considered a de facto authority on Islam. On top of it all, the Taliban and Al Qaeda will declare themselves opposed to the reform and vow to kill anyone who favours it.
But the truth is right there if you want to know it. Women must have rights given to them by the Holy Quran. This has been highlighted in the past by Islamic scholars and by lawyers. It is no accident that the recommendations of the CII, without being aware of it, conform to the findings of a Pakistan activist, Ms Rashida Muhammad Hussain Patel, the founder in 1985 of the Pakistan Women Lawyers Association (PAWLA), a pressure group for the reform of laws discriminating against women.
In her book Woman versus Man: Socio-Legal Gender Inequality in Pakistan (2003), Rashida Patel had demanded reforms that the CII has now adopted. She objected to the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961 on the grounds that it asked the bride to declare whether or not she was married earlier whereas no such provision was applied to the bridegroom. The chapter on divorce discusses the three ways of giving talaq to a wife. The good way is according to the Quran but simultaneous three-time divorce (talaq bidat) is not according to the Quran even though it is acceptable to the court of law. Ms Patel asked: how can a husband who is just one party to the contract of marriage annul the marriage unilaterally without the consent of the other signatory to the contract? She called it a misinterpretation of Islam.
The Family Laws Ordinance of 1961 never became law because the clergy rejected it. Since 1961, clerics have been going to court asking for the annulment of the provision of registration of nikah and talaq. In 2003, in a discussion on TV, a cleric bluntly told Pakistans renowned Islamic scholar Javed Al Ghamidi that the practice of the old jurists was to be held above the Quran, despite the fact that the practice of talaq is not uniform in the Islamic world.
Will the PPP soon get cold feet and will Mr Babar Awan, himself a popular orator on Islam, tell the CII to cool it? It would be a great day in the history of Pakistan when its women get their rights from its parliament.
The Council for Islamic Ideology (CII) under the chairmanship of one of Pakistans top scholars of Islam, Dr Khalid Masud, has recommended that divorce laws in the country be brought in line with the edicts of the Quran by giving the right of divorce to wives too. It says that a woman has the right to demand divorce and such a divorce would be deemed to go into effect 90 days after a woman has filed for separation, even if the man does not respond by that time.
Next, the CII has recommended the registration of divorce proceeding the same way as nikah on a new form that would safeguard the right of the woman under Quran. It wants the nikahnama amended too in order to describe in it the right of the wife to ask for divorce without being bequeathed the right to do so by the husband. The CII report says the husband must be made to register the first divorce too instead of the current practice of sending the woman a notice of three simultaneous talaqs. Only after the registration of the first talaq would the later talaqs become valid.
Another drawback for women has been addressed by the CII. A woman demanding divorce has to surrender assets given to her by the husband but not her dowry. The bridegroom should declare his assets at the time of his first marriage and give full details about his first wife and children in the nikahnama in case of a second wedlock. The practice today is that a woman approaching the court for khula (asking for divorce) is accused of possessing assets that were not given to her. Some husbands force wives to surrender their dowries too.
A CII delegation called on President Asif Ali Zardari, the constitutional appointer of the Council, and told him that only around 10 percent of the current Islamic legal provisions would need to be amended. The President responded by setting up a committee under Minister for Parliamentary Affairs Mr Babar Awan to look into the report and plan its implementation. This is where the battle for Quranic law will be fought and political reactions from the opposition would be carefully examined before going ahead with a truly revolutionary reform.
Of course, the PPP government will immediately come under pressure from a number of quarters. The non-religious political parties in the opposition may secretly agree with the CII recommendations but they will issue threatening statements against implementing them, calling the CII an extension of the Musharraf period. The religious parties will start issuing equally dangerous statements which the media mujahideen will highlight since the clergy of all stripes is considered a de facto authority on Islam. On top of it all, the Taliban and Al Qaeda will declare themselves opposed to the reform and vow to kill anyone who favours it.
But the truth is right there if you want to know it. Women must have rights given to them by the Holy Quran. This has been highlighted in the past by Islamic scholars and by lawyers. It is no accident that the recommendations of the CII, without being aware of it, conform to the findings of a Pakistan activist, Ms Rashida Muhammad Hussain Patel, the founder in 1985 of the Pakistan Women Lawyers Association (PAWLA), a pressure group for the reform of laws discriminating against women.
In her book Woman versus Man: Socio-Legal Gender Inequality in Pakistan (2003), Rashida Patel had demanded reforms that the CII has now adopted. She objected to the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961 on the grounds that it asked the bride to declare whether or not she was married earlier whereas no such provision was applied to the bridegroom. The chapter on divorce discusses the three ways of giving talaq to a wife. The good way is according to the Quran but simultaneous three-time divorce (talaq bidat) is not according to the Quran even though it is acceptable to the court of law. Ms Patel asked: how can a husband who is just one party to the contract of marriage annul the marriage unilaterally without the consent of the other signatory to the contract? She called it a misinterpretation of Islam.
The Family Laws Ordinance of 1961 never became law because the clergy rejected it. Since 1961, clerics have been going to court asking for the annulment of the provision of registration of nikah and talaq. In 2003, in a discussion on TV, a cleric bluntly told Pakistans renowned Islamic scholar Javed Al Ghamidi that the practice of the old jurists was to be held above the Quran, despite the fact that the practice of talaq is not uniform in the Islamic world.
Will the PPP soon get cold feet and will Mr Babar Awan, himself a popular orator on Islam, tell the CII to cool it? It would be a great day in the history of Pakistan when its women get their rights from its parliament.
niaz
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alamgir
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Muslim Intellectual Inertia and Ijtehad
By M. Hanif Lakdawala
History bears testimony to the fact that change in the society, environment and life style, fed by the unveiling of latest information has always posed major challenges to mankind. In modern society hidden and unknown frontiers are conquered and obscure facts decoded at an accelerated pace. Societys environment and life style is changing as never before.
Islam, in the earlier stages of its civilisation and cultural career met various challenges successfully with the result that it became the dominant ideology of the world and the Islamic world-the lone super power. In his book, Reconstruction of Religious thought in Islam, famous poet and philosopher, Allama Iqbal, writes, from about the middle of the first century, upto the beginning of the fourth, not less than 19 schools of law and legal opinions appeared in Islam. This fact alone is sufficient to show how incessantly our early doctors of law worked in order to meet the necessities of a growing civilisation.
But ironically, Islamic world at the door step of the new millennium is at the cross road, confused and out of tune with the reality. The notion, that the Islamic concept of law is absolute and authoritarian and hence immutable amongst the believers is breeding intellectual inertia.
It is argued that Islamic law seeks its basis in divine revelation through the Prophet, it is embedded in the Quran and Hadith. Being divine, or divinely inspired, these sources are believed to be sacred, final, eternal and hence immutable.
Philosophers such as Abu Ishaq al-Shatifi argue that the divine law has not provided a ruling for each and every individual case that will ever occur. It has prescribed only universal principles, general statements and a number of examples that provide guidance in an infinite number of cases.
In al-Muwafaqat, Shatibi writes, each individual case differs from the other in details and facts. The Qazi or Mufti distinguishes these cases from each other. Two institutions, futya (juris consultation) and hukm (qada, court of law), were developed by the Muslim society to deal with legal cases. A Qazi or a Mufti finds out which general or abstract principle governs a specific case. Sometimes this knowledge is easily available and often it requires a great effort. This whole process is called Ijtihad.
While defining Ijtihad Shatibi writes, A process in which one exerts ones efforts to ones full capacity in order to acquire exact or probable knowledge or reach judgement in a given case.
The different schools of thought (fiqh) which exist today is nothing but the collection of Ijtehad done by the various Islamic scholars, prominent amongst them being Imam Abu Hanifa, Imam Hanbal, and Imam Malik.
The Ijtehad done by them were based on the interpretation of Quran and Sunnah keeping in mind the changes and the needs of the society at that particular time. To consider their Ijtehad as binding on all Muslims of all eras would lead to intellectual stagnation.
Allama Iqbal in, Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, writes ....but since things have changed and the world of Islam is to-day confronted and affected by new forces set free by the extraordinary development of human thought in all its directions, I see no reason why this attitude (finality of legal schools) should be maintained any longer. Did the founders of our schools ever claim finality for their reasoning and interpretations? Never. The claim of the present generation of Muslim liberals to re-interpret the foundational legal principles, in the light of their own experience and the altered conditions of modern life is, in my opinion, perfectly justified. The teaching of the Quran that life is a process of progressive creation necessitates that each generation, guided but unhampered by the work of its predecessor, should be permitted to solve its own problems.
A jurists fatwa is merely his opinion and not law. To give it the status of law ijma or consensus is necessary. For example, drinking of wine is forbidden by the clear text of the Quran but no specific punishment is prescribed for it. The Prophet Muhammad (Pbuh) punished the offenders as it suited the particular case. The Caliphs Hadrat Abu Bakr and Hadrat Umar punished the offender with forty lashes but there was no established law to this effect. In the days of the Caliph Hadrat Uthman when the number of offenders increased, the problem was presented before the advisory council [Majlis -i- Shura] and it was suggested by Hadrat Ali on the analogy of calumny that eighty lashes should be the punishment for this crime which was upheld by the consensus and became law.
Ijtehad and Quran
In the Quran, it is crystal clear that far from leaving no scope for human thought and legislative activity the intensive breath of these principles virtually acts as an awakener of human thought.
Ijtehad literally means to exert. In the Islamic terminology it means to exert with a view to form an independent judgement on a legal question. It has its origin in the well-known verse of the Quran And to those who exert we show our path.
Ijtehad and Holy Prophet (Pbuh)
The Prophet Muhammad (Pbuh), while sending Maad Ibn Jabal to Yemen as its governor, is reported to have asked him as to how he would decide matters coming up before him. I will judge matters according to the Book of Allah, said Maad. But if the book of Allah contains nothing to guide you then I will act on the precedents of the Prophet of Allah. But if the precedent fails? Then I will exert to form my own judgement. The Prophet (Pbuh) approved his answers.
The Quranic verse their affairs are (conducted) by mutual counsel, was applied to its fullest extent by the Prophet (Pbuh) in his private and public life and was fully acted upon by the Caliphs.
Ijtihad an Caliphs
The companions of the Prophet were the first to resort to analogy [A form of Ijtihad] when confronted with the problem of the election of Abu Bakr to Khilafat. The Prophet (Pbuh) having asked Abu Bakr to lead the prayers they elected him as their leader, for one who is the leader in religious affairs must also be the leader in worldly affairs. The cause for election is quite apparent and they were justified in electing Abu Bakr as their leader.
The companions were unanimously in agreement concerning the application of analogy. An example is the directive from the Caliph umar to Abu Musa al-Ashari which read; know the similitude and weigh the cases against them!
Hazrat Ali, when consulted by Caliph Uthman on the punishment which should be meted out to those who drank wine, he advised; We apply the punishment for calumny, namely eighty lashes of the whip, because if a person becomes intoxicated, he knows not what he says, and in such a condition he commits calumny. Thus, through this analogy, drinking of wine was linked to calumny. Other examples of Ijtehad by Caliphs are as follows; Punishment as prescribed by the Quran for the thief, male or female, is to cut off their hands, but the Caliph Umar suspended it in the year of famine because of necessity and in order that people might keep alive. The consensus of jurists followed this rule.
Similarly workers and artisans such as tailors and goldsmiths were not responsible for the loss of things given to them to work upon. Hadrat Ali argued, although the workers or the manufacturers do not seem to be responsible for the loss of such things, if there is no responsibility they will become quite negligent with the result that the owners will have to suffer a great loss. Therefore, the artisans and workers must be held responsible, hence Alis proposal was adopted by consensus.
Caliph Umar , observed the principle of sound analogy (Tawil) in the interpretation of the Quranic verse: Alms are only for the poor and the needy, and those who collect them and for those whose hearts are to be reconciled, and to free the captives and the debtors, and for the cause of Allah and the wayfarer, a duty imposed by God. (9:60)
The words, those whose hearts are to be reconciled, refer to a group of weavers who were included among the recipients of the alms. The verse is silent as to the cause why this group was included among the recipients of alms.
The sole object was to win them over to the side of Islam on account of their influence and the high esteem in which they were held in their tribe. Caliph Umar refused to give them alms when Islam had gained in strength saying: These were payments from the Prophet (Pbuh) to you in order to win you over for Islam. Now Allah has given power to Islam and made your support unnecessary. So you either remain faithful to Islam or the sword will be the arbitrator between us.
Ijtihad and Four Imams
It is interesting to note that the four Imams Abu Hanifa, Malik, Shafi and Ahmed Ibn Hanbal never advised to follow their views unless their sources were ascertained.
Imam Abu Hanifa and Abu Yusuf are reported by Ibn Qyyaim al-Jawziah to have said, It is not legitimate for anyone to follow our view until he has learned the source where from we derived those views.
Imam Mohammad, and Imam Yusuf both students of Imam Hanifa, rejected eighty percent of Ijtehad of their teacher Abu Hanifa in the light of new sources and changed conditions. The Fiqh Hanafi as it exists today is based on the Ijtehad of both these students, that is, Imam Yusuf and Imam Mohammad.
Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, reputed the most meticulous adherent to the traditions said, Do not imitate me, Malik, AlShafii or al-Thawri but learn from the source from which they learned.
All these statements prove that interpretation is incumbent upon every man of learning. They also prove that the interpreter is liable to err. Caliph Umars instructions to Abu Musa -al- Ashari given in a letter are noteworthy. After giving judgment, if upon reconsideration you come to a different opinion, do not let the judgement which you have given stand in the way of retraction; for justice may not be disregarded and you are to know that it is better to retract than to persist in injustice.
Ibn Qayyim writes, The sharia is all justice, kindness, common good and wisdom. Any rule that departs from justice to injustice ... or departs from common good (Maslaha) to harm (Mafsada) ... is not part of Sharia, even if it is arrived at by literal interpretation.
Abu Ishaq Al-Shatibi in Maqasid al-Sharia writes, Allah made this blessed righteous Sharia accommodating and convenient and thus won the hearts of human beings and invoked in them love and respect for law. Had they had to act against convenience they could not have honestly fulfilled their obligations.
The new millennium beckons Indian Muslims to approach the Quran and Sunnah with a fresh mind in the light of changed conditions and new information and move away from imitation [taqlid].
In a Hadith of Sahih Muslim, the Prophet (Pbuh) is reported to have said: Strive and make effort for each is ordained to that which he was created for. In another hadith Prophet (Pbuh) said, if a judge interprets and gives a right judgement, he will have earned two rewards, if he interprets but errs in judgement he will still have earned one reward.
By M. Hanif Lakdawala
History bears testimony to the fact that change in the society, environment and life style, fed by the unveiling of latest information has always posed major challenges to mankind. In modern society hidden and unknown frontiers are conquered and obscure facts decoded at an accelerated pace. Societys environment and life style is changing as never before.
Islam, in the earlier stages of its civilisation and cultural career met various challenges successfully with the result that it became the dominant ideology of the world and the Islamic world-the lone super power. In his book, Reconstruction of Religious thought in Islam, famous poet and philosopher, Allama Iqbal, writes, from about the middle of the first century, upto the beginning of the fourth, not less than 19 schools of law and legal opinions appeared in Islam. This fact alone is sufficient to show how incessantly our early doctors of law worked in order to meet the necessities of a growing civilisation.
But ironically, Islamic world at the door step of the new millennium is at the cross road, confused and out of tune with the reality. The notion, that the Islamic concept of law is absolute and authoritarian and hence immutable amongst the believers is breeding intellectual inertia.
It is argued that Islamic law seeks its basis in divine revelation through the Prophet, it is embedded in the Quran and Hadith. Being divine, or divinely inspired, these sources are believed to be sacred, final, eternal and hence immutable.
Philosophers such as Abu Ishaq al-Shatifi argue that the divine law has not provided a ruling for each and every individual case that will ever occur. It has prescribed only universal principles, general statements and a number of examples that provide guidance in an infinite number of cases.
In al-Muwafaqat, Shatibi writes, each individual case differs from the other in details and facts. The Qazi or Mufti distinguishes these cases from each other. Two institutions, futya (juris consultation) and hukm (qada, court of law), were developed by the Muslim society to deal with legal cases. A Qazi or a Mufti finds out which general or abstract principle governs a specific case. Sometimes this knowledge is easily available and often it requires a great effort. This whole process is called Ijtihad.
While defining Ijtihad Shatibi writes, A process in which one exerts ones efforts to ones full capacity in order to acquire exact or probable knowledge or reach judgement in a given case.
The different schools of thought (fiqh) which exist today is nothing but the collection of Ijtehad done by the various Islamic scholars, prominent amongst them being Imam Abu Hanifa, Imam Hanbal, and Imam Malik.
The Ijtehad done by them were based on the interpretation of Quran and Sunnah keeping in mind the changes and the needs of the society at that particular time. To consider their Ijtehad as binding on all Muslims of all eras would lead to intellectual stagnation.
Allama Iqbal in, Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, writes ....but since things have changed and the world of Islam is to-day confronted and affected by new forces set free by the extraordinary development of human thought in all its directions, I see no reason why this attitude (finality of legal schools) should be maintained any longer. Did the founders of our schools ever claim finality for their reasoning and interpretations? Never. The claim of the present generation of Muslim liberals to re-interpret the foundational legal principles, in the light of their own experience and the altered conditions of modern life is, in my opinion, perfectly justified. The teaching of the Quran that life is a process of progressive creation necessitates that each generation, guided but unhampered by the work of its predecessor, should be permitted to solve its own problems.
A jurists fatwa is merely his opinion and not law. To give it the status of law ijma or consensus is necessary. For example, drinking of wine is forbidden by the clear text of the Quran but no specific punishment is prescribed for it. The Prophet Muhammad (Pbuh) punished the offenders as it suited the particular case. The Caliphs Hadrat Abu Bakr and Hadrat Umar punished the offender with forty lashes but there was no established law to this effect. In the days of the Caliph Hadrat Uthman when the number of offenders increased, the problem was presented before the advisory council [Majlis -i- Shura] and it was suggested by Hadrat Ali on the analogy of calumny that eighty lashes should be the punishment for this crime which was upheld by the consensus and became law.
Ijtehad and Quran
In the Quran, it is crystal clear that far from leaving no scope for human thought and legislative activity the intensive breath of these principles virtually acts as an awakener of human thought.
Ijtehad literally means to exert. In the Islamic terminology it means to exert with a view to form an independent judgement on a legal question. It has its origin in the well-known verse of the Quran And to those who exert we show our path.
Ijtehad and Holy Prophet (Pbuh)
The Prophet Muhammad (Pbuh), while sending Maad Ibn Jabal to Yemen as its governor, is reported to have asked him as to how he would decide matters coming up before him. I will judge matters according to the Book of Allah, said Maad. But if the book of Allah contains nothing to guide you then I will act on the precedents of the Prophet of Allah. But if the precedent fails? Then I will exert to form my own judgement. The Prophet (Pbuh) approved his answers.
The Quranic verse their affairs are (conducted) by mutual counsel, was applied to its fullest extent by the Prophet (Pbuh) in his private and public life and was fully acted upon by the Caliphs.
Ijtihad an Caliphs
The companions of the Prophet were the first to resort to analogy [A form of Ijtihad] when confronted with the problem of the election of Abu Bakr to Khilafat. The Prophet (Pbuh) having asked Abu Bakr to lead the prayers they elected him as their leader, for one who is the leader in religious affairs must also be the leader in worldly affairs. The cause for election is quite apparent and they were justified in electing Abu Bakr as their leader.
The companions were unanimously in agreement concerning the application of analogy. An example is the directive from the Caliph umar to Abu Musa al-Ashari which read; know the similitude and weigh the cases against them!
Hazrat Ali, when consulted by Caliph Uthman on the punishment which should be meted out to those who drank wine, he advised; We apply the punishment for calumny, namely eighty lashes of the whip, because if a person becomes intoxicated, he knows not what he says, and in such a condition he commits calumny. Thus, through this analogy, drinking of wine was linked to calumny. Other examples of Ijtehad by Caliphs are as follows; Punishment as prescribed by the Quran for the thief, male or female, is to cut off their hands, but the Caliph Umar suspended it in the year of famine because of necessity and in order that people might keep alive. The consensus of jurists followed this rule.
Similarly workers and artisans such as tailors and goldsmiths were not responsible for the loss of things given to them to work upon. Hadrat Ali argued, although the workers or the manufacturers do not seem to be responsible for the loss of such things, if there is no responsibility they will become quite negligent with the result that the owners will have to suffer a great loss. Therefore, the artisans and workers must be held responsible, hence Alis proposal was adopted by consensus.
Caliph Umar , observed the principle of sound analogy (Tawil) in the interpretation of the Quranic verse: Alms are only for the poor and the needy, and those who collect them and for those whose hearts are to be reconciled, and to free the captives and the debtors, and for the cause of Allah and the wayfarer, a duty imposed by God. (9:60)
The words, those whose hearts are to be reconciled, refer to a group of weavers who were included among the recipients of the alms. The verse is silent as to the cause why this group was included among the recipients of alms.
The sole object was to win them over to the side of Islam on account of their influence and the high esteem in which they were held in their tribe. Caliph Umar refused to give them alms when Islam had gained in strength saying: These were payments from the Prophet (Pbuh) to you in order to win you over for Islam. Now Allah has given power to Islam and made your support unnecessary. So you either remain faithful to Islam or the sword will be the arbitrator between us.
Ijtihad and Four Imams
It is interesting to note that the four Imams Abu Hanifa, Malik, Shafi and Ahmed Ibn Hanbal never advised to follow their views unless their sources were ascertained.
Imam Abu Hanifa and Abu Yusuf are reported by Ibn Qyyaim al-Jawziah to have said, It is not legitimate for anyone to follow our view until he has learned the source where from we derived those views.
Imam Mohammad, and Imam Yusuf both students of Imam Hanifa, rejected eighty percent of Ijtehad of their teacher Abu Hanifa in the light of new sources and changed conditions. The Fiqh Hanafi as it exists today is based on the Ijtehad of both these students, that is, Imam Yusuf and Imam Mohammad.
Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, reputed the most meticulous adherent to the traditions said, Do not imitate me, Malik, AlShafii or al-Thawri but learn from the source from which they learned.
All these statements prove that interpretation is incumbent upon every man of learning. They also prove that the interpreter is liable to err. Caliph Umars instructions to Abu Musa -al- Ashari given in a letter are noteworthy. After giving judgment, if upon reconsideration you come to a different opinion, do not let the judgement which you have given stand in the way of retraction; for justice may not be disregarded and you are to know that it is better to retract than to persist in injustice.
Ibn Qayyim writes, The sharia is all justice, kindness, common good and wisdom. Any rule that departs from justice to injustice ... or departs from common good (Maslaha) to harm (Mafsada) ... is not part of Sharia, even if it is arrived at by literal interpretation.
Abu Ishaq Al-Shatibi in Maqasid al-Sharia writes, Allah made this blessed righteous Sharia accommodating and convenient and thus won the hearts of human beings and invoked in them love and respect for law. Had they had to act against convenience they could not have honestly fulfilled their obligations.
The new millennium beckons Indian Muslims to approach the Quran and Sunnah with a fresh mind in the light of changed conditions and new information and move away from imitation [taqlid].
In a Hadith of Sahih Muslim, the Prophet (Pbuh) is reported to have said: Strive and make effort for each is ordained to that which he was created for. In another hadith Prophet (Pbuh) said, if a judge interprets and gives a right judgement, he will have earned two rewards, if he interprets but errs in judgement he will still have earned one reward.
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