JF-17's ferry and combat ranges

[Naif al Hilali]

Bismillah ir Rahman ar Raheem

Following on from :

F-16 Ferry Range Analysis
https://defence.pk/threads/pakistan-f-16-discussions-2.15226/page-649#post-8906190

and

F-16 Combat Mission Radius Analysis
https://defence.pk/threads/pakistan-f-16-discussions-2.15226/page-649#post-8916212

I was going to post the analysis of the JF-17's ferry and combat ranges to the JF-17 Discussions thread, but that thread is infested with trolls and flamers.

If there are no objections, I would like to start by analyzing the ferry range of the JF-17 today, and we will attempt to see how it was designed to PAF requirements, after we are done with the combat range analysis later in the week, Insha'Allah.

To recap, please recall from the F-16 Ferry Range Analysis part:

"I have been working on an analysis of ferry and combat ranges for active fighter aircraft. The conclusion will seem to be that (except for a couple of outliers) these figures are mostly similar for most modern combat fighters/attack aircraft. Not surprising considering that, no matter from what country the planes originate, they are usually designed to broadly similar payload/performance/range requirements.
...
I started with the F-16 because it's charts are widely available and can be checked online. So, it will form a baseline for assumptions to be made when data are not fully available for other aircraft.

No classified information will be presented in the analysis and (for the sake of alarm-raisers) any country that might be interested in the figures will have more accurate data and much more (tactics and capabilities) already made available to them by the manufacturer. The F-16 has been demoed to just about everybody including India.

The figures have all been rounded after calculations to make them more readable (and the roundoffs adjusted, for the nitpickers, so that they add up and/or are consistent)."

Now on to the task at hand. There have been many conflicting statistics on the JF-17's combat ranges. Not surprising given that operational & environmental conditions, takeoff & reserves requirements, and the need to evade enemy defenses, all of these exclude the possibility of fixing a hard number to a mission radius figure. Please recall that for the F-16C examples we worked out, the combat radius ranged all the way between 65 and 670 nautical miles.

For most aircraft, the only hard constructor-claimed range estimate you can seriously consider is the ferry range. This is usually stated under very well-known standard conditions with the aircraft flying under optimum cruise conditions all the way from Point A to Point B, with a nearly standard landing reserve.

We have a very good figure of 1,880 nautical miles for the JF-17 with three external tanks that has been validated by its overseas deployments. After considering all the claimed estimates and data, I decided to form this as the basis of my JF-17 analysis. It gives us a baseline for the JF-17's subsonic-cruise fuel consumption that should serve us well later, Insha'Allah.

Recall for the F-16A's ferry range with three tanks, we calculated:

F-16A Block 15 Ferry Range (16,300 pounds Aircraft Empty Weight)
Internal Fuel + 300 Gallon Centerline + Two 370 Gallon Drop Tanks
33,000 pounds Takeoff Weight
14,000 pounds [7,800 liters] usable fuel
- 500 pounds taxi & takeoff
- 800 pounds climbout to 36,000 feet initial cruising altitude, covering 60 nautical miles
- 11,700 pounds cruise at Mach 0.84, climbing to 45,000 feet final altitude, covering 2,080 nautical miles
- 1,000 pounds reserves for 20+ minutes Sea-Level Loiter or 150-200 nautical miles Divert
2,140 nautical miles
(F-16B Two-Seater has 12,800 pounds fuel for 1,880 nautical miles range)
General Dynamics Stated Range for F-16A: 2,100+ nautical miles

Now, I will list the JF-17's estimated calculations first and then discuss them:

---

JF-17 Block I/II Ferry Range (14,500 pounds Aircraft Empty Weight):
Internal Fuel (5,000 pounds usable) + 800 Liter Centerline Drop Tank + Two 1,100 Liter Drop Tanks
26,500 pounds Takeoff Weight
10,000 pounds [6,000 liters] usable fuel
- 400 pounds taxi & takeoff
- 700 pounds climbout covering @ 50+ nautical miles
- 8,100 pounds cruise covering 1,800+ nautical miles
- 800 pounds reserves for 20 minutes Sea Level Loiter or 200 nautical miles Divert
CAC/PAC Stated Range: 1,880 nautical miles

---

Notes:

1. Warmer than standard temperatures at cruising altitude may reduce ferry range slightly (1-5% for some portions of flight).
2. Afterburner (A/B) assisted takeoffs require additional fuel reducing ferry range by @ 100 nautical miles. In practice, Afterburners are likely to be used when carrying more than just a Centerline Drop Tank, in order to shorten takeoff distances.
3. Not being able to cruise at optimum altitudes/airspeeds for some portions of flight may reduce ferry range by 50-200 nautical miles.
4. Headwinds encountered during some portions of flight may reduce ferry range by 50-250 nautical miles.
5. Extra Stores such as Cargo Pods and Missiles will reduce ferry range by @ 100-150 nautical miles.

---

Units:

One Nautical Mile [nm.] = 6080 Feet [ft.] = 1.15 Statute Miles [mi.] = @ 1.85 Kilometers [km.]
One Pound [lb.] = @ 0.4535 Kilograms [kg.]; One Kilogram = 2.205 Pounds
1,000 Pound-Force [lbf.] Thrust = @ 4,450 Newtons = 4.45 Kilo-Newtons [kN.] Thrust
Kilograms are units of mass and the term Kilogram-Force [kgf.] is meaningless.
One US Gallon = 3.785 Liters = @ 6.84 pounds JP-8 fuel; One Imperial Gallon = 4.54 Liters; One Liter = @ 0.82 Kilogram JP-8

---

We see that the JF-17 is about 80% the weight of an F-16A, it has very similar trapezoidal wings, and the engine produces roughly 80% the thrust of the F-16A's original F-100-PW100 engine and is about as fuel-efficient as that engine (actually better when in afterburner).

The fuselage cross-section is also very compact and the DSIs are known for being efficient at speeds from Mach 0.4 to 1.6. It is practically impossible to calculate drag (at-lift, induced, trim, wave, or any other) without taking a scale model to the wind tunnel but we might estimate some of these from our experience later on.

Right now, we are most interested in the two aircrafts' subsonic cruise efficiency. The F-16 has a specific range in cruise of (2,080 nautical miles / 11,700 pounds fuel =) 0.178 nautical miles/pound. The JF-17 has a specific range of (1,830 nautical miles / 8,100 pounds fuel =) 0.226 nautical miles/pound.

Thus, we find that the JF-17 consumes roughly 80% of the fuel in subsonic cruise as the F-16. What this posits for us is that the JF-17 is probably as efficient in subsonic cruise as the class-leading F-16 was. We can thus safely assume that the aircraft (normalized to the F-16) is as efficient in producing lift and reducing drags during subsonic cruise.

Of course, this does not give us any idea of subsonic and supersonic maneuver-time drags. But those have more to do with turn rates, and fuel consumption will be predicated primarily by afterburner use. Similarly, non-optimal speed/cruising altitude consumption can be estimated with some certainty later on, given that the planform of both aircraft are similar and we have reasonably established that the JF-17 is not much draggier than an F-16.

On an aside, please note that the Blended-Wing-Body (BWB) planform of the F-16 produces 30-40% of its lift from its fuselage during high-AOA turning maneuvers. From NASA's BWB studies in the 1950s and experience of other aircraft, the JF-17's fuselage probably contributes only 20-30% lift under these conditions.

The JF-17's wings are, however, more than 80% the size of an F-16's (263 square feet vs. 300 square feet) and it has large Leading Edge Root Extensions (LERXs). These factors, as well as a good power-to-weight ratio, relaxed static stability, and digital pitch-axis Fly By Wire (FBW) should make it reasonably maneuverable in the Mach 0.6-0.9 dogfighting regime at 10,000-20,000 feet altitude.

Lastly, please note that the F-16A we used as a benchmark here had a fuel fraction of (14,000 pounds fuel / 33,000 pounds takeoff weight=) 0.425 and the JF-17 has a fuel fraction of (10,000/26,500 =) 0.375. The F-16C from our afore-mentioned analysis had a fuel fraction of (14,000/36,500 =) 0.385 and we had estimated its ferry range in this configuration at approximately 1,900 nautical miles.

So, if you can compensate for engine efficiency and drag issues, a fuel fraction gives you a good idea about a fighter aircraft's range. Fighters that carry all fuel and payload internally (or conformally) will have an advantage here. However, if the fighter with external non-conformal carriage is allowed to drop its tanks when empty, it can even come out slightly ahead.

As always, please feel free to point out all mistakes. I will be happy to correct them, Insha'Allah.

Allah keep everyone safe.

 

[Naif al Hilali]

Bismilah ir Rahman ar Raheem

"Lastly, please note that the F-16A we used as a benchmark here had a fuel fraction of (14,000 pounds fuel / 33,000 pounds takeoff weight=) 0.425 and the JF-17 has a fuel fraction of (10,000/26,500 =) 0.375. The F-16C from our afore-mentioned analysis had a fuel fraction of (14,000/36,500 =) 0.385 and we had estimated its ferry range in this configuration at approximately 1,900 nautical miles."

To compare with the JF-17's grandpa (philosophically speaking) from https://defence.pk/threads/jf-17-thunder-made-for-the-paf.398270/page-23#post-8907808:

F-20 Tigershark (14,000 pounds empty)
Fuel Fraction with 5,000 pounds Internal Fuel & Three 330 US gallon drop tanks (11,500/27,500 =) 0.415
Ferry Range 2,020 Nautical Miles
(Note: Most online sources are highly inaccurate and mix up the F-20's numbers with the F-5E's)

And its daddy and cousins:

SAAB Gripen JAS-39A/C (14,500-15,000 pounds empty)
Fuel Fraction with 5,000 pounds Internal Fuel & Three 300 US gallon drop tanks (11,000/27,000 =) 0.405
Ferry Range 1,800 Nautical Miles
(Usually conservatively under-reported as 3,000 kilometers or 1,620 nautical miles)

SAAB Gripen JAS-39E (17,500 pounds empty)
Fuel Fraction with 7,500 pounds Internal Fuel & Three 480 US gallon drop tanks (17,000/36,000 =) 0.485
Ferry Range 2,200 Nautical Miles
(Usually rounded to 4,000 kilometers or 2,080 nautical miles)

Hifz u kum Allah

 

[Naif al Hilali]

Great read over at War is Boring:
​

B-17s unload over Germany in March 1945. U.S. Air Force photo
America’s Over-Hyped Strategic Bombing Experiment
Bombers blasted the Hell out of Pantelleria

by JAMES STEVENSON

In the years after World War I, the brain trust of the U.S. Army evolved two conflicting opinions on how best to apply air power in the next war.

The Army Air Corps’ emerging bomber faction believed directly attacking the vital centers of a country, instead of bombing combat troops, was the best solution. This theory held that destroying an enemy’s war-making capabilities, its will to wage war, would lead to victory without the need to risk soldiers or even spend money on them.

These beliefs were incorporated into the phrase “strategic bombing,” pioneered by Giulio Douhet, an Italian military theorist who in the 1920s argued — horrifyingly — for the widespread use of chemical and biological weapons. Douhet later served as chief of aviation under Italian fascist dictator Benito Mussolini.

The second group looked to aviation as a kind of mobile artillery to support ground troops. After all, no one ever won a war without troops conquering territory — so the addition of aerial artillery would make soldiers that much more effective.

This thinking coalesced around the phrase “army cooperation” in the United Kingdom and “close air support” in the United States.

In the spring of 1943, American and British forces successfully defeated the German and Italian armies in North Africa. This experience informed U.S. Gen. Pete Quesada and others who wished to experiment in the unperfected art of “close air support” that would pay off once the invasion of France began.

But first, the Allies’ strategic bombing advocates wanted to put their theories to the test.

The occasion came during planning for the invasion of Sicily and mainland Italy. The first stop was Pantelleria, an island that been occupied in the distant past by Carthaginians, Romans, Moors and Normans, and which Mussolini had made into a penal colony.

The onslaught on this small, 32-square-mile island — 10 square miles larger than Manhattan — was known as Operation Corkscrew. It would have been a trivial footnote in history except that it appeared to offer an opportunity to provide ostensible evidence that bombing alone can win wars.

Thus, the bombing of Pantelleria became an experiment, one anticipated to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that bombing would ratify what up to then had been a matter of faith, but would soon offer proof that through bombing alone, surrender was a certainty.

“All these forces were assembled to test the assertion that if you destroy what a man has, and remove the possibility of his bringing more in, then in due course of time, it becomes impossible for him to defend himself,” Maj. Gen. Jimmy Doolittle said.

If bombing alone did not force a surrender, the Allies planned to invade the island by June 11. In an attempt to avoid the need for an invasion, the Allies generated 5,284 sorties, dropping a total of 12.4 million pounds of bombs on Pantelleria.

The Allies’ rain of bombs began on May 8, 1943. As June 11 approached, cannons from five British cruisers and seven destroyers intensified the downpour.

In some respects, the presence of warships contaminated the results of the strategic bombing test, but one could look the other way and pretend the ships’ guns were the functional equivalent of small bombs.

“I want to make the capture of Pantelleria a sort of laboratory to determine the effect of concentrated heavy bombing on a defended coastline,” Gen. Dwight Eisenhower told Gen. George Marshall.

“When the time comes we are going to concentrate everything we have to see whether damage to material, personnel and morale cannot be made so serious as to make a landing a rather simple affair.”

The person in charge of the aerial operation, Lt. Gen. Carl “Tooey” Spaatz, had been convinced of the strategic bombing theory for a long time. He believed that if you knew where to drop enough bombs, you could have a decisive result.

“Spaatz … committed to the assault the entire Strategic Air Force and part of the Tactical Air Force, an armada of four heavy-bomber groups, seven medium-bomber groups, two light-bomber groups, and eight fighter groups, a total of … [1,017] operational aircraft,” Wesley Craven and James Cate wrote in the official history Army Air Forces in World War II.

“Against this concentration the Axis had 900 operational combat planes within range of the island, most of them committed to tasks other than defending Pantelleria.”

On June 11, the Italians surrendered — 33 days after the bombing began.

It’s hard to blame strategic bombing advocates for crediting the aerial onslaught for the surrender — and credit it they did. But the fallacy in this post hoc thinking derives from the belief that the order of events was the cause of the result without considering other factors.

For one, the Allied bombers were virtually unopposed for more than a month. Allied bomber crews would face a far bloodier situation during the strategic bombing campaign in the heavily-defended skies above Germany.

The results were also unanticipated. The 11,000 defending Italian soldiers on Pantelleria dug in deeper and twice refused requests to surrender. However, when Allied troops finally began their approach to the island, the Italians gave up.

Secondly, the Italian troops — along with a handful of Germans — did not mount a robust anti-aircraft defense.

“In the opinion of a small group of captured Luftwaffe technicians, a company of German soldiers would have made a better showing than” all the Italians, a 1959 Air Force historical review stated. Had the defenders been all German, the bombers would have “been less successful.”

God No, the U.S. Air Force Doesn’t Need Another Curtis LeMay
‘The Demon’ napalmed Tokyo and stoked the fires of Mutually Assured Destruction
But the bombing itself was hardly successful. It inflicted little damage on the island’s coastal defenses and anti-aircraft batteries, and the damage which did exist could have been repaired by a determined crew.

Around 22 percent of the B-17 Flying Fortresses involved in the bombing hit their targets within a 100 yard radius. “For the medium bombers,” the review noted, “approximately 6.4 percent, … [and] for light and fighter-bombers about 2.6 percent.”

The abysmal and unopposed performance should have been a warning of how much worse bombing accuracy would become over Germany with fighter and flak opposition, particularly in the winter months, rather than a celebration of the proof that strategic bombing alone would force a surrender.

Claiming Pantelleria was a strategic bombing success is like a basketball team bragging about successfully making unopposed layups.

According to one of Eisenhower’s biographers, the bombing of Pantelleria was “one of the greatest examples of overkill of the war.”

Eisenhower’s comments to Britain’s Fleet Adm. Andrew Cunningham aboard the cruiser HMS Aurora tends to confirm the “overkill” comments. “Andrew, why don’t you and I get into a boat together and row ashore on our own,” Eisenhower said. “I think we can capture the island without any of these soldiers.”

The experience on Pantelleria also refuted one of Gen. Henry “Hap” Arnold’s “truisms” scattered throughout his autobiography, Global Mission. “Normally it takes five years from the time the designer has an idea until the plane is delivered to combatants,” Arnold wrote.

Pantelleria was an exception. A group of A-36 Apaches — a ground support variant of the P-51 Mustang — took part within seven months of the plane’s first flight and less than three years after the P-51’s first flight. A-36s would make 138 sorties over the island, dropping 57.5 tons of ordnance.

Finally, Eisenhower clearly wasn’t convinced that bombers alone could win wars — because he continued to rely on massed ground forces for the invasion of France the following year.

The Allies landed in Sicily and continued to the Italian mainland, landing there on Sept. 3, 1943. Italy capitulated five days later.

The speed with which Italy surrendered, six times faster than Pantelleria, might also be an insight into a country’s “will to wage war.” Forty days prior, Mussolini had been ousted and arrested. That likely had more to do with collapsing Italy’s will to wage war than bombing from above.

 

[Manticore]

Moved posts

Ranges are also posted here
https://defence.pk/threads/specifications-of-jf-17.297636/

https://defence.pk/threads/design-characteristics-of-canard-non-canard-fighters.178592/page-2

https://defence.pk/threads/light-fighters-global-need-options-unbiased-broad-comparisons.249882/

 

[volatile]

Finally after so much ,this thread is really to be read for

 

[Naif al Hilali]

(Usually rounded to 4,000 kilometers or 2,080 nautical miles)

Bismillah ir Rahman ar Raheem

Please consider this line edited to:
(Usually rounded to 4,000 kilometers or 2,160 nautical miles)

Sorry for the mistake

Hifz u kum Allah

 

[Naif al Hilali]

Bismillah ir Rahman ar Raheem

Now, when estimating the combat radius for the JF-17, we need to keep in mind that the drag- and weight- induced fuel consumption penalties for the smaller, lighter JF-17 will be more for an equivalent payload when compared with our F-16 baseline.

Our calculations are somewhat simplified by observing that the payloads carried by the JF-17 are usually very simply aligned into the air-stream and with respect to each other. There are not many munitions carried concurrently (at one time). Interference drags (caused by airflow disturbance in-between stores and between pylons) seem to be well-controlled also.

However, the drag of stores compared to the clean aircraft (no external stores) or ferry-configured aircraft will be higher as a percentage of the clean (or ferry-configured) aircraft's drag. This is nothing new; this percentage effect of a store's drag (called its drag index) is obviously going to be smaller for the already larger, draggier airframes - the store's drag remains the same, its proportion to the different airframe's drags changes.

As an example, the drag index of a single 600 US gallon wing drop tank is 28 (% of the total clean-airframe drag) of an F-16C, but only 12 for the much larger F-15C (not sure with or without pylon drag), and just 2 for the very draggy A-10. The drag index of a store also increases in conjunction with what else is carried externally (due to the interference drag we mentioned earlier).

It can be safely assumed that the drag index of an equivalent store on the JF-17 is probably going to be more than 25% higher than for an F-16. How much it is exactly, is going to be open to much conjecture without resorting to an accurate JF-17 model and a wind tunnel.

For the F-16 (whose charts are available on-line) we can safely assume that our optimal range calculations were within a few percentage points of reality. However, for the JF-17, even if all assumptions are very carefully considered, our mission radius calculations will be fortunate to be within 10% of the actual figures.

Also, please keep in mind that a total stores drag index of 100 means that the aircraft is twice as draggy as when clean. However, it does not mean that it will consume twice as much fuel. At similar weights, the fuel consumption might only increase by 20% in cruise. Increasing weight without increasing drag generally has a somewhat proportional effect on fuel consumption.

Now, for the JF-17 we have one very important measure of combat radius, its CAP (Combat Air Patrol) endurance from the PAF. It is safe to assume that this measure was defined by the same metrics and assumptions used by General Dynamics (not necessarily the same as ours) for measuring the F-16A's CAP endurance.

Fortuitously, we found that the JF-17 in a very similar ferry configuration to the F-16 used about 80% of the fuel per nautical mile. So, without more ado, let us see if we can scale our F-16 charts to fit the JF-17 and come to a CAP endurance estimate close to the PAF's.

---

Mission Profile I - Combat Air Patrol [CAP] 200 nautical miles from base

JF-17 Block I/II (14,500 pounds Aircraft Empty Weight)
Internal Fuel + 800 Liter Centerline Drop Tank + Two 1,100 Liter Drop Tanks + Two SD-10A + Two PL-5EII
28,000 pounds Takeoff Weight [TOW]
10,000 pounds [6,000 liters] fuel
- 500 pounds taxi & takeoff
- 1,700 pounds climbout & cruise (total 200 nautical miles) to CAP area
- 4,700 pounds stay on station for one hour and fifty minutes
- 1,600 pounds reserves for 5 minutes dash and two minutes afterburner combat
- 700 pounds cruise up to 200 nautical miles back to base
- 800 pounds reserves for 20 minutes Sea Level Loiter or 200 nautical miles Divert
@ 1 Hour 50 Minutes at 200 nautical miles from base
PAF Stated Endurance for CAP mission: 1 Hour 45 Minutes

---

Notes:
1. Warmer than standard temperatures at cruising altitude may reduce range slightly (usually 1% to 2% , but up to 10% for some portions of flight).
2. Afterburner (A/B) assisted takeoffs require additional fuel, reducing combat radius by @ 50 nautical miles (or endurance by 15 minutes).
3. Not being able to cruise at optimum altitudes/airspeeds for some portions of flight may reduce endurance by 5-15 minutes.
4. Headwinds encountered during some portions of flight may reduce combat endurance by 5-10 minutes.
5. Every minute of afterburner use at medium-high altitude consumes as much fuel as 20 to 10 minutes of optimum cruise (or CAP endurance).

---

Units:
One Nautical Mile [nm.] = 6080 Feet [ft.] = 1.15 Statute Miles [mi.] = @ 1.85 Kilometers [km.]
One Pound [lb.] = @ 0.4535 Kilograms [kg.]; One Kilogram = 2.205 Pounds
1,000 Pound-Force [lbf.] Thrust = @ 4,450 Newtons = 4.45 Kilo-Newtons [kN.] Thrust
Kilograms are units of mass and the term Kilogram-Force [kgf.] is meaningless.
One US Gallon = 3.785 Liters = @ 6.84 pounds JP-8 fuel; One Imperial Gallon = 4.54 Liters; One Liter = @ 0.82 Kilogram JP-8

---

These figures were surprising to me. Using simpler metrics earlier, I had come to a CAP endurance for the JF-17 at 1 hour 35 minutes to 1 hour 40 minutes, 200 nautical miles from base. Remember, the heavy Block 50 F-16Cs that we calculated CAP endurance for came out at 1 hour 35 minutes under similar conditions (also surprising - expected it to be a bit higher; probably under-estimated the effect of the large engines and extra weight).

As always, all errors pointed out will be greatly appreciated. We will attempt to post our calculations for the other mission profiles later this week, Insha'Allah (hopefully simplified and with not as much exposition).

Allah keep everyone safe.

 

[salarsikander]

Bismillah ir Rahman ar Raheem

Please consider this line edited to:
(Usually rounded to 4,000 kilometers or 2,160 nautical miles)

Sorry for the mistake

Hifz u kum Allah

@HAKIKAT I am sure you will be pleased to know we have just a guy like you

So youre not thal all exclusive anymore

 

[Naif al Hilali]

f there are no objections, I would like to start by analyzing the ferry range of the JF-17 today, and we will attempt to see how it was designed to PAF requirements, ...

Bismillah ir Rahman ar Raheem

We will design the combat mission profiles for the JF-17 this weekend, Insha'Allah. However, the PAF requirement questions were mostly answered in the replies to MK's queries on the F-16. Kindly read them below; we won't be re-hashing the debate here:

https://defence.pk/threads/pakistan-f-16-discussions-2.15226/page-649#post-8918583

https://defence.pk/threads/pakistan-f-16-discussions-2.15226/page-650#post-8919134

https://defence.pk/threads/pakistan-f-16-discussions-2.15226/page-650#post-8921967

https://defence.pk/threads/pakistan-f-16-discussions-2.15226/page-650#post-8936789

The reasons for the suitability of the F-16 to the PAF's requirements mentioned in the last post above stand for the JF-17 as well, and are the reasons the JF-17 was designed the way it is.

Based on our observations above, we attempt today to estimate the long-range interception capability of the JF-17:

---

Mission Profile III - Long-Range Interception (/Air Superiority/Fighter Escort):

JF-17 Block I/II (14,500 pounds Aircraft Empty Weight)
Internal Fuel + 800 Liter Centerline Drop Tank + Two 1,100 Liter Drop Tanks + Two SD-10A + Two PL-5EII
28,000 pounds Takeoff Weight [TOW]
10,000 pounds [6,000 liters] fuel
- 500 pounds taxi & takeoff
- 800 pounds climbout covering 50 nautical miles
- 3,600 pounds cruise 570 nautical miles
- 1,700 pounds reserves for five minutes combat (including two minutes afterburner use)
- 2,600 pounds climbout and cruise 620 nautical miles back to base
- 800 pounds reserves for 20 minutes Sea Level Loiter or 200 nautical miles Divert
@ 620 nautical miles mission radius
CAC Initial Estimated Range for Fighter Mission: 1,400 kilometers (@ 750 nautical miles) mission radius

---

Notes:
1. Warmer than standard temperatures at cruising altitude may reduce range slightly (usually 1% to 2% , but up to 10% for some portions of flight).
2. Afterburner (A/B) assisted takeoffs (where not explicitly mentioned) require additional fuel reducing combat radius by @ 50 nautical miles. In practice, unless range is absolutely important, afterburners are likely to be used when carrying more than just a Centerline Drop Tank, in order to shorten takeoff distances.
3. Not being able to cruise at optimum altitudes/airspeeds for some portions of flight may reduce combat radius by 25-100 nautical miles.
4. Headwinds encountered during some portions of flight may reduce combat radius by 25-100 nautical miles.
5. It is rarely possible to fly in a straight line or at optimum speeds/altitudes to and from the target. To avoid enemy aircraft and defenses, the routes and altitudes selected usually decrease actual mission radius (if defined by straight-line distance from base to target) to 70-80% of the flying distances calculated above.
6. Every Two miles of sea-level cruise consumes as much fuel as Three miles of cruise at optimum alitude (or even Four miles of optimum cruise, if flying at lighter aircraft weights).
7. Every Two miles of high-subsonic dash at sea-level (@ 480 nautical miles per hour [knots]) consumes as much fuel as Four miles of sea-level optimum cruise (usually 330-390 knots).
8. Every Two miles of high-subsonic dash at medium-high altitude (@ 540 knots) consumes as much fuel as Three to Four miles of optimum cruise (usually 440-480 knots) at optimum alitude.
9. Every minute of afterburner use at medium-high altitude consumes as much fuel as 20 to 10 minutes of optimum cruise. One minute of Maximum Afterburner at sea-level may consume fuel equivalent to 40 minutes of optimum-altitude cruise back to base.

---

Units:
One Nautical Mile [nm.] = 6080 Feet [ft.] = 1.15 Statute Miles [mi.] = @ 1.85 Kilometers [km.]
One Pound [lb.] = @ 0.4535 Kilograms [kg.]; One Kilogram = 2.205 Pounds
1,000 Pound-Force [lbf.] Thrust = @ 4,450 Newtons = 4.45 Kilo-Newtons [kN.] Thrust
Kilograms are units of mass and the term Kilogram-Force [kgf.] is meaningless.
One US Gallon = 3.785 Liters = @ 6.84 pounds JP-8 fuel; One Imperial Gallon = 4.54 Liters; One Liter = @ 0.82 Kilogram JP-8

---

Please note that there was an error in the F-16's Mission Profile III we initially calculated. Kindly find the correction here:

https://defence.pk/threads/pakistan-f-16-discussions-2.15226/page-651#post-8953917

Hifz u kum Allah

 

[Preacher]

I don't know who you are but I will find you and I'l thank you sir

 

[Naif al Hilali]

Bismillah ir Rahman ar Raheem

---

Mission Profile IV - Modern Medium Altitude Strike (Precision Strike/Battlefield Air Interdiction/Deep Air Interdiction):

JF-17 Block I/II (14,500 pounds Aircraft Empty Weight)
Internal Fuel + Two 1,100 Liter Drop Tanks + Targeting Pod + Two 1,100 pound Precision Guided Bombs + Two PL-5EII
28,000 pounds Takeoff Weight [TOW]
8,600 pounds [5,200 liters] fuel
- 500 pounds taxi & takeoff
- 800 pounds climbout covering 50 nautical miles
- 2,700 pounds cruise 420 nautical miles to target
- 700 pounds five minutes high-subsonic combat @ 20,000 feet & climbout back to cruising altitude
- EITHER
a) 3,100 pounds bring back all drop tanks and bombs, cruising up to 550 nautical miles
OR
b) 1,300 pounds jettison tanks and bombs, and engage in up to two minutes of afterburner combat @ 20,000 feet
1,800 pounds cruise 470 nautical miles back to base
- 800 pounds reserves for 20 minutes Sea Level Loiter or 200 nautical miles Divert
@ 470 nautical miles mission radius [minimum of 420+50, 550, 470]

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Mission Profile V - Classic Long-Range Hi-Lo-Hi Strike (Deep Interdiction):

JF-17 Block I/II (14,500 pounds Aircraft Empty Weight)
Internal Fuel + Two 1,100 Liter Drop Tanks + Targeting Pod + Two 1,100 pound Precision Guided Bombs + Two PL-5EII
28,000 pounds Takeoff Weight [TOW]
8,600 pounds [5,200 liters] fuel
- 500 pounds taxi & takeoff
- 800 pounds climbout covering 50 nautical miles
- 2,300 pounds cruise 350 nautical miles and jettison empty drop tanks
- 700 pounds cruise and descend to sea level 130 nautical miles
- 500 pounds 50 nautical miles low-level cruise to target
- 400 pounds afterburner use over target (jettison bombs if target not found)
- 700 pounds 50 nautical miles climbout back from target
- 1,900 pounds cruise back up to 530 nautical miles
- no air combat engagement with enemy
- 800 pounds reserves for 20 minutes Sea Level Loiter or 200 nautical miles Divert
@ 580 nautical miles mission radius
CAC Initial Estimated Range: 1,000 kilometers (@ 540 nautical miles) Medium-Low-Low-High mission radius with
Three Drop Tanks, No Targeting Pod, Four 250 Kilogram Bombs, and Two PL-5EII

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Mission Profile VI - Classic Long-Range Hi-Hi Strike (Deep Interdiction):

JF-17 Block I/II (14,500 pounds Aircraft Empty Weight)
Internal Fuel + Two 1,100 Liter Drop Tanks + Targeting Pod + Two 1,100 pound Precision Guided Bombs + Two PL-5EII
28,000 pounds Takeoff Weight [TOW]
8,600 pounds [5,200 liters] fuel
- 500 pounds taxi & takeoff
- 800 pounds climbout covering 50 nautical miles
- 2,300 pounds cruise 350 nautical miles and jettison empty drop tanks
- 1,200 pounds cruise 220 nautical miles to target (jettison bombs if target not found)
- 700 pounds afterburner use over target
- 2,300 pounds cruise back up to 630 nautical miles
- no air combat engagement with enemy
- 800 pounds reserves for 20 minutes Sea Level Loiter or 200 nautical miles Divert
@ 620 nautical miles mission radius

---

Notes as for the previous post above.

Hifz u kum Allah

 

[Naif al Hilali]

Bismillah ir Rahman ar Raheem

The final three mission profiles we are going to evaluate for the JF-17:

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Mission Profile VII - Close Air Support [CAS]:

Internal Fuel + Two 1,100 Liter Drop Tanks + Targeting Pod + Four 600 pound Precision Guided Bombs + Two PL-5EII
28,000 pounds Takeoff Weight [TOW]
8,600 pounds [5,200 liters] fuel
- 500 pounds taxi & takeoff
- 800 pounds climbout covering 50 nautical miles
- 1,700 pounds cruise 250 nautical miles to target
- 2,800 pounds 25 minutes loiter + five minutes combat (including two minutes in afterburner) @ 20,000 feet
- 2,000 pounds bring back all drop tanks and bombs, climbout & cruise up to 350 nautical miles
- 800 pounds reserves for 20 minutes Sea Level Loiter or 200 nautical miles Divert
@ 30 minutes combat endurance 300 nautical miles from base
(or @ 55 minutes at 200 nautical miles from base)

---

Mission Profile VIII - Suppression of Enemy Air Defences [SEAD]:

Internal Fuel + Two 1,100 Liter Drop Tanks + Electronic CounterMeasures [ECM] Pod + One LD-10 Anti-Radiation Missile + One 500 pounds Bomb (or SD-10A) + Two PL-5EII
27,000 pounds Takeoff Weight [TOW]
8,600 pounds [5,200 liters] fuel
- 500 pounds taxi & takeoff
- 800 pounds climbout covering 50 nautical miles
- 1,400 pounds cruise 250 nautical miles to target
- 3,400 pounds 35 minutes loiter + five minutes combat (including two minutes in afterburner) @ 20,000 feet
- 1,700 pounds bring back all drop tanks and bombs, climbout & cruise up to 350 nautical miles
- 800 pounds reserves for 20 minutes Sea Level Loiter or 200 nautical miles Divert
@ 40 minutes combat endurance 300 nautical miles from base

---

Mission Profile X - Anti-Shipping Mission:

Internal Fuel + Two 800 Liter Drop Tanks + One C-802AK Anti-Shipping Missile + Two SD-10A + Two PL-5EII
27,000 pounds Takeoff Weight [TOW]
7,600 pounds [4,600 liters] fuel
- 500 pounds taxi & takeoff
- 800 pounds climbout covering 50 nautical miles
- 1,900 pounds cruise 320 nautical miles to target
- 1,600 pounds reserves for five minutes combat (including two minutes afterburner use)
- 2,000 pounds bring back all drop tanks and missiles, climbout & cruise up to 390 nautical miles
- 800 pounds reserves for 20 minutes Sea Level Loiter or 200 nautical miles Divert
@ 370 nautical miles mission radius

---

Notes as for last two posts. As always, all errors pointed out will be appreciated.

Hifz u kum Allah

 

[Joe Shearer]

@HAKIKAT I am sure you will be pleased to know we have just a guy like you

So youre not thal all exclusive anymore

Oh, come on. This guy is way beyond anything I've read so far. He's class.

 

[Shoaib Aziz]

Bismillah ir Rahman ar Raheem

The final three mission profiles we are going to evaluate for the JF-17:

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Mission Profile VII - Close Air Support [CAS]:

Internal Fuel + Two 1,100 Liter Drop Tanks + Targeting Pod + Four 600 pound Precision Guided Bombs + Two PL-5EII
28,000 pounds Takeoff Weight [TOW]
8,600 pounds [5,200 liters] fuel
- 500 pounds taxi & takeoff
- 800 pounds climbout covering 50 nautical miles
- 1,700 pounds cruise 250 nautical miles to target
- 2,800 pounds 25 minutes loiter + five minutes combat (including two minutes in afterburner) @ 20,000 feet
- 2,000 pounds bring back all drop tanks and bombs, climbout & cruise up to 350 nautical miles
- 800 pounds reserves for 20 minutes Sea Level Loiter or 200 nautical miles Divert
@ 30 minutes combat endurance 300 nautical miles from base
(or @ 55 minutes at 200 nautical miles from base)

---

Mission Profile VIII - Suppression of Enemy Air Defences [SEAD]:

Internal Fuel + Two 1,100 Liter Drop Tanks + Electronic CounterMeasures [ECM] Pod + One LD-10 Anti-Radiation Missile + One 500 pounds Bomb (or SD-10A) + Two PL-5EII
27,000 pounds Takeoff Weight [TOW]
8,600 pounds [5,200 liters] fuel
- 500 pounds taxi & takeoff
- 800 pounds climbout covering 50 nautical miles
- 1,400 pounds cruise 250 nautical miles to target
- 3,400 pounds 35 minutes loiter + five minutes combat (including two minutes in afterburner) @ 20,000 feet
- 1,700 pounds bring back all drop tanks and bombs, climbout & cruise up to 350 nautical miles
- 800 pounds reserves for 20 minutes Sea Level Loiter or 200 nautical miles Divert
@ 40 minutes combat endurance 300 nautical miles from base

---

Mission Profile X - Anti-Shipping Mission:

Internal Fuel + Two 800 Liter Drop Tanks + One C-802AK Anti-Shipping Missile + Two SD-10A + Two PL-5EII
27,000 pounds Takeoff Weight [TOW]
7,600 pounds [4,600 liters] fuel
- 500 pounds taxi & takeoff
- 800 pounds climbout covering 50 nautical miles
- 1,900 pounds cruise 320 nautical miles to target
- 1,600 pounds reserves for five minutes combat (including two minutes afterburner use)
- 2,000 pounds bring back all drop tanks and missiles, climbout & cruise up to 390 nautical miles
- 800 pounds reserves for 20 minutes Sea Level Loiter or 200 nautical miles Divert
@ 370 nautical miles mission radius

---

Notes as for last two posts. As always, all errors pointed out will be appreciated.

Hifz u kum Allah

Salam and thank you very much for your brilliant and informative posts. Could you please also evaluate JFT's High speed Intercept Mission profile with 4X MRAAM and 2X WVRAAM missiles without external fuel and also with 1 800L center line tank.

 

[Naif al Hilali]

Bismillah ir Rahman ar Raheem

Our analysis of the more likely JF-17 combat mission profiles has concluded. However, before MK posts pictures such as for the following payload validation flights and asks questions on them, we will for exercise's sake, calculate mission radii for them:

JF-17 with two C-802/803 class air-to-surface missiles, centerline tank, and four air-to-air missiles

JF-17 with two CM-400 class air-to-surface missiles

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Mission Profile X - Anti-Shipping Mission:

Internal Fuel + 800 Liter Drop Tank + Two CM-400AKG Anti-Shipping Missiles + Two SD-10A + Two PL-5EII
27,500 pounds Takeoff Weight [TOW]
6,300 pounds [4,600 liters] fuel
- 500 pounds taxi & takeoff
- 800 pounds climbout covering 50 nautical miles
- 1,200 pounds cruise 190 nautical miles to target
- 1,600 pounds reserves for five minutes combat (including two minutes afterburner use)
- 1,400 pounds bring back all drop tanks and missiles, climbout & cruise up to 240 nautical miles
- 800 pounds reserves for 20 minutes Sea Level Loiter or 200 nautical miles Divert
@ 240 nautical miles mission radius (@ 250 nautical miles with C-802s)

---

Mission Profile XI - Short-Range Strike:
Internal Fuel + 800 Liter Drop Tank + Two 2,000 Pound Bombs + Two SD-10A + Two PL-5EII
27,500 pounds Takeoff Weight [TOW]
6,300 pounds [4,600 liters] fuel
- 500 pounds taxi & takeoff
- 800 pounds climbout covering 50 nautical miles
- 1,200 pounds cruise 190 nautical miles to target
- 1,600 pounds reserves for five minutes combat (including two minutes afterburner use)
- 1,400 pounds bring back all drop tanks and missiles, climbout & cruise up to 240 nautical miles
- 800 pounds reserves for 20 minutes Sea Level Loiter or 200 nautical miles Divert
@ 240 nautical miles mission radius

Internal Fuel + Targeting Pod + Two 2,400 Pound Precision Guided Bombs + Two SD-10A + Two PL-5EII
27,000 pounds Takeoff Weight [TOW]
5,000 pounds [4,600 liters] fuel
- 500 pounds taxi & takeoff
- 800 pounds climbout covering 50 nautical miles
- 500 pounds cruise 80 nautical miles to target
- 1,600 pounds reserves for five minutes combat (including two minutes afterburner use)
- 800 pounds bring back all drop tanks and missiles, climbout & cruise up to 130 nautical miles
- 800 pounds reserves for 20 minutes Sea Level Loiter or 200 nautical miles Divert
@ 130 nautical miles mission radius

---

All notes as for previous strike mission examples.

You can see the effect of heavy payloads on a light airframe here. Of course, you can go slightly farther by being tighter with your combat allowances, or more likely the strike weapons can be carried on a two-ship (two aircraft formation) and a two-ship fighter escort can accompany them.

Still, the reality is that even if you have exact target location data and fighter escort, you might need a couple of minutes afterburner use in evading enemy defenses and disengaging from the attack while the escort take care of the defenses. As clarified in the notes for the previous posts, the actual mission radius is further reduced by takeoff afterburner use; atmospheric conditions; and routes, speeds, and altitudes adopted.

So all in all, the mission ranges we have calculated should be taken as optimum ranges and a considerable allowance should be made for all foreseeable (calculate-able as shown previously) and some unforeseen obstacles (maybe an arbitrary figure such as 25% of optimum range).

Alternatively, while having to operate at the limits of your range in order to strike long-range high-value targets, if you run into obstacles and don't have enough fuel left to reach the target and make it back to base, the mission will need to be aborted.

While martyrdom is a worthy ambition indeed, it is also the responsibility of the pilot to bring back his valuable assets so that both he and the plane can fly again to wreak more damage on the enemy. You have to make sure that your life and damage to your force's assets come at a far greater cost to the enemy. The only way to achieve this is to fly as many sorties (aircraft-missions) as possible before your time is up.

Also, note that we have allowed for the jettisoning of stores in some examples, in order to get a feel of what is possible. In reality, pilots will be loathe to waste even dumb (non-precision guided) bombs and cheap war-reserve drop tanks. Only when forced to close-range combat or when running low on reserves on the final leg back to base, will these options be seriously considered.

Over the coming weeks, we will attempt to compare the JF-17's ferry range and one to three of the relevant mission profiles with other active-duty fighter aircraft, Insha'Allah. This is an attempt to form a database of aircraft payload-and-range capabilities in realistic scenarios and to overcome the confusion and obfuscation spread on-line (sometimes by the manufacturers themselves).

Allah keep everyone safe.