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Hayabusa Class



Length: 164 ft.
Width: 28 ft.
Draft: 14 ft.
Displacement: 250 tons
Propulsion: 3 x GE LM500-G07 gas turbines. 3 x Pump Jets
Speed: 46 knots
Crew: 21
Armament:
1 x 76mm DP gun
4 x Harpoon Missiles
2 x 12.7mm MGs
 
@Nihonjin1051 Sir, last year Abe said that Japan would send 10 patrol boats for the Philippine coast guard through soft loan. Do you have any idea what these boats are? By the way, the Hayabusa patrol boats are a beauty that can pack a punch. I think they would be perfect for our navy.
 
@Nihonjin1051 Sir, last year Abe said that Japan would send 10 patrol boats for the Philippine coast guard through soft loan. Do you have any idea what these boats are? By the way, the Hayabusa patrol boats are a beauty that can pack a punch. I think they would be perfect for our navy.

Hi @JayMandan

As from reports from the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force and from the Japan Coast Guard, we will be transferring 2 of our active Shiretoko Class patrol vessels , which are currently in service in the Japan Coast Guard. The Shiretoko Class is a 1,000 ton large patrol vessel, and will come armed with JM6-1M 20mm gun and KDC 35 mm gun.

I also heard that we will be transferring 1 of our Hateruma Class patrol vessel to the Philippine Coast Guard. This is the type that will also be forwarded to Vietnam next year.

The rest are medium sized patrol ships are a combination of the Tokara and Amami Class patrol vessels.


Some illustration for you:

Shiretoko Class - High Endurance Patrol Vessels

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Hateruma Class

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@Nihonjin1051 fix my mistake in last post about Russia type11356 N.o22350 air-defense FFG building.

The latest pic showed it still not install PESA/AESA radar system, they just using planks to block the hole not radar yet =).
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JS Ashigara (DDG-178) is an Atago class guided missile destroyer in the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). Ashigara was named for Mount Ashigara, and is the first Japanese ship to bear the prefix JS (Japanese Ship) instead of JDS (Japanese Defense Ship).
 
Launch of 2 new Akizuki-Class Destroyers:

1) JS Akizuki

2) JS Fuyuzuki

Akizuki_3.jpg


akizuki-04.jpg


Akizuki_2.jpg


Keep a look out for the ATECs, OYQ-11 ACDS, NOLQ-3D EW system, FCS -3A AAW, OQQ-22 ASW, and OPS-20C systems... :azn:




:yahoo:
 
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WASHINGTON — Following an April decision to rewrite its export laws to allow broader sales of defense products, Japan is preparing for a new wave of deals as it tries to strengthen security bonds in the face of rapid Chinese military growth and continued regional tensions.

The change to the rules that govern defense exports were years in the making as Japan increasingly moves from its post-World War II, purely pacifist, defense ideology. But in recent years the security equation has shifted, with major players such as the US confronting reduced or flat budgets and the cost of advanced weapons programs necessitating international cost-sharing.

It was the need to participate in international programs that drove the latest round of reforms, said Jun Kazeki, director of the Security Export Control Policy Division of Japan’s trade ministry.

“We decided to go ahead with the F-35 program but we needed additional exemptions because of the third party transfer issue,” said Kazeki, who was in Washington for meetings.

With parts for the F-35 program being manufactured around the world, participating nations have to ship parts all over the globe to be re-exported down the line. That was exceedingly difficult for Japan, since the policy created an almost impossible standard for export that recipient countries could neither be involved in a conflict nor “likely” to be involved in a conflict.

Given the uncertainty of security arrangements in the modern era, guaranteeing that a country would avoid conflict is ostensibly impossible.

So special exemptions were created for the F-35 program, and then the system as a whole was revised to strip out the “likely” requirement, as well as antiquated references to Communist bloc countries.

With the new standards in place, Japanese companies will be looking for new market opportunities. But Kazeki said the government has no estimates for how much growth might occur, emphasizing the decision is not based on helping defense.

“There is no statistics, no estimation, not at all,” he said. “From the beginning we looked at this policy as a security policy, not an economic policy.”

Japan generates less than 1 percent of its gross domestic product from the defense sector.

Experts have been skeptical of the potential for large growth, given high labor costs in Japan and the fact that much of the nation’s defense technology is licensed from the US. But there’s another factor: the need to improve relationships around the world to hedge against the growth of China’s military.

A report released this month by Deloitte on global defense spending trends highlighted not only the growth of spending in China and Russia, but in China’s case, the potential for even more spending in the near future.

“The fact that China spends less than 3 percent of [gross domestic product] on defense makes it an economizer,” Jack Midgley, one of the report’s authors and a director with Deloitte consulting, told Defense News.“Its rapid growth in sheer size make it possible for it to substantially increase its expenditure on defense. This is catch-up on a massive scale.”

Midgley said if Japan wants to remain technologically advanced by retaining a domestic industry through sufficient order volumes and participating in international programs, it had no choice but to change its policy.

Politically, the move will allow Japan to improve its ties to other nations without the direct involvement of troops.

“I think the Japanese see defense exports as a way to extend their influence without putting themselves in a position of looking militaristic,” Midgley said. “Japan is looking at a world that is very different than the world of 30 years ago. Most of the economic growth in the region has been Chinese, not Japanese. Most of the growth in defense spending has been China, not Japan.”

The Deloitte report points to continued growth from countries such as China and Russia as those two nations try to catch up to the US on a variety of technological fronts. That coincides with the US and many of its major allies who, having provided a shield for Japan, have also been cutting or flattening defense spending curves.

Opening exports does create the potential for products to wind up in Chinese hands. That has led to separate negotiations between Japan and France, since the French have been known to do business with the Chinese, Kazeki said.

“Our official priority is to stop their exports to China,” he said. “France officially has a policy to keep an embargo after Tiananmen in 1989. In reality it exports some concerning items to China.” ■




Reference: Defense News
 
The vice president of the Liberal Democratic Party indicated Tuesday the Cabinet won’t be able to approve a statement allowing collective self-defense by the June 22 end of the Diet session, unless the two ruling parties strike an agreement by Friday.

“In order for the Cabinet to approve a constitutional reinterpretation allowing Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defense during this Diet session, we have to show a draft at a meeting (between the LDP and New Komeito) on Friday,” said Masahiko Komura, who is chairing the defense talks with the LDP’s junior partner. “I intend to work with New Komeito to avoid any clash with them.”

Meanwhile, New Komeito Vice President Kazuo Kitagawa pushed back against the rush for Cabinet approval, saying more time is needed to build a solid party consensus on collective self-defense.

Backed by the lay Buddhist group Soka Gakkai, New Komeito has been opposed to reinterpreting the Constitution so that Japan can defend its allies even when it’s not under attack.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe instructed Komura later on Tuesday to keep working with New Komeito so that his Cabinet can authorize the notion of collective self-defense by the end of this Diet session. The daft is likely to say that the right is allowed under international law and Japan will “study” how to exercise it.

The talks between the LDP and New Komeito on revamping national defense strategies are based on 16 hypothetical security scenarios.

Abe will have a tough time meeting the deadline, as any agreement by the LDP and New Komeito negotiators will have to be approved by each party before the Cabinet will act. The coalition started discussing the most contentious scenarios on Tuesday. These have the potential to require a reinterpretation of war-renouncing Article 9, which until now has been sacrosanct.

“The coalition talks have not even discussed all the scenarios yet. I hope the talks will be sufficiently thorough,” New Komeito chief Natsuo Yamaguchi said.

During Tuesday’s talks, the fifth such session, Komura admitted the two sides remain far apart. The administration argued Japan cannot tackle the eight toughest security scenarios without exercising the right to collective self-defense. But New Komeito countered that Japan can help defend U.S. vessels in nearby waters without invoking the right because it can be assumed that in such a situation Japan would also deem itself under attack.


Reference: Japan Times
 
TOKYO, Japan – Key ministers from Japan and Australia will meet Wednesday, June 11, to beef up their defense relations, including a possible future submarine deal, as a rising China stirs tension in the Asia-Pacific region.

Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida and Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera will play host in Tokyo to Julie Bishop and David Johnston, their respective counterparts, for the fifth round of so-called "2+2" talks.

The two US allies are eager to discuss the future transfer of Japanese submarine technology to Australia, with Canberra needing to replace its fleet of stealth subs over the coming years at a reported cost of up to US$37 billion.

The potential deal, which is some way from being finalized, would boost Japan's defense industry, while also further cementing relations both economically and militarily.

At their meeting, the ministers will follow up on a free trade pact and a security deal reached in April between Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott and his Japanese counterpart Shinzo Abe.

Abe has argued that Japan must play a bigger role on the global stage and has pushed to loosen restrictions on when its well-equipped armed forces can act.

He has also relaxed a self-imposed ban on weapons exports, paving the way for the possible deal with Australia.

In their evening meeting, the ministers will make particular efforts to hammer out terms for a legal framework to allow the two nations to conduct joint research and trade of defense equipment – a necessary precursor to any submarine deal.

"We will engage in practical discussions to strengthen our security and defense cooperation," Kishida told a press conference Tuesday.

Following an Australian request, Tokyo will let Johnston see Japanese submarines during his stay, according to Onodera.

The Japanese defense chief also said the two nations are looking to boost the interoperability of their troops through more joint drills, humanitarian assistance programs, disaster relief and projects to ensure maritime security.

The ministers are also expected to discuss the impact of China's ambitious naval activities and territorial claims that have shifted the balance of power in the region, which was long dominated by the United States. (READ: Obama warns against 'aggression' in South China Sea)

Beijing has intensified its claims over the South China Sea, and has butted heads with Hanoi and Manila.

Japan's ties with China have remained sour, due mainly to a territorial dispute in the East China Sea.

Worries about China have encouraged a relationship-building drive across Asia, analysts say, with Abe and Abbott aiming to elevate their ties to "a new special relationship.”
 
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SEVENTY years on from posing the greatest existential threat that Australia has yet faced, Japan is on the verge of becoming our closest military partner next to the US.
The meeting today in Tokyo between the foreign and defence ministers of Australia and Japan would a few years ago have been a routine matter of only marginal interest beyond the two countries, or even within them.

Now the ambitious outcomes will be watched with intense interest in Washington and Manila, in Hanoi and Seoul, in New Delhi and Islamabad, and virtually every other capital in the region.

And especially in Beijing.

Japan is assiduously promoting Australia to become its second most important international partner after the US. It has already agreed a groundbreaking free trade agreement, locking in our economic engagement.

Today’s meeting will indicate just how far the countries are likely to step in security partnership.

Last October, soon after being elected, Tony Abbott told his Japanese counterpart Shinzo Abe during the East Asia Summit in Brunei that “as far as I’m concerned, Japan is Australia’s best friend in Asia”.

This formulation has since been criticised as endangering friendships with other countries in Asia, such as South Korea, that have a particular problem with Abe, and especially with China.

Abbott has not revisited that phrase, and during his visit to Japan, South Korea and China in April he declined to elevate any of the relationships above another.

Such verbal discipline remains important because Australia’s foreign affairs agenda for 2014 is topped by the determination to conclude a free trade agreement with the country’s biggest trading partner, China, which has eluded negotiators for a decade.

China has found life lonely as the dominant Asian power. Its territorial ambitions in the East China and South China seas have met some push-back, although not yet to the extent of causing it to retreat from recent gains.

Beijing is in the throes of a governance shake-up to streamline the lines of authority, as well as a massive economic restructuring — complicating its bid to upgrade relationships with countries like Australia that will not be security allies but might be cast as “friends” in a broader sense.

This presents Foreign Minister Julie Bishop and Defence Minister David Johnston with a particularly nuanced challenge when they meet their counterparts Fumio Kishida and Itsunori Onodera.

Canberra likes to feel wanted by Tokyo, but does not wish Beijing to view its response as hostile to China.

Much attention will be paid in Tokyo today to ensuring a full and meaningful program for Abe’s visit to Australia, probably in early August, when he will become the first Japanese leader to address parliament. But Canberra will also be straining to plan a positive big-picture visit for China’s President Xi Jinping, who will come to Australia for the G20 summit in Brisbane in November — as will Abe.

Xi is almost certain to remain in Australia, to visit Tasmania and possibly also Canberra. And the Abbott government is doing its best to ensure that during this visit the countries can trumpet the successful conclusion of FTA talks.

The formulation Abbott used — starting in Brunei, and repeatedly since — is that building such a strong friendship with Japan “doesn’t mean we don’t have other good friends”.

“Obviously,” he said, “China is a good friend of Australia, and I hope in years to come it will become an even better friend.”

A particular stumbling block to such friendships, in Beijing’s view, is surprises. It especially values predictability and consistency in international relationships.

How much of what will be discussed and agreed in Tokyo today will be the topic of painstaking explanation by Australian diplomats in Beijing?

That will be a useful indicator of the extent to which Canberra wishes to be seen as balancing its Asian interests and relationships. Bishop has herself conducted such quiet diplomacy, briefing ambassadors on issues that may be contentious.

The Abe government has spoken of elevating the strategic partnership between the two countries to a “new special relationship”.

The mutual defence pact that Japan and Australia share, separately, with the US remains central.

US President Barack Obama announced during his recent visit to Japan that any attack on the islands that are possessed by Japan but disputed by China, called Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China, would trigger the mutual defence pact.

But gratifying though this was to Tokyo, anxiety persists about the extent of Washington’s commitment to the “pivot” to Asia. Hence the moves within Asia not only to seek reassurance from the US, but also to intensify complex regional patterns of security co-operation, in which Australia is perceived to play a key part.

At this fifth “2+2” meeting of foreign and defence ministers, the agenda will include:

● Stepping up joint exercises and training, including working more closely in UN peacekeeping operations, and with each other bilaterally as well as jointly with the US.

● Cooperation on humanitarian assistance, including disaster relief, as last year in The Philippines, when Japan deployed its biggest number of troops overseas since World War II, and search and rescue missions as for Malaysian flight MH370.

● The Japan-Australia Acquisition and Joint-Servicing Agreement that came into force at the start of last year, through which the countries agree to provide resources to each other’s forces when operating side by side.

● The information security agreement signed two years ago, to exchange intelligence.

● The involvement of a Japanese naval ship in the commemoration in October of the ANZAC fleet gathering at Albany to take soldiers to fight in World War I, with the Japanese imperial vessel Ibuki having helped escort the original convoy to Egypt.

● Cooperation on defence equipment and technology, set to be the subject of an agreement confirmed today allowing such exchange — previously granted by Japan only to the US and Britain, with France likely to follow Australia.

When he visited Tokyo in April, Abbott discussed this move with Japan’s new National Security Council, becoming the first foreign leader to meet the group. A ban remains in place on exporting defence technology, but Australia is set to become a rare exception.

It is under this new arrangement that Johnston will become this week the first foreign defence minister to take a close look at Japan’s Soryu submarines, built by Mitsubishi and Kawasaki, with an special interest in their silent-running diesel-electric propulsion systems. This technology could be incorporated in the next series submarines built in or for Australia — or Soryu-class vessels could be purchased holus-bolus.

The countries have already begun joint research on hydrodynamics, aimed at reducing vessels’ water resistance, making them faster and quieter.

This remains at the stage of fundamental science, with work being conducted by scientists in both countries, but is expected to develop military-related spin-offs.

Malcolm Cook, senior fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, says this security program could be advanced further by bilateral exercises that do not include the US, particularly army to army, by the Japan Air Self-Defence Force training in Australia, with ample space to test-fly fighters, and by inviting Japan to the Talisman Sabre exercises — the key US-Australia bilateral exercises.

Narushige Michishita, director of the security program at Japan’s National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, tells The Australian: “Some suggest that Japan might be willing to sell the Soryu-class submarines to Australia. If it happens, that would be a big win-win for both of us.

“Australia will obtain the world’s most cutting-edge diesel-engine submarines, Japan will benefit from better economies of scale, and interoperability of our navies will be significantly enhanced.

“It would also contribute to the objective of maintaining balance in the region.”

He says a negative response from China “is certainly a thing to worry about, particularly for Australia. But history tells us that balancing is always a better strategy than bandwagoning.

“By not balancing with China, you can enjoy your day today, but you will have to play a much tougher game later.”

Johnston recently hosted a visit by Onodera to his home state of Western Australia, where they discussed areas in which co-operation could potentially be expanded, and also agreed to jointly oppose “attempts to change the status quo by coercion”.

This was the ground for Bishop to call in Chinese ambassador Ma Zhaoxu to complain late last year about Beijing’s declaration of an air defence identification zone that covered disputed islands in the East China Sea — resulting in friction at the official level that only faded after Australia took a lead in the search for MH370, which contained 153 Chinese passengers.

The Abe government has rejected international criticisms that its inclination to review the interpretation of Japan’s pacifist constitution to permit “collective self-defence” — including supporting partners and allies under attack — is militaristic, stressing that it seeks to define this right in a minimum manner.

Andrew O’Neil, head of the school of government and international relations at Queensland’s Griffith University, says: “I think we’re witnessing a transformation of the Australia-Japan relationship under the Abe-Abbott governments.

“It wasn’t that long ago when almost all observers agreed that economics was first, second and third order priority, and that closer security and defence ties would never really come to much, despite the aspirational rhetoric.”

He says Johnston’s assertive intervention at the recent Shangri-La security dialogue in Singapore — “very much in line” with the speeches there by Abe and US Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel — reinforced Bishop’s response to Beijing’s ADIZ declaration, “placing Australia squarely and publicly in the camp criticising China’s behaviour in the East and South China seas”.

This, O’Neil says, is the “classic balancing behaviour one would expect from small and middle powers in response to a rising great power, so we shouldn’t be too surprised. Also, the democratic ties that bind shouldn’t be underestimated.”

Today’s meeting, he says, will demonstrate how “Tokyo is transparently trying to pull Australia closer strategically, in an effort to resist Chinese domination of East Asia.

“The less isolated Japan is, the harder the task for Beijing to paint it as an outlier.”



Reference: The Australian
 
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