Italy delivering surplus self-propelled howitzers to Pakistan Army

[ziaulislam]

its a good choice going for the Korean Towed gun. Doesn't cost soo much but does the same job

Pakistan needs to do a full tot and start building its own equipment

 

[Basel]

Pakistan also has 155mm M198 towed guns. The M777 that India is acquiring is a stripped down version of M198 to allow for air mobility.

If Pakistan need light weight 155/39 gun then China can make one for Pakistan just like SH-15, also PA may upgrade M-198s to 155/52 standard.

its a good choice going for the Korean Towed gun. Doesn't cost soo much but does the same job

The news was that PA may buy upto 150 units and will award contract to upgrade all 130mm guns to 155mm standard along with some 155/39 guns to 155/52 standard.

 

[Path-Finder]

If Pakistan need light weight 155/39 gun then China can make one for Pakistan just like SH-15, also PA may upgrade M-198s to 155/52 standard.



The news was that PA may buy upto 150 units and will award contract to upgrade all 130mm guns to 155mm standard along with some 155/39 guns to 155/52 standard.

it is an incredible bang for buck.

 

[waz]

Brothers what are the facts around the S.Korean towed artillery? Is it the Hanwha Corporation KH179 155 mm which was on loan through a trial?

Has there been a definite order for this gun?

 

[HRK]

Brothers what are the facts around the S.Korean towed artillery? Is it the Hanwha Corporation KH179 155 mm which was on loan through a trial?

Has there been a definite order for this gun?

current status is not known but only two pieces were imported for testing purpose

@Bilal Khan (Quwa) / @Quwa do you have any update about KH-179 howitzer trail in Pakistan (link)

 

[naahmad28]

I am not sure but wisdom leads me to believe, Things on all of these supposed outdated guns can be updated. From Barrel to all forms of mechanical and electronic systems from possibly Turkey's indigenous systems they use on their own SP guns.

'If' that is the case then it is big bang for small buck.

They are updated twice during the lifetime in Italy.

http://www.army-guide.com/eng/product3729.html

Here is detail

View attachment 470947

Few things are missing in the above detail, that is:
1) These pieces were bought without Ammo, locally developed in Italy
2) Longer Barrel designed and installed in Italy

 

[Bilal Khan (Quwa)]

current status is not known but only two pieces were imported for testing purpose

@Bilal Khan (Quwa) / @Quwa do you have any update about KH-179 howitzer trail in Pakistan (link)

Not sure where the wheeled SPH is at. On last check, the PA was just following a few programs in China and Turkey (after apparently SA, Serbia didn't meet requirements). IMO, no money = no one meets requirements.

 

[SSGcommandoPAK]

M109s delivered to Pak army ?

https://www.facebook.com/

 

[Signalian]

Also, tactics and training would take time. Now seems to be a good time to join Artillery because they will need to induct more people.

Field and Medium Regiments convert to SP.

If all Italian M109L's are acquired, not only IABG/IMBG's but Infantry Division armoured regiments & Artillery Divisions can be equipped as well:

M109L:

1 + 1 + 1 regiments in 3x IABG (18 x 3 = 54)

1 + 1 regiments in 2x IABG under raising/planned (18 x 2 = 36)

1 battery each for 17x Infantry Division armoured regiments excl. 12 ID, FCNA & 34 LID (6 x 17 = 102)

2 Artillery Division (I Corps)

1x SP Heavy Regiment with M110A2 (exists?)

2x SP Medium Regiments with M109L (18 x 2 = 36)

21 Artillery Division (V Corps)

1x SP Heavy Regiment with M110A2 (confirmed)

2x SP Medium Regiments with M109L (18 x 2 = 36)

Total = 264

You are not factoring in the Independent Artillery Bde's under Corps HQ's. The M-109's are a maneuver piece of equipment, there presence in Arty Div is under utilization.

 

[Signalian]

yes..so its odd why indian think otherwise..towed art is very vulnerable to counter battery fire...the reason why SPH/truck art is getting very popular now

The knowledgeable ones have openly accepted this.

M-777 can be lifted by chopper and deployed in mountains.

Along LOC and Siachen, there are locations where wheeled vehicles cannot go, therefore PA uses pack howitzers/light howitzers at such places. FCNA is deployed in such terrain. 23 ID, 19 ID and most of 12 ID are deployed in terrain with good roads.

During counter battery fire in mountains and hilly areas, there is not much room to maneuver for a battery under fire, even wheeled. The roads are not wide, the deployment zones are cramped with ammunition, supplies and natural obstacles. Mobility becomes worse in snow and icy conditions. In mountains, Howitzers are usually deployed on reverse slopes to escape counter battery fire.

Wheeled systems can keep good pace and deploy quickly to support infantry divisions, if the infantry formations are motorized but bear in mind that infantry fights on foot after dismounting from trucks and APC's. There is hardly any maneuver warfare in infantry formations. Its not practical to assume that infantry is holding a portion of land defensively and in rear the artillery is continuously shifting positions due to counter battery fire.

Counter battery fire is complicated. Factors to be considered before executing fire:
1. Knowledge of the tactics and technique of employment of the enemy's artillery and other heavy weapons.
2. The amount and types of artillery in the enemy force and the degree to which it is active.
3. Knowledge of the enemy's capability for reinforcing position with more artillery.
4. An estimation of own capability to locate enemy artillery position.
5. An estimation of own ability to deliver effective fire on enemy artillery locations by appropriate methods.
6. Knowledge of the strength, status, and morale of enemy artillery units.
7. Knowledge of the intensity or type of fire required to achieve the effect desired upon the enemy artillery locations.
8. Knowledge of the enemy capability of locating own artillery and delivering effective fire on own battery positions.
9. Employment of deception techniques to reduce the enemy's capability for locating our artillery positions.
10. Knowledge of the communication systems employed by enemy artillery commanders and the location of enemy communication installations.

Usually artillery units attached to Corps Artillery are used for counter battery fire because the artillery units attached to divisions are used for supporting division's formations. Enemy batteries are usually attacked with surprise fire. Time and ammunition permitting, enemy batteries once neutralized should be destroyed by fire for effect. The observation battalion can often determine the accuracy of unobserved fires by sound, flash, or radar.

WLR's(weapon locating radar) are not the only system used to locate enemy artillery, other methods are used too:
1. Field Artillery Observation battalion.
2. Corps Artillery aviation battery and other tactical/Recon army aviation assets.
3. Photo interpreters (satellite assets included).
4. Unit shelling reports and shell crater analysis.
5. Ground observation posts including bunkers.
6. Interrogating prisoners of war but mostly civilians living in proximity.
7. Communication Recon units.
8. Infantry/SF/Armored units positioned in the Area.

 

[ziaulislam]

M-777 can be lifted by chopper and deployed in mountains.

Along LOC and Siachen, there are locations where wheeled vehicles cannot go, therefore PA uses pack howitzers/light howitzers at such places. FCNA is deployed in such terrain. 23 ID, 19 ID and most of 12 ID are deployed in terrain with good roads.

During counter battery fire in mountains and hilly areas, there is not much room to maneuver for a battery under fire, even wheeled. The roads are not wide, the deployment zones are cramped with ammunition, supplies and natural obstacles. Mobility becomes worse in snow and icy conditions. In mountains, Howitzers are usually deployed on reverse slopes to escape counter battery fire.

Wheeled systems can keep good pace and deploy quickly to support infantry divisions, if the infantry formations are motorized but bear in mind that infantry fights on foot after dismounting from trucks and APC's. There is hardly any maneuver warfare in infantry formations. Its not practical to assume that infantry is holding a portion of land defensively and in rear the artillery is continuously shifting positions due to counter battery fire.

Counter battery fire is complicated. Factors to be considered before executing fire:
1. Knowledge of the tactics and technique of employment of the enemy's artillery and other heavy weapons.
2. The amount and types of artillery in the enemy force and the degree to which it is active.
3. Knowledge of the enemy's capability for reinforcing position with more artillery.
4. An estimation of own capability to locate enemy artillery position.
5. An estimation of own ability to deliver effective fire on enemy artillery locations by appropriate methods.
6. Knowledge of the strength, status, and morale of enemy artillery units.
7. Knowledge of the intensity or type of fire required to achieve the effect desired upon the enemy artillery locations.
8. Knowledge of the enemy capability of locating own artillery and delivering effective fire on own battery positions.
9. Employment of deception techniques to reduce the enemy's capability for locating our artillery positions.
10. Knowledge of the communication systems employed by enemy artillery commanders and the location of enemy communication installations.

Usually artillery units attached to Corps Artillery are used for counter battery fire because the artillery units attached to divisions are used for supporting division's formations. Enemy batteries are usually attacked with surprise fire. Time and ammunition permitting, enemy batteries once neutralized should be destroyed by fire for effect. The observation battalion can often determine the accuracy of unobserved fires by sound, flash, or radar.

WLR's(weapon locating radar) are not the only system used to locate enemy artillery, other methods are used too:
1. Field Artillery Observation battalion.
2. Corps Artillery aviation battery and other tactical/Recon army aviation assets.
3. Photo interpreters (satellite assets included).
4. Unit shelling reports and shell crater analysis.
5. Ground observation posts including bunkers.
6. Interrogating prisoners of war but mostly civilians living in proximity.
7. Communication Recon units.
8. Infantry/SF/Armored units positioned in the Area.

In war india will aim for cold start..meaning rapid movement and capture of areas in sindh and Punjab ..this is where SPH will be more useful..Kashmir indeed is a different story

 

[Signalian]

In war india will aim for cold start..meaning rapid movement and capture of areas in sindh and Punjab ..this is where SPH will be more useful..Kashmir indeed is a different story

India is acquiring K-9 SPG from ROK for this purpose.

 

[CriticalThought]

M-777 can be lifted by chopper and deployed in mountains.

Along LOC and Siachen, there are locations where wheeled vehicles cannot go, therefore PA uses pack howitzers/light howitzers at such places. FCNA is deployed in such terrain. 23 ID, 19 ID and most of 12 ID are deployed in terrain with good roads.

During counter battery fire in mountains and hilly areas, there is not much room to maneuver for a battery under fire, even wheeled. The roads are not wide, the deployment zones are cramped with ammunition, supplies and natural obstacles. Mobility becomes worse in snow and icy conditions. In mountains, Howitzers are usually deployed on reverse slopes to escape counter battery fire.

Wheeled systems can keep good pace and deploy quickly to support infantry divisions, if the infantry formations are motorized but bear in mind that infantry fights on foot after dismounting from trucks and APC's. There is hardly any maneuver warfare in infantry formations. Its not practical to assume that infantry is holding a portion of land defensively and in rear the artillery is continuously shifting positions due to counter battery fire.

Counter battery fire is complicated. Factors to be considered before executing fire:
1. Knowledge of the tactics and technique of employment of the enemy's artillery and other heavy weapons.
2. The amount and types of artillery in the enemy force and the degree to which it is active.
3. Knowledge of the enemy's capability for reinforcing position with more artillery.
4. An estimation of own capability to locate enemy artillery position.
5. An estimation of own ability to deliver effective fire on enemy artillery locations by appropriate methods.
6. Knowledge of the strength, status, and morale of enemy artillery units.
7. Knowledge of the intensity or type of fire required to achieve the effect desired upon the enemy artillery locations.
8. Knowledge of the enemy capability of locating own artillery and delivering effective fire on own battery positions.
9. Employment of deception techniques to reduce the enemy's capability for locating our artillery positions.
10. Knowledge of the communication systems employed by enemy artillery commanders and the location of enemy communication installations.

Usually artillery units attached to Corps Artillery are used for counter battery fire because the artillery units attached to divisions are used for supporting division's formations. Enemy batteries are usually attacked with surprise fire. Time and ammunition permitting, enemy batteries once neutralized should be destroyed by fire for effect. The observation battalion can often determine the accuracy of unobserved fires by sound, flash, or radar.

WLR's(weapon locating radar) are not the only system used to locate enemy artillery, other methods are used too:
1. Field Artillery Observation battalion.
2. Corps Artillery aviation battery and other tactical/Recon army aviation assets.
3. Photo interpreters (satellite assets included).
4. Unit shelling reports and shell crater analysis.
5. Ground observation posts including bunkers.
6. Interrogating prisoners of war but mostly civilians living in proximity.
7. Communication Recon units.
8. Infantry/SF/Armored units positioned in the Area.

You've opened a Pandora's box. Too many scenarios are possible so blanket statements are not possible. I wrote what I did assuming planes in Punjab or deserts in Sindh. You already have a thread on Pakistani artillery. How about a thread on IBG maneuvers in the world section discussing where we systematically dissect various scenarios? I promise to write Monte Carlo simulations if you provide the data.

Oh and you have been found AWOL on this thread

https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/indian-deceptive-coercion.602373/

 

[Signalian]

You've opened a Pandora's box. Too many scenarios are possible so blanket statements are not possible. I wrote what I did assuming planes in Punjab or deserts in Sindh. You already have a thread on Pakistani artillery. How about a thread on IBG maneuvers in the world section discussing where we systematically dissect various scenarios? I promise to write Monte Carlo simulations if you provide the data.

Oh and you have been found AWOL on this thread

https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/indian-deceptive-coercion.602373/

Data of IA or PA?

 

[jamal18]

Pakistan needs to do a full tot and start building its own equipment

Years ago, and I mean about 20 yrs, when all this ToT business and self-sufficiency took off, we were told that they will be making artillery. Since then I believe we haven't made a single artillery barrel.

SP 155m is the basics in any modern military, and the talk is only of importing them, not making them.