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Amid Iranian nuclear talks in Lausanne, Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries seek to halt Tehran’s influence in the Middle East.
By Zvi Bar'el
Egypt's President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud in Egypt's Sinai resort of Sharm el-Sheikh, March 28, 2015. Photo by AFP
While talks between Iran and six world powers head into their final lap, an Arab “defensive shield” is being built in the face of the expected implications of a nuclear agreement reached in the Swiss city of Lausanne.
At the same time as events are proceeding toward the prospect of a possible redesign of the Middle East, whether consensual or not, we are already witnessing an event the likes of which the region has not seen in decades. A number of Arab countries intend to assemble a large and powerful Arab military force and, for the first time, Israel is not alarmed. Not only is Israel not alarmed, it is actually ecstatic.
For generations, Israel’s defense strategy was based on a desire to be able to fend off any Arab coalition of forces rather than just individual Arab countries. But now that such a coalition is coming together, Israel sees it as an indivisible element of its own defense policy. Even if no one is inviting Israel to take part, it’s already among the coalition’s first stakeholders.
It may be a bit early to hold our collective breaths. The decision of the Arab League to assemble a joint force of about 40,000 soldiers was made with little opposition, but it involves important practical questions and issues of principle that will require long deliberations, which are scheduled to begin in April. It’s not clear who would command such a force, or who would fund it and what share each country would pay, for example. And it’s not clear whether the force would rely on volunteers or standing units of the member states’ armies, what the limitations on the force will be, on what grounds it could be deployed or who would be responsible for such a deployment.
Would Egypt, for example, be able to demand that the joint force get involved when the Egyptians are attacked by terrorist organizations coming in from Libya, as occurred two months ago (when Egypt attacked Libya itself)? Would Saudi Arabia be able to order the joint force to act against a civilian Shi’ite rebellion in Bahrain should there be one? And what about intervention in Iraq against the Islamic State group, also known as ISIS or ISIL? Gazans are wondering if the force would be authorized to act against Hamas’ military wing, which Egypt deems a terrorist organization. “If the Arab force were to have been established to act against Israel, we would have been the first to join,” said Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. But Israel will evidently not be the target.
Sunni vs. Shi’ite
Even before the Arab joint force was announced, there had been an important change in the military perspective of Arab countries.
Arab states had long refrained from sending in armed forces to act against other Arab states or to act directly in countries in which terrorist groups have sprouted up. When Saddam Hussein’s Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, setting the Gulf War in motion, it became the only Arab country to invade another Arab country. (Iran is a Muslim country but not an Arab one, so the Iran-Iraq War doesn’t count in this context.) The Arab League decision means that Arab military forces have received a stamp of approval to intervene in the affairs of other Arab countries.
Such a force, at least as initially conceived, is designed to hit at terrorist organizations while halting Iran’s influence in Arab countries without necessitating military intervention in Iran. This military and political alignment, if it becomes a reality, can be seen as a reflection of the Sunni vs. Shi’ite axis, but it would be a mistake to see it as a religious mission.
Terrorism in Egypt, for example, is Sunni terrorism, and in this case the Shi’ites are on the side of the “good guys.” It behooves the joint force to define the Arab alignment as a battle against Iran and its representatives rather than against Shi’ism as a religious branch of Islam.
Iranian political and media figures have recently taken pains to condemn the combined Arab assault in Yemen involving five Arab countries, supported by Turkey and Pakistan. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who declared that “Iran seeks to control the region, which is unacceptable,” perhaps provides the decisive proof of the fact that the target is Shi’ite Iran and not a Sunni war against Shi’ites more generally, and he is even prepared to pay a steep diplomatic price for it. Officially, Iran has said that Erdogan’s visit to the country scheduled for the beginning of April is not off, but some Iranian lawmakers are asking that Erdogan not come.
The Turkish president, who has cultivated close ties with Iran, was forced to make an exception to his general policy of getting along with Turkey’s neighbors. It should be noted, to his credit, that this recent step is consistent with his earlier decision to sever ties with Syria and his demand to remove Syrian President Bashar Assad from office as a condition of Erdogan’s participation in a Western coalition against ISIS.
Turkey’s position is also a flashy sign of the changes that are expected to reshape relations in the Middle East due to the need of Arab and Muslim countries to decide whether they belong to the Saudi axis or the Iranian one. The president of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, made a similar decision as Erdogan when he joined the Saudi alliance a week ago and expelled Iranian representatives from his country.
The spread of the Saudi mantle in the region is connected to the expectation that Iran and the six world powers sign both parts of the impending nuclear agreement: the statement of principles and a future detailed agreement.
Rejoining the club
Whatever the pace of the removal of sanctions against Tehran, Iran will retake its place in the oil export market with full vigor. Iran will be shifting from its position as a country dependent on the decisions of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and the stance of Saudi Arabia, which has contributed greatly to the fall of oil prices, to that of a country capable of dictating market prices.
In addition, Iran is expected to enjoy historic growth in the coming years as foreign corporations, businesspeople and countries pounce at the chance to invest in every sector of life there. Its technological infrastructure, educated workforce and stable government will make it more enticing for investors than Egypt, Jordan or the North African countries. Unlike those other countries, Iran also has financial resources to contribute rather than requiring financial aid.
Its return to the club of oil-exporting countries would give the Iranian regime a strong economic base that it would also exploit against its domestic rivals. The fear of Iranian reformists is that the regime will be able to arrange a trade-off in which the improvement of the Iranians’ economic plight will come at the expense of human rights, enabling the suppression of those seeking to replace the current regime.
Among Arab countries, however, the real concern is not the dictatorial nature of the Iranian regime but the diplomatic alliance that could develop between Tehran and Washington, an alliance that could come at the expenses of Washington’s ties with the Arab states.
It is doubtful if such fears have a basis in fact, but when Washington is satisfied with Iran’s participation in the war against ISIS in Iraq and when Iran and its Houthi allies in Yemen are seen as an effective partner against the Al-Qaida branch in the country, such an agreement is liable to create an opening for strategic cooperation.
Another concern is that a nuclear agreement would give Iran the status of a legitimate power, of the kind that can be included in an effort to solve regional conflicts such as those in Syria, Yemen and Iraq.
Since the Arab countries have thus far failed to put an end to the fighting in those countries, Iran could be seen as a deus ex machina, an outside force that suddenly swoops in to solve problems. In such circumstances, Iran is liable to gain senior status not only among states involved in those confrontations but also among other Middle Eastern countries that up to now have not been forced to take sides with Iran or with Saudi Arabia. After all, if the United States establishes normal ties with Iran, they too should be permitted to do so.
And this is the basis of the major diplomatic importance currently attached to the campaign being waged in Yemen between the Arab forces and the Houthis. In and of itself, Yemen doesn’t have strategic importance, and its oil reserves are not a pretext for war or inter-Arab mobilization. But in the zero-sum game being played out between Iran and most of the Arab states, particularly the Gulf states, a loss in Yemen would mean a victory for Iran and the loss of another Arab country to the Arab fold.
This is the basis for the ambitious goal of the Saudis and their allies to have the campaign end only when the Houthis retreat to their base in northern Yemen, return the weapons they took from the army and recognize the administration of exiled President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi.
This week Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called the Iran-Lausanne-Yemen axis a danger to humanity. But Saudi Arabia did not need Netanyahu’s latest slogan in order to recognize the threat.
By Zvi Bar'el
Egypt's President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud in Egypt's Sinai resort of Sharm el-Sheikh, March 28, 2015. Photo by AFP
While talks between Iran and six world powers head into their final lap, an Arab “defensive shield” is being built in the face of the expected implications of a nuclear agreement reached in the Swiss city of Lausanne.
At the same time as events are proceeding toward the prospect of a possible redesign of the Middle East, whether consensual or not, we are already witnessing an event the likes of which the region has not seen in decades. A number of Arab countries intend to assemble a large and powerful Arab military force and, for the first time, Israel is not alarmed. Not only is Israel not alarmed, it is actually ecstatic.
For generations, Israel’s defense strategy was based on a desire to be able to fend off any Arab coalition of forces rather than just individual Arab countries. But now that such a coalition is coming together, Israel sees it as an indivisible element of its own defense policy. Even if no one is inviting Israel to take part, it’s already among the coalition’s first stakeholders.
It may be a bit early to hold our collective breaths. The decision of the Arab League to assemble a joint force of about 40,000 soldiers was made with little opposition, but it involves important practical questions and issues of principle that will require long deliberations, which are scheduled to begin in April. It’s not clear who would command such a force, or who would fund it and what share each country would pay, for example. And it’s not clear whether the force would rely on volunteers or standing units of the member states’ armies, what the limitations on the force will be, on what grounds it could be deployed or who would be responsible for such a deployment.
Would Egypt, for example, be able to demand that the joint force get involved when the Egyptians are attacked by terrorist organizations coming in from Libya, as occurred two months ago (when Egypt attacked Libya itself)? Would Saudi Arabia be able to order the joint force to act against a civilian Shi’ite rebellion in Bahrain should there be one? And what about intervention in Iraq against the Islamic State group, also known as ISIS or ISIL? Gazans are wondering if the force would be authorized to act against Hamas’ military wing, which Egypt deems a terrorist organization. “If the Arab force were to have been established to act against Israel, we would have been the first to join,” said Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. But Israel will evidently not be the target.
Sunni vs. Shi’ite
Even before the Arab joint force was announced, there had been an important change in the military perspective of Arab countries.
Arab states had long refrained from sending in armed forces to act against other Arab states or to act directly in countries in which terrorist groups have sprouted up. When Saddam Hussein’s Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, setting the Gulf War in motion, it became the only Arab country to invade another Arab country. (Iran is a Muslim country but not an Arab one, so the Iran-Iraq War doesn’t count in this context.) The Arab League decision means that Arab military forces have received a stamp of approval to intervene in the affairs of other Arab countries.
Such a force, at least as initially conceived, is designed to hit at terrorist organizations while halting Iran’s influence in Arab countries without necessitating military intervention in Iran. This military and political alignment, if it becomes a reality, can be seen as a reflection of the Sunni vs. Shi’ite axis, but it would be a mistake to see it as a religious mission.
Terrorism in Egypt, for example, is Sunni terrorism, and in this case the Shi’ites are on the side of the “good guys.” It behooves the joint force to define the Arab alignment as a battle against Iran and its representatives rather than against Shi’ism as a religious branch of Islam.
Iranian political and media figures have recently taken pains to condemn the combined Arab assault in Yemen involving five Arab countries, supported by Turkey and Pakistan. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who declared that “Iran seeks to control the region, which is unacceptable,” perhaps provides the decisive proof of the fact that the target is Shi’ite Iran and not a Sunni war against Shi’ites more generally, and he is even prepared to pay a steep diplomatic price for it. Officially, Iran has said that Erdogan’s visit to the country scheduled for the beginning of April is not off, but some Iranian lawmakers are asking that Erdogan not come.
The Turkish president, who has cultivated close ties with Iran, was forced to make an exception to his general policy of getting along with Turkey’s neighbors. It should be noted, to his credit, that this recent step is consistent with his earlier decision to sever ties with Syria and his demand to remove Syrian President Bashar Assad from office as a condition of Erdogan’s participation in a Western coalition against ISIS.
Turkey’s position is also a flashy sign of the changes that are expected to reshape relations in the Middle East due to the need of Arab and Muslim countries to decide whether they belong to the Saudi axis or the Iranian one. The president of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, made a similar decision as Erdogan when he joined the Saudi alliance a week ago and expelled Iranian representatives from his country.
The spread of the Saudi mantle in the region is connected to the expectation that Iran and the six world powers sign both parts of the impending nuclear agreement: the statement of principles and a future detailed agreement.
Rejoining the club
Whatever the pace of the removal of sanctions against Tehran, Iran will retake its place in the oil export market with full vigor. Iran will be shifting from its position as a country dependent on the decisions of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and the stance of Saudi Arabia, which has contributed greatly to the fall of oil prices, to that of a country capable of dictating market prices.
In addition, Iran is expected to enjoy historic growth in the coming years as foreign corporations, businesspeople and countries pounce at the chance to invest in every sector of life there. Its technological infrastructure, educated workforce and stable government will make it more enticing for investors than Egypt, Jordan or the North African countries. Unlike those other countries, Iran also has financial resources to contribute rather than requiring financial aid.
Its return to the club of oil-exporting countries would give the Iranian regime a strong economic base that it would also exploit against its domestic rivals. The fear of Iranian reformists is that the regime will be able to arrange a trade-off in which the improvement of the Iranians’ economic plight will come at the expense of human rights, enabling the suppression of those seeking to replace the current regime.
Among Arab countries, however, the real concern is not the dictatorial nature of the Iranian regime but the diplomatic alliance that could develop between Tehran and Washington, an alliance that could come at the expenses of Washington’s ties with the Arab states.
It is doubtful if such fears have a basis in fact, but when Washington is satisfied with Iran’s participation in the war against ISIS in Iraq and when Iran and its Houthi allies in Yemen are seen as an effective partner against the Al-Qaida branch in the country, such an agreement is liable to create an opening for strategic cooperation.
Another concern is that a nuclear agreement would give Iran the status of a legitimate power, of the kind that can be included in an effort to solve regional conflicts such as those in Syria, Yemen and Iraq.
Since the Arab countries have thus far failed to put an end to the fighting in those countries, Iran could be seen as a deus ex machina, an outside force that suddenly swoops in to solve problems. In such circumstances, Iran is liable to gain senior status not only among states involved in those confrontations but also among other Middle Eastern countries that up to now have not been forced to take sides with Iran or with Saudi Arabia. After all, if the United States establishes normal ties with Iran, they too should be permitted to do so.
And this is the basis of the major diplomatic importance currently attached to the campaign being waged in Yemen between the Arab forces and the Houthis. In and of itself, Yemen doesn’t have strategic importance, and its oil reserves are not a pretext for war or inter-Arab mobilization. But in the zero-sum game being played out between Iran and most of the Arab states, particularly the Gulf states, a loss in Yemen would mean a victory for Iran and the loss of another Arab country to the Arab fold.
This is the basis for the ambitious goal of the Saudis and their allies to have the campaign end only when the Houthis retreat to their base in northern Yemen, return the weapons they took from the army and recognize the administration of exiled President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi.
This week Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called the Iran-Lausanne-Yemen axis a danger to humanity. But Saudi Arabia did not need Netanyahu’s latest slogan in order to recognize the threat.
