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Israel approves F-35 fighters deal

Have no doubt we can replicate the S-300's radar signals to %99.999 fidelity and apply it against any aircraft we want.
arrrm.. I'll pass on that one.. I don't think you can. Not unless you are the manufacturer of said system or you know something the rest of us don't, or perhaps living in cpt. Picard's era and can use the Enterprise's replicators to replicate the S-300 multi-mode radar circuitry.
Multi-mode, eh?

First...We will enlightened interested readers on what is this funky 'multi-mode' radar thingamabob doohickey...

aesa_beam_multi.jpg


The above AESA illustration is quite instructive.

Most radar systems are single beam, meaning the system produces only one beam whose beam characteristics can be manipulated to perform many functions, such as 'Search' or 'Track'...BUT NOT AT ONCE

An AESA system can create more than two beams to perform more than two functions through a process called 'subarray partitioning'. Essentially, the main antenna is logically divided into many smaller arrays and performs multiple functions ALL AT ONCE.

Going back to the S-300 and its cousins...We do not need to know how it perform in multi-modes. We already know how to make a single beam radar system do that. But what we do not know are its beam characteristics, which I will refer you to here...

Inside a transmission are four major basic and important characteristics...

- Pulse width
- Pulse frequency
- Pulse amplitude
- Pulse interval

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) is a specialty in the USAF...

1N5X1 - ELECTRONIC SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE EXPLOITATION
Conducts signals intelligence (SIGINT) activities and operations. Performs operator and analyst duties to exploit electronic intelligence (ELINT), foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT), and PROFORMA activities. Employs signals exploitation activities to support electronic warfare (EW) operations.
We will provoke radar transmissions, not just to record their source locations but also to capture signal characteristics, analyze, then replicate them. If we can record how quick can an air defense radar system switches from 'Search' to 'Track' to 'Target' modes -- great. If we cannot, but usually we do, then we will be satisfied with just signal characteristics for the moment. The more sensitive the recording instruments, the better the analysis and replication. The greater the fidelity of that replication, the more we know how an air defense radar system can locate and track any target, from a B-52 to an F-22, giving US an edge in formulating an attack entry. By the way...Long ago I helped wrote that career field...:D
 
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- Pulse width
- Pulse frequency
- Pulse amplitude
- Pulse interval

I happen to know that on the S300 especially as well as the Tor M1 systems, all of those can be varied as an anti counter measure -measure (hard to say that one) technique. I have monitored the output signal of the S300 phased array radar on search/track function and it is a variable output. Which mode exactly will the Sigint ship/plane record and how will it use that? It doesn't even use the same freq to track a target it has locked on !!

:coffee:
 
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I happen to know that on the S300 especially as well as the Tor M1 systems, all of those can be varied as an anti counter measure -measure (hard to say that one) technique. I have monitored the output signal of the S300 phased array radar on search/track function and it is a variable output. Which mode exactly will the Sigint ship/plane record and how will it use that? It doesn't even use the same freq to track a target it has locked on !!

:coffee:

ummmm.......

You may prove a challenge to the expertise of GAMBIT:usflag:
 
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ummmm.......

You may prove a challenge to the expertise of GAMBIT:usflag:

I don't doubt what he says on sigint, sounds simple enough as a concept anyway. I just think its way too difficult to do. In my mind borderline impossible with the equipment a sigint plane is supposed to carry.

mind you (just to be on the safe side) i've never been aboard one.

:coffee:
 
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I happen to know that on the S300 especially as well as the Tor M1 systems, all of those can be varied as an anti counter measure -measure (hard to say that one) technique. I have monitored the output signal of the S300 phased array radar on search/track function and it is a variable output. Which mode exactly will the Sigint ship/plane record and how will it use that? It doesn't even use the same freq to track a target it has locked on !!

:coffee:
Of course the 'Search', 'Track', and 'Target' freqs are different from each other. In general, the 'Search' freqs band are usually lower, meaning longer wavelengths...

For example...

AN/SPS-49 Very Long-Range Air Surveillance Radar
The AN/SPS-49(V) radar is a narrow beam, very long range, 2D air search radar that primarily supports the AAW mission in surface ships. The radar is used to provide long range air surveillance regardless of severe clutter and jamming environments. Collateral functions include air traffic control, air intercept control, and antisubmarine aircraft control. It also provides a reliable backup to the three-dimensional (3D) weapon system designation radar.

Band L
Frequency Band: 850 to 942 MHz
three selectable 30MHz bands
48 discrete frequencies
Target resolutions such as altitude, speed, heading, and aspect angle can be sacrificed, even when there is suspicion of multiple inbounds, in favor of volume coverage.

The 'Track' mode uses higher freqs or shorter wavelengths...

Radar Frequency Bands
X 8-12 GHz. Short-range tracking, missile guidance, mapping, marine radar, airborne intercept
The 'X' band is common in fighter aircrafts, air defense radars in 'Track' mode, and some meteorological radars.

The 'Target' mode is more antenna operation than frequency manipulation, although a missile's active radar may use even shorter centimetric (ghz) freqs, but that usage has been found to be unnecessary...

Engineering Dictionary, Radar terms, and definitions 'N'
NUTATION: As applied to current missile system radars, this term refers to the mechanical motion of an antenna feed to produce a conical scan (fixed polarization) by the main beam of a tracking antenna, thus providing a means of developing tracking error signals. By analogy, "Nutation" also is used to denote the electrical switching of the quadrants of a seeker antenna. The effect is similar to that of a conical scan.
This is what 'nutation' look like...

Conical_scan.jpg


Basically...The antenna does NOT change its operating freq but does changes its antenna movement: From a side-side sweeping motion to a circular one keeping the target centered in that circle. Boresighting the target is the last stage of the entire process.

First...Volume search determine the potential threat's direction of approach. For a SIGINT provocateur aircraft, we would recognize the freq use and because the 'Search' antenna has a side-side sweeping motion, if we detect a cyclical return of that freq, we know we are recording a 'Search' mode or antenna in that mode.

Second...If the SIGINT aircraft detect a change of impinging freq to a higher freq with a shorter return cycle, we know we are being tracked by a secondary antenna as we are still recording the 'Search' freq. Antennas in the 'Track' mode still has a side-side sweeping motion but with narrower sweep angle.

Third...If the SIGINT aircraft detect a much shorter return cycle of the 'Track' freq, we know we are being targeted by a nutating antenna from an incoming missile.

The 'Search' mode give the defense general target direction and location. The 'Track' mode give the defense increased target resolutions, such as speed, altitude, heading and aspect angle. Those information are given to the missile launcher unit who point the launch platform towards that direction. The missile then takes over with its own radar.

Altering the pulse train characteristics...

- Pulse width
- Pulse frequency
- Pulse amplitude
- Pulse interval

...Does not alter the three modes. If anything, altering those characteristics give the SIGINT aircraft additional information as to the defense's ECCM capability, as in the frequency agility rate -- jumping from one freq to another.

So by all means, change away...:D
 
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One of the many things about an air defense radar system that everyone has an erection over is how many targets can the radar track and actively engage. The 'track' quantity is usually higher than the 'engage' quantity. For the S-300PMU with its phased array radar, its 'engage' quantity is 6. Some people would jump to the conclusion that the 6 'engage' quantity is because there are only 6 missiles per battery. It is a reasonable assumption but it is valid only up to a point. It could mean that there are hardware and software related limitations to 6 targets. Anyway...The 6 'engage' quantity does not mean there are 6 different radar beams but that there is only ONE beam moving from one target to another. Of course, a phased array antenna would be moving its beam faster than a mechanical antenna, which is limited by structural inertia, including motor capability.

Now we come to a very important point in simulation: That there is no need for us to simulate all 6 targets.

Think about it for a moment...If the radar is crap on target resolutions -- speed, altitude and aspect angle -- for one target. It will be crap for all 6 'engage' targets. And those same resolutions will be even worse for the higher quantity 'track' targets.




Even if the above assumptions are hypothetical I would like to point out a few thing about the S-300.

First it's processing power:



96L6 Radar


100 targets simultaneously at speeds between 30 to 2,750 m/s.


Now altitude:

S-300PMU SA-10 GRUMBLE - Russia / Soviet Nuclear Forces


The S-300PMU2 Favorit can engage targets flying from 10 m to 27 km



Altitude and aspect angle:

Although I could not find a S-300 demo I did find a Tor-M1 demo, forward to 2:51-2:53 and 3:10-3:15.



Note the altitude which the targets were knocked out, also note the targets themselves were missiles, as we all know missile are smaller, faster and harder to knock out than aircraft.

When NPO Almaz made the claim that the S-300 can intercept cruise missiles and in general 'stealthy' targets they weren’t kidding, systems such as the S-300 have achieved real world kills against small rcs targets such as cruise missiles and engineers have gone to extreme lengths when testing these batteries and their radars.


The following picture shows an F-117 replica being tested, if you believe that the Serbians gave F-117 wreckage to Russia for examination than we can assume that the F-117 mock-up has similar composites and similar RAM, similar radar blockers and a similar geometry.




Now I’m not saying that an S-300 can shoot down a 'stealth' aircraft but what I am saying is that the systems on the S-300 have been put through a battery of tests and that it is far from trash; considering that the S-300's radar has been tested rigorously, it would be safe to assume that no 'LO' aircraft would feel comfortable any where near this system considering it's radar has been tested against 'LO' targets.





Also, to make the assumption that the system can engage 6 targets because there are only 6 missiles per battery would be a very reasonable assumption considering that Russia has much smaller radars that can double the number of targets engaged (12).

The S-300 also has data-link which enable it to engage 36 targets, of course this is over-kill.

The data-link is capable of more than just data transfer from SAM to SAM :


S-300PMU2 Favorit SA-20 GARGOYLE


the 83M6E2 uses its own radar data and data received from the controlled SAM systems, as well as information derived from higher control aids, elec*tronic reconnaissance troops and neighboring SAM sys*tems groupings.

The ability to share and transfer data via several methods would assure batter survivability and enhance the systems overall performance.





The need to have physical possession of the opposition's hardware is far less today than before, at least for US anyway because of our superior technological lead over the Russians. Our data analysis, meaning our ability to break down an intercepted radar signal, aka SIGINT, is all that we need to recreate the same signal characteristics using our own hardware. It does not matter if the recreated signal is transmitted by a mechanical antenna or a phased array. Given our superior lead in semiconductor technology, our data processing for one target will be superior to the Russians'. That mean our simulations will be of a lower tolerance than the actual Russian hardware and that mean our response will be more precise. It is easier for the superior to simulate the inferior than the opposite.


Soviet/Russia SAMs have always been a big threat and regarded as some of the most capable SAMs in the world regardless of the fact the Soviet Union wasn't the best in the semiconductor industry. However, Russia is not the Soviet Union, US companies such as IBM have sold Russia one of its most powerful super computers.

Currently Russia also has access to computers, microprocessor and the likes from Israel, France, Japan, and of course the United States.

The Russian semiconductor industry has also been growing, partly because of government funds, partly because of access to foreign technology and partially because Russian workers over seas.





What we do is provoke the Soviets into transmitting their air defense radars. The longer we record their transmissions, the better we understand Soviet tactics and technology.



Getting back to what we are talking about...If we can get a reasonably good sampling of the S-300's radar -- and we have -- then we can break down the signal into discrete elements like frequency, amplitude, pulse repetition freq (PRF), pulse train duration, and many more. The amount of details are dependent upon the technology available to us.


The older S-300's via the 1980s and 1970's probably/maybe because the US obtained some from former Warsaw pact nations, but modern S-300 share almost nothing in common with S-300's of decades past, so older S-300 will likely be destroyed at little to no cost, new systems, however, be more difficult to deal with.

Russia was also well aware that examples of the S-300 had fallen into wrong hands, and considering that the Soviets changed out Mig-25 systems after Victor Bilenko defected we can assume that the S-300 went through a similar process.

The S-300 was designed to defeat electronic counter measures, the designers considered everything.


Have no doubt we can replicate the S-300's radar signals to %99.999 fidelity and apply it against any aircraft we want.


New S-300's? Perhaps there might be success against old S-300 but modern day S-300's are a different systems all together, again they are designed to overcome and defeat electronic counter measures, just like American systems such as the PAC-3 were designed with the same purpose.

And not only are they designed with counter measures in mind but the ability to share data-link via different methods will make it that much more difficult to kill, especially if you have a large network of them receiving and transferring data by various means.
 
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Altering the pulse train characteristics...

- Pulse width
- Pulse frequency
- Pulse amplitude
- Pulse interval

...Does not alter the three modes. If anything, altering those characteristics give the SIGINT aircraft additional information as to the defense's ECCM capability, as in the frequency agility rate -- jumping from one freq to another.

So by all means, change away...:D


mmmmm... I see, food for thought for sure.

:coffee:
 
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Even if the above assumptions are hypothetical I would like to point out a few thing about the S-300.

First it's processing power:

96L6 Radar
Let us have the full quote, shall we?

The maximum detection range is 300 km and it can track up to 100 targets simultaneously at speeds between 30 to 2,750 m/s.
Tracking is not the same as targeting. If the demand is for high object data update rate, as missiles usually do in order to respond to object's maneuvers, then antenna operation must enter nutation or boresight mode. So if the ground antenna is doing just that, then its 'targeting' capability will be far less than 100. A phased array system will be far faster at boresighting multiple objects than a mechanically actuated antenna, but unless this phased array is an active array, it is still limited to boresighting one object at a time because it has only one beam, albeit switching from object to object is much faster. For an AESA system, the amount of objects under 'Track' and can be boresighted is limited to array dimensions and subarray partitioning softwares. In other words, the 100 objects are being boresighted simultaneously with 100 beams instead of sequentially with only one beam.

Note the altitude which the targets were knocked out, also note the targets themselves were missiles, as we all know missile are smaller, faster and harder to knock out than aircraft.

When NPO Almaz made the claim that the S-300 can intercept cruise missiles and in general 'stealthy' targets they weren’t kidding, systems such as the S-300 have achieved real world kills against small rcs targets such as cruise missiles and engineers have gone to extreme lengths when testing these batteries and their radars.

The following picture shows an F-117 replica being tested, if you believe that the Serbians gave F-117 wreckage to Russia for examination than we can assume that the F-117 mock-up has similar composites and similar RAM, similar radar blockers and a similar geometry.

For interested readers, am going to briefly rehash some basic radar information.

1- Radar sees everything. The US have never claimed our 'stealth' aircrafts to be 'invisible' to radar detection.

2- But just because we can see everything, that does not mean we want to or should see everything.

In radar detection, there is an arbitrary region called the 'clutter rejection threshold', meaning signals that we do not want to analyze. Cosmic background radiation (CBR) is one such signal. Music radio and television are others. For meteorologists, rain clouds are desirable but an airliner is 'junk'. For the air traffic controllers, it is the opposite. So for specific applications, we create many 'clutter rejection threshold' algorithms to filter out things that a specific application does not need to analyze.

Birds are natural radar non-cooperative targets. The word 'non-cooperative' mean difficult to detect, intentionally or accidentally. So even a B-52 flying below the radar horizon is a 'non-cooperative' target. But if the B-52 is impacted by radar signals, then it become a 'cooperative' target. A bird's body is full of curvatures and its layers of feathers are natural radar absorbers. We can detect ONE bird through the high centimetric (ghz) bands and mainly because of its hard beak or we can detect a flock of birds in lower freqs because of the cumulative radar reflections build-up when they fly close together. So if a bird drop out of the flock, but still is airborne, it will not be detected and the flock's radar return, as a mass, is slightly diminished. Keep this up and eventually no bird will be detected even all of them are still airborne somewhere. Same thing for insects just more difficult because of their smaller size.

The American 'stealth' aircrafts are shaped to be inserted into the clutter rejection threshold by the majority of radars because their RCS values are smaller than that of individual birds. So even if we grant that the Russians managed to replicate an F-117 to a life size model, that is no guarantee to the Russians that what they created has the exact same RCS as that of the genuine F-117. For all they know, what they have is above the clutter rejection threshold. Its RCS might be low enough to make detection difficult but not statistically uncertain.

Now I’m not saying that an S-300 can shoot down a 'stealth' aircraft but what I am saying is that the systems on the S-300 have been put through a battery of tests and that it is far from trash; considering that the S-300's radar has been tested rigorously, it would be safe to assume that no 'LO' aircraft would feel comfortable any where near this system considering it's radar has been tested against 'LO' targets.
But if it was tested against LO targets that are not in the same class as a US 'stealth' aircraft, then it is false confidence.

The older S-300's via the 1980s and 1970's probably/maybe because the US obtained some from former Warsaw pact nations, but modern S-300 share almost nothing in common with S-300's of decades past, so older S-300 will likely be destroyed at little to no cost, new systems, however, be more difficult to deal with.

Russia was also well aware that examples of the S-300 had fallen into wrong hands, and considering that the Soviets changed out Mig-25 systems after Victor Bilenko defected we can assume that the S-300 went through a similar process.

The S-300 was designed to defeat electronic counter measures, the designers considered everything.

New S-300's? Perhaps there might be success against old S-300 but modern day S-300's are a different systems all together, again they are designed to overcome and defeat electronic counter measures, just like American systems such as the PAC-3 were designed with the same purpose.

And not only are they designed with counter measures in mind but the ability to share data-link via different methods will make it that much more difficult to kill, especially if you have a large network of them receiving and transferring data by various means.
SIGINT is not about ECM although SIGINT analysis can and have been used to produce ECM technical responses and combat tactics. My point was that hardware analysis is desirable but is less necessary than before. Say our SIGINT analysis revealed a weakness in a pulse train, we can replicate that weakness and apply that signal against our aircrafts and see the result.
 
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Let us have the full quote, shall we?

My point was that hardware analysis is desirable but is less necessary than before. Say our SIGINT analysis revealed a weakness in a pulse train, we can replicate that weakness and apply that signal against our aircrafts and see the result.

I hear you, it's just so damn difficult to fathom.

For starters, the frequency bands, the modulation of the pulse train, the fact that modern radars (S300 included if I am not mistaken), embed information (such as IFF) in the pulse train, the variation also depending on angle and range can be significant.

It's just hard to imagine the validity of firing an XGhz signal at the F35 and seeing how it does, than firing an Actual Radar XGhz beam at it at tracking, ranging, locking modes.

I did say, I have very little (to almost nill) experience with SIGINT practices and equipment, perhaps that is why....


:coffee:
 
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This source:rofl::rofl:

I can reproduce much like these:hitwall:

Furthermore if you know about about computer simulation (as you had bickered) I tell you that one can't produce effective results & of coarse not effective conclusions if you have dont possess a thorough technical know-how of concerned equipment.
And I doubt that Israeil has got adequate knowledge of S-300 or any current Russian system to create any viable simulation!!!Unless & until it had smuggled or captured S-300:azn:

Israel never did the simulation..LM did. And the US has studied S300 systems from the east European states for years now.(I remember US also bought one system to incorporate certain features in the Patriot system)
 
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Israel never did the simulation..LM did. And the US has studied S300 systems from the east European states for years now.(I remember US also bought one system to incorporate certain features in the Patriot system)

These are extremely non-linear systems. Simulations can help you only up to a point. A very limited point.

:coffee:
 
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Let us have the full quote, shall we?


Tracking is not the same as targeting. If the demand is for high object data update rate, as missiles usually do in order to respond to object's maneuvers, then antenna operation must enter nutation or boresight mode. So if the ground antenna is doing just that, then its 'targeting' capability will be far less than 100.


You're correct, tracking is not the same as targeting, but i though we were talking about processing speed. But since we're on the topic i suppose it's worth discussing.

If we look at Rosoboronexport, an official source, the specs of the S-300PMU1 are:

http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&sour...jaGyDg&usg=AFQjCNHmKG7hhjXQSRo0XwamVA35Zz7KDA

Number of simultaneously detected targets up to 300

Number of simultaneously tracked targets up to100

Number of targets engaged simultaneously up to 36

Officially all of the targets are listed as 'simultaneous', meaning 300, 100, and 36 targets can be managed at once.

Lets for a moment assume that the tracking is less than 100 targets, but lets also assume that the S-300 has multiple data-link, which it does, so even if one antenna is not able to fully exploit 100 targets, then another antenna or even multiple antennas will. Either way even if one battery is able to track only 50, 20, or even 10 targets that would be adequate enough considering that the system only carries 6 missiles.



A phased array system will be far faster at boresighting multiple objects than a mechanically actuated antenna, but unless this phased array is an active array, it is still limited to boresighting one object at a time because it has only one beam, albeit switching from object to object is much faster. For an AESA system, the amount of objects under 'Track' and can be boresighted is limited to array dimensions and subarray partitioning softwares. In other words, the 100 objects are being boresighted simultaneously with 100 beams instead of sequentially with only one beam.


The S-300 can be linked up with the 1L119 Nebo SVU AESA radar.



If 1L119 Nebo SVU is linked with the S-300 it will open entirly new windows of opportunity in both the offensive and defensive roles.





In radar detection, there is an arbitrary region called the 'clutter rejection threshold', meaning signals that we do not want to analyze. Cosmic background radiation (CBR) is one such signal. Music radio and television are others. For meteorologists, rain clouds are desirable but an airliner is 'junk'. For the air traffic controllers, it is the opposite. So for specific applications, we create many 'clutter rejection threshold' algorithms to filter out things that a specific application does not need to analyze.




Birds are natural radar non-cooperative targets. The word 'non-cooperative' mean difficult to detect, intentionally or accidentally. So even a B-52 flying below the radar horizon is a 'non-cooperative' target. But if the B-52 is impacted by radar signals, then it become a 'cooperative' target. A bird's body is full of curvatures and its layers of feathers are natural radar absorbers. We can detect ONE bird through the high centimetric (ghz) bands and mainly because of its hard beak or we can detect a flock of birds in lower freqs because of the cumulative radar reflections build-up when they fly close together. So if a bird drop out of the flock, but still is airborne, it will not be detected and the flock's radar return, as a mass, is slightly diminished. Keep this up and eventually no bird will be detected even all of them are still airborne somewhere. Same thing for insects just more difficult because of their smaller size.


Yes, of course, most radars are bias to whatever their intended purpose may be.

If the S-300 runs off of a decimetric band and if that band fails to see an 'LO' target and a VHF band such as the one found in the Nebo SVU AESA picks up a target in the VHF band than chances are the target is 'LO'.


The American 'stealth' aircrafts are shaped to be inserted into the clutter rejection threshold by the majority of radars because their RCS values are smaller than that of individual birds. So even if we grant that the Russians managed to replicate an F-117 to a life size model, that is no guarantee to the Russians that what they created has the exact same RCS as that of the genuine F-117. For all they know, what they have is above the clutter rejection threshold. Its RCS might be low enough to make detection difficult but not statistically uncertain.


But if it was tested against LO targets that are not in the same class as a US 'stealth' aircraft, then it is false confidence.


The F-117 was 1970's technology, and the mock-up target was replicated on the F-117's geometry, the mock-up may have also for-gone features such as canopy which would likely increase the rcs.

And if reports about Russians examining the F-117 are true than chances are the mock-up likely came close to the F-117's rcs.

The only factors that would hinder the mock-up rcs value would be quality issues and RAM, if the mock-up doesn’t use RAM or if the surface areas were of poor quality than its rcs is likely higher than that of the F-117, if not than the rcs would likely be somewhere near the F-117, based on geometry.

But of course exact figures are not released so it is any ones guess.
 
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Multiple datalinking of various SAM systems



---------- Post added at 11:24 AM ---------- Previous post was at 11:23 AM ----------

The S-300 can be linked up with the 1L119 Nebo SVU AESA radar.

Much appreciated
 
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I'll start off by pre-facing that I don't know anything about SIGINT, but I will say that it poses many of the same problems of Hardware/Software reverse engineering.

It is a black box problem. We don't see the inputs, or the inner workings, but lets assume we can see everything that comes out. A bit like isolating a chunk of code and seeing all the system calls that it makes, or hooking up a processor to a specialized motherboard and getting all the pin inputs/outputs. Theoretically, so long as you put enough inputs in and record enough outputs, you should eventually be able to figure out the response of the system to every imaginable stimulus.

Once you know the systems response to any stimulus over the range you care about, you can then make a "Finite State Automata" to replicate that machine for each and every input and output. Then, despite knowing nothing about what the machine actually does internally, you have built the same machine.
200px-Finite_State_Machine_Logic.svg.png


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finite-state_machine

The problem is twofold.
1. You might not have considered every single input/output scenario.(In Fact, By Cantor's Diagonilization argument, you can't...But the real world is finite, so you can get it down to within the margin's of error of the system)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cantor%27s_diagonal_argument

2. It is actually much harder in practice to do this than just design your own machine that does the same thing in almost all cases. There are just too many possible conditions.

So, when you actually "Reverse Engineer" things, what you do is get a fairly wide spectra of input/output scenarios and then ask yourself "Well, how would I make a subsystem that gave the same response?"

When you do all the work for that, you often find that through the design necessities you get a final product which is very, very close to the original product. So, basically, you make a new design, which is not exactly the original, but behaves the same way 95% of the time.

Why do you think most GUI's have a similar appearance? Or why are most birds similarly sized? Or why Airbus or Boeing aircraft look pretty much the same? Multiple independent paths to the same conclusion.

So, to sum it up. I doubt Gambit's claim of 99.9999% fidelity. It is probably closer to 90-95%. But in the end, does it really matter? The US makes better radar/SAM systems than its' opponents. It has no military technology peer competitor. And the F-35 can tear through a PAC-3, SM2, F-18, and F-15 filled environment with ease. Do you really think the S-300 is more capable air defense system than any of those systems?
 
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I'll start off by pre-facing that I don't know anything about SIGINT, but I will say that it poses many of the same problems of Hardware/Software reverse engineering.

It is a black box problem. We don't see the inputs, or the inner workings, but lets assume we can see everything that comes out. A bit like isolating a chunk of code and seeing all the system calls that it makes, or hooking up a processor to a specialized motherboard and getting all the pin inputs/outputs. Theoretically, so long as you put enough inputs in and record enough outputs, you should eventually be able to figure out the response of the system to every imaginable stimulus.

<snipped>

So, to sum it up. I doubt Gambit's claim of 99.9999% fidelity. It is probably closer to 90-95%. But in the end, does it really matter? The US makes better radar/SAM systems than its' opponents. It has no military technology peer competitor. And the F-35 can tear through a PAC-3, SM2, F-18, and F-15 filled environment with ease. Do you really think the S-300 is more capable air defense system than any of those systems?
There is a misconception here about SIGINT. One purpose of SIGINT is to determine the locations of any sources arrayed around a vital target. The characteristics of the radar signals tells us what kind of air defense, if any, is assigned to that area. The other purpose of SIGINT is to replicate the output itself -- NOT -- in trying to reverse engineer the 'black box' that produces the output. So if we record over time a series of pulse trains with repeating characteristics, we can use our own equipments to replicate those signals and apply them against our own aircrafts. Further, if we have older generation equipments, and we do have Soviet/Russian hardwares in our possession, we can attempt to have the older hardware produce what we record. The degree of success or failure will tell us the degree of advances.
 
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