Where is the ISI then? where have they been for the past decade?
One could say the same about FBI against Russian(and others) activities during the 2016 &2020 elections but intelligence cannot be everywhere. Even the NSA that picks up pretty much everything to pass on to other agencies can only watch as attacks still do happen.
Lets agree that it isn’t the ISI’s JOB to build infrastructure, provide education or social uplift for these places. Technically it isn’t even the military’s job eithers but comes in purview of state(and federal to an extent). If you disagree then we have nothing further to discuss because you’re criticizing for the sake of criticizing then.
Take the area that Balochistan has: 347000km2(about 40% of Pakistan in land mass)
Add in the additional area which isn’t part of Pakistan from Afghanistan and Iran which is around 100000km2 so its 447000km2 of area most of which is barely populated but amply covered with geographic features such as caves and valleys that provide excellent hiding features.
Now, within that area you not only have poverty ridden fiefdoms of local Sardars but also separate villages which can be sourced for recruits. Since Balochistan has no water resources(rivers or lakes) as such these population areas are spread over wherever tubewells struck water which also means that any BLA camps or otherwise can either employ the same method or also use local resources for water.
Now the ISI doesn’t actually own ANY paramilitary forces and at most uses its lightly armed personnel or coordinated activities with the FC or Army.
For COIN, the requirement is that a combination of Human and signals intelligence is carried out to pinpoint key actors and recruits from the primary population centers - to then run the same from the secondary and tertiary towns and villages as the links arrive.
You also cannot maintain larger bases everywhere and have to rely on a wheel spoke type of network. Even with Firebases like the US tried in Afghanistan you have to rely on them to cover hundreds of sq km if not more. And we are talking about ISI which either has to rely on paramilitary infrastructure or if it is its own stick closer to population areas.
Regardless of budget, it isn’t possible to be in every town or village and unlike the United States there isn’t a EC-130 compass call or other aircraft in the air nor the operating costs of $12000/hr available. Even in Waziristan when they did fly C-130 sorties that was barely 15000km2. So you pick and choose where to run airborne intel or use manpack Sigint if available.
In terms of human intel you start with village elders and work down.. “my son went with some men 6 months ago and didn’t return.. I don’t know where” and start looking from there. You use a combination of SIGINT to try and pinpoint approximate areas but it’s effective against cellphones and not the encrypted satphones or even harris radios from Nato stock in Afghanistan that have been found at times on the higher ops caught.
So if you conducted a 100 operations then you expect to get intelligence and human targets from around 30-50 of them at best. For the most part due to land mass and lack of road infrastructure even with actionable intel the best response time achieved can only be done with helicopters and those aren’t available throughout for the ISI so they need to coordinate with the Army.
Btw if you involve uniforms at scale an insurgent cell just has to shut down electronic communications and simply leave its current cave for the next one 5km away which they have been seeing as a child or at least are aware of the surroundings.
So, if you have intel you may start to roll out or pass it onto FC or Army that adds a delay of anywhere between 15-30 minutes even with a QRF - hoping that there aren’t any militant sympathizers around watching your base with binoculars from afar who make a call and then your operation is useless.
Lets say everything worked out and you go get these guys .. turns out they are in a valley entrenched. You conduct an operation, not all will put down their arms and one blows himself up with grenades and the commander of the cell is shot.
You take them for interrogation. Well, turns out they altered their handlers in Afghanistan or Iran who in turn call a friendly social worker or politician in Pakistan who goes into a missing person’s rant against the institutions. If you release them they come back again requipped and smarter.. if you kill them they become martyrs and are on every recruitment story and pamphlet used for the next generation.
Because at the end regardless of how the person got recruited , they are impacted by poor infrastructure and lack of opportunities versus the idea of fighting for rights and $500 a month coming from India.
From the interrogation you received intel on an attack about to happen in Rahim Yar Khan or Tando Adam on some section of a train line tomorrow morning or evening based upon which militant you interrogated because they too have been given half knowledge . You pass that intel onto the FIA and the local ISI office to act on who then have to coordinate with local Law enforcement to find which of the hundreds of km of train line will be hit and at what time tomorrow morning or evening… add those communication and local inefficiencies into the calculations as well.
You talk to your Iranian counterparts on the main channel and they say they are not aware but resend you a list of militants from some religious terror organization they want you to catch even though you told them those guys have been sighted in Afghanistan multiple times.
Now multiply all of this by 5-10 per week (also think of the costs) and then try to figure out what is going to happen when.
The lady who blew herself up was known - however, if you pick up a qualified educator and mother of 2 what do you think would happen?
What if she was picked up and jailed? You think the NGO’s would be quiet or political class?
What if she was picked up and harassed initially because she saw her peoples rights not fulfilled?
It only makes her more determined..
So, yes there are things that could be done much better both from the ISI’s and the military perspective and a lot of blame does rest on the shoulders of not just current but previous military leadership.. but also on all the political leadership as well which at the end of the day doesn’t really care about the Pakistani aspect of any issue than what gets them back in power and focused on their interests.
The national leadership and bureaucracy is full of malaise; the people are generally ignorant of anything other than their day and their 4 walls.
The 2% from all walks of life(civil & military) that aren’t can only do so much to keep things sane.
It’s not the ISI job to keep it all together and if you expect them to and they try THEY WILL FAIL because they aren’t superhumans as much as most of the country tries to paint them as so.
en.wikipedia.org
