What's new

Is PA bloated? Can modernization increase if it hires at slow speed?

Which Terrain will you give preference for upgradation or top standard equipment and support?

PA is deployed in following Terrain:
1. Snow + Mountains (Kashmir)
2. Mountains (KPK and Kashmir)
3. Plains + canals + hills (Punjab)
4. Semi desert (Lower Punjab)
5. Desert (Sindh)
6. marshes + swamps (Rann of kutch/Sir Creek)
Sindh and Lower Punjab. vast plain desert with no natural obstacles. A determined enemy thrust can land them near bahawalpur, sukkur, hyderabad and karachi. upper Punjab and Northern areas have a lot of natural and man made obstacles, in the form of mountains, rivers and canals. They also need to upgraded, but Sindh and Lower Punjab formations must get the most attention.
 
. .
1. Raise a new paramilitary force for internal security (like CRPF of India) for COIN/CT ops. This force should have air arm to deploy any where within Pakistan. It should also have a special operation wing. IB and local intelligence agency should be grouped with it and it should be placed directly under interior ministry. The force should also be trained to act as a reserve force during all out conflict with external enemy.
2. FC Balochistan, FC KPK, Punjab and Sindh Rangers, Pakistan Marine should be relived from internal security and placed on borders. Apart from manning the border, these forces should have a primary task to curb smuggling etc.
3. Western border with Afghanistan should be completely secured. Flood lights and electronic surveillance, mobile signal jamming etc. should be completed on war footing.
3. PAA modernization should be the top priority. In this regard gunships, fixed wing, transport assets should increased. This will multiply the firepower at PA disposal.
4. PAF is the air arm, which would be the first one responding any kind of aggression. Its modernization should be the top priority.
5. PN is our weak link.
7. The country of our size/population should have a 1 million plus regular army. Once issues like Kashmir is settled, it could be reduced but atm its unthinkable. Giving out salaries in PKR to soldiers is no big deal. Eventually all this money is circulated back in the economy and contribute to GDP. When we have very few options (international politics) to acquire top of the line weaponry (even if we have the money) then men power is the only thing to keep the equilibrium.
8. If we look in the history (1965/71) numbers played crucial role. Heck, whenever Indians were feeling the heat they have the infantry in numbers to open a new front. Thus relieving off the pressure from other sector. Our armored thrusts failed not once, not twice but many times during these wars as we lacked the number of attached infantry to hold or clear the entrenched enemy ambushing the tanks.

So IMO this idea is a big no-no.
 
.
With every new FC wing raised, one army battalion is pulled back to its original location. Since large-scale COIN/CT ops are winding down, a new paramilitary force makes no sense, nor does increasing army size to over 1 million.

Such raisings will only drain budgets and contribute to more officers shortage.
 
.
With every new FC wing raised, one army battalion is pulled back to its original location. Since large-scale COIN/CT ops are winding down, a new paramilitary force makes no sense, nor does increasing army size to over 1 million.

Such raisings will only drain budgets and contribute to more officers shortage.
Disagree. FC, Rangers, MSA original role was to guard the frontiers and curb smuggling, illegal crossing etc. Over the previous 3 decades starting from 1992 Karachi operation, we were forced to deployed them for law and order duties. This effect our ability to guard the borders.
The idea is to raise a new paramilitary force for internal deployments. It has to be under interior ministry with internal intelligence agencies working in tandem. This will allow our border security forces to do the job and Army, ISI to do her primary job. Involving Army in COIN/CT ops is not a good idea to begin with.
On the other point that insurgencies are winding down. I also disagree with it. Pakistan is under 5th generation war and we will continue to face terrorism threat in foreseeable future. It has improved a lot but still we are taking ~150+ security forces casualties per year. Which is huge.
 
.
Army: Make airborne/air assault units, e.g. convert 111 Brigade to dedicated Airborne or air assault
PAF: Expand SSW into COIN and BEL operating force. No more dependency on SSG in any Ops.
PN: Electronic warfare expansion- whether vessels or aircrafts.
Marines: LCB standard Air assault force using helis.

All the above since region is Pakistan and net-impact will be internal security(need of the hour) by conducting IB- Ops which Police/FC/Rangers cannot conduct, on the other hand training will also improve capability in conducting Overseas SF Ops by all forces of limited scale in peacetime and larger scale in war. Make Pakistani SF and Light infantry the deadliest in the region. Navy needs an edge over IN, that edge cannot be in numbers or missiles but modern technology like EW.

I think that 37th Infantry Division is the Army GHQ Reserve, and its attached to Ist Corps for administrative proposes only. It should became the real Rapid Responce Formation (partialy air assault capability). It could be used in any type of terrain (North-South), not specifically one terrain orinted like Corps does (Divisions).
Thanks
 
.
19 Div is the command reserve.
I think that 37th Infantry Division is the Army GHQ Reserve, and its attached to Ist Corps for administrative proposes only. It should became the real Rapid Responce Formation (partialy air assault capability). It could be used in any type of terrain (North-South), not specifically one terrain orinted like Corps does (Divisions).
Thanks
 
.
Army: Make airborne/air assault units, e.g. convert 111 Brigade to dedicated Airborne or air assault
PAF: Expand SSW into COIN and BEL operating force. No more dependency on SSG in any Ops.
PN: Electronic warfare expansion- whether vessels or aircrafts.
Marines: LCB standard Air assault force using helis.

All the above since region is Pakistan and net-impact will be internal security(need of the hour) by conducting IB- Ops which Police/FC/Rangers cannot conduct, on the other hand training will also improve capability in conducting Overseas SF Ops by all forces of limited scale in peacetime and larger scale in war. Make Pakistani SF and Light infantry the deadliest in the region. Navy needs an edge over IN, that edge cannot be in numbers or missiles but modern technology like EW.

Don't we already have the LCB qualified for airborne/air assault ops? Why don't we just group all the LCB embedded in the various divisions into its own division?

Also, I never understood why we don't have a dedicated mountain warfare div?
 
.
Don't we already have the LCB qualified for airborne/air assault ops? Why don't we just group all the LCB embedded in the various divisions into its own division?

Also, I never understood why we don't have a dedicated mountain warfare div?
Several LCBs are part of 34 Light Infantry Division.
 
.
Don't we already have the LCB qualified for airborne/air assault ops? Why don't we just group all the LCB embedded in the various divisions into its own division?
resources - helis.
Also, I never understood why we don't have a dedicated mountain warfare div?
FCNA
 
.
With every new FC wing raised, one army battalion is pulled back to its original location. Since large-scale COIN/CT ops are winding down, a new paramilitary force makes no sense, nor does increasing army size to over 1 million.

Such raisings will only drain budgets and contribute to more officers shortage.
Do you think there's any value in amalgamating the paramilitary branches (FC, Rangers, etc) into a single one (e.g., National Guard) with unified air, intelligence, etc capabilities?
 
.
With every new FC wing raised, one army battalion is pulled back to its original location. Since large-scale COIN/CT ops are winding down, a new paramilitary force makes no sense, nor does increasing army size to over 1 million.

Such raisings will only drain budgets and contribute to more officers shortage.
that is interesting, I guess there is still some threat levels which doesn't need army but needs militia to tackle it. I think it might be worth making Pakistan Paramilitary which is all combined and thus reduces unnecessary logistics and constraints.

But having Rangers in Punjab and Sindh, FC in their respective areas has its merits too. Pakistan's terrain is such and localised people are best at the job too like we just saw in the decade long COIN ops.
 
.
With every new FC wing raised, one army battalion is pulled back to its original location. Since large-scale COIN/CT ops are winding down, a new paramilitary force makes no sense, nor does increasing army size to over 1 million.

Such raisings will only drain budgets and contribute to more officers shortage.
Officers shortage lol we need infantary men to fight a war officers are 2 to dozen
 
.
No need to cut numbers. Cap the numbers at 600k, spend money to equip half of them as per international standards. They'll be our fighting force, the remaining will form the defensive lines.
 
.
Do you think there's any value in amalgamating the paramilitary branches (FC, Rangers, etc) into a single one (e.g., National Guard) with unified air, intelligence, etc capabilities?

that is interesting, I guess there is still some threat levels which doesn't need army but needs militia to tackle it. I think it might be worth making Pakistan Paramilitary which is all combined and thus reduces unnecessary logistics and constraints.

But having Rangers in Punjab and Sindh, FC in their respective areas has its merits too. Pakistan's terrain is such and localised people are best at the job too like we just saw in the decade long COIN ops.

A paramilitary directorate at GHQ led by a Lt. Gen with all FC, Rangers, etc under command was once suggested but never implemented. Recently, Army officers proposed a new border security force for the Pak-Afghan border.

IMO, with the (ongoing) establishment of operational commands, the control of paramilitaries in respective areas should lie with the Army commander. During wartime, the command can organize paramilitary battalions into brigades and assign them to subordinate Corps/Divisions within its geographical area as per requirements.

Merging these paramilitaries into one will create administrative & training issues, which Pak can't afford at the moment.
 
Last edited:
.

Country Latest Posts

Back
Top Bottom