No, we were nowhere near launching anything; the Pakistan Army would have known days in advance, because the logistics - the roadways - in the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir is such that materiel build-up takes weeks of effort. It cannot be disguised as the customary build-up taken up every year, because this is not the season; it cannot be disguised in any shape or form, one piece of evidence being the volume of traffic that has been seen going up the LAC and various Indian Army strong points on it. If it was possible to do anything surreptitious, that would have been done in the east; it was not possible, so it was visible.
You talk about a 'multi-prong' attack; is that multi-prong as in several axes of attack, or multi-prong as in cross-service? The phrase sounds good, but it should be used wisely and effectively, not merely for effect. As far as multi-prong is concerned, what could have been the prongs? The Pakistan Army has deep defences in the south and its main garrisons are located within hours of the LOC from Gurdaspur northwards; it has a strong presence along the entire alignment of Pakistan administered Kashmir, what Pakistan terms Azad Kashmir; it is also strong in the Neelum Valley, and then in a re-entrant going up to Skardu. Its presence in the lower heights of the approach from the Pakistan side to Siachen is well-established.
Opposing this is the XVI Corps, of course, a very strong defensive corps, but one that will consume thousands of litres of fuel in any advance; where is that fuel stockpiled? Next we have XV Corps in the Valley and on its outer rim facing Pakistan administered Kashmir; there, too, we have enough troops to defend, nowhere near the number needed to attack, especially not anywhere near the numbers needed to attack on heavily defended and forested hill-sides. Finally, in the Dras-Kargil-Batalik belt, we have a single, solitary division, detached from XIV Corps, for the entire front.
One single, solitary opportunity is left, and that is watched like a very hungry cat watches a mouse-hole. That area of opportunity is also one marked by geographically unpromising features, and the impossibility of mounting attacks by large numbers of troops.
A campaign like Genghis Khan's needs numbers like Genghis Khan's.
Perhaps you should explain why you are in such a high state of excitement and are staring round-eyed at a vista is peaceful and serene, and interrupted only by state-sponsored and supported infiltration from Pakistan administered Kashmir into J&K. What evidence do you have, what were the signs you saw that convinced you that there was an imminent prospect of - what was that phrase again? - ah, yes, a multi-prong attack.
In 1962, Pakistan was nowhere to be seen, so there was little question of begging to anyone against Pakistan.
If you are speaking about Pakistan, that makes sense; from its inception, having joined two, not one, military alliance, Pakistan gained arms, artillery, armour and even a reorganisation of its formations away from the British system. Later, after an increasingly acrimonious relationship with your masters, you turned to the Chinese, and have filled your aircraft with Chinese inventions that don't get used by the Chinese themselves, your army has entirely converted to Chinese imitations of Soviet tanks to which you give resounding names, your foot soldiers carry anti-tank missiles mass-produced from Chinese models, and now your navy, the last hold-out, is getting filled with cookie-cutter surface ships produced in great volumes at high speed by Chinese yards.
You have frequently been brave, some would say far too frequently. When were you alone?
Three unprovoked attacks without warning, and WE are the backstabbers?
How old are you?
. 
