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Is India Panicking In Ladakh!

Exactly, which brings us to some interesting questions needing answers....

Did the Chinese make these ingresses with forces already available at these locations (the minimum deployed) or did they pump in more to make these probes?

There is a lot of third party information,including some dependent on garnering information from Chinese sources. There is no confirmation for these in authentic Indian sources; the views of media talking heads and their associates, superseded junior officers earning a living out of fanning jingoism, are not worth taking into account.

Troops at the forefront, on the LAC and clustered around their existing concentrations, are uniformly troops who have been here for the minimum period of acclimatisation, six months at two different levels.

There has been an induction of additional troops, but they are still concentrated on their military bases, outside main Xijang towns and cities, undergoing acclimatisation.

If additional Chinese forces were inducted, why their buildup, move and assembly of all these forces were not detected in time? (akin to what IA 121 Brigade did in Kargil...as per Gen V P Malik......sending patrols on papers, giving All Ok to superiors until the infiltration was detected late, issue of Bajrang Post etc)

Two points - first, the newly inducted troops have not been deployed to the front; at the front are to be found only the regular formations (or their budli replacements) who have been accounted for already. This may be one reason why the sudden aggressive attitudes of the PLA GF had not been anticipated; no new troops were visible, nor was there an induction of new equipment, no signs of the light tanks, light-weight howitzers, or high-altitude utility helicopters that have been listed over the last five to seven days as being part of the intended inventory for any action on this front. Intended inventory, please note.

Second, the treatment of the Brigadier in question is extremely controversial; there are very knowledgeable people (obviously we are not talking of civilians here) who believe that he was made a scapegoat and cashiered in order to avert blame on his Corps commander, Lt.Gen. Pal, who did not show up well, as well as the Army Commander and the Chief himself (General Malik was away on a golfing holiday in Europe and didn't return even after it became known that there was some kind of crisis).

Present situation reminds me of 1962 again.....Chinese did the same, issue got internationalized, Indians are giving all the wrong signals to their audience, their audience is asking for action just like they asked for in 1962.....then in 1962 Chinese unilaterally withdrew WELL into their own area, showing to the world that they did all this without any military pressure from India, giving India no chance to prove their military might...

There are differences.

Unlike 62, there was no long-drawn out, protracted diplomatic engagement where the Chinese very carefully warned the Indian side that they meant business, and were treated with disdain by the Indian side. That was certainly not the case this time; there was utterly no warning of these impending confrontations.

I believe, and have been saying on various threads dedicated to these developments, that precisely the same will happen this time.

What is of grave concern, however, to the Indian side, is the presence of a Defence Minister who has no clue about what is going on, and generally seems to be going around in a perpetual daze, twitching into position as demanded by his colleagues, the Prime Minister and the Home Minister. While he does not have the infinite capacity to do harm that had Krishna Menon, our most dangerous Defence Minister so far, he is also a dull and unimaginative man, so the forces have reversed the terms of the fable, and exchanged King Stork for King Log.

On the military side, in place of the havoc caused by Biji Kaul, we have a breath of fresh air in Naravane, who is a soldiers' general. The trouble is that he is weaker today than Chiefs have been in the past, due to the looming presence of a Chief of Defence Staff at his shoulder.

We have to wait and see if these equations work out well.

The cacophony of fanboys and the hyper-patriot is much larger today than it was y'day. Therefore the pressure on the government is enormous; as has been said by a critic, the head of government has realised that what is appealing to the Indian public is the quality of acting decisive, not the quality of being decisive.

Another conclusion which can be drawn from the present crisis is that, like 1962, we may witness a massive permanent deployment of IA, a permanent inducted of regular forces in these areas.....which means addition infra (road and accommodation) are likely to come up....

The road making will continue and even increase.

The permanent re-deployment is not likely to happen.

In post 1962 time, this is exactly what was demanded by Indian critics, as to what Indians should have done in 1962...

Some more points raised by you will have to wait till tomorrow.
 
I don't see how your personal abuse wins any points or makes any reasonable point.

Where did I lie? Can you point to any instance? Repeating your own self-created delusions does not mean that someone who disagrees is lying; it simply means that you are delusional.



You do understand that you have just said that there is no change at the point of conflict, and that there is instead a new intrusion?

That does disprove your own point, or don't you understand what it means when you say, look at X and tell me how it changed, and are told it has not changed, and then reply, but Y has!

No, I don't get Chinese Go. I think these are just games that you play with yourselves to console yourselves.
Lolol... I will show you the whole stretch when it's ready..... Such simple minded people
 
Exactly, which brings us to some interesting questions needing answers....

Did the Chinese make these ingresses with forces already available at these locations (the minimum deployed) or did they pump in more to make these probes?

If additional Chinese forces were inducted, why their buildup, move and assembly of all these forces were not detected in time? (akin to what IA 121 Brigade did in Kargil...as per Gen V P Malik......sending patrols on papers, giving All Ok to superiors until the infiltration was detected late, issue of Bajrang Post etc)

Present situation reminds me of 1962 again.....Chinese did the same, issue got internationalized, Indians are giving all the wrong signals to their audience, their audience is asking for action just like they asked for in 1962.....then in 1962 Chinese unilaterally withdrew WELL into their own area, showing to the world that they did all this without any military pressure from India, giving India no chance to prove their military might...

Another conclusion which can be drawn from the present crisis is that, like 1962, we may witness a massive permanent deployment of IA, a permanent inducted of regular forces in these areas.....which means addition infra (road and accommodation) are likely to come up....



In post 1962 time, this is exactly what was demanded by Indian critics, as to what Indians should have done in 1962...
The infrastructure building on the Indian-Chinese border - both in Laddakh and in Arunachal Pradesh is likely to increase after this. The current infrastructure increase has helped the Army mobilize faster, it is very likely that there would be an increase in permanent troop deployment in the area.
 
There is a lot of third party information,including some dependent on garnering information from Chinese sources. There is no confirmation for these in authentic Indian sources; the views of media talking heads and their associates, superseded junior officers earning a living out of fanning jingoism, are not worth taking into account.

Troops at the forefront, on the LAC and clustered around their existing concentrations, are uniformly troops who have been here for the minimum period of acclimatisation, six months at two different levels.

There has been an induction of additional troops, but they are still concentrated on their military bases, outside main Xijang towns and cities, undergoing acclimatisation.



Two points - first, the newly inducted troops have not been deployed to the front; at the front are to be found only the regular formations (or their budli replacements) who have been accounted for already. This may be one reason why the sudden aggressive attitudes of the PLA GF had not been anticipated; no new troops were visible, nor was there an induction of new equipment, no signs of the light tanks, light-weight howitzers, or high-altitude utility helicopters that have been listed over the last five to seven days as being part of the intended inventory for any action on this front. Intended inventory, please note.

Second, the treatment of the Brigadier in question is extremely controversial; there are very knowledgeable people (obviously we are not talking of civilians here) who believe that he was made a scapegoat and cashiered in order to avert blame on his Corps commander, Lt.Gen. Pal, who did not show up well, as well as the Army Commander and the Chief himself (General Malik was away on a golfing holiday in Europe and didn't return even after it became known that there was some kind of crisis).



There are differences.

Unlike 62, there was no long-drawn out, protracted diplomatic engagement where the Chinese very carefully warned the Indian side that they meant business, and were treated with disdain by the Indian side. That was certainly not the case this time; there was utterly no warning of these impending confrontations.

I believe, and have been saying on various threads dedicated to these developments, that precisely the same will happen this time.

What is of grave concern, however, to the Indian side, is the presence of a Defence Minister who has no clue about what is going on, and generally seems to be going around in a perpetual daze, twitching into position as demanded by his colleagues, the Prime Minister and the Home Minister. While he does not have the infinite capacity to do harm that had Krishna Menon, our most dangerous Defence Minister so far, he is also a dull and unimaginative man, so the forces have reversed the terms of the fable, and exchanged King Stork for King Log.

On the military side, in place of the havoc caused by Biji Kaul, we have a breath of fresh air in Naravane, who is a soldiers' general. The trouble is that he is weaker today than Chiefs have been in the past, due to the looming presence of a Chief of Defence Staff at his shoulder.

We have to wait and see if these equations work out well.

The cacophony of fanboys and the hyper-patriot is much larger today than it was y'day. Therefore the pressure on the government is enormous; as has been said by a critic, the head of government has realised that what is appealing to the Indian public is the quality of acting decisive, not the quality of being decisive.



The road making will continue and even increase.

The permanent re-deployment is not likely to happen.



Some more points raised by you will have to wait till tomorrow.

A very good post - thank you for your honesty.

I just have one point, "permanent deployment" (yes or no) is not the Indian decision; this is being called out by China.
So! if Chinese stay there, you will have to stay ….. and winter months are going to cause more problems
 
A very good post - thank you for your honesty.

I just have one point, "permanent deployment" (yes or no) is not the Indian decision; this is being called out by China.
So! if Chinese stay there, you will have to stay ….. and winter months are going to cause more problems

So be it.

What is life without problems?

The infrastructure building on the Indian-Chinese border - both in Laddakh and in Arunachal Pradesh is likely to increase after this. The current infrastructure increase has helped the Army mobilize faster, it is very likely that there would be an increase in permanent troop deployment in the area.

It will increase by an order of magnitude. It is good for security; far, far more important, it follows Mao's dictum that development follows roads. We need to build these to develop those areas (in the north-east; in the Ladakh region, there are only the isolated villages near Leh to be considered, and those on the other fringe, on the Dras-Leh highway.
 
Thank Heaven we are simple minded. It must be stressful to be so full of guile and subterfuge as others seem to want to be.
Joe you just need to pay attention to the valleys, then you will find your answer, we are roughly halfway done with the new road.

Fuss ya phuss
پھس؟



RSS media says China backed out. Chinese media says China still out for blood. One of 2 is lieing. Given Indian media's reputation it ain't hard to guess.
China media said nothing but borders are stable and under control.
 
Joe you just need to pay attention to the valleys, then you will find your answer, we are roughly halfway done with the new road.

All I wish to say is that you should take a look around; there are many roads being built. It was Chairman Mao who said development follows roads.


China media said nothing but borders are stable and under control.
 
All I wish to say is that you should take a look around; there are many roads being built. It was Chairman Mao who said development follows roads.
It's deep inside Bhutan mate, and the only use is military. I hope you find out where it is.
 
This seems so awfully strange... Sun Tzu said “All warfare is based on deception”.

Would India hand over Ladakh for Kashmir? Could this be a ploy by India and China to get Pakistan to take over the rest of Kashmir?

Keep in mind these are just possibilities. But I warn that Pakistan should tread carefully and wait to see a fully committed Chinese military act before making any serious moves.
BS, have you seen the hatred Indians have for Chinese on Social Media? Not just on the Ministerial level, even the ordinary citizens of India have a deep-rooted hatred for anything Chinese. China would not betray Pakistan and especially not jeopardize the CPEC just for a small patch of land? There are many factors in hand that the Chinese are at this point with the Indians. You should also think about them being a poodle to the USA and trying to contain China, then trying to divert FDI to India, banning Huawei 5G, imposing an increase in the import duty on Chinese goods, boycotting Chinese goods, etc. They are simply behaving like a two-faced enemy. They think we don't know what they are up to.
 
It's deep inside Bhutan mate, and the only use is military. I hope you find out where it is.

You didn't get it, did you, no offence meant?

I'm not interested.

What's happening here is NOT about a road, or two roads. It's about two armed forces pushing each other, sometimes where they know there will be resistance, sometimes where they think there will be none. The idea is to keep the psychological upper hand, and to keep the other side worried about what happens next.

So far, China has played the game. If you take the trouble to read up on Indian military history, you will find the words 'strategic restraint' cropping up again and again. Further, you need to read up, on this forum itself, the contributions of @PanzerKiel on the Indian Army. It is not an Army that plays this game, because there was never any impulse from the civilian controllers to do so. Today things are different.

Today, we have a regrettable political party in power in India, and it matches the regrettable political party in power in China in terms of arrogance and desire to dominate. The equation has changed, because some coefficients have changed, and senior people, decision-making people in Beijing have realised it (it obviously and visibly hasn't percolated down: work that one out).

Today, with both Nathu La and Doklam behind us but yet between us, it is not necessary that every move made by one side should be symmetrically opposed by the other. Even the confrontation in Ladakh is something that is qualitatively different from previous incidents. It is true that the volatile section of the Indian population is out of control, and is putting pressure on the government and on the military, and this is a grave danger to the maintenance of the border, and to the planning of the military position. But notwithstanding this, the Indian Army is more level-headed than before, more experienced in mountain warfare, and better led than it has been for three or four years now. It is not needed to go after the minute details of roads built or being built for this one simple reason: we can build roads ourselves or deny the PLA GF the right to build those only when we have something to offer. {to be cont.}
 

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